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ABSTRACT
Guerrilla commanders Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Ethiopia’s Meles 
Zenawi seized power in 1986 and 1991. Both made press freedom a prominent 
and credible policy to differentiate themselves from their predecessors in 
seeking domestic and international support in their efforts to consolidate power. 
Nevertheless, each still presides over a highly centralized autocratic regime, 
with limited opportunities for political contenders to contest free and fair 
national elections. There are, however, important differences. In Uganda the 
press has remained vibrant and open despite 2006 election tensions, while in 
Ethiopia much of the private press was dramatically closed after the 2005 
electoral contests. Why the press has evolved differently in Ethiopia than in 
Uganda and what the role of the press has been under the current systems are 
core questions to be addressed in this research. In neither country can the media 
be studied separately from politics. The analytic framework of the thesis 
therefore highlights four key political variables, as well as four key media 
variables. The selected media variables are: the polarisation of the press; 
ideologies of journalists; institutionalisation o f the press; and government 
interventions:; and the selected political variables are: the ideology o f the 
liberation movement; the process of state construction and the consolidation of 
power:; reconciliation, trust and confidence building; and international 
dimensions. Each case study also includes a brief history highlighting the 
differences in the earlier development of the press in Ethiopia and Uganda. 
Because of the dearth of existing literature, the thesis has built on comparative 
literature from other regions and has relied on extensive field research, 
including semi-structured interviews and oral histories with key political and 
media actors for what is one of the first substantial pieces of research examining 
the press in contemporary Ethiopia and Uganda. The argument that emerges 
from this analysis is that the press can play an important role in building peace, 
encouraging reconciliation and facilitating dialogue in the aftermath of civil 
wars. It primarily does so through providing a space for different elite factions 
to negotiate power, reconcile competing versions of history and build a common 
national vision. This process has developed differently in Ethiopia and Uganda 
and accounts for some current discrepancies in their political and press systems.
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NOTE:
The Ethiopian calendar begins 11 September and is seven years behind the Gregorian 
calendar until 31 December. After this date it is eight years behind. I have referred to 
dates as documented- i.e. for Amharic newspapers the date will be as provided with 
(EC) for Ethiopian Calendar. All other dates unless noted otherwise are in the 
Gregorian calendar.
I have used the popular form for spelling Amharic and Tigrayan words in English 
rather than transliteration. In addition, Ethiopians do not go by family names but 
rather their given names so I have used this name as the primary name.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Kassahun Addis for the translation of 
articles and documents. I am also grateful to Press Digest and Seven Days Update, 
which translate selected articles from the papers into English on a weekly basis, and 
for the editors for allowing me access to their archives.
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CHAPTER 1 
Comparing Media Systems:
Ethiopia and Uganda
This is a thesis about nation-building and the role of the press. It focuses on 
Ethiopia and Uganda and asks why, in each country, the press has developed the way it has. 
While much has been written about the role of the press in nation-building since the 1950s, 
very little deals with the contemporary challenges facing troubled African states and there 
has been even less on Africa that is comparative for theory building and deciding difficult 
media policy.
My research explores the political and media system factors that contributed to the 
reversal of media freedoms in Ethiopia but not in Uganda. For countries whose political 
leaders are often described as similar, they reacted differently to comparable political 
challenges in the same period and international environment. The press after Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi successfully seized power in Ethiopia in 19911 became deeply polarized but 
the same did not happen after President Yoweri Museveni forcibly took charge of Uganda in 
1986.
Both leaders led successful guerrilla wars that defeated African dictatorships and 
since coming to power they have instituted ambitious political projects that have prioritised 
consolidating the power of their leadership and respective parties. This has also included 
some democratic reforms. In Ethiopia the process of change is referred to as ‘Revolutionary 
Democracy’ while in Uganda it is known as the ‘Movement’. With the end of the Cold War 
and a shift in US and Soviet policy towards the continent, both leaders were hailed by 
international supporters as ‘agents of change’ who would bring peace to ethnically diverse 
and war ravaged populations along with a broader African Renaissance. Together, with 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Prime Minister Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea, they were 
seen as indicative of a larger trend that has at times included South African leader Thabo
1 Prime Minister Meles was the Interim President until he was elected Prime Minister in 1995.
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Mbeki, Joachim Chissano from Mozambique and the former Ghanaian President Jerry 
Rawlings.2 These leaders, it was argued, were committed to changing the lives of 
their people and were applying state and nation-building3 strategies that were 
appropriate for their particular contexts.
US President Bill Clinton and his Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, 
popularized the notion of a new generation of African leaders in the late 1990s and 
while neither publicly listed the leaders who were part of this group, Albright visited 
Ethiopia and Uganda in 1997 and Clinton followed with a visit to Kampala in 1998 in 
which he praised both Meles and Museveni. Academics also endorsed the notion of 
‘new leaders,’4 as did foreign affairs commentators and the international media, 
though not without critics.5
Before long international disenchantment with these leaders became evident, 
notably in the US journal Foreign Affairs. In 1998 an article entitled ‘Africa’s New 
Bloc’ argued that these leaders are “coalescing into a new political and military bloc”
2 OTTAWAY, M. (1999) Africa's New Leaders, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment.
3 The difference between nation-building and state-building is often muddled, particularly in post-war 
situations where both processes are often occurring. There is a rich and nuanced literature on ‘failed 
states’ or ‘crisis states’ in Africa that addresses the state and nationbuilding debates (See: 
FUKUYAMA, F. (2004) State Building, London, Profile, ROTBERG, R. (2003) When States Fail: 
Causes and Consequences, Princeton, Princeton University Press.). It is, however, important to note 
that both nation and state-building are central to the political projects and the role of the media in 
Ethiopia and Uganda. Generally accepted definitions are offered by the authors of State-Building, 
Nation-Building and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and 
an Appraisal of Different Approachs, when they note “State-building means the establishment, re­
establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public 
goods. Essential to state-building is the creation of sovereign capacities of which the fundamental one 
is the successful and generally undisputed claim to a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force’” (p. 583). In contrast, “Nation-building is the most common form of a process of collective 
identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory. This is an 
essentially indigenous process which often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on 
existing traditions,institutions, and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to 
support the nation’s claim to sovereignty and uniqueness. A successful nation-building process 
produces a cultural projection of the nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs 
which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state structure.” (p. 586). BOGDANDY, A. V., 
HAUSSLE, S., HANSCHMANN, F. & UTZ, R. (2005) State-Building, Nation-Building, and 
Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of 
Different Approaches. IN BOGDANDY, A. V. & WOLFRUM, R. (Eds.) Max Plank Yearbook o f  
United Nations Law..
4 OTTAWAY, M. (1999) Africa's New Leaders, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment.
5 ONYANGO-OBBO, C. (2004) Seeking Balance in a Continent Portrayed By Its Extremes. Nieman 
Reports, 58,6-8.
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and they “share the goal of ending the cronyism and instability”.6 In 2000, in ‘Ending 
Africa’s Wars’ it was argued that these leaders had clay feet suggesting that they 
might not be the purveyors of peace as expected particularly since “currently all four 
“partners” are at war”.7 And in 2007 ‘Blowing the Horn’ dramatically, but correctly, 
contended that the greater Horn, including Uganda, is “the hottest conflict zone in the 
world” and suggested that these leaders have not been held to account by Western 
states which “are like barking dogs with no bite”.8
Meles and Museveni have ruled for nearly a generation and their record of 
governance offers opportunities for research into the nation-building process, which is 
complex and incomplete in both Ethiopia and Uganda, although current developments 
suggest that the Ethiopian state is in a significantly more precarious situation at risk of 
continued conflict and possible disintegration. The press under these leaders has both 
contributed to, and provides insight into, the dynamics of the political processes and 
experiments underway. Initially, both leaders made media freedoms a central part of 
their governments’ new political agendas where citizens and journalists enjoyed 
unprecedented access to diverse media outlets. The situation, however, has evolved 
differently both politically and for the press in the two countries.
On 15 May 2005, Ethiopia experienced the most democratic elections in the 
country’s long history. The media and the opposition enjoyed extensive freedoms 
during the campaign period and voting day was relatively free and fair. The following 
day, as preliminary results from the election suggesting unexpected and 
unprecedented gains for the opposition parties became clear, the situation for the 
press and opposition parties began to change. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared 
a state of emergency on May 16 while the opposition parties claimed widespread vote 
rigging. Due to extensive complaints of irregularities, the National Election Board 
(NEB) delayed the official announcement of the election results.
Despite a government ban on protests, discontent towards the ruling Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party grew, particularly in the
6 CONNELL, D. & SMYTH, F. (1988) Africa's New Bloc. Foreign Affairs, 77, 80-94. p.82.
7 STREMLAU, J. (2000) Ending Africa's Wars. Ibid.79,117- 132.p.l24.
8 PRENDERGAST, J. & THOMAS-JENSEN, C. (2007) Blowing the Horn. Ibid.86,59-74. p.71.
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cities where many of the opposition supporters were. On June 8, the original day the 
official results were to be publicised, government troops and the federal police 
opened fire on large gatherings in the Merkato and Piazza areas of Addis Ababa 
killing dozens of people and arresting hundreds of students.9 In the months that 
followed, opposition leaders were placed under house arrest and reports were made of 
widespread persecution and arrests of suspected opposition supporters. In November 
the situation violently exploded again with dozens more killed during protests and 
tens of thousands arrested. Government troops could be seen going door to door in 
Addis arresting young men indiscriminately. While the exact numbers are not known, 
an October 2006 internal enquiry of the Ethiopian government was leaked and 
suggested that 193 civilians and six policemen had been killed, over 700 people
Movement (NRM) led by President Yoweri Museveni with 59% of the vote in the 
February 23, 2006 elections.11 The media played a key role in the political debate in 
the periods before, during and after the election. With two main newspaper groups, 
one of which is government-leaning but widely respected, and over 100 local radio 
stations, the candidates received wide and diverse coverage.
The election period was tense and marred by some violence but was 
significantly more peaceful than Ethiopia’s. The election was controversial from the 
beginning as Museveni changed the constitution removing the two-term limit to 
enable him to compete, causing both national and international condemnation. In the 
run-up to the elections, Kizza Besigye was arrested in November on charges of 
treason, relating to links with the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda 
and alleged rape involving a family friend. The arrest of Besigye led to riots in 
Kampala by supporters who believed that the charges were levied to prevent him 
from contesting the elections. One rioter was shot dead by police.12
There were several instances of the NRM government shutting down 
particular media outlets temporarily, putting forward charges against journalists and 
not allowing international journalists complete access to the country. Nevertheless, 
Uganda today continues to enjoy over 100 private radio stations, as well a variety of 
television stations and papers. The media are widely considered vibrant and open.
Uganda provides a contrasting history to that of Ethiopia, but there are 
sufficient similarities that the pairing lends itself to useful comparative study of the 
question posed at the beginning of this thesis: Why has the press developed the way 
it has? And how, in each context, has it contributed to the nation-building process 
and, vice-versa, what has been the role of the state in shaping the press system?
1. Comparative case studies: Ethiopia and Uganda
It is difficult to find answers to these questions in the existing literature. Africa 
has long been neglected in academia and even more so in studies relating to the
11 26 February 2006 , “Ugandans relieved at calm poll”.
A vailable at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/4753238.stm .
12 15 November 2005, “Uganda police shoot rioter dead”.
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/4438090.stm .
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media. In particular, there is very little work that probes into the complex relationship 
between the media and the state or seeks to understand why the press has evolved the 
way it has in Ethiopia and Uganda.
Much of the current information available looks at the media either from a 
normative perspective of how free or un-free the media are compared to Europe or 
North America or from a descriptive assessment of how many radio stations and 
newspapers exist. While both of these dominant approaches purport to provide insight 
into the media within these countries, such indicators provide little understanding of 
what journalists are doing in these places and why, and similarly how the state and 
political sphere has actively been intervening to shape the media system. In media 
freedom rankings generated and publicized by advocacy groups politics is 
exogenous. For Ethiopia and Uganda, countries emerging from conflict and still 
struggling to resolve internal and external tensions, understanding the press is equally 
a process of understanding the political space where issues such as reconciliation,13 
trust-building and the negotiation of political power, particularly among elites, are 
key factors.
Since comparing case studies allows researchers to identify factors and 
variables that they might have overlooked, a goal of this thesis is to offer an 
alternative comparative framework of analysis to provide greater insights into press 
systems in complex conflict/post-conflict environments. Explanatory variables can be 
deduced and illuminate greater systematic understanding of the above stated research 
uestions. Since little scholarship exists comparing A frjcam afidia—
Ethiopia and Uganda both fall into the undesirable category that Paul Collier 
has labeled “the bottom billion”.14 While many of the world’s developing countries 
have conditions that are steadily improving, Ethiopia and Uganda are among those 
where the situation is worsening and conventional international interventions have 
been ineffective. Collier lists four "traps" that countries in the "bottom billion" can 
fall into. Although neither Uganda nor Ethiopa have had to overcome the trap of vast 
mineral wealth, to varying degrees they have had to grapple with the other three. 
Both have experienced large-scale deadly internal conflicts, they have histories 
of poor governance under autocratic rulers and they are land-locked with bad 
neighbors. Ethiopia's Horn of Africa neighborhood is in perpetual turmoil and 
Uganda is next to the crisis-ridden Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The two countries have significant demographic differences.15 Ethiopia is the 
most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and has a population close 
to 77 million while Uganda has less than half that with around 30 million people. The 
GDP per capita of Uganda is almost double that of Ethiopia at 1,900 USD while in 
Ethiopia GDP is 1000 USD. In Uganda there is a higher literacy rate with 66.8 
percent of the population able to read while in Ethiopia only 42.7 percent is literate. 
At the same time there are many similarities. The structure of the labour force is 
relatively similar in both countries with approximately 80 percent of the population 
engaged in agriculture and 12 percent in services and the remainder in industry. 
Poverty rates are also similar with roughly 36 percent of the population in both 
countries living under the poverty line. Ethiopia’s substantially larger population 
mediates some of the larger disparities where Uganda seems to be a bit further ahead 
such as in the rate of literacy. In Ethiopia, for example, there are approximaftely 32 
million people who can read and 20 million in Uganda - an absolute number which 
has a narrower gap than the disparity between the percentages of literate persons.16
l4COLLIER, P. (2007) The Bottom Billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done 
about it, New York, Oxford University Press.
15 All data in this section comes from the Central Intelligence World Fact Book on Ethiopia and 
Uganda, https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html and 
https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html. Accessed on 15 November 
2007.
16 Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the significant language differences as most literate 
Ugandans read English, thus connecting them to the more global outlets o f news and literature whilst 
for most Ethiopians they are more likely to read Amharic which is far more limiting.
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1.1 Politics
While managing differences and similarities in comparisons is always 
complex, there are important historical, societal and political differences that make 
this study perhaps even more interesting whilst at the same time slightly more 
complicated. Uganda was a British protectorate (which made British intervention less 
intense than if it were an actual colony as Kenya was) that was formed through the 
integration of regional chiefdoms and territories. There are three major ethnic groups 
in Uganda: Bantu, Nilotic and Central Sudanic. The Bantu are the most numerous 
and include the Baganda and the Banyankole from the Southwestern area.17 
Residents of the north are largely Nilotic and comprise the next largest group.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, has more often been a colonising than colonised 
state.18 It was occupied by a western power, Italy, for only a short period, between 
1936 and 1941. Ethiopia is one of the oldest states and historians often trace the 
modem nation to the arrival of Sabaeans around 800 BC. Today the state is highly 
diverse with over 82 languages. The Oromo, who in the past served as slaves for the 
highlanders, are the largest ethnic group with 32%. The Amhara, the traditional 
rulers, represent 30% while Meles’group, the Tigrayans, are 6% of the population.
The NRM and TPLF liberation struggles have Marxist roots and when they 
came to power both implemented some version of federalist governance partly to 
address the complexities of having such multi-ethnic populations. The Ethiopian 
federalist constitution is more ambitious and devolved power to regional states to the 
point of self-determination up to secession. Since Eritrea’s secession, however, the 
devolution of power has been more in theory than in practice. Nevertheless, regional 
states have autonomous governments, which are considered, in principle, to be equal 
to the federal government. The Ugandan federalist system differs in that it consists of 
two levels of government each of which controls the same territory and citizens. 
Regional governments are responsible for more local issues while the national 
government addresses larger issues. The underlying rational for these systems was 
different: in the case of Ethiopia it was to address complex issues of power and ethnic
17 President Museveni is from the Southwest.
18 HOLCOMB, B. K. & IBSSA, S. (1990) The Invention o f Ethiopia, Trenton, Red Sea Press.
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relations, whilst in Uganda it was seen as a means of engaging people at the local 
level and increasing their stake in the political process.
The differing approaches to federalism are also indicative of divergent 
approaches towards the state and ethnic communities. Ethiopia has granted ethnic 
communities full rights (in theory though not in practice), but Uganda’s strategy has 
been to encourage ethnic sentiments to be expressed through cultural loyalties.19 As 
will be explained later, these policies have been reflected in the press.
1.2 Wars and transitions
Ethiopia and Uganda are often described as ‘transitioning’ or ‘post-conflict’ 
but neither term is accurate. For the purposes of locating the countries within a 
comparative context, in 1994 the countries were both categorised in Bratton and Van 
de Walle’s typology “Transitions Outcomes, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1994” as ‘flawed 
transitions’ (as opposed to ‘precluded transitions’, ‘blocked transitions’ or 
‘democratic transitions’).20 Similarly, in 2007 both Ethiopia and Uganda were ranked 
as ‘partly-free’ by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report.21 Although they 
may be ‘transitioning’, as the term is often employed it suggests that they are on a 
particular trajectory towards democracy. Just as ranking countries according to how 
‘free’ or ‘un-free’ their press is can obscure serious analysis of the complex political 
and media systems, similar rankings of how ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’ countries 
are can also cloud the bigger picture and imply inaccurate assumptions of democratic 
processes that these countries are “somehow on the road to democracy and that they 
have simply been stalled or delayed”.22 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to predict 
future political developments, and current evidence of political reform is 
inconclusive; at present, however, neither Meles nor Museveni could be called 
democrats but they also have both delivered the most open system that some of their 
people have enjoyed in generations.
19 YOUNG, C. (2001) Uganda under Museveni. African Studies Review, Vol. 44, No. 2,207-210.
20 BRATTON, M. & WALLE, N. V. D. (1994) Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa. World Politics, 46,453-89.
21 FREEDOM HOUSE (2007) Freedom of the Press 2007: A Global Survey o f Media Independence, 
Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
22 HERBST, J. (2001) Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years. Comparative Politics, 33, 357- 
74. pp. 358-359.
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While the EPRDF and NRM have brought peace they have not brought an end 
to violent conflicts both internally and with their neighbours. The use of violence has 
been a clear strategy on the part of both parties as a tool for the consolidation of 
power. In Uganda, a major war in the North with the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) 
has raged with no resolution for the past twenty years suggesting that the NRM has 
the power to stop it but has rather chosen to prolong the violence for political and 
financial benefit. On the international front, Uganda has also been involved in a 
controversial war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and previously in 
the war in Rwanda. Ethiopia has been involved in more violent conflicts. Since the 
EPRDF came to power, there have been a number of ongoing secessionist and 
liberation movements fighting the central government. Ethiopia recently intervened in 
Somalia
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ONLF fighters and government troops are currently engaged in combat. Ethiopia and 
Eritrea also fought the bloodiest conventional war of the late twentieth century over
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access and listening at least occasionally. Government owned and run Uganda 
Broadcasting Corporation has the largest reach and broadcasts in several local 
languages. Television penetration is substantially lower: according to the 2002 census 
only 4.5 percent of the population own televisions sets. Apart from the government 
UBC television station there are a number of private stations. The New Vision and the 
Monitor24 are the two dominant newspapers and are published daily; The New Vision 
leads with an estimated daily circulation at 35,000 while the Daily M onitor is around 
20,000. The Sunday Vision, which is the Sunday edition of The New Vision, has the 
largest circulation of any paper with 40,000. Local language papers are also popular 
and Bukedde, owned by The New Vision, has a daily circulation of around 15,000.26
Radio and newspaper penetration is lower in Ethiopia where approximately
19.6 percent of the population owns a radio. It has only been within the past year that 
the government licensed private radio stations, and the two stations licensed so far are 
both aligned with the government. Television is limited to the government 
programming and only around 0.6 percent of households have television sets27 (with
2.8 percent of the population having access to TV) and are primarily in urban areas. 
For over a decade newspapers have been the sole independent media outlet apart from 
the vibrant web-based magazines and blogs, which are largely run by members of the 
diaspora. Most of the papers remain weekly. Two of the three dailies are government 
owned while the other, The Daily Monitor, is not overly political and largely compiles 
reports from the government and wire services. Prior to the elections there were many 
weekly papers. During the elections, their circulation often doubled or tripled - at 
points reaching 90,000 - and some papers would publish almost daily. Sustained 
circulation for publications varies. At present Addis Admass, published in Amharic,
24 Over the years the Monitor changed its name to Daily Monitor and Sunday Monitor. To avoid 
confusion and for the purpose of this thesis I will simply refer to the paper with its original founding 
title, the Monitor.
25 As across much o f Africa one newspaper copy is usually read by a number of people.
26 World Newspapers Association (WNA) (2003) Circulation: A ‘visionary’ approach to boost sales in 
Uganda. Available at: http://www.rap21 .org/article 18817.html. Accessed on 23 January 2007.
27 Abebe Chekol, “Ethiopian Free and Open Source Software Network”. Available at: 
http://www.globaliswatch.org/en/node/460. Accessed on 3 February 2007.
28UNESCA “Ethiopia, NICI Infrastructure”. Available at:
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/countrv profiles/ethiopia/ethioinfra.htm. Accessed on 3 February 2007.
has the highest circulation, around 40,000 copies, while the Amharic Reporter and 
English Fortune are around 5,000.29
Linguistically, Ethiopia is far more diverse than Uganda. While this thesis is 
focused on elites and their role in the press and politics, in Uganda where English is 
more widely used the population has greater access to the international media and the 
English press has a broader readership across the country. In Ethiopia, the press 
remains limited to urban areas, and primarily the Amharic and English speaking 
population. Nevertheless, the press in both countries, as this thesis will argue, is 
highly influential in the nation-building and political process.
There are, of course, numerous potential explanations to account for the 
differences of media systems. Cultural attitudes towards the press, reading habits, 
historical perceptions of newspapers, expendable income, costs of reading papers 
(both direct and indirect), and language, etc., could all be considered but are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. The factors to be highlighted within these cases will 
illuminate the characteristics that are particularly influential in answering the research 
questions posed and will focus on the complex relations between the media and 
political system.
2. Elites and the press
The press is the focus of this research for reasons particular to poor countries 
in Africa. In Ethiopia and Uganda, I argue during the course of this thesis that the 
press, however it is characterised in terms of being "free and independent," has served 
as an important forum for processes of elite negotiation of political power, 
reconciliation, historical consensus and envisioning the future of the country. I am 
skeptical of some of the broad-based claims linking a free press alone with good 
governance and economic development without including the functions of 
negotiation I have just described. Later, I will look at accountability, in its broad and 
narrow meaning and its links to the status of the press in society. There are certainly
29 Statistics, Ethiopian Ministry of Information, Addis Ababa. Personal communication.
30 WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (Ed.) (2002) The Right To Tell: The Role o f  the Mass 
Media in Economic Development, Washington DC.
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select examples of instances where the press does promote accountability,31 but the 
salience must be examined. There is also not a consensus from Africans themselves
32that the press matters in this way. More audience research is required to fully 
investigate these arguments. The claims of accountability will be explored in greater 
depth in Chapter 2 during a review of the mainstream literature.
In addition, Ethiopia and Uganda as ‘bottom billion’ countries face different 
challenges in the media environment than some of their developing country 
counterparts, or even those ‘bottom billion’ countries which are not post-conflict. 
This, I argue, makes the traditional press particularly relevant in nation-building. 
While South Africa, Mauritius and their neighbours in North Africa may be flooded 
with the competitors of foreign media outlets, particularly satellite television, such 
competition matters far less in countries with small middle classes and restricted 
outlets for reception. Thus while new media may challenge state power and national 
sovereignty for many countries, it matters far less for poor African countries which 
may not have the markets, infrastructure or the businesses to be wholly part of the 
new system.33
Independent radio stations are transforming the media landscape across much 
of Africa in interesting ways and the importance o f this is undeniable. This is 
particularly true for some countries with high rates of illiteracy.34. But when the 
NRM and EPRDF came to power, this transformation had not occurred and even 
now, Ethiopia has been excluded from this trend. Since this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the transition from guerrilla war to the present government, it is the 
press that is the focus of this analysis. And more contemporaneously, national news 
still matters and the press continues to be the principle medium in generating this. In 
Ethiopia and Uganda after the civil wars it has been the newspapers that have the 
resources for original investigative reporting and it is the newspapers that set the
31 BESLEY, T. & BURGESS, R. (2002) The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: 
Theory and Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, 1415-52. COLLIER, P. (2007) The 
Bottom Billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it, New York, 
Oxford University Press.
32 AFROB AROMETER (2003) Freedom of Speech, Media Exposure, and the Defense o f a Free Press 
in Africa. Afrobarometer Briefing Paper. 10 December 2007, World ‘divided’ on press freedom. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/in depth/7134918.stm.
33 PRICE, M. E. (2002) Media and Sovereignty, Cambridge, MIT.
34 FARDON, R. & FURNISS, G. (Eds.) (2000) African Broadcast Cultures, Oxford, James Currey.
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agenda and largely continue to do so to this day. In Uganda, for example, where there 
are over one hundred radios stations and radio talk shows are growing in importance 
as forums for dialogues with the masses,35 radio stations can still seldom afford to 
have their own correspondents but rather rely on the dailies for the news. They often 
take the material from the newspapers and either read it out verbatim, summarize it or 
sometimes translate it into local languages for particular radio programmes. Thus 
while radios may spread the message the fastest, it is the print journalists who are 
most often setting and defining that message.
Charles Onyango-Obbo, a founding editor of the Monitor newspaper in
Uganda, argued that in his country it is the print media that really matters because:
In print you have the policy debate. In Africa you cannot have policy debates 
in any sensible way in the broadcast media. For call-in shows in Uganda and 
a lot of Africa their function is for people to vent. People go home after they 
have vented. They don’t actually call so their point of view can form the 
basis of government action but they call spur-of-the-moment. It is not 
recorded. But the people that write in the media are very meticulous, they do 
their research, it is the intellectual forum.36
The press, as Onyango-Obbo implied, remains the realm of the intellectuals and 
elites. Print journalists in Ethiopia and Uganda have also had substantially more 
freedoms than their electronic counterparts and were very active during and post­
liberation transitions. Thus this research builds upon the experience of the press as a 
forum, both effectively and ineffectively utilised, for the negotiation of power 
between different factions, elites and, importantly (and often overlooked), the 
government.
African studies has long been interested in the influence of ‘personal rule’ or 
the role of a few key individuals (elites) to affect change in politics37 and more recent 
studies have been looking at the role of elites in shaping democratic consolidation or 
transitions.38 Villalon and VonDoepp, for example, focus on several case studies of
35 MWESIGE, P. G. (2004) "Can You Hear Me Now?": Radio Talk Shows and Political Participation 
in Uganda. Communication. Indiana University.
36 Interview: Charles Onyango-Obbo.
37 JACKSON, R. & ROSBERG, C. (1982) Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prophet, Autocrat, Prophet, 
Tyrant, Berkley, University of California Press.
38 VILLALON, L. A. & VONDOEPP, P. (Eds.) (2005) The Fate o f Africa's Democratic Experiments: 
Elites and Institutions, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.
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countries that have been the most successful in transitioning to democracy, and argue 
that it is key politicians (governing and opposition) that have shaped democratic rule.
A major issue to be explored throughout this thesis is the contrasting ways 
elites in Ethiopia and Uganda have used the press. This also provides some insight 
into why papers were either tolerated or forced to close by the government. In 
Ethiopia, the press has largely been used by elites to argue for alternative visions of 
what the Ethiopian nation should be. The press came to reflect some fundamental 
disagreements about key policies, including the new constitution, that the EPRDF was 
implementing. In Uganda, the press was sympathetic to the NRMs nationbuilding 
project and was more critical about its implementation rather than the movement 
system itself. In both Ethiopia and Uganda, where the commitment to multi-party 
politics is questionable, journalists have emerged as an important section of elites and 
as individual political players.
There has been some research into the effects of the press compared with 
other mediums. For example, a recent study by the Afrobarometer suggests that 
newspaper readership, in comparison with other media, is the most important medium 
for cultivating democratic attitudes and practices.39 It also proves to be the most 
significant motivator in reinforcing popular commitments to free speech, the 
emergence of opinion leadership, the reduction of political fear, and open criticism of 
national broadcasters’.40 Such studies on the influence of the media on audiences have 
also indicated that the printed word is commonly regarded as more legitimate and 
truthful partly because one can go back and refer to something in print. This 
argument was corroborated in a number of interviews during field research, 
particularly in Ethiopia where significant value is placed on the written word and it is 
often believed that to be true, things have to be written down.
Focusing on the print media also has benefits for conducting research. As the 
press has been and continues to be the freest medium, there is the greatest space for 
allowing research into understanding how the media may be used as a tool in the 
nation-building process. The printed press is also an important record of history, and
39 AFROBAROMETER (2003) Freedom of Speech, Media Exposure, and the Defense of a Free Press 
in Africa. Afrobarometer Briefing Paper.
40 TEMIN, J. & SMITH, D. (2000) Media Matters: Evaluating the Role of the Media in Ghana's 2000 
Elections. African Affairs, 101.
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for some countries that have less of a tradition, or scarce financing, for academic 
scholarship, this is a very valuable and important source of documentation. It also 
gives researchers the added opportunity to take an historical perspective and is the 
easiest medium to verify. The stories told by journalists were inevitably the stories of 
the press in their societies. Some of what they say can be corroborated and the work 
that they do is also available for examination and further study. In both Ethiopia and 
Uganda, I found that the press reporting of the press itself (or of the media in general) 
gave the richest perspective of the media environment, albeit sometimes with a self- 
interested bias.
In addition, much of the literature on comparative media systems and on the 
media in poor countries has focused on the press. As Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 
state in the first paragraph of Four Theories of the Press, “by press, in this book, we 
mean all the media of mass communication, although we shall talk about the printed 
media oftener than about broadcast or film because the printed media are older and 
have gathered about them more of the theory and philosophy of mass 
communication”.41 For the above reasons and since this thesis also tries to address 
the major research challenges put forward by such authors, limiting the present study 
to the press in Ethiopia and Uganda seems a natural starting point.
3. Key political and media variables
As there is little literature on comparing African media systems, or on 
comparing media systems in poor countries, this thesis will have to draw on broader 
literature. The differences in the development of the press systems in Ethiopia and 
Uganda, for example, are very much at the heart of the research questions Siebert, 
Peterson, and Schramm posed in Four Theories of the Press in 1956. In this 
international communications text, the authors asked, “in the simplest terms, the 
question behind this book is, why is the press as it is? Why does it apparently serve 
different purposes in widely different forms in different countries?”42 In the past fifty
41 SIEBERT, F., PETERSON, T. & SCHRAMM, W. (1956) Four Theories o f the Press, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, p .l.
42 Ibid. p. 1.
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years, there has been little progress in addressing these questions and even less so in 
relation to the press in Africa.
This central question, which most recently Hallin and Mancini in Comparing 
Media Systems attempted to revisit, gets at core questions in the relationship between 
media systems and political systems.43 It probes variations in the structure and the 
political role of the news media and asks why these variations occur. While their 
work is Western-centric, the texts of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm or of Hallin and 
Mancini suggest key questions and possible experiences of devising analytical 
frameworks for understanding the relation between politics and the press in Africa.
The strength and applicability of Hallin and Mancini’s work lies not in the 
typologies or models they define but in the analytical process, of both political and 
media factors, that led to their argument. While the political and media variables they 
identified are helpful in understanding why the media in North America and Western 
Europe “are the way they are”, they do not directly correspond to the conflict/post­
conflict situation in Eastern Africa. Thus new, more context appropriate, variables 
have been developed for the purpose of this thesis. The media variables include: the 
polarisation of the press; ideologies o f journalists; institutionalisation of the press; 
and government interventions. The political variables include: the ideology o f the 
liberation movement; the process of state construction and the consolidation of 
power; reconciliation, trust and confidence building; and international dimensions. 
Together, these variables provide important context, are imperative for understanding 
the press and political environment and to allow for an effective case study 
comparison they will provide structure for specific chapters. The variables will be 
elaborated, including the rational for their selection, in Chapter 2.
These variables will be employed within an historical context and case study 
perspective. For both Ethiopia and Uganda, the history of the press is briefly traced to 
locate particular influences and developments. In the case of Uganda, the growth of 
the two major newspapers, the Monitor and The New Vision, are explored while in 
Ethiopia three newspapers, namely The Ethiopian Herald, The Reporter and Tobiya 
(which after an internal split became Lisane Hezeb) are analysed. The papers have
43 HALLIN, D. & MANCINI, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press.
27
been selected as representatives of dominant and particular perspectives. In Ethiopia, 
for example, there are three such categories: strongly pro-government, ‘gray zone’ 
but government leaning, and strongly anti-government. In Uganda, there are two 
main categories: government leaning and opposition leaning. There are other papers 
that fall in between these categories but they have generally been less influential. 
These papers can be represented along the flowing lines where the far left side 
represents strongly pro-government and the far right side represents strongly anti- 
government publications. It is also important to note that by no means should these 
publications be considered as located in static categories. The model below is a 
snapshot and indicative of general placement of the papers under the NRM and 
EPRDF. As will be elaborated in the coming chapters, for example, the Monitor has 
been moving to the left, as has The Reporter.
UGANDA
The New Vision The Monitor
ETHIOPIA
The Ethiopian The Reporter Tobiya/ Lisane
Herald Hezeb
H------------- 1----------- 0--------------------- 1—
Looking closely at the development and agenda of these particular papers during the 
period since the NRM and EPRDF provides insight into their role in the political 
processes and their contribution to society.
4. Field research
The methodology employed to answer the research questions is 
multidimensional and different tools have been used to show the complex 
international, political and media dynamics at play. At times in this dissertation I will 
write in the first person. This is partly because of the nature of the research and the 
difficulty of taking the researcher out of the context since I was often an active 
participant as the data was collected.
This research builds upon previous work experience in 2001-2002 in Addis 
Ababa at The Reporter newspaper. During this period I wrote the weekly features 
article and I also spent time working at a weekly entertainment newspaper. The year 
spent writing for the media in Ethiopia was for providing contacts in an environment 
that is often distrustful and difficult to penetrate quickly.
Formal data collection for this thesis began during the East African 
Fellowship Programme organised with the Stanhope Centre for Communications 
Policy Research and the LSE’s Crisis States Programme in 2005. Fourteen journalists 
from seven Eastern African countries (including Ethiopia, Somaliland, Uganda, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Sudan) spent six weeks studying politics and 
economics in London. There was a week follow-up meeting in Addis where we 
looked at issues relating to the region and the African Union.44 A subsequent meeting 
was organised by the Fellows in Khartoum, Sudan as part of the newly established 
Eastern African Professional Journalists Association. Throughout the programme in 
London I led regular focus groups with seven participants at a time. We would 
discuss a particular issue related to the media in the region for an hour. These semi­
structured focused group discussions and the comprehensive notes have been very 
important in providing data early on in the research. It also provided a basis for 
employing a comparative methodology.
An outgrowth of the East African Fellowship Programme has been the 
research and writing of a book on Oral Histories of Eastern African Editors that I
44 This project also grew out of my experience working for The Reporter in Addis. There was an 
abundance o f short training programmes- either very issue specific (HIV/AIDS) or basic training. 
There was very little opportunity for journalists to learn to contextualise and think critically about the 
issues they were covering.
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have been pursuing simultaneously with my thesis research. More then 30 in-depth 
interviews with the most prominent journalists and editors in the seven countries 
represented in the fellowship programme have been collected and transcribed. This 
research seeks to address what the role of journalists is in war and guerrilla 
movements as well as post-war transitions, including how they often perceive their 
work in different ways from journalists in the West. While some of the material and 
data collected during this research is applicable to my thesis, the book of oral histories 
diverges in a number of ways, including methodology, scope and the use of 
theoretical frameworks. Since my thesis focuses on Ethiopia and Uganda, the oral 
histories project has also allowed me to bring in the experiences of other countries in 
the region. The research for this work was carried out between January and August 
2006 through research trips to neighbouring countries while I was based in Ethiopia.
The majority of the data included in this thesis comes from over 150 semi­
structured interviews carried out in Ethiopia and Uganda (or, as in the cases of some 
informants from both Ethiopia and Uganda, in Kenya) and a number of oral histories. 
For sixteen months I used Ethiopia as my base and spent substantial time researching 
in Uganda, among other places. Given local political events in Ethiopia and the 
culture of secrecy I found it significantly more difficult to establish contacts and get 
reliable information than in Uganda, which thus necessitated much more intensive 
and time-consuming field research. In both Ethiopia and Uganda I succeeded in 
gaining access to prominent journalists and policy makers. As there has been so little 
written about the press in these two countries (and particularly Ethiopia), semi­
structured interviews and oral histories are the most effective way to get the necessary 
and relevant data. Discussing issues of the press and media remains a sensitive issue 
in most societies in the region, and Ethiopia is more extreme than Uganda where the 
debates are particularly complex and nuanced. This issue will appear later in my 
thesis when I argue that much of the debate and discussion in Ethiopia surrounding 
the press and the journalists who are in jail has less to do with the media itself but 
with ideological clashes and struggles for political power, some of it very personal, 
that go back decades. Thus it is essential for media research to be contextualised in a 
broader political and historical setting.
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A substantial part of this research has also entailed trawling through 
newspaper archives. Given the contemporaneous nature of the study, and the fact that 
the media in both Ethiopia and Uganda is under-researched, the newspapers 
themselves held some of the richest data for understanding the role of the press - and 
media in general - and why it has evolved the way it has. Of course there is a slight 
tendency with the press to pursue their own self-interests when writing history, but I 
have been sensitive to this and tried, when possible, to corroborate events with 
outside sources as well. While there are countless articles that informed the analysis 
and material presented here, I have only cited an article when explicitly referred to or 
quoted.
5. Outline of the thesis
This introductory chapter has sought to outline some of the major issues and 
central research questions to be explored in the coming chapters as well as to provide 
a brief overview of Ethiopia and Uganda and the methodology.
Chapter II considers the comparative case study framework and builds upon 
previous studies comparing media and political systems as well as the literature on 
media development and conflict and the press in Eastern Africa. Chapters III through 
Vin present the case studies. Chapter HI examines the history of the press in Ethiopia 
and then focuses on the development and role of The Ethiopian Herald, The Reporter 
and Tobiya/  Lisane Hezeb, Chapter IV considers the media system in Ethiopia with 
the media variables outlined. Chapter V focuses on the political system in Ethiopia 
and how it has shaped the media system along the political variables. A similar 
pattern is repeated for the case of Uganda with Chapter VI considering the history of 
the media in Uganda, with a particular focus on the often-neglected development of 
the African press and an examination of the development and role of The New Vision 
and the Monitor. Chapter VII looks at the media system followed by Chapter VDI’s 
analysis of the political system and its impact on the media in the Uganda case. The 
final chapter, Chapter IX, concludes by drawing out the major differences as to the 
development of the press and its role in the nation-building process in Ethiopia 
compared with Uganda, connecting the arguments made in Chapter II with lessons
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from these case studies and suggesting new ways of attempting to understand the 
complex relations between the state and the press in conflict/post-conflict African 
countries.
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CHAPTER 2 
Bridging Theory and Practice:
Understanding and Comparing Press Systems in 
Conflict/Post-Conflict Countries
We still have a lot of problems with Amnesty [International]  and IPI [International Press Institute].
It is not a question o f not wanting to help, I think it is a question of ideological vision.
I don’t agree with their vision o f the world especially with a freeflow  o f information....
Freeflow of ideas are only coming in one direction, 
all the ideas are coming from the West.
They are not taking in ours....
If I have any idea about democracy, it won’t reach you in London.
— Veteran Kenyan Journalist Philip Ocheing45
Philip Ocheing’s criticism is not new. In the existing academic, advocacy or 
policy literature it is difficult to find answers as to why the press has developed the 
way it has in Ethiopia and Uganda, or what its role has been in the nation-building 
process under Meles and Museveni. Ever since countries have been ranked according 
to how free or unfree they are, and Western scholars have been waxing about the 
modernising effects of a liberal press, critics and many Africans have argued that 
context and politics is seldom sufficiently taken into consideration.
1. Comparing African media systems
The strongest contributions on the media in African studies largely focus on 
the unique experience of post-apartheid South Africa or the dynamic media in 
Nigeria, and comparative case study research remains rare. Nevertheless, interest in 
this field appears to be growing and in the past ten years there have been rich 
contributions with cases from across the continent.46 These publications have been
45 Interview: Philip Ocheing.
46 FARDON, R. & FURNISS, G. (Eds.) (2000) African Broadcast Cultures, Oxford, James Currey. 
HYDEN, G. & OKIGBO, C. (2002) The Media and the Two Waves of Democracy. IN HYDEN, G., 
LESLIE, M. & OGUNDIMU, F. (Eds.) Media and Democracy in Africa. New Brunswick, Transaction. 
NYAMNJOH, F. (2005) Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging, New York, Zed 
Press. BOURGAULT, L. M. (1995) Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press. ERIBO, F. & JONG-EBOT, W. (Eds.) (1997) Press Freedom and Communication in 
Africa, Trenton, Africa World Press. RONNING, H. & KUPE, T. (2000) The dual legacy of 
democracy and authoritarianism: The media and the state in Zimbabwe. IN CURRAN, J. & PARK, 
M.-J. (Eds.) De-Westemizing Media Studies. New York, Routledge.
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important in moving the field forward47 and contributed to the development of this 
thesis. Uganda has been significantly more researched than Ethiopia, largely because 
of an interest from British scholars in their former colony, the history of British 
journalists in the country and the fact that many of the papers are in English 48 In 
contrast, Ethiopia, with little colonial experience apart from a short occupation by the 
Italians and few English publications, has been far less researched.49
When it comes specifically to comparing African media systems, comparative 
research remains predominately focused on the colonial experience or comparing 
African countries along a stratum as to ‘how free’ they are.
The colonial comparison is a historical legacy. For example, one of the 
landmark publications on the news media in Africa is by William Hachten (1971). 
Typical of his time, Hachten places countries in colonial categories. He argues that 
“the historical background, which determined the path the press of each region 
followed, sets the scene for the primary concern with the news media’s activities in 
the first decade of African independence”.50 Another influential book of that period 
by Dennis Wilcox (1975) opens with an examination of the colonial legacy arguing, 
“the nature of press-govemment relationships in Africa today is, in large part, due to
47 Most of the early work on the media in Africa is from the 1960s and early 1970s. This is not 
surprising given the political realities of the 1970s and 1980s making research extremely difficult 
particularly on the independent media. For the foundation of the general studies on media and Africa 
see:
BAKER, G. (1964) The Place of Information in Developing Africa. African Affairs, 63, 209-220, 
AINSLIE, R. (1966) The Press in Africa, London, Victor Gollancz, STOKKE, O. (Ed.) (1971) 
Reporting Africa, Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, WILCOX, D. L. (1975) 
Mass Media in Black Africa: Philosophy and Control, New York, Praeger.
48 See, for example, TABAIRE, B. (2007) The Press and Political Repression in Uganda: Back to the 
Future? Journal o f Eastern African Studies, 1, 193-211, MWESIGE, P. G. (2004) "Can You Hear Me 
Now?": Radio Talk Shows and Political Participation in Uganda. Communication. Indiana University, 
GARIYO, Z. (1994b) The Press and Democratic Struggles. IN MAMDANI, M. A. J. O.-O. (Ed.) 
Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionaism. Vienna, JEP, 
GARIYO, Z. (1993) The Media Constitutionalism and Democracy in Uganda. IN PUBLICATIONS, 
C. (Ed.) Kampala, Centre for Basic Research, KAYANJA, R. D. (2002) The Current State of Media 
Reform in Uganda. IN PRICE, M. E., ROZUMILOWICZ, B. & VERHULST, S. (Eds.) Media Reform: 
Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State.
49 There are, however, some excellent contributions by the following: BONSA, S. (2002) The State of 
the Private Press in Ethiopia. IN ZEWDE, B. & PAUSWANG, S. (Eds.) Ethiopia: The Challenge of 
Democracy from Below. Uppsala, Nordiska Affikainstitutet, BONSA, S. (2000) Survey of the Private 
Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies, PANKHURST, R. (1962) The 
Foundation of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production, Libraries and Literacy in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia Observer, STY AN, D. (1999) Misrepresenting Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa? Constraints 
and Dilemmas of Current Reporting. IN ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) The Media o f Conflict. 
London, Zed.
50HATCHEN, W. (1971) Muffled Drums. Ames, Iowa State University Press.
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the legacy left by colonial administrators and governments”.51 Yet Wilcox 
acknowledges “today’s national leaders are now the prime decision makers who will 
decide whether to continue that legacy or initiate new press-government 
relationships”.52 Forty years later, however, colonial history and regional geography 
continue to have a prominent role in the literature on comparing African media 
systems. Festus Eribo and William Jong-Ebot’s edited volume on Press Freedom and 
Communication in Africa (1997) took a historical look at the developments and 
influences of countries on the continent. By grouping a series of chapters into 
Anglophone, Arabic, Francophone and Lustaphone speaking countries readers are 
provided insight into the colonial influences that have shaped the media in different 
regions of the continent. The authors rightly argue that too often media in Africa is 
discussed without equal consideration of both the internal and external factors that 
have affected it. Their desire to move beyond the normative analysis and with the 
rejection that the Western media should be the “guiding light for all other media 
systems” is also well placed.53 Nevertheless, by the nature of their comparative 
framework, Eribo and Jong-Ebot discount the effects of local actors and more 
contemporary media policy decisions and developments. While colonial experience 
is a factor in shaping the media systems, this thesis will argue, through the 
comparison of Uganda, a colonised country, and Ethiopia, a mostly non-colonised 
country, that other influences are more important in understanding contemporary 
media issues.
Other cases of applying comparative methodologies to African media systems 
have been part of an effort to describe or locate particular media systems either in 
relation to others on the continent, or more frequently, along a global strata of how 
‘free’ or ‘unfree’ they are. Freedom House is probably the most well known ranking 
of this kind, although there are others produced by organisations such as Reporters
51 WILCOX, D. L. (1975) Mass Media in Black Africa: Philosophy and Control, New York, Praeger. 
R 1-
Ibid. p. 19. Wilcox develops several themes about how the press is employed- for promotional goals, 
namely as a vessel for the government to explain to the people its objectives and policies; as a nation- 
builder assisting in national development projects and promoting national unity and consciousness; a 
facilitator of mass education and as a provider of constructive criticism providing what African leaders 
to deem to be responsible and helpful commentary and suggestions.
53 ERIBO, F. & JONG-EBOT, W. (Eds.) (1997) Press Freedom and Communication in Africa, 
Trenton, Africa World Press, p. xi.
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Sans Frontiers. They are largely constructed by gauging the ‘impressions’ of outsiders
or an accounting of the press freedom violations that are collected by groups such as
the International Freedom of Expression Exchange.
While they have taken on a new role in a post-Cold War world where they are
often considered as indicators of democratisation, press freedom indicators are
nothing new.54 And just as they were criticised in the 1960s for their normative and
seemingly forgone conclusions, they continue to be susceptible to the same attacks.
As journalist E. Lloyd Sommerland noted in the 1960s:
It is inappropriate to judge governments and press in Africa by the same 
criteria one would apply in the United Kingdom or the United States.... 
Africa is in a transitional state, experimenting with new forms of democracy 
and building new political structures. In the West, the very idea of 
government publishing newspapers in anathema - it is incompatible with the 
independent, objective, critical role of a free press. But in the new nations, it 
is considered a logical and proper function of governments to produce 
newspapers, no different from conducting a broadcasting service which is 
widely recognised as falling within the area of public confidence.55
And as early as the 1960s there were discussions and attempts to revise the rankings 
to take into account Sommerland’s criticisms, though seemingly with little success.56
54 Raymond Nixon, for example, in the 1960s suggested: “the higher the level o f socio-economic 
development in a country, the greater the likelihood that press freedom will exist; the lower the level of 
development, the greater the chance that press control will be found”.
See NIXON, R. (1965) Freedom in the World’s Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data. Journalism 
Quarterly, 52. Most researchers at the World Bank today would turn this around to fit the democracy 
and development agenda by saying that the media are the independent variable and the level o f poverty 
the dependent variable. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Nixon’s article, however, is the 
methodology for the rankings. The world rankings for all 117 countries were decided by four judges (2 
from the US and 2 from Europe) and sometimes with the assistance of 1 rotating judge from the region 
concerned. It is difficult that these judges had the expertise to successfully understand the complexities 
and reality on the ground of the majority of countries involved.
55 SUMMERLAND, E. (1968) Problems in Developing a Free Enterprise Press in East Africa. Gazette, 
14. p.77.
56 The ‘Africanist’ response to Nixon was initially made by both Wilcox and Lowenstein. Lowenstein 
attempted to involve more local judges and sent questionnaires to individuals in each of the countries 
involved. Responses were erratic and Wilcox attempted to develop a set o f more comprehensive 
categories and a more thorough methodology. He developed 25 categories ranging from newspaper 
ownership to the extent of supervision over broadcasting personnel. Using these factors (either yes or 
no), Wilcox ranked countries along a continuum and then developed 5 groups from minimal control (0- 
5), low control (6-10), medium control (11-15), high control (16-20) and total control (21-25). He 
solicited responses to his questionnaire to over 200 individuals throughout 34 countries and African 
embassy personnel in Washington, DC- this type of research would be even more difficult now given 
that virtually every embassy employee from Africa would tell a researcher that their media are entirely 
free and fair.
See NIXON, R. (1968) Factors Related to Freedom in National Press Systems. Journalism Quarterly, 
37, 13-28. “Freedom in the World’s Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data,” Journalism Quarterly
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In general, however, the African studies literature on the media has set 
standards of tempered idealism with acceptance of different cultural realities that 
contrast with the more ideological literature of the media and development or 
democratisation fields. Nyamjoh’s book Africa’s Media: Democracy and Politics of 
Belonging, along with some chapters from Fardon and Fumiss’s African Broadcast 
Cultures, makes more nuanced arguments that are influencing the field. While 
Nyamjoh uses Cameroun as a case study and does not engage in comparative research 
or directly address Ethiopia or Uganda, he nevertheless has strongly considered the 
political and cultural dimensions of the media in Cameroun and argued for example 
that
If the law on Freedom of Communication has made it difficult for the private 
press to operate freely and to contribute to the democratisation of society, the 
private press has on its part compounded that difficulty with its 
unprofessional journalism. Ignoring or downplaying the latter, as some over- 
sympathetic analysts and media scholars have tended to do, is either 
dishonest, paternalistic or both. It does not help the democratic aspirations of 
ordinary Africans, as it tends to play into the hands of opportunistic or 
mercenary journalism. Again, these shortcomings on the part of journalists 
and the media point to shortcomings in liberal democratic assumptions about 
Africa.57
Nyamnjoh’s work has been critiqued by scholars such as Guy Berger who questions 
“on just whose side he is”.58 But at the same time Nyamnjoh’s research is 
encouraging for its objectivity, contextualisation and consideration of the 
complexities of the media in Cameroun and it is a relief that he is not taking sides as 
much of the literature on media in developing countries does.
2. Media and development
There is a long history of more general literature both on the role of the media 
in the developing world and on efforts to develop the media in such countries.59 More
42 (Winter 1965): 3-14, 118-19. LOWENSTEIN, R. (1970) Press Freedom as a Political Indicator. IN 
FISCHER, H. D. & MERRILL, J. C. (Eds.) International Communication New York, Hasting House.
57 NYAMNJOH, F. (2005) Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging, New York, Zed 
Press, p. 185.
58 BERGER, G. (2006) Review, Francis Nyamnjoh. Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of 
Belonging. Journal o f Southern African Studies, 32,642-644. p. 642.
59 This is a broad literature and there are many ways to cut it: media and transitions; media and 
democratisation; media and peace and conflict; media development; and media and development.
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recently there has been a growing number of studies looking at the specific role of 
media in violent conflict and building peace some of which is particularly relevant for 
Ethiopia and Uganda.
Closely connected to the geo-political issues of the day in the 1950s the 
central debate was on how the radio could ‘modernise’ developing countries.60 While 
this approach has been highly controversial for decades, with critics arguing it was 
merely a form of colonisation,61 it remains influential and its legacy can continue to 
be seen in many NGO and IGO media development projects.
Today, however, the discourse and literature on media development strategies 
in the developing world have largely become synonymous with democratisation. 
Much of this agenda and the current research are being pushed by the media 
development industry that has market-driven interests and often lacks serious political 
analysis or contextualisation. The focus is generally on what donors and international 
non-governmental organisations can do to ‘improve’ the media in poorer countries.62
While there is not the space to examine all o f this related literature here, media and development is 
perhaps the broadest way of framing this to encapsulate many of these issues. Given the recent history 
of Ethiopia and Uganda particular focus in this section is on media and conflict.
60 LERNER, D. (1958) The Passing o f Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Glencoe, EL, 
Free Press, LERNER, D. & SCHRAMM, W. (Eds.) (1967) Communication and Change in the 
Developing Countries, Honolulu, HI, East-West Center, BLAKE, C. (1979) Communication Research 
and African National Development. Journal of Black Studies, 10, 218-230, SCHRAMM, W. (1964) 
Mass Media and National Development, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Daniel Lemers’ The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East is perhaps the most 
referenced contribution to this field. Lerner argues that societies can move from being ‘traditional’ to 
‘modern’ through stimulating the growth of five variables including urbanization, literacy, mass media 
exposure, wider economic participation and political participation. Similarly, Everett Rogers in 1962 
built upon Earner’s research with a diffusion of innovations theory that essentially argued that the 
‘persuasive powers’ of the communications media to change beliefs and behaviours could be an 
essential tool in increasing productivity within communities. Another classic of modernisation theory 
was Wilbur Schramm’s Mass media and Development: The Role o f Information in Developing 
Countries which argues that “underdeveloped countries have underdeveloped communications 
systems” (p.41) but the mass media can work to bridge the gap between rich and poor by facilitating 
social transformation and national development efforts.
61 By the 1970s the modernisation agenda fell out of favor and was criticised for its top down approach 
and for suggesting the ignorance and lack of agency of those being studied. Critics noted that linear 
pre-structured approaches to modernisation failed to take into account local realities that may not even 
need to be entirely destroyed for modernisation to occur. Additionally, the suggestion that somehow 
Europeans or Americans can come in and teach others, via the radio, to be Western or modern was 
seen as not only patronizing but arrogant.
62 The African Media Development Initiative (AMDI) survey by the BBC World Service Trust of 
seventeen sub-Saharan African countries is the most recent initiative and is indicative of the 
publications within this field. The country reports, while lengthy (some number around 100 pages) are 
largely descriptive providing readers with information such as how many television stations or 
newspapers there are as well as the overall legal environment. While it is an important step in 
documenting this information for comparative study, there is little or no analysis and contextualization
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Much of the current discourse of media and democratisation is a product of 
the post-Cold War period63 emerging out of the transitions and Central and Eastern 
Europe and expanding into a field with a strong advocacy and aid agenda.64 Theories 
on the stages of media reform in transitions have been elaborated in multiple forms by 
different authors.65 One frequently cited example is scholarship by Beata 
Rozumilowicz that builds upon literature for the democratic transition process and 
argues that there are four stages of media reform including pre-transition, primary 
transition, secondary stage and late or mature stage.66 Much of this literature is 
problematic when applied to Ethiopia and Uganda for several reasons.
Firstly, assumptions made about the trajectory and transitions between and 
within these stages are not entirely appropriate for countries engaged in, and 
emerging from conflict. Models of media and democratisation often assume that there 
is a path towards normative democracy as we understand it in the West. This is not 
the case for Ethiopia and Uganda, which have crafted their own ‘democratic’ systems, 
namely the Movement system in Uganda and Revolutionary Democracy in Ethiopia.
of the media in broader political or social dynamics is almost entirely lacking. The focus on “training 
and capacity building exercises” and the role of the international community in delivering these 
services rather than local governments or local efforts at media reform is indicative o f the normative 
focus the media and development sector has in general.
In the case of the AMDI report for Ethiopia, for example, the author was the Deputy Director 
of A A U ’s School o f Journalism and a well-known (for those that work in Ethiopia) member of the 
EPRDF. See GEBRETSADIK, G. S. (2006) Ethiopia. Research Findings and Conclusions. African 
Media Development Initiative. London, BBC World Service Trust. It should thus not be surprising, 
that in this ninety-three page report there is virtually no mention of the widespread persecution faced 
by the journalists after the 2005 election. There are similar issues for the report on Uganda and Kenyan 
Blogger Ogova Ondego offers a critique of the Kenya report here: 5 April 2007, “BBC Wastes World 
Bank and Bill Gates Money on African Media ‘Research’”. Available at: 
http://www.artmatters.info/?articleid=283. Last accessed 02 January 2008.
63 While debates on the role o f the media in democracy have changed recently in the past twenty years 
there is a rich and dynamic history of academic research on the role o f the media in the modern nation 
state ANDERSON, B. R. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread o f  
nationalism, London, Verso, GELLNER, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, HOBSBAWM, E. J. (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, New York, 
Cambridge University Press.
64 MILTON, A. (2001) Bound but Not Gagged: Media Reform in Democratic Transitions. 
Comparative Political Studies, 34,493-526.
65 JAKUBOWICZ, K. (2005) Post-Communist Media Development in Perspective. IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS UNIT (Ed.), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, SPARKS, C. (2000) 
Media theory after the fall o f European communism. Why the old models from East and West won’t 
do anymore. IN CURRAN, J. & PARK, M.-J. (Eds.) De-W estemizing Media Studies. London, 
Routledge.
66 ROZUMILOWICZ, B. (2002) Democratic change: A theoretical perspective. IN PRICE, M. E., 
ROZUMILOWICZ, B. & VERHULST, S. G. (Eds.) Media Reform: Democratizing the media, 
democratizing the state. London, Routledge.
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In both countries a free press has at times served as an important part o f single-party 
rule, international legitimisation, and a facade to cover the hallowing out of other 
institutions.
Similarly, models of transition often appear to make assumptions about the 
particular ‘good’ role of so-called media ‘reformers’ and the democratic intentions of 
the journalists as actors encouraging transition to an ideal of media that is free from 
“interference from government, business or dominant social groups” so it “is better 
able to maintain and support the competitive and participative elements that define the 
concept of democracy and the related process of democratisation” .67 As this thesis 
will elaborate, conflict/post-conflict transitions are seldom on a normative-linear 
trajectory but are rather more complex and muddled. In this case it is important to 
heed the warnings of a number of African scholars including Guy Berger from South 
Africa who notes the dangers of “lifting concepts like media and democracy from
AS
Western conditions and applying them unthinkingly to Africa”. This should not, 
however, be interpreted as a call for cultural relativism but rather a note of caution 
that such concepts can have significantly divergent interpretations even across the 
African continent, just as they certainly do between Ethiopia and Uganda.
Thirdly, the focus on the rule of law, as Rozumilowicz, for example suggests 
as the key agent of media reform can be problematic for countries emerging from 
conflict. This argument is made within the expectations for reform during ‘ruptured 
transitions’ (which are part o f the ‘primary transition’ phase and most closely 
analogous to something that Ethiopia or Uganda have experienced). As 
Rozumilowicz describes “ruptured transitions classically occur through revolutionary 
overthrow o f the previous regime”. Appropriately, she acknowledges examples from 
Central and Eastern Europe but the application of such frameworks are regularly 
attempted for countries like Ethiopia and Uganda. As Chris Ogbondah notes in a 
chapter on “Media Laws in Political Transition” from Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu’s
67 Ibid. p. 12.
68 BERGER, G. (2000) Theorizing the media-democracy relationship in African conditions. Available 
at http://guvberger.ru.ac.za/Research/Democracv/theorise.htm. Accessed on 24 November 2007. Many 
researchers, politicians and journalists have long warned o f such issues, including as previously quoted 
in this chapter, Summerland. See SUMMERLAND, E. (1968) Problems in Developing a Free 
Enterprise Press in East Africa. Gazette, 14.
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book Media and Democracy in Africa the transition of countries such as Ethiopia,
Eritrea or Uganda leads to a different type of political transformation:
The civil war that preceded this turn of events in Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Uganda cost these countries a lot in terms of human sufferings, but when the 
pervious leadership was defeated, it created a tabula rasa, that is, a situation 
where the incoming leadership could begin reshaping the political system 
quite radically. Thus it is no coincidence that these countries have not only
introduced a drastically different constitution but also carried out a broad-
69based review process to arrive at these new principles.
In conflict/post-conflict environments the many models of media and democratic 
transition with their recommended reforms do not sufficiently account for the often 
more urgent priorities of the consolidation of power, nation-building and 
reconciliation or the reality that governments can lack real control over the state itself.
As will be elaborated in the coming chapters, in nation-building projects that 
are the products of long and protracted civil wars, it is equally, if not more important 
to be aware of the parallel media systems running alongside the official government 
one and to understand this historical legacy. The politics and media policies of 
guerrilla struggles often have a more important legacy than the autocratic nature of 
the previous government. Analysis within the ‘transitional’ framework is rarely set 
up to account for such multiple historical factors.
More recently academics and practitioners have begun looking specifically at 
the media and conflict much of which is more relevant for the cases of Ethiopia and 
Uganda. Of course there is a long history of studies on media and propaganda in wars, 
particularly since the Second World War, but more recently there have been attempts 
to understand the unique issues of media reform and transitions to peace in 
conflict/post-conflict countries. During the mid to late 1990s interest in this field grew 
partly as a product of the Rwandan genocide and the concurrent civil war in the 
Balkans. Much of this literature offers greater insights and is more appropriate for 
understanding the press in Ethiopia and Uganda than the previously mentioned 
research on transitions because it is more concerned with issues of an enabling
69 OGBONDAH, C. (2002) Media Laws in Political Transition. IN HYDEN, G., LESLIE, M. & 
OGUNDIMU, F. F. (Eds.) Media and Democracy in Africa. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 
p. 71. While this is a useful book, it is particularly relevant for studying the more peaceful transitions 
of the post-cold war era rather than those that emerged from civil wars such as Ethiopia and Uganda.
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environment, reconstruction, peace-building and reconciliation. These studies are also 
often sensitive to the reality that when new governments come to power after wars, 
many institutions simply do not exist or function and thus cannot always be 
‘reformed’ but must be built.
At the same time, however, the emphasis within this field is on the role of 
IGOs and NGOs in looking at what the international community can do and has done. 
Comparative research, for example, focuses on the reconstruction and state-building 
processes in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. More recently, Iraq and Afghanistan have 
dominated research. While this work, particularly that of Monroe Price,70 is valuable 
in suggesting issues that should be considered neither Ethiopia nor Uganda 
experienced an international peacekeeping force after their civil wars that was 
involved in national reconstruction.71 There were, and continue to be, strong 
international dimensions to the processes of ending their wars and nation-building but 
it is very different to having a UN broadcaster or internationally sponsored and 
supported media commission as was the case in Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan.72
Important contributions to this field have also centred on how journalists can 
contribute to peace-building or exacerbate conflict. Allen and Seaton in The Media of 
Conflict, for example, have focused on reporting during conflict and the role of 
representations of ethnic violence in the media.73 Representations of conflict
70 PRICE, M. E. (2000) Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four perspectives the 
experience of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. UNESCO World Press Day. 
Geneva, PRICE, M. & THOMPSON, M. (Eds.) (2002) Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights 
and the Management o f Media Space, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. THOMPSON, M. & 
PRICE, M. E. (2003) Intervention, Media and Human Rights. Survival, 45, 183-202. KRUG, P. & 
PRICE, M. E. (2003) A Module for Media Intervention: Content Regulation in Post-Conflict Zones. 
New York, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. For work indicative of that done by NGO’s see: 
BAJRAKTARI, Y. & HSU, E. (2007) Developing Media in Stabalization and Reconstruction 
Operations. Stabalization and Reconstruction Series Washington D.C., United States Institute for 
Peace, ROSS, H. (2002) An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding. IN IMP ACS (Ed.), 
IMPACS, JOURNALISTS, T. N. A. O. (2002) The Role of the Media in Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding. The Hague, The Netherlands Assocication of Journalists.
71 The United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is along the northern border in 
Ethiopia although it has not been involved with internal political development.
72 PUTZEL, J. & ZWAN, J. V. D. (2006) Why Media Templates Do Not Work In Crisis States., for 
example, remind readers of the importance of context specific interventions.
73 ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) (1999) The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and 
Representations of Ethnic Violence, London, Zed Books. Other contributions, for example, looking at 
the role of journalists in conflict and peace (though not on reporting ethnic conflicts) include 
WOLFSFELD, G. (1998) Promoting peace through the news media. IN LIEBES, T. & CURRAN, J. 
(Eds.) Media, Ritual and Identity. London, Routledge, JAKOBSEN, P. V. (2000) Focus on the CNN 
Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect.
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contribute to internal understandings of history and consequently national 
reconstruction.74 In addition, the scattered research within the broad field of media, 
democratisation, transitions and conflict that has focused on the reforms that came 
largely without international assistance and the political aspects of media reforms has 
been particularly interesting for this thesis. Such contributions include research that 
has highlighted the importance of looking at local representations of ethnicity in 
conflict in Northern Uganda,75 the role of local commercial stations (rather than 
international NGO initiatives) in peace-building in Sierra Leone76 and the media of 
guerrilla struggles that ran parallel to official government media in Sudan.77
3. Re-thinking the role of the press
In ‘An agenda for researching African media’, Tawana Kupe suggests the 
need to “revisit the debate about the institutional roles of the journalism, media and 
communication structures in our context by more critically and rigorously 
interrogating the fashionable liberal notion of media and democracy”.78 The 
challenges raised by the development of the press systems and nation-building 
projects of Ethiopia and Uganda suggest that the press plays a rather different role 
than often assumed. Discourse related to freedom of the press is often reinterpreted 
or employed for different purposes. Similarly, local ideas on the media from both the 
government and journalists are often insufficiently explored and understood, as are 
the ways in which the broader public receives and processes the media.
Implicit in the theoretical frameworks within much of this field are 
assumptions on the role of the media in promoting accountability. While detailed 
debates over definitions of democratisation are beyond the scope of this thesis, such
Journal o f Peace Research, 37, 131-143, HANITZSCH, T. (2004) Journalists as Peacekeeping Force? 
Peace journalism and mass communication theory. Journalism Studies, 5,483-495.
74 LEOPOLD, M. (1999) 'The War in the North': Ethnicity in Ugandan Press Explanations of Conflict, 
1996-97. IN ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) The Media o f Conflict. London, Zed.
75 Ibid.
76 RICHARDS, P. (2000) Local Radio Conflict Moderation. IN FARDON, R. & FURNISS, G. (Eds.) 
African Broadcast Cultures. Oxford, James Currey.
77 JAMES, W. Ibid.The Multiple Voices of Sudanese Airspace. IN FARDON, R. & FURNISS, G. 
(Eds.).
78 KUPE, T. (2004) An agenda for researching African media and communication contexts. Ecquid 
Novi, 25, 353-356. p. 353-4.
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arguments are elaborated in a range o f publications from The World Bank’s book,
The Right to Tell19 which emphasises the link between a free media and economic
growth to Amartya Sen’s famous quote “no substantial famine has ever occurred in
any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press” .80 The media
development NGO Intemews encapsulates this ideology when it argues:
Media play a critical role in fostering transparency and accountability in 
governance and society. They serve a crucial watchdog function, providing 
citizens with the information they need to keep the public and private sectors 
accountable. In many countries, however, repressive legal environments 
inhibit the media's ability to play this role. Moreover, some journalists lack 
the skills to conduct the in-depth investigative reporting that is essential to 
accountability. Beyond traditional forms of media, people's access to 
information via the Internet, cell phones and other communications 
technologies can be stifled by a restrictive or monopolistic regulatory 
environment.81
In some instances a free press certainly can adopt this role but in many cases it does 
not and it is difficult to see that there is a direct correlation between a free press and 
less corruption in the least developed countries. For example, if these arguments 
were largely the case, why do Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria have the most vibrant 
media on the continent but also some of the highest rates of government corruption? 
Yet some countries that have the most restrictive media environments have relatively 
low levels of corruption.82 And in Northern Kenya there has been a widespread and 
devastating famine but even if the media reports on it many Kenyans seem 
unconcerned. Answers to these questions are difficult and require more extensive 
research particularly on audience attitudes, however, the assumptions implicit in this 
discourse will be considered throughout the case studies and these particular
79 For a critique on The Right to Tell, see STREMLAU, N. (2002) Groundbreaking or more of the 
Same: the World Bank’s claim that a Free Press leads to Economic Growth. London, SOAS. In this 
MA dissertation, it was argued that the causal link o f corruption between a free press and economic 
growth was weak and insufficient to draw the widespread conclusions that were made in this book. 
Subsequent studies have been carried out by LSE that provide more conclusive evidence using the case 
study o f India. It is, however, unlikely that theoretical generalizations could be made from this single 
case. For more on the normative perspective see for example, WARRAN, C. (2006) Transparent, 
Accountable, Non-Corrupt Government and Media. World Press Freedom Day. Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Available at: 
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:L3ZRxaz OkgJ:portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/22Q25/l 147264198 
1 Warren Colombo speech.doc/Warren%2Bcolombo%2Bspeech.doc+media+accountable+developing 
+world&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd= 1 &client=firefox-a. Last accessed 10 October 2007.
80 SEN, A. (1999) Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal o f  Democracy, 10. p. 7-8.
81 Global Issues, http://www.internews.org/global/gov/default.shtm. Accessed on 24 November 2007.
82 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007. Available at: 
http://www.transparencv.org/policv research/surveys indices/cpi/2007. Accessed on 22 October 2007.
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arguments will be addressed in the conclusion after the two case studies have been 
analysed.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the focus of this thesis was on the press 
because not only was it the primary producer of news, which the electronic media 
later picked up, but it was also the most free and open space through which different 
perspectives could be aired. These perspectives are primarily of elites, which is not 
surprising. But without sufficiently analyzing the nature of the state and different 
constituencies it is very difficult to suggest that the primary role of the media are to 
hold governments to account by the masses.
The above-mentioned media and development literature that emerged from the 
Eastern European experience in the 1980s starts with an assumption about the role of 
the state, civil society and how power is organised. It tends to be more ideological 
than historical and it is presumed that the civil society that exists in Africa is similar 
to that in Europe and that this drives democratisation.83 But the colonial legacy in 
Africa (Ethiopia included as Haile Selassie could be considered a ‘coloniser’84) left a 
different kind of state with substantial portions of the population that did not partake 
in civil society activities, of which the press is part. Here Mahmood Mamdani’s 
important work on the nature of the contemporary African state is useful for 
rethinking the relationship between the media and nation-building process and 
particularly the consolidation of political power under the EPRDF and NRM. As 
Mamdani argues
No nationalist government was content to reproduce the colonial legacy 
uncritically. Each sought to reform the bifurcated state that institutionally 
crystallized a state-enforced separation, of the rural from the urban and of 
one ethnicity from another. But in doing so each reproduced a part of that 
legacy, thereby creating its own variety of despotism.85
83 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p.13. There is a 
rich literature on civil society and Africa. See for example: CHABAL, P. (1998) “A Few 
Considerations on Democracy In Africa”, International Affairs, 74 (2), 289-303, LEWIS, D. (2002), 
“Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the Usefulness of the Concept”, Development and 
Change, 33 (4): 569-586, MW MAKUMBE, J. (1998) “Is there a civil society in Africa”, International 
Affairs, 74, 2, 305-317.
^HOLCOMB, B. K. & IBSSA, S. (1990) The Invention o f Ethiopia, Trenton, Red Sea Press.
85 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 8.
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And this bifurcated state, according to Mamdani contained
two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke 
the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and 
culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledged to 
enforce tradition.86
Thus,
the rights of free association and free publicity, and eventually of political 
representation, were the rights of citizens under direct rule, not of subjects 
indirectly ruled by a customarily organised tribal authority... the colonial 
state was a double sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially 
defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime 
of rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over the subjects, was a regime of 
extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice. No wonder that 
the struggle of subjects was both against customary authorities in the local 
state and against racial barriers in civil society. The latter was particularly 
acute in settler colonies, where it often took the form of an armed struggle, 
but it was not confined to settler colonies.87
Reforming this state was a challenge and while independence usually succeeded at 
deracialising the state it did not have the same effect on civil society but rather, as 
Mamdani argues,
historically accumulated privilege, usually racial, was embedded and 
defended in civil society. Wherever the struggle to deracialise civil society 
reached meaningful proportions, the independent state played a central role. 
In this context, the state-civil society antagonism diminished as the arena of 
tensions shifted to with civil society.88
Thus, Mamdani concludes, “no reform of contemporary civil society institutions can 
by itself unravel this decentralised despotism. To do so will require nothing less than 
dismantling that form of power”.89
Though certainly not without his critics, the impact of Mamdani’s argument 
on the development of the press in much of Africa is important.90 Without 
considering the nature of audiences and the state itself, it cannot simply be assumed 
that the media or journalists will hold governments accountable for the masses. In 
both Ethiopia and Uganda, as in many other countries in Africa, the divide between
86 Ibid. p. 18.
87 Ibid. p. 19.
88 Ibid. p. 20.
89 Ibid. p. 16.
90 A few scholars have touched on related implications. See, for example, WEST, H. & FAIR, J. E. 
(1993) Development Communication and Popular Resistance in Africa: An Examination of the 
Struggle over Tradition and Modernity through Media. African Studies Review, 36,91-114.
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citizen and subjects is still very much an issue and effects not only who participates in 
the media but who is impacted by it. Too often postulations are made about the nature 
of the state and the political order when in fact there are often parallel spaces within 
states that have very little to do with each other. In the case of Uganda, for example, 
there is the excluded North or the Karamojong.91
Additionally, the ways in which this normative discourse on the role of the 
press and freedom of expression is reinterpreted by journalists and those in the 
government is rarely considered. Journalists are typically considered to be ‘good’ and 
‘watchdogs’ serving as checks on the state while governments are uniformly seen as 
‘bad’ and ‘repressors’.92 As will be explored later in this thesis the reality is more 
complex as both journalists and the state often have their own priorities as to what 
role the press might play in the nation-building process. Such ideas, however, are 
rarely considered or viewed in historical context.
It is helpful to recall that there is a long history of African ideas on the media.
For example, running parallel to the media and development discourse in the 1960s
there was an emergence of African nationalist leaders talking about the role of the
media in their nation-building projects. Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania
and Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, along with some of Africa’s
greatest post-colonial founders were journalists themselves and held passionate views
on how the power of the media could be harnessed for the challenges they faced
particularly unity and integration.93 Nkrumah described, for example, that the press
was a central tool in supporting individual freedoms in a one-party state.
Because we want strong and yet democratic governments in our African 
Revolution, we must guard against the dangers inherent in governments
whose only opposition to tyranny and abuse lies in the folds of the ruling
party itself. A ceaseless flow of self-criticism, an unending vigilance against 
tyranny and nepotism and other forms of bribery and corruption, unswerving 
loyalty to principles approved by the masses of the people, these are the main
91 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2007) "Get the Gun!": Human Rights Violations by Uganda’s National 
Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region. New York, Human Rights Watch,, 
KNIGHTON, B. (2005) The Vitality o f Karamojong Religion, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
92 Some scholars, such as James Curran have effectively argued the ‘limits o f the watchdog 
perspective’. Curran, for example, argues that it is “quixotic to argue it should be paramount and 
determine media policy”. Speaking largely of the western press, he argues that in the twentieth century 
media increasingly focuses on entertainment and has become itself a ‘big business’ thus challenging 
this old liberal notion. CURRAN, J. (2002) Media and Power, New York, Routledge. p. 219.
93 Benjamin Mkapa, interviewed for this thesis was also a journalist with Nyerere and later went on to 
serve as Tanzania’s President from 1995-2005.
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safeguards for the people under one-party rule. Who is best able to exercise 
that vigilance, to furnish the material for self-criticism, to sound warnings 
against any departure from principles, if not the press of Revolutionary 
Africa?94
While the ideas of Nyerere and Nkrumah are no longer complementary to the 
prevailing geo-strategic order of the day, they have continued to have some resonance 
with African leaders, and with Museveni in particular.
The cases of Ethiopia and Uganda suggest that the press can play a crucial role 
in countries emerging from civil wars but often it is a role that is not sufficiently 
considered in the media and development or conflict discourse. By serving as a 
forum for elite negotiation of political power, reconciliation, historical consensus and 
envisioning the future of the country the press provides an important outlet for 
promoting peaceful dialogue rather than continuing or starting violent conflict.
4. Analytical framework
The challenge for the rest of this chapter is to elaborate how countries such as 
Ethiopia and Uganda can be analysed to bring out the nuances of both the press 
system and the political system. As this chapter has argued so far, much of the media 
and development literature often prescribes certain ways of analyzing the press and 
obscures deeper understanding. It tells us how journalists should act, what the roles 
of the government and press should be and what they should aspire towards. Often 
these assumptions and ideal statements are made without sufficient knowledge of the 
political environment or the complex realities on the ground.
There is a need for a different approach or model of analyzing the press in 
African countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda. A greater focus should be on why the 
press is they way it is at a particular time, the process of transitions and the varying 
alliances and dispositions of key actors. Understanding these fundamental questions 
will also help to understand the ‘trajectory’ the press is on and why in some cases it is 
shut down. Such analysis can also provide substantial and new insight into political 
developments.
94 NKRUMAH, K. (1965) The African Journalist, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishers, p. 87.
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4.1 Comparing press systems
The interest for this thesis in comparative methodologies for African media 
systems has less to do with the actual development of typologies or rankings but the 
process of analysis. Case study comparisons have long been a central tool of social 
science research and thus the methods used here draw upon a long lineage of 
academic discourse.95 I have attempted to heed the warnings to avoid the extremes of 
comparative national research: the ‘universalist’ approach, which risks over­
generalisations and the ‘culturalist’ approach which may over-specify. I thus take 
Hantrais’s suggestion of pursuing a ‘societal’ approach. I agree that contextualisation 
is very important in such comparative studies and that an “in-depth understanding of 
the socio-cultural, economic and political contexts in which social phenomena 
develop is a precondition for successful cross-national comparative research.”96 
Nevertheless, I would lean towards the cultural argument emphasising the importance 
of understanding the social reality within the particular contexts from which it 
emerges rather than the universalists who excel at producing generalisations (often 
from the US experience).97 But I also hope to be able to make some generalisations 
about the role and development of press systems in conflict/post-conflict African 
nations. And in line with JS Mill’s methods of agreement and difference, the cases of 
Ethiopia and Uganda, which share many similarities aim to understand the nature of 
the causal factors that have led to the differences of press system development.
In my research, I have chosen to limit my comparison to two nations,98 both 
because of logistical constraints but also to allow sufficient depth of analysis and
95 DURKHEIM, E. (1964) The Rules of Sociological Method, New York, Free Press, WEBER, M. 
(1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York, Free Press, LIJPHART, A. (1975) The 
Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. Comparative Political Studies, 8,158-77, 
LIJPHART, A. (1971) Comparative Politics and Comparative Method. American Political Science 
Review, 65,682-93, SKOCPOL, T. & SOMERS, M. (1980) The Uses of Compartive History in 
Macrosocial Inquiry. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22,174-97, COLLIER, D. (1993) 
The Comparative Method. IN FIN1FTER, A. (Ed.) Political Science: The State o f the Discipline II. 
Washington DC, American Political Science Association, GEORGE, A. (1979) Case Study and Theory 
Development: The Method of Structured Focussed Comparison. IN LAUREN, P. G. (Ed.) Diplomatic 
History: New Approaches. New York, The Free Press.
96 HANTRAIS, L. (1999) Contextualization in cross-national comparative research. International 
Journal o f Social Research Methodology, 2,93-108. p. 94.
97 Ibid. p. 93.
98 Nation is obviously a loaded term in the context o f Ethiopia and Uganda with such diverse 
populations, on-going conflicts and governments that are clearly having some difficulty in ‘nation-
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because of the uniqueness of the governments and state in Ethiopia and Uganda. 
Given the complexities of comparing two multifarious situations I reduced the 
number of variables or explanatory factors (sometimes referred to as ‘data 
reduction’)99 to eight. Rather than using predetermined or normative variables, I 
developed the variables during the research and process of analysis through 
extrapolating what the key explanatory factors were in the cases of Ethiopia and 
Uganda.
Difficult choices had to be made in identifying which variables were most 
important and relevant for the research questions and in this I took some direction 
from comparative political communication. Unfortunately, there was little substantial 
contribution in this direction from existing comparative research on African media 
systems or the media and development/ conflict literature. While comparative 
political communication is Western focused, it helped in providing some direction 
and structure to the study of Ethiopia and Uganda just as some of the western 
literature on media and politics has.100
After Four Theories o f the Press, there were a number of studies that outlined 
political and media variables that are useful for addressing and understanding the 
development of press systems. In the 1970s Blunder and Gurevitch elaborated the 
links between the media and politics and proposed a framework for analysis that 
included a number of dimensions by which political communication arrangements101 
and their effects102 could be understood. Further efforts have been made at 
developing understanding of comparing media systems through case studies, though
building’. Nevertheless, it appears to offer the most obvious unit o f analysis for the study at hand and I 
have tried to be sensitive about the very important differences within the nations.
99 GEDDES, B. (1990) How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics. IN STIMSON, J. (Ed.) Political Analysis. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, COLLIER, D. (1993) The Comparative Method. IN FTNIFTER, A. (Ed.) Political Science: The 
State o f the Discipline II. Washington DC, American Political Science Association.
100 CURRAN, J. & SEATON, J. (1997) Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in 
Britain, London, Routledge.
101 These dimensions included “(1) degree of state control over mass media organizations; (2) degree of 
mass media partisanship; (3) degree of media-political elite integration; (4) the nature of the 
legitimizing creed of media institutions”. See BLUMLER, J. & GUREVITCH, M. (1995) Towards a 
Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research. IN BLUMLER, J. & GUREVITCH, 
M. (Eds.) The Crisis o f Political Communication. London, Routledge. p. 62.
102 These dimensions included “(1) the valuation of politics as such; (2) degree of partisan 
commitment; (3) degree of consensus over society’s agenda of political issues” Ibid. p. 67.
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much of it remains rooted in the United States.103 While there are some indications 
that this is slowly changing, comparative research has mostly been extended to 
Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia, and much less so Africa.
Given this lack of non-Westem comparative research I have continued to draw 
upon this Western literature. Most recently, Hallin and Mancini employed 
comparative analysis in an effort to “develop a framework for comparing media 
systems and a set of hypotheses about how they are linked structurally and 
historically to the development of the political system...”104 In their publication, they 
created a framework that they believed to be useful in comparing the media systems 
in Western Europe and North America and this was also complemented with a 
framework of dimensions useful for comparing political systems. A set of hypotheses 
was developed from the ways in which these variables may be connected emphasising 
the co-evolution of variables rather than strict causal ordering. Hallin and Mancini 
offered models that are empirical and based on the historical development of media 
systems as institutions within particular political settings.
This research has naturally been of great interest to my own work but it is not 
appropriate for comparing the media in developing, poor states that are grappling with 
violent conflict and nation-building. Nor is it sufficient for addressing my primary 
research questions concerning the role of the media and the consolidation of power in 
nation-building. There are dramatically different influences, constraints and issues at 
play in Ethiopia and Uganda than the US or Italy. Hallin and Mancini’s scholarship 
does suggest key questions about the political and media systems that should be asked 
when trying to understand why the press is the way it is and its role. I depart from 
their framework of analysis significantly but it has nevertheless been an important 
starting point.
Like the authors of Four Theories of the Press, Hallin and Mancini offer 
distinct models of media systems. There is certainly something very appealing about 
viewing the world’s media through neat models. While these models may be useful in 
understanding the media in developed rich countries that are at peace they are not
103 BLUMLER, J. G., MCLEOD, J. M. & ROSENGREN, K. E. (Eds.) (1992) Comparatively 
Speaking: Communication and Culture Across Space and Time, London, Sage.
1 HALLIN, D. & MANCINI, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 5.
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entirely relevant for poor countries struggling with violent conflict and messy 
transitions. The models that Hallin and Mancini describe do not necessarily require 
that the media be static and un-evolving, as they acknowledge that the media in the 
1960s was very different in the United States then it is now and that there may be 
many different journalistic cultures, but they do require a certain level of stability and 
continuity of the state.
In May 2007, I presented my research at a conference focused on the book 
Comparing Media Systems in Wroclaw, Poland entitled ‘When East Meets West’. 
Almost all of the fellow participants were presenting papers on how Central and 
Eastern European countries could fit into the typology that Hallin and Mancini 
elaborated. There was a sense of exclusion and part of legitimising themselves as 
having modem European media systems would be to be included in the typology. 
Both Hallin and Mancini, who were present and participated in the panels, stressed 
that more benefit from their research was to be gleaned from the process of analysis 
rather than the glamorisation of the models. I strongly agree with this and in my 
comparative analysis I do not attempt to start offering typologies but rather seek to 
identify the most productive variables for understanding the process of press and 
political change in countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda. I draw on Hallin and 
Mancini as a starting point because I think their process suggests what types of 
questions should be asked.
4.2 My comparative analysis
Since Ethiopia and Uganda are both engaged in a process of nation-building 
they cannot be examined through static variables but rather the nature of these 
changes must be identified and the media as an actor in a process that is not only in 
motion but is often unpredictable and complex and must be understood. As this thesis 
focuses on the relationship between the state (particularly those in power) and the 
media, the variables I have selected concentrate on these aspects. Following the lead 
of previous scholars who have convincingly argued that political and media variables 
are closely tied together, and both are imperative for understanding the development 
of press systems, I use four media variables and four political variables. Chapters 4
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and 7 on Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively, are structured along the media variables 
that follow and Chapters 5 and 8 are similarly structured along the political variables.
4.2.1 Media variables
Hallin and Mancini outline the following as their four major dimensions for 
comparing media systems:
(1) The development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the 
strong or weak development of a mass circulation press; 2) political 
parallelism; that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and 
political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system 
reflects the major political divisions in society; 3) the development of 
journalistic professionalism; and 4) the degree and nature of state 
intervention in the media system.105
The media variables I have identified draw on those outlined by Hallin and Mancini 
and include: (1) political parallelism and polarisation; (2) the ideology of journalists; 
(3) the institutionalisation of the press; and (4) the degree and nature o f state 
intervention.
Political parallelism and polarisation refers to the polarisation in the media or 
the degree to which it is characterised by strong alignment with political parties or 
particular ideologies.106 Journalism is never neutral but the extent to which it is 
objective or free of political values varies between and within different societies. In 
some countries it is quite possible to map out the loyalties different media 
organisations have and rate them along a political spectrum of left to right, such as in 
Italy. In the United States, for example, the situation is a bit more ambiguous and 
while biases are clearly evident it is more difficult to reach a clear consensus on 
where exactly some media would be situated along such a spectrum. This section will 
examine the degree and nature of that parallelism and polarisation and how it has 
shifted or evolved over time. Given the importance and the divergent outcomes of the 
recent elections in both Ethiopia and Uganda, this variable focuses on this period as 
an indicator.
106 Political parallelism as addressed by Hallin and Mancini refers to the political advocacy dynamic of 
the print media only have newspapers been established to further the political agendas of political 
parties but they have also been an important implement for those wishing to influence public opinion
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The ideology107 of journalists or the intentions and role of journalists as actors 
in the transition is, in some respects, a counterpart to the political variable of looking 
at the ways in which the leaders or ideology of the new government serves to shape 
the media environment. This is related to ‘professionalisation’, or ‘professionalism’, 
which has been argued to be an important indicator reflecting the nature of the media 
and society in general.108 In Ethiopia and Uganda it is interesting and instrumental to 
trace the development of ideas of the role of journalists and to consider why these 
individuals are journalists, how they think about the work they are doing and for what 
motive or purpose. Oftentimes these journalists have reinterpreted the normative 
Western human rights discourse or employed it selectively. In some circumstances 
journalists can see their work in radically different ways and this is particularly the 
case in less institutionalised media and political spaces. The impact of these 
perspectives must be considered.
I address some of the concerns Hallin and Mancini raise through their factor
of the development of the mass press through my concept of the institutionalisation of
the press. For Hallin and Mancini, the development of a mass press is an obvious
distinction among media systems and they emphasise a historical perspective
examining not only quantity but also the nature of the newspaper including its role in
a broader social and political environment. Interestingly, they note,
so far as we know, no country that did not develop mass circulation 
newspapers in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century has ever 
subsequently developed them, even if its levels of literacy and pattern of 
political and economic development have converged with those of the high- 
circulation countries. And we will argue that the presence or absence of a 
mass circulation press has deep implications for the development of the 
media as political institutions.109
107 The term ideology is used to denote a comprehensive approach regading the profession- a certain 
ethical set o f principles and ideals, much of which in the context o f Ethiopia and Uganda is political. It 
considers how journalists believe media and political power should be used and to what end. More 
broadly it touches on what ways the society should develop. For a more general debate on the ideology 
of professional journalists in the west, see: DEUZE, M. (2006) What is Journalism? Journalism, 6, 
442-464.
108 For Hallin and Mancini a developed journalistic profession consists of a high degree of autonomy 
for actors, distinct professional norms and a public service orientation. They argue that political 
parallelism and professionalism are interrelated and as differentiation theory suggests where there is a 
high level o f professionalism there is a lower level of political parallelism. Thus, with a lower level of 
professionalization there is a higher level of instrumentalisation of the media where outside actors or 
political parties co-opt the media.
109 HALLIN, D. & MANCINI, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models o f Media and 
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 24.
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Given this claim, what does the concept of either the media as a political institution or 
a ‘mass circulation press’ mean for countries like Ethiopia and Uganda? By looking at 
how the press has developed as an institution or an actor it takes into account the 
youth of the press in the countries being considered. Compared with the press in 
European or North American countries, the press in Ethiopia and Uganda is extremely 
young. With the exception of The Ethiopian Herald, all of the papers I will be 
considering in the coming chapters are less then twenty years old and some are less 
than ten. Given the youth of the publications researched there is a level of volatility 
and transformation that must adequately be taken into account. Thus, strategies and 
factors that institutionalise the media (both on the part of the government as well as 
journalists and outside actors such as donors or foreign governments) are considered.
The degree and nature o f state intervention is important because as with any 
state building project the state has been involved in shaping the media environment 
not only through legislation, but also through their own propaganda and interaction 
with the independent press. The press can serve as an important forum for elite 
negotiation but this also entails effective government participation.
While for more developed countries the existence of a public broadcaster may 
be central in considering the state involvement with the media, in poorer countries 
where the public broadcasting component is less developed and more complicated to 
reform, the state attempts to insert its message into the competition of ideas through 
alternative means. This could mean state involvement in the production of media or 
ensuring that particular information that is disseminated by certain news outlets. 
Other factors to be considered include the legal approach to media regulation (and the 
independence of the judiciary), access to information and govemment-joumalist 
interaction.
The philosophy of the govemment-media relationship also matters- in 
Western countries, such as those that Hallin and Mancini compare, the major 
diversions are between relatively liberal countries such as the United States where the 
primacy of the first amendment is the overriding driving force behind state-media 
interactions and the social-democratic governments such as the northern Scandinavian 
countries where the government is often involved in a host of issues relating from
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regulation to ownership and funding. For countries that are in the process of state 
construction and governments that are attempting to consolidate their power, this 
variable is of particular importance. Thus, through looking at the type of media 
environment that the government has either intended, or not, to construct, insight into 
the political development of the country will be gleaned.
4.2.2 Political variables
To complement the media variables, Hallin and Mancini developed a set of 
variables adapted from political sociology and comparative politics literature that 
include:
(1) The relation of state and society, and particularly the distinction between 
liberal and welfare-state democracy; (2) the distinction between consensus 
and majoritarian government; the distinction, related to consensus and 
majoritarian patterns of government, between organised pluralism or 
corporatism, and liberal pluralism; (3) the development of rational-legal 
authority; and (4) the distinction between moderate and polarised 
pluralism.110
The political variables that I have identified as most useful to understanding the press 
in Ethiopia and Uganda include: (1) the ideology of the liberation movement; (2) the 
process of state construction and consolidation o f power; (3) trust, confidence 
building and reconciliation; and (4) international relations.
The political variables as defined by Hallin and Mancini are not entirely 
appropriate for the circumstances that apply to Ethiopia and Uganda. In Western 
Europe, the distinction between liberal democracies and welfare democracies is a 
clear differentiation and can help to categorise many parts of Europe in relation to 
countries like the US. The historical tradition of an active state in Europe- funding 
everything from higher education and health care to cultural events contrasts with the 
US where such services are not fully provided by the state- and is evident in the 
media as well. But this is not the case in states whose leaders are struggling to 
consolidate power. Similarly, the factor of majoritarian or consensus government is 
also not one of the most definitive factors in shaping the media systems in Ethiopia 
and Uganda- for countries that are questionably democratic this is of less importance.
110 Ibid. p. 65.
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Given the democratic reality (or lack thereof) and power issues at play, the 
variable ideology of the liberation movement provides insight into the nature of the 
transition and attitudes of the leaders towards the media. As the nation-building 
process and the consolidation of power is still underway, the ideology of the party 
during the guerrilla war is important and often significantly more personal than in 
more institutionally developed countries that have greater checks and balances within 
their systems. Thus factors that will be considered in this variable include examining 
what the strategy was like for the guerrilla fighters in the bush and how this 
experience shaped their political thinking towards civil liberties such as the media. 
These movements also had complex information strategies and media projects during 
their struggle that will be examined. Their ideas of media policy did not start when 
they came to power but rather evolved prior to, and during, their struggle. It will also 
question how their policies were implemented when the movements first came to 
power and who was most influential in defining this strategy.
The process of state construction includes a number of major factors including 
institutionalisation, the development of rational-legal authority111 and crucial 
processes of nation-building that have influenced national reconciliation. This seeks 
to identify the ways in which the governments of Ethiopia and Uganda have 
embarked on consolidating the power of the state while promoting or ensuring the 
peace that they promised when assuming power. Issues of federalism, representation 
and democracy will be considered in this context.
The variable of polarised pluralism has been extended to focus on the process 
of trust and confidence building and national reconciliation which is more reflective 
of the evolving nature of a transitioning society. The process through which the state, 
press and society built or failed to engage in reconciliation will be discussed. A key
111 Public administration and the establishment of an autonomous bureaucracy with a strong civil 
service is a defining feature of rational legal authority and a key differential of a clientist system. A 
strong and independent judicial system is also an integral part. Much has been written about 
clientelism in Africa and Ethiopia and Uganda are certainly no exception to its prevalence. Hallin and 
Mancini argue that in Europe and America “where rational-legal authority is strongly developed, these 
institutions [public broadcasting systems, agencies that regulate private broadcasting, allocate press 
subsidies] similar to other public agencies, are likely to be relatively autonomous from control by 
governments, parties and particular politicians, and to be governed by rules and procedures.” (Ibid. p. 
56). Rational legal authority is also related to a whole host of other characteristics that have been 
mentioned including professionalisation (which is more common) and instrumentalization (which is 
less common) with high levels of rational-legal authority.
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variable identified by Hallin and Mancini and adopted from literature on comparative 
politics relates to moderate vs. polarised pluralism. For the comparison of Ethiopia 
and Uganda that I am undertaking, this distinction is critical. Polarised pluralism, 
according to the Italian political scientist Giovanni Satori reflects a society where 
“cleavages are likely to be very deep... consensus is surely low, and... the legitimacy 
of the political system is widely questioned. Briefly put, we have polarisation when 
we have ideological distance....”112 While Hallin and Mancini only note a couple of 
examples in Western Europe where anti-system political parties have existed, their 
prevalence may be significantly more common for conflict countries in the 
developing world. Ethiopia, as will be described later is a vivid example of this. 
Hallin and Mancini make the connection that “the underlying distinction between 
systems in which ideological polarisation and diversity are relatively great or more 
limited is much more broadly useful... for understanding the development of media 
systems”.113 For the countries they are examining, they can only draw upon primarily 
the historical differences and the legacy of polarised pluralism. The pattern of 
political development in countries that have experienced polarised pluralism can be 
associated with high levels of political parallelism and partisan journalism. Thus, on 
the other side, in countries with high levels of polarised pluralism, politically neutral 
journalism is less plausible as the media are regarded as a critical tool for the political 
struggle or conflict underway. Neutrality is not always deemed an adequate weapon 
for those struggling to defeat a particular system or ideology.
The final factor I will consider is the international dimensions of media 
development in the media system. The way in which I have used it is particularly 
unique to poor countries. Monroe E. Price, for example, has elaborated a convincing 
argument about how the global information revolution is challenging state power and 
proposes a framework for analyzing media globalisation.114 But for a select number 
of countries that comprise the ‘bottom billion’ the international competition for 
loyalties of Ethiopians and Ugandans in the global media environment are not as 
relevant as the international dimensions affecting state construction and political
112 As quoted in HALLIN, D. & MANCINI, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of 
Media and Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 59.
113 Ibid. p.61.
114 PRICE, M. E. (2002) Media and Sovereignty, Cambridge, MIT.
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sovereignty. Both Ethiopia and Uganda have economies that are roughly the size of a 
40,000 person US town and government budgets that receive over 50% of direct 
budget support from donors. A free press is a symbol of respect for human rights and 
a signal of democratic credentials. But just how much this matters is debatable. 
Current events in Somalia, for example, where Ethiopian troops are fighting a proxy 
war for the US, make it appear that little could interfere with this strategic 
relationship. Nevertheless, there is international pressure, and often intense 
intervention from media development groups and international human rights 
advocates, that can influence a media system. This can also effect the media’s 
conception of its role in the democratic debate as well as expectations on the part of 
the audience sometimes leading to greater polarisation.
The framework I have developed for use in my comparative analysis is 
empirical, not normative. Rather than comparing the media in developing countries 
to the ‘ideal’ British or American model the framework I have developed seeks to 
understand the media within the particular context of poor countries emerging from 
civil wars but continuing to face protracted violent conflict. It provides insight into 
the role that the press is actually playing in society, how and why it has developed to 
play the particular role it has and how it relates to other social and political aspects of 
the state. This type of broad comparative analysis is challenging and not 
straightforward. By focusing on Ethiopia and Uganda and avoiding the development 
of typologies, I hope to steer clear of some of the political pitfalls that Four Theories 
of the Press faced by comparing different countries in such a clearly ideologically 
biased way.115 Hallin and Mancini similarly averted some of these problems by 
focusing on systems that are relatively comparable in terms of economic 
development, culture and political systems.
In 1975 Blumler and Gurevitch posed a fundamental problem in comparing 
communication systems by suggesting that researchers are unsure of what to look for 
and what is relevant to be compared. This challenge continues today- for Hallin and 
Mancini it was the development of one set of factors to understand the media in the
115 Four Theories o f the Press is seen as epitomizing times of the Cold War where the libertarian 
system o f the United States was the ideal and all other systems subordinate, particularly the communist 
system of the Soviet Union.
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Western world. My research has required the development of another set of factors, 
some of which draw upon their framework but are clearly unique to the region and 
issues I am studying. Similarly, I would expect that researchers seeking to understand 
other parts of the world or countries in a different political or economic situation 
would find parts of my framework useful but it may have to be adapted. At the same 
time, there are likely to be some natural extensions and applications of the framework 
developed here, particularly to countries that have a similar experience with guerrilla 
wars such as Eritrea and Rwanda. Researchers in other conflict/post-conflict 
situations are also likely to find the framework useful in understanding media 
development.
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PARTI
Ethiopia: A Divided Country and a Divided Press
Ethiopia serves as the first case in this comparative study and is addressed 
prior to Uganda because it allows the reader a chance to see a less successful example 
of political reconciliation and media reform before moving to a case with more 
positive developments. It is also assumed that readers are likely to be less familiar 
with Ethiopia than Uganda because the literature is less substantial.
Together the next three chapters analyse the complex situation of the press and 
politics during Ethiopia’s political transition and exercise in nation-building. They 
focus on the period from the guerrilla struggle through the aftermath of the 2005 
elections (ending 2006). It may have been simpler to develop these chapters 
chronologically along, before, during and post- transition periods. However, for 
answering the research questions posed in the beginning of this thesis, it is more 
important to pull-out the comparative distinctions between Ethiopia and Uganda using 
the political and media variables to focus on the role of the press and politics in 
nation-building.
Press systems are not often what they seem at first glance. In Ethiopia several 
dominant events and movements have shaped the system. The 1970s student 
movement, for example, looms large and continues to have a strong influence on 
politics and the press. Similarly, the length, nature and ideology of the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) guerrilla war has been defining and continues to 
play a role today. More recently, the issue of reconciliation that never came, the 
federalist constitution and the secession of Eritrea have shaped the political dynamics 
of the press system.
Ethiopians historically have had a complex relationship with authority and 
often have been distrustful of each other and outsiders. Such cultural factors have an 
important legacy and are also evident in the ideology of journalists. As actors in a 
broader nation-building project, these individuals hold differing perceptions and 
values that underlie the work they do and how they choose to interact with the 
government. Journalism, and the development and role of a press system, is a very
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human process and it is thus important to illuminate as fully as possible the actors that 
are driving it.
The portrait that emerges from the three chapters in this section is one of a 
highly polarised press and a divided country. The press is easily closed down by the 
government, lacks institutionalisation and reflects competing political agendas, albeit 
sometimes with questionable constituencies beyond elite groups. Partly because the 
government has refused to fully engage with the arguments presented in the press, the 
press has provided a forum for elites to vent but it has not been able to provide a 
space for mediating or negotiating power. Rather, the press has come to reflect a 
society that has not reconciled a complex transition and that contains many groups 
that feel disenfranchised, are angry at the present situation and are pushing competing 
agendas for the future of Ethiopia. Particularly among elite groups, for example, 
there are the Amhara elites that long for a return to the days when their group was the 
hegemonic power, the Oromo elites who hold a dream of an independent Oromo 
nation and the Tigrayan elites that desperately want to maintain their present 
monopoly of state power. And then there are the numerous guerrilla and liberation 
movements, such as the Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF), engaging the already over­
stretched Ethiopian armed forces. Given the political realities, genuine reform of the 
media and press will be difficult unless fundamental political issues are addressed.
Through the comparative framework, this section addresses some of these 
issues that are often missed in more chronological narrative approaches but there are 
also limitations. In the first chapter on Ethiopia, the historical development of the 
press system is elaborated with a focus on the key government and independent 
publications, specifically The Ethiopian Herald, The Reporter and Tobiya/Lisane 
Hezeb. The subsequent chapter will examine the press system along the key media 
system variables. While there are many aspects that could be included such as issues 
of language and the economic factors of distribution of papers and market size; the 
focus is on the aspects of the press system that are not only most important for 
understanding the development and role of the press during the period of transition 
until the present but that also provide the richest comparative material for a contrast 
with Uganda. The media variables include issues of political polarisation, 
institutionalisation of media outlets, competing ideologies of journalists and
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government intervention as these are the most salient for understanding the unique 
characteristics that both define and drive the press system as well as how the press 
itself has been shaping the industry and the political space in which it operates.
Similarly, the political system variables, which are addressed in the final 
chapter of this section on Ethiopia, are limited but they nevertheless focus on the core 
and important ideas that shaped the liberation movement, drove the struggle, and 
characterised the politics surrounding the transition, especially the process (or lack of) 
of reconciliation. International factors are included to emphasise the reality that 
Ethiopia and Uganda are forced to operate in the international context of political 
norms and pressures particularly stemming from their heavily aid-dependent 
economies.
In order to link these three chapters, and the following three on Uganda, as 
well as craft a coherent case study, each chapter will have a short conclusion followed 
by a more comprehensive conclusion at the end of each part. This structure will be 
applied as well to the case of Uganda, allowing for comparisons to be drawn.
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CHAPTER 3
A History of the Press in Ethiopia: 1902-2005
This chapter will provide an overview of the development of the press in 
Ethiopia from its earliest days through to the current situation under the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). As there are few existing studies 
on the media in Ethiopia, this chapter is ambitious in scale.
The first part will consider the history of the press and challenge common 
understandings about how it evolved. When I was conducting my field research in 
Ethiopia, many Ethiopians were surprised by the comparison of Ethiopia and Uganda. 
It was frequently argued that because Ethiopia was not colonised by a Western power 
or the press was ‘newer’ in Ethiopia, it could not be compared with Uganda.116 First, 
I will argue that despite Ethiopia’s lack of a Western colonial experience,117 there 
were still external influences during the colonial period, particularly that of the United 
States, shaping the press. Second, it is commonly argued that Ethiopia’s experience 
with freedom of expression and the press began under the EPRDF. This is not entirely 
the case; while Ethiopia has certainly experienced the greatest amount of freedoms 
under the current government, there were earlier periods when independent and 
critical publications emerged, particularly at Haile Selassie University (now Addis 
Ababa University). Third, as mentioned in the introduction, the EPRDF’s media 
system is often asserted to have begun when the guerrillas actually seized power in 
Addis. In fact the TPLF had a media system that ran parallel to the Derg’s and 
provided some space for the struggle to formulate ideas about the role of the media 
and its relation to political reforms. This historical section is important for the 
comparison with Uganda and suggests that the historical development in the two 
countries exhibits some similarities and thus the central focus on the present role of
1161 would suggest that these comments were often partly motivated by a feeling of exceptionalism and 
superiority for not having been colonised and a belief by some that Ethiopians are not Africans. There 
was also an apparent insecurity among some with the fact that Uganda, a black African country, has a 
far stronger and more sophisticated press despite the difficult periods of Obote and Amin.
117 The Ethiopian state itself has been regarded as a colonizing power by some, particularly the Oromos 
who have been the ‘colonized’. See HOLCOMB, B. K. & IBSSA, S. (1990) The Invention o f Ethiopia, 
Trenton, Red Sea Press.
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the EPRDF and the NRM in shaping the media systems of their countries is correctly 
emphasised.
The second part of the chapter will focus on the press under the EPRDF and, 
in particular, key papers from the three broad areas of the press including the 
government press, the anti-state press and the gray zone press. Rather than simply 
providing an overview of the technicalities of the media system (e.g., the number of 
private papers), this study is crafted to provide readers with insight into how these 
sections of the press operate and for what purposes.
This chapter will argue that the Ethiopian press under the EPRDF has been 
vibrant yet polarised. On the one side, the independent ‘anti-state press’118 represents 
a portion of the population (mostly urban dwellers and elites although their 
constituencies include some in the middle and lower classes as well) that is deeply 
opposed to many of the policies of the present government and sees little scope for 
acceptable reforms as long as the EPRDF remains in power (Chapter 5 will further 
this discussion through analyzing some of the underlying political developments that 
have contributed to this particular perspective). Since the 2005 elections, these ‘anti- 
state’ papers are no longer publishing: some closed due to the arrest of key journalists 
while others simply found it too difficult to continue in the present situation. On the 
other side, the government press, when under pressure, has been extraordinarily pro- 
government which has encouraged other papers to counter its assertions more boldly. 
There is generally little scope for papers that seek to mediate a middle ground. Those 
that have continued in the post-election period (after November 2005) have supported 
the government more aggressively.
This chapter cannot purport to comprehensively map the press system in 
Ethiopia as many interesting and important factors have been excluded due to space 
constraints. Nevertheless, the breadth and nature of the analysis provided here lays a 
solid foundation for the coming chapters on political and media variables.
118 It is referred to as the anti-state press because this is what the government has publicly labeled it to 
be. The journalists that were arrested in 2005 faced ‘anti-state charges’ such as attempting to 
overthrow the constitutional order.
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1. The development of the press in Ethiopia: A historical perspective
1.1 The first papers: an effort in modernising the empire
There is substantially less known about the early days of the press in Ethiopia 
compared with other sub-Saharan African countries. Because Ethiopia was not 
colonised by a western powers, it did not attract the European or American 
researchers who pursued studies of European colonies. Similar to the lack of research 
on media published in indigenous African languages, the Amharic language has also 
traditionally served as a major obstacle to researchers pursuing in-depth analyses on 
the press. Additionally, despite the significant attempts by Professor Richard 
Pankhurst to develop a collection of early newspapers at the Institute for Ethiopian 
Studies at Addis Ababa University (AAU), historical research is difficult because the 
Ethiopian archives are in a dilapidated state.
The press and the newspaper first started in Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik 
n. As the Emperor expanded his rule into non-Amhara areas, he facilitated the 
introduction and use of communications technology as part of an effort to centralise 
power and through connecting Addis with the different regions to bring vast 
territories under government control.119 The first telephone was established between 
his finance office and the imperial palace and the first telegraph was used between 
Harar and Addis in the late 1800s. This priority of using the media to consolidate 
power domestically is different than Haile Selassie who emphasised communicating 
with the outside world.
The earliest publications, like those across much of Africa, centred on 
religious texts and, in the case of Eritrea, news for and by the colonial power in 
Italian.120 The government paper Aemero, established in 1902 by a Greek and 
meaning ‘intelligence’, is credited as being the first Amharic newspaper in Ethiopia.
119 GARTLEY, J. (1982) The Role of the Media in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Ethiopia Conference. 
Washington DC.
120 Publications such as Corriere Eritreo, founded in 1891, and L'Eritreo and Bollettino Officiate della 
colonia Eritrea, founded the following years were also available in Ethiopia. Several papers in French 
also appeared contemporaneously in Ethiopia at the turn of the 20th century including the Bulletin de la 
Leproserie de Harar, which soon became Le Semeur d ’Ethiopia, was published in Harar by the French 
Franciscans and edited by the Priest. The paper was mostly in French with a few items in Amharic. 
PANKHURST, R. (1962) The Foundation of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production, 
Libraries and Literacy in Ethiopia. Ethiopia Observer.
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The first copies, of which there were 24,121 were handwritten. A copying machine, 
however, was soon obtained and 200 copies were published. The first printing press 
did not arrive until 1906, several years after Emperor Menelik agreed to provide one 
to facilitate the production of the paper. While Aemero was certainly not clear of 
government control, an editorial on March 11, 1907 (EC) suggests that the paper did 
aspire to some sort of independent editorial policy: “[S]ince its very origin, the paper 
has maintained a non-partisan stand and does not promote the interest of any one 
group. This freedom is used to serve the country and not to publish anything I 
like.”122 Some have even suggested that by the mid- 1930s Aemero was acting as “a 
reactionary or opposition organ to the Regent’s papers”.123 Nevertheless, demand for 
the paper was initially slow and mostly driven by the government as part of a 
modernisation process.
In 1923, as part of this broader process of modernising the state, Haile 
Selassie established Berhana Salem (‘light and peace’) printing press, which still 
operates today and is the major printer in Ethiopia. Since its founding, Berhana 
Salem has been responsible for printing books, newspapers and government gazettes. 
In the same year it opened, a paper bearing the name of the press was printed. It is 
estimated by 1925 there were at least three weekly papers being published in Addis: 
Aemero, Berhana Salam and Courrier d ’Ethiopie.124
By the time of the Italian invasion in 1936 there were seven printing presses in 
Addis Ababa and at least an equal number of newspapers, four of which were in 
Amharic, two in French and one in Italian. There were a number of other 
publications that attempted to gain a foothold in the small market during this period, 
particularly in the Greek community.
With the invasion and occupation, the newspaper industry ceased to expand 
and existing publications were suspended and replaced with the production and 
distribution of fascist propaganda. In some places, such as Harar and Jimma, printing
121 Though Gartley suggests there were only twelve. See GARTLEY, J. (1982) The Role of the Media 
in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Ethiopia Conference. Washington DC. p. 92.
122 BONSA, S. (2000) Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for 
Social Studies.
123 C.F. Rey, quoted in PANKHURST, R. (1962) The Foundation of Education, Printing, Newspapers, 
Book Production, Libraries and Literacy in Ethiopia. Ethiopia Observer, p. 271.
124 Ibid. p. 271.
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presses were destroyed or taken over by the occupying forces. Whatever slight 
budding of independent papers that had begun in Ethiopia was completely replaced 
with propaganda published in both Italian and Amharic and including titles such as 
Corner delVImpero, Corrier Eritrea, Somalia Fascista, and Ye Qesar Mengist 
Meliktagne, among others (and in some cases imported from Italy such as Difesa 
della Razza).
Since there was no space for dissent within Ethiopia, a number of vibrant and 
influential publications were established internationally to challenge the fascist 
occupation. These were primarily in English and were intended to galvanise 
international support against the Italian occupation and improve understanding of the 
Ethiopian people and cause. The most famous of these publications was the New 
Times and Ethiopia News, which was published by Sylvia Pankhurst, a well-known 
British suffragette leader who later moved to Ethiopia and became a close confident 
of Haile Selassie.125 Pankhurst used strong rhetoric and propaganda centred on the 
anti-fascist struggle. Although she was usually responsible for writing most of the 
articles in the weekly magazine, it soon developed a pan-African role as its articles 
were reproduced in countries from South Africa to Nigeria and it hosted contributions 
from emerging leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta.126 Initially, the 
New Times and Ethiopia News proved awkward for the British government as it 
included interviews with Haile Selassie who was in exile in the UK and the British 
wanted to downplay his presence to prevent further damage of relations with Italy. 
Despite that the magazine appeared on a stop-list of publications in the UK, it had an 
important role in focusing international attention on the situation in Ethiopia.127
Haile Selassie was soon reinstated as Emperor with the help of the British 
after Italy entered the Second World War on Hitler’s side. After regaining control of 
Ethiopia, the Emperor went about significantly trying to expand the newspaper 
industry both to reap the powers of propaganda as well as to use it as a tool of 
modernisation (and similarly to demonstrate a ‘modem’ Ethiopia). The radio in
125 In 1956, New Times and Ethiopia News became Ethiopia Observer, which was published by S. 
Pankhurst in both Ethiopia and Britain.
126 Interview: Richard Pankhurst, Ethiopian scholar and founder of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 
Addis Ababa University.
127 PANKHURST, R. (2003) Sylvia Pankhurst: Counsel fo r Ethiopia, Hollywood, Tsehai Publishers.
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particular was a new tool for his empire and for the first time many of his subjects
were able to hear his voice. The idea of a central, powerful state grew, as he was able
to communicate directly with remote parts of a vast and mountainous country.
Haile Selassie also set about expanding the press that he had begun to
cultivate before the Italian invasion. In 1941 the government established Addis
Zemen that was published weekly by the Ministry of Pen, what was later to become
the Ministry of Information. Addis Zemen was followed by its English counterpart
The Ethiopian Herald in 1943. One of the first editorials in Addis Zemen illustrates
the motivations behind the papers:
This newspaper [Addis Zemen] was established with the permission of His 
Imperial Majesty to explain to the people about what they should do for their 
country, for their king and for His government. Its duties are defined in three 
terms: truth, service and freedom.... Service refers to the paper’s 
responsibility to serve the government of the beloved king of kings who has 
sacrificed and suffered so much for his country and his people in a way no 
man had done before.128
Both the press and the radio served as important tools in asserting and publicising the 
Emperor’s power after the devastating occupation.129
1.2 American Influence
While the media infrastructure did not have the same intensive international 
involvement of many of its colonised counterparts, there was still substantial financial 
assistance from the UK and US for purchasing equipment, training journalists through 
organisations such as the Thompson Foundation, and sending North American and 
British journalists to work temporarily in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Herald, for 
example, was established in 1943 and was first edited by Ian H. Simpson from 
England who was praised for bringing ‘editorial elegance’ and ‘writing to a new level 
of excellence’.130
128 BONSA, S. (2000) Survey o f the Private Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for 
Social Studies.
129 Despite two changes in governments, both these papers are still around and today and have not 
changed dramatically in either layout or quality of content.
130 WOLDE-MARIAM, Y. (2003) Brief Autobiography and Selected Articles, Addis Ababa, Artistic 
Printing Enterprise, p. 84.
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Most significant, however, was the American interest in Ethiopia, both 
strategically and sentimentally.131 Because Ethiopia successfully resisted colonisation, 
a number of African Americans took a particular interest in the country and traveled 
to Addis ready to assist. Dr. David A. Talbot, an African American, took over the 
position of editor-in-chief of The Ethiopian Herald in 1945 and stayed until I960.132 
During this period several other key positions were also held by African Americans 
and, according to Yacob Wolde-Mariam, a journalist at The Ethiopian Herald at the 
time, the paper became “a mirror image of its American counterparts, particularly on 
issues of international relations”.133 In the 1960s a number of Americans served as 
advisors and those in the Ministry of Information even started a short-lived magazine 
critical of some of the government’s policies called the Addis Reporter.
The United States Information Service (USIS), the American Embassy and the 
Peace Corps were also involved in shaping the media. A representative from USIS, 
for example, would regularly visit The Ethiopian Herald and bring news and reports 
the agency thought should go in the paper. Peace Corps volunteers were also involved 
through either submitting their own articles or training journalists to write articles that 
were favorable to the American way of life or the ‘free world’. And the US 
Ambassador would have regular ‘fireside chats’ for Ethiopian journalists where the 
US position on issues would be explained. Some local journalists went so far to refer 
to The Ethiopian Herald as the ‘American Herald’ for its strong connections and pro- 
US leanings.134
1.3 Journalism education in America and expanding the circle
At the same time, some journalism students were sent abroad to study by the 
Emperor to create a foreign-educated intelligentsia that would modernise his 
bureaucracy. Many of these journalists went to the United States and returned
131 In 1943 the US established a military listening station, Kagnew, in Eritrea. It was one of the most 
important intelligence bases for the US during the Cold War and was a reason why the US supported 
the incorporation of Eritrea into greater Ethiopia as they believed that this station would be more likely 
to continue its important operations with the loyal support of Haile Selassie. The station was closed in 
1973. For more information and stories from those that were stationed at the base, see 
http://www.kagnewstation.com/
132 William Steen, another American briefly edited the paper for a year after Simpson.
133 WOLDE-MARIAM, Y. (2003) Brief Autobiography and Selected Articles, Addis Ababa, Artistic 
Printing Enterprise, p. 73.
134 Ibid. p. 92.
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supportive of the American political agenda. But they also returned with new ideas
about journalism and political reform. Negash Gebre Mariam, for example, studied 
journalism at Montana State University and returned to take up a position at the 
Ministry of Information in 1953 (EC). He was one of the first editors of Addis 
Zemen and, in an environment where pre-publication censorship was mandatory and 
the paper was aimed at glorifying the Emperor and explaining his policies to his 
subjects, Negash struggled to implement the ideals of journalism he had learned in 
America. Under Haile Selassie’s rule Addis Zemen and The Ethiopian Herald, like 
Radio Ethiopia, were also dominated and controlled by priests. He thus had to 
struggle with a staff that was largely comprised of “priests who spent most of their 
time glorifying the Emperor”.135 The Orthodox Church felt so strongly about the 
power the news media could have over the population that they had even argued that 
they should be given the power to completely run the radio station.136
At the same time, however, Negash found some space for introducing new 
ideas, albeit very slowly. As he describes:
You couldn’t criticise the government at all. You could criticise the 
provincial officials or you could criticise a few smaller people but not the real 
problems to do with the policies - important agricultural [issues, or the] court 
systems.... But I was the editor and as an editor I was supposed to be given a 
certain chance to select what we write. They let you write it but then you had 
to show it to the censorship office and if the man looks and says no, this is 
not good, you can’t do much. You can’t be angry and leave because there is 
no other press. There’s only a government press, and you are making a 
living so you had to work together. But.. .little by little you can nibble if  you 
like...
For example, when I got there I was told you cannot put an article on 
the front page that is reserved for the Emperor, but it was not actually a solid 
story, just commentary: the Emperor has done this and that, the Emperor has 
been at this and that school.... Nothing else should be put there except the 
Emperor’s photograph. This was the policy so when I came there I was 
puzzled- unless you put a few good articles that people can read on front 
page, unless you put some impressive photographs, how can you attract 
readers? How can you communicate? So I said OK, I’ll put my editorial on 
the front page although according to my training in America, you have to 
have the editorial, your opinion on another page and put the important news 
on the front of it. But I started by putting the editorial there, then.... 
eventually, slowly I started putting a little news at the bottom. You have to 
build slowly.137
135 Interview: Negash Gebre-Mariam.
136 GARTLEY, J. (1994) Control of Media and Concept of Image by Haile Selassie I. Societe Francais 
pour les etudes Ethiopiennes, 1,649-654.
137 Interview: Gebre-Mariam.
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While Negash talks of slowly widening the circle, other journalists of this period have 
argued that “the advent of real censorship of the Ethiopian mass media did not come 
into existence until 1961”.138 There certainly was censorship prior to this, but using 
this small space to slowly and delicately expand the circle would prove to be a 
significant differentiating factor between the media under Haile Selassie’s regime and 
the subsequent military government of the Derg.
1.4. The student movement
While journalists like Negash were trying to expand the space for free debate 
in the government media, universities, particularly during the period of the student 
movement, were providing an alternative space in which new publications could 
emerge, students could experiment with different arguments and where there was a 
relative tolerance of free expression.139 The arrival of African scholarship students 
from across the continent facilitated the growth of the publications as these students 
had some experience with critical and vibrant student publications in their own 
countries and encouraged the Ethiopian students.140 Many of the Ethiopian students, 
however, were concerned with negotiating the thin cultural line between ‘criticism’ 
and ‘insult’, which were often regarded as the same. The intelligentsia also supported 
the idea that criticising someone’s ideas was essentially attacking the individual.141
In 1959 Kenyan scholarship student Omogi Calleb started the first critical and 
outspoken publication, Campus Star. This paper did not survive long but challenged 
the authorities and argued that the Ethiopian student body was too apathetic. The 
Ethiopian-run official student paper, the Newsletter, soon accepted this criticism and
138 1961 was the year of an attempted coup. WOLDE-MARIAM, Y. (2003) Brief Autobiography and 
Selected Articles, Addis Ababa, Artistic Printing Enterprise, p. 85.
139 The first student magazine was published in 1952 but was shortly discontinued because of lack of 
interest. Students complained that they were already overburdened with work and did not seem to feel 
that there was a need for a student paper. As, Balsvik argued: “It was acknowledged that college 
students should have a paper, but the purpose of such an undertaking was far from clear, and the 
students only had vague ideas of what it should be” BALSVIK, R. R. (2005) Haile Selassie's Students: 
The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1974, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa 
University Press, p. 71.
140 This was part of Haile Selassie’s project relating to the Organization of African Unity and an effort 
to make Ethiopia, and Addis Ababa, the capital of the continent.
141 BALSVIK, R. R. (2005) Haile Selassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to 
Revolution, 1952-1974, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press, p. 74.
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began including a section of “news and views” referring to the “most important duty 
of a paper—that is, the expression of one’s thoughts and ideas”.142 The Newsletter 
believed that the authorities should have the right to monitor and oversee the paper 
and that a free and unregulated press would lead to chaos.
The students did not really support ‘free’ publications until the well-known
Struggle magazine in the late 1960s that was published by the Union of the University
Students in Addis Ababa (USUAA). Struggle is one of the most important magazines
in Ethiopia’s history, although relatively little is known about it and copies are not
readily available. It carried some key articles that spurred the student movement and
encouraged dissent against Haile Selassie’s government. The purpose of the magazine
was to debate political and social issues and to continue
condemning injustice, oppression, feudalism, semi-colonialism, neo­
colonialism, imperialism and all the rest of the social evils wherever and 
whenever they exist... we cannot afford to be indifferent in such a society as 
ours which is engulfed by all the social problems of a stagnant society.143
Due to administrative constraints and controversy among the faculty advisors, the 
magazine was published erratically and closed in 1969. Nevertheless, it set the trend 
for the papers that followed and encouraged both academic freedom and the idea that 
the student movement should be “responsible for the political education of the
"  144masses .
After the failed coup d'etat against Haile Selassie in 1960, the student 
movement developed into the core of national dissent and adopted a strong Marxist- 
Leninist ideology favoring the experiences of Bolshevik Russia and Maoist China as 
well as the lessons of Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara. Debates centred on land rights 
and the ‘nationalities question’ including issues of ‘self-determination up to 
secession’. The students argued that a revolution was needed to transform the 
imperialist feudal state and replace it with a modem system capable of functioning in 
the present day. Within the student movement a substantial group believed that class 
interests had to form the basis of the struggle against the imperial regime, while there 
were a number of groups that placed ethnic struggle at the centre of their agenda.
142 Ibid. p. 75.
143 Ibid. p. 168.
144 Ibid. p. 178.
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The Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), along with a number of other 
ethnically based insurgencies, emerged out of the student movement.145 While at 
university, Tigrayan students had the opportunity to compare the situation in their 
native region with the living standards in other parts of the country and increasingly 
were convinced that the situation in Tigray was the most dismal. The Tigrayan 
students formed a number of groups including the Tigrayan University Students’ 
Association (TUSA) and the Tigrayan National Organisation (TNO) that focused 
primarily on debating political ideology as well as mobilising intellectuals and 
students in Tigray. Their commitment to a dynamic role in the effort to overthrow 
Haile Selassie’s regime had less to do with restoring Tigrayan political hegemony 
than with issues of cultural hegemony and environmental degradation, as well as 
social and political problems.146
A number of publications were circulating at this time, many of which were 
aligned with particular ethnic or political groups.147 In Addis, for example, TUSA 
established a number of newspapers to communicate its agenda including Etek (To 
arms!) and Dimtsi Bihere Tigray (Voice of the Tigrayan Nation). They were 
distributed free of charge and had a role in increasing agitation for change and 
broadening engagement, primarily among the literate class. The students also 
organised demonstrations and encouraged protest songs and slogans among the 
peasantry. Popular songs were sung on special occasions such as weddings or 
religious holidays as well as routinely during fanning. These songs communicated 
the ideas of the forthcoming struggle and expressed deep anger towards the difficult 
conditions across the region.
Many of the TPLF’s future leaders were from the student movement and were 
involved in the propaganda campaigns. As the regime of Haile Selassie began to
145 Aside from the TPLF, other prominent groups emerged during Mengistu’s time and from the 
student movement including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). They often had mixed objectives regarding 
issues of sovereignty: the EPLF was fighting for Eritrean independence whilst the OLF was divided 
over greater representation within Ethiopia and independence.
146 BERHE, A. (2004) The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. African Affairs, 103, 569- 
592.
147 Markakis and Ayele have an interesting discussion on some of the publications that contributed to 
the 1974 revolution. Leaflets were popular in Addis Ababa and were often targeting the soldiers in an 
effort to encourage a rebellion. For more on this, see MARKAKIS, J. & AYELE, N. (2006) Class and 
Revolution in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Shama pp. 103-116.
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decline, it was through popular action that students and the intelligentsia succeeded in 
establishing a new space for the print media primarily as a vehicle for anti- 
government discourse and opposition politics.
1.5 The Derg's press
The February Revolution of 1974 swiftly overturned the Emperor, disbanding 
the feudal system and monarchical structure and replacing them with the Derg, a 
military regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. During this transition many of the 
student papers continued publishing and flourished.148 In some respects this period is 
analogous to what is often referred to as ‘the golden age’ of Ugandan journalism, the 
period immediately after colonialism. The lifting of censorship in Ethiopia 
encouraged a vibrant press, including titles such as Democracia, Labader, Struggle, 
Goh and Ye Sefiw Hizb Dimts that dynamically contributed to debates on issues of 
democracy, governance and economic development. The majority of the papers at the 
time, however, primarily catered to particular political groups and sympathisers.
These publications did not survive long as Mengistu’s attitude towards the 
independent press proved harsher than Haile Selassie’s. Independent papers were 
largely eliminated, although a few survived periodically as underground publications 
and some began publishing from the diaspora.
However, the effects of the debates that occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s 
have had extraordinary longevity and continue to play themselves out in current 
political clashes and ideological divisions, including in the newspapers. Current 
leaders, from the opposition and the government, as well as many prominent 
journalists were members of the student movement. And there were some trends put 
in place under Haile Selassie that would carry through to Mengistu’s time. Like 
Menelik and Haile Selassie, Mengistu was concerned with the nationality question 
and used Amharisation as a solution for dealing with the country’s diverse population. 
Establishing Amharic as the language of unity and education was a major priority for 
the Emperor and something for which he sought to harness the power of the media.
148 Similar to the ways in which the present EPRDF government has sought to disrupt student 
mobilization at the universities, the ruling regime would shut the schools and colleges in an effort to 
disperses the students and weaken their resolve with little success.
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While Gartley notes that this agenda was less articulated than the more precise and 
central objective of projecting a positive image of the Emperor within Ethiopia and to 
the outside world, utilising the media for education and fostering a united sense of 
Ethiopianess was a project that was continued more explicitly and earnestly under 
Mengistu.149
Within the government media initially there was little change except that 
journalists were expected to shift their discussions from the Emperor to the Derg’s 
political agenda and were ‘re-educated’. Ato Negash, head of Ethiopian Radio at the 
time, recalls that
The existing problems, they continued to exist. Instead of saying the 
Emperor has done this and that, it was the Derg has done this. They would 
come and tell you in the office, now look, you are following different 
ideology. This is socialism, no longer feudalism, in socialism, we give 
importance to the proletariat, to the peasant and you have to say that the 
government is being run by the proletariat now.... Some of the programmes 
they didn’t change, like the musical programme, except they added slogans 
and...some political jingles. They also used to have a discussion club. Every 
week, in some places even more, a government officer would come and talk 
to you about what socialism is, what its principles are, how the people live 
.. .what the role of the rich is.150
There was also a shift from looking to the US to the USSR for guidance in running a
paper. Students began going to the USSR for further education and to learn how the
media worked there. Similarly, Russian journalists would come to Ethiopia and
explain how a newspaper was supposed to operate. Negash describes the change:
The Russian officials used to make speeches when they were invited to come. 
They were not teachers to teach you Russian journalism. During Haile 
Selassie’s time there were trainers...some people who’d come from the 
United States mostly [which] would send 4 or 5 people for 6 months - one 
person teachers how to be a reporter, and other how to write commentary... 
and on ethics. But the Russians they didn’t come in and do this thing, they 
simply made speeches.151
At the same time, the journalists who were returning from Russia were often trained 
in everything but journalism. Amare Aregawi struggled to work with these 
journalists after the fall of the Derg and noted that
149 GARTLEY, J. (1982) The Role of the Media in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Ethiopia Conference. 
Washington DC.
150 Interview: Gebre-Mariam.
151 Interview: Gebre-Mariam.
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Nobody was going to the West to learn journalism because they were the 
enemy of the government. There were some people who were going to the 
East. They would come back with a Masters degree in journalism from 
Russia or Yugoslavia. They spent seven years in the Soviet Union to get a 
Masters degree in journalism, but for two years they would learn Russian, 
one year they would learn political economy, another year they would learn 
Marxism, Leninism. They would spend two years in Uzbekistan but they 
didn’t learn journalism... and they’ve earned a Masters degree!152
As is often the case, the relationship between the government and journalists was 
complex. Some journalists supported the Derg, but others were not quite clear or 
chose to be ambivalent.
1Mairegu Bezabih, for example, edited Addis Zemen until he was removed
after he had problems with the Minister, and while he admits “it was hard because
anything could be misinterpreted” he also acknowledges that
We were all enthusiastic that a new event was unfolding. I was editing the 
largest national newspaper.... At the revolution the social outlook was 
transformed. The question was could one fit into the revolution; if they 
couldn’t, they left. I stayed to see how things would develop and I don’t 
regret it. During my university days we were exposed to Marxist-Leninism 
and what it means to be a Marxist journalist. We didn’t like some things that 
were happening but everyone was enthusiastic. Marxist journalism was 
socialist-oriented journalism. We were just serving a system that was more 
socialist oriented.... Class analysis was the major issue so we had to look at 
everything from a class perspective.154
Mairegu, like most of his colleagues, many who were active in the private press until 
recently, now strongly condemns the Derg’s destructive violence. But it took time for 
the atrocities to become clear. During the Derg, the situation often appeared 
muddled, complex and the real brutality of the government was not always obvious, 
particularly in the countryside.
For many journalists, along with much of the society in general, survival 
became the key, overriding concern. Journalistic ideals and aspirations (if they ever 
existed), or the desire to change things slowly as Negash described, were often 
secondary. Partly this was because of the strict punishment for errors, as Negash 
explains:
152 Interview: Amare Aregawi.
153 Mairegu assumed the editorship of Addis Zemen after Negash, and similar to Negash he studied 
abroad. His first degree was in politics from Johns Hopkins, USA and he studied journalism with the 
support of the Thompson Foundation in Cardiff, UK.
15 Interview: Mairegu Bezabih.
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During Haile Selassie’s time, if you commit a mistake and this happens very 
often in the paper, either intentionally or without knowing, you could be 
pardoned. But during the Derg there wasn’t such a thing. You make a 
mistake, you will be shot. There was no middle way. During the Emperor’s 
time you couldn’t commit mistakes because there is censorship, but if you 
did, a Minister intervened. If you were an editor they’d say, ‘oh this fellow 
does a good job, but it was a mistake you know’, so the Emperor would 
pardon him. At the worst, he could be removed from the government, radio 
or television but you could hardly be shot.155
Many Ethiopians, and journalists, felt trapped during the Derg. If you tried to get out
of the system, you raised suspicions so the most you could do was wait it out and
hope not to be killed for some reason, perhaps unbeknownst. As Negash describes:
My sole training was in journalism. Getting a job was not so easy for me. I 
don’t know business. I don’t know any other thing really, and I have a 
family, and I couldn’t have done it really. I didn’t want also to... raise a
But Negash was soon forced out.
They called and told me, as of next month you are retired, you’ll get a 
retirement pension. I thanked them; they gave me my small pension, I took 
that and I left. The important thing was you got out of this revolution, you 
had to survive that Holocaust, whatever happened.... [But] I was only fifty- 
two when they did this, so what to do? I would go out and go around and ask 
some churches whether they want to put out a magazine for a holiday to get a 
little money. I used to work for other people now and then and so I survived 
with a little bit and then I taught in a private school.... So I would get my 
daily bread by doing that sort of thing for some time. It was bad. But I lived. 
The only thing is I survived. It could have been worse.157
Just as working under Idi Amin was the most difficult period for Uganda journalists, 
the Mengistu period was the worst for Ethiopian journalists. If the Derg did not kill 
you, you struggled to survive unless you were a strong party member.
1.6 Media of the liberation front
Parallel to the government and party media during Mengistu’s time was the 
media of the rebel groups including that of the TPLF and the Eritrean Peoples 
Liberation Front (EPLF). One way of understanding the development of the press
155 Interview: Negash.
156 Interview: Gebre-Mariam.
157 Interview: Gebre-Mariam.
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system under the EPRDF is to examine the way in which the guerrilla leaders in the 
bush thought about the media.158
The TPLF had a strong propaganda arm that took lessons from the EPLF. 
Amare Aregawi was central to the media efforts in the bush, although characteristic 
with the ideology of the struggle, he downplays his contribution and individual 
efforts. Amare joined the struggle during the student movement along with many of 
his colleagues. After being imprisoned by the Derg for a year, he decided that it was 
too dangerous to stay in Addis and left for the bush. He did not have experience in the 
media but enjoyed writing so he soon shifted from working on the TPLF’s political 
agenda to the media.159 Building upon their experience as students at AAU, the TPLF 
leadership made newspapers the first medium to announce their war. The targets of 
the propaganda throughout the struggle were both domestic and international.160
The newspapers started in the late 1970s and the message was clear. As 
Amare describes:
More or less you’d say it was propaganda.... To be honest at the time it was 
not a question of balance. This way or that way, you have to tell the bad 
things of the Derg: it’s a military government, a fascist government, no 
democracy, no freedom, you can’t talk in your language161.... The papers 
would try to take the people out of the government and then to organise them 
against the Derg and so you... generally would focus saying the Derg was 
bad, the Cubans were bad, the Soviet Union is bad, everybody must fight for 
democracy.162
The papers attempted to be as realistic and accurate as possible as to what was going 
on in the bush in an effort to gain the confidence and trust of their readers and, 
eventually, listeners. Despite this, however, they were not aspiring to western 
journalistic norms - it was considered to be the time for propaganda.
Until 1985, the TPLF shared the EPLF’s radio station, but after a political 
disagreement the TPLF started its own station, The Voice o f the Rebellion, and the 
radio became the centrepiece of its propaganda strategy. From its base in Tigray it
158 Too often the media environments in countries under study are looked at in a uni-linear way (e.g. 
the media under Mengistu led to the media under Meles ignoring the formation of both the media as 
instruments and media policy that the new government was pursuing simultaneously to the government 
media).
159 Interview: Aregawi.
160 STYAN, D. (1999) Misrepresenting Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa? Constraints and Dilemmas of 
Current Reporting. IN ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) The Media of Conflict. London, Zed. p. 294.
161 Referring to the Derg’s Amharicization policy.
162 Interview: Aregawi.
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had a reach across much of the country, with clear reception in Addis and Nazareth,
and even parts of Southern Sudan. The radio programmes were initially broadcast 
only in Tigrinya, but as the struggle gained momentum they were also broadcast in 
Amharic and Oromifa.
TPLF supporters contributed money to buy the station and its generators. The 
entire propaganda system had to be protected within caves. As Amare describes “We 
would build houses inside the mountains and not only for the radio station. We were 
working on the newspapers and printing our newspapers inside of the caves... We had 
a printing press and we had computers.” Running a media outfit in the bush was 
extremely difficult but it is characteristic of the struggle and how the TPLF fought 
one of the longest guerrilla struggles of this period. A lengthy comment by Amare 
captures some of this:
The most interesting and challenging thing was to run a radio 
station... because there were planes that would come and bomb you... so you 
always have to move the radio station. But since we had the radio station, 
[despite that] there was a lot of bombing it never stopped... it was never 
interrupted.
You wouldn’t say [the radio station was] portable, but we made it 
portable ourselves. Whether it was by donkeys or camels it had to be 
portable. You know what we used to do was for example we had two metre 
bands and (I don’t think that the Cubans or the Russians even understood it) 
when there was a big campaign coming, [the Derg] would gather some 
information through personal spies or maybe technology - where the radio 
waves are coming from, so they would target that area to destroy the radio 
station. What we used to do was, out of the two-meter bands, we would take 
one of the metre bands out and we would install it again in a very safe place
somewhere, where we would plan to go when the enemy comes So when
that one starts, this one stops and then we take back this one on the camels 
and donkeys again. When the enemy comes, they thought the radio station 
was here but still they are here and still the radio works. They think they 
were wrong, but they were not wrong, it was there. They never thought we 
would separate the two metre bands.
Sometimes we had a problem with the antenna. So for example in 
the Simian mountain station area, there are some very long straight hollow 
plants, so we had to put the antenna inside those plants. So out of 1000 
plants, it is very difficult for the enemy to know in which plant the antenna is.
In some places, for example, at one time, we had to go to the 
mountains where there is snow and it’s cold, we had to wear gloves, we 
looked like Eskimos. It was amazing. It was a new experience for us. We 
were going to turn on the radio station at seven o’clock in the morning. We 
had to get up at three after midnight and start a fire, you had to heat the 
generator first, keep it warm. So for two hours you had to warm the
163 Interview: Aregawi.
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generator and the generator would work and then after an hour you’d have 
the radio station.164
The TPLF was skillful and had substantial access to external technical support and 
international supporters. Sometimes these supporters would send materials and 
equipment or provide opportunities for training. British photographers, for example, 
visited and provided training to aspiring journalists.
In contrast to the technical advances of the TPLF in the bush, it was surprising
how little progress the Derg made. After becoming the new head of Ethiopian
Television under the EPRDF, Amare noted the extent to which the TPLF was
technologically superior,
When I was at Ethiopian television I couldn’t find a single new 
videocassette... There were no computers ready.... So the television was 
running on erasing other tapes. That had never been an issue for us out in the 
bush.... We had so many videocassettes from all over the world. We had lots 
of copies, lots of printing facilities, videos, and generators...165
The TPLF also sought international support for their war by bringing journalists from 
Africa and elsewhere to Tigray to report back. Many foreign journalists had difficulty 
placing their articles on the struggle in papers since the Western press was 
preoccupied with famines and the role of international NGOs. It is now obvious that 
during this period there was a great lack of political analysis and understanding of the 
liberation front in Tigray as well as the underlying factors that were contributing to 
the conflict.166 Many both inside and outside Ethiopia were not expecting the success 
that the TPLF had in managing to defeat the largest army in Africa that enjoyed 
Soviet support. In 1991 the EPRDF came to power and brought with it new media 
policies influenced by its time in the bush.
164 Interview: Aregawi.
165 Interview: Aregawi.
166 YOUNG, J. (1997) Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 5- 
7.
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2. The press under the EPRDF
When the EPRDF arrived in Addis, and the transitional government took over,
the media environment was almost immediately liberalised. Similar to the situation in
Uganda under Museveni, the EPRDF wanted to show that it was different from its
oppressive predecessors but the liberalisation was also taken in response to internal
and external pressure. Just as the Derg had begun to realise in 1987 that it had to
adapt to the changing environment and adopt a new constitution, the EPRDF on its
way to Addis was told by the Americans that its brand of Marxist-Leninism would not
be advisable. The EPRDF also recognised that if it wanted to have a form of
Revolutionary Democracy,168 space for dissent would help legitimise it.169 Despite
critics who argue that the EPRDF really did not believe in the principle of an open
media, Bereket Simon, the former Minister of Information,170 argued
We wanted the people to feel free, to believe in themselves. To see that 
governments can be criticised if it’s well founded [and] to show that 
governments are accountable to the public and that they are bound to be 
criticised if they make mistakes. We wanted to show we were a tolerant
171government.
To clamp down on freedom of expression in the early stages, Bereket argued, would 
“be a risky choice. If we restricted them, people wouldn’t feel free”.172 In 1992 the 
government passed a press law that allowed for substantial and significant new 
freedoms for the media.
167 Under significant pressure by a faltering Russia and discontent population, the Derg had been forced 
to draft a new democratic constitution for the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Freedom of 
the press was inserted as article 49 in 1987, but it was never implemented.
168 This is a central political philosophy of the EPRDF and has largely been elaborated by Meles. It will 
be further explained in Chapter 9.
169 In 1992, Dima Noggo, the first Minister of Information for the Transitional Government noted that 
“A country’s democratic tradition, and a government’s democratic credentials, are today being 
measured by how much the press and the media in general are free.” Noggo appeared acutely aware 
that press standards are key indicators of democracy for rich countries who provide acceptance and 
legitimacy. NOGGO, D. (1992) Keynote Speech. Seminar on the Role of the Press in a Democratic 
Society. Addis Ababa.
170 Until 2005 Bereket Simon was the Minister of Information. He is a close confident of the Prime 
Minister and controversial Member of Parliament from the Amhara region (in the first election results 
he lost his seat but in a re-vote he regained it). Bereket is now head of the EPRDF Political Department 
but he continues to wield tremendous influence over the government media structure as a whole. He 
remains Chairman of the Board of the Ethiopian Press Agency.
171 Interview: Bereket Simon.
172 Interview: Simon.
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The government did not anticipate the response it received.173 Bereket notes 
they were “surprised that it wasn’t people that were against the previous regime but it 
was Derg leaders, etc... that they found their way to control the private press”.174 
Despite Bereket’s claims, it was not only ‘Derg leaders’ that began private 
newspapers. A significant part of the population, particularly in the capital city, was 
wary of the ethnically grounded EPRDF and skeptical of their democratic claims; thus 
some of these individuals also entered the press.
The media strategy (to the extent that one did exist) was heavily influenced 
and driven by political objectives. This was in part because the government did not 
have a clear strategy, but it was also due to incompetence and the inherent difficulties 
in reforming a large bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Information. Additionally, 
the government ended up approaching the independent press in a similar way that it 
did the arguments of its critics, the calls for national reconciliation conferences and 
the critiques of the proposed constitution — by ignoring it. The government’s strategy 
will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 but as background, the following sections will 
probe into the development and role of three sections of the press: the government 
press, the anti-government press and the government-leaning ‘gray zone’ press.
2.1 The Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen
While the propaganda strategy the TPLF employed in the bush was effective 
for its purposes, the continuation of such propaganda has proved counterproductive, 
particularly in recent years. The two major government dailies, The Ethiopian Herald 
and Addis Zemen, have a small circulation and are unanimously regarded as failures 
(including by their staff). The Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen are similar and
173 Tellingly Minister Noggo argued:
Today the mass media in America is a . .. very powerful institution. It makes and 
unmakes leaders, and has tremendous influence on public opinion as well as the 
government. It’s becoming so powerful has to however be worrying, for any 
powerful institution has reasons to protect its power and corporate interests, from 
others. In the end freedom must be jealously protected and guarded from the 
powerful. There is the saying that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely”. Hence if the press itself becomes too powerful, it may also abuse its 
power. For now and in our case, this danger does not exist. Ours is a struggle to 
implement principles which are taken for granted in many parts of the world... 
NOGGO, D. (1992) Keynote Speech. Seminar on the Role o f the Press in a 
Democratic Society. Addis Ababa, p. 10
174 Interview: Simon.
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many articles from Addis Zemen are simply translated into English for The Ethiopian
Herald. According to Wondimkun Alayou, editor-in-chief of Addis Zemen, the
objectives of his paper are:
(1) to serve the public, the political parties and the government.... (2) to make 
consensus on development issues. We ask leaders and entertain different 
ideas on development issues. We don’t have a business agenda but a 
development agenda. In private newspapers you don’t find articles on the 
MDGs. (3) to allow the public to express their opinions through letters to the 
editor; and (4) to serve civic associations.175
The objectives of The Ethiopian Herald are similar and the content focuses on issues 
about development and includes topics from tourism and investment to women.
The four government papers, including the weekly Al Alam in Arabic and 
Barifa in Oromifa, are under the supervision of the Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA) 
that is headed by Kefyalew Azeze, an EPRDF cadre and political appointee. The EPA 
has a board of ten members that is elected by the parliament every five years. Bereket 
Simon is presently chairman of the board and was also chairman while he was 
Minister of Information. Technically he is accountable to the head of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Information and Culture, although the extent to which 
this actually happens is debatable. This has been a contentious issue at the 
government papers because there is a consensus that the papers legitimately do aspire 
to be independent and to be led by independent bodies, but this has been hampered by 
the present structure.
Kefyalew is directly responsible for the editorial content of all the newspapers
and the editors are accountable to him. He ensures that all articles are within the
editorial policy. If a government official wants an editorial, then he or she will
approach Kefyalew. Journalists at the papers take their cues from his office. During
the elections, for example, Dejene Tesemma the editor of The Ethiopian Herald,
noted a point that was reiterated in many interviews, that criticism of the government
or supporting the opposition
would not be accepted if it was printed. It was not explicitly said not to print 
the other views but you know. There is no apparent policy but every Friday 
an editorial comes from the Ministry of Information that explains the 
government stand on current issues. In these they use certain adjectives. 
Once the legal process started we refrained from the adjectives. But before
175 Interview: Wondimkun Aleyou.
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we used lots of adjectives. We used it because it reflects the government 
views. When they use these words, we do. It’s not journalistically fair and 
right but journalists want to please the officials.... Ownership matters.176
Despite government ownership, journalists from these papers face great difficulties 
getting information from the government.177 In some cases they have to wait three 
months before they can get the information requested from a government ministry 
even when Kefyalew tries a ‘top down’ approach of telling the Minister that the 
journalists want to have access to interview someone in their department.
2.7.7 Reforming the government press
The difficulty of increasing circulation and improving the quality of the papers 
stems in part from the organisational structure of the EPA. Both papers are primarily 
distributed to government offices and embassies and are available for sale only in a 
limited number of shops. There are some private subscribers most of which are 
businesses interested in the government tenders that are advertised. The revenues of 
the papers go directly back to the government. During interviews, both editors of The 
Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen were unaware of how much profit they earn 
although they believed that the money they made through advertisements exceeded 
the printing costs. This arrangement is problematic: the editors do not have the right 
to invest profits and the only way they can access funds is to ask the parliament for an 
increase in the annual budget, a request which is rarely accepted. But, as the case of 
the Ugandan paper The New Vision will suggest in Chapter 7, even for government 
papers generating a profit and having the opportunity to re-channel that money into 
either the shareholders or improving the quality of the publication is important, 
particularly in volatile environments.
Staff morale at government papers is low and the lack of enthusiasm is 
obvious in even the shortest visit to the office. Wondimkun readily admits that they 
recently held a three-year review at Addis Zemen and ‘no one is happy’. Many of the
176 Interview: Tesemma.
177 The journalists at the government papers are from similar backgrounds as their colleagues in the 
private press. Most studied Amharic, English or theatre at school, the only difference being that some 
have also received training from the school that is almost exclusively for government journalists 
EMMTI. Similar to the problems throughout the Ethiopian press, few journalists have received 
training in a particular subject- such as economics or law, as most of these graduates are drawn to more 
lucrative employment at the UNECA or other business opportunities.
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journalists (he estimates around forty percent) ‘just want the bread’. He realises that 
“we’re not readable, we know our weaknesses, we need a fundamental change. All 
national papers across the world are in colour.... The government also wants to 
change it, they are not satisfied.” 178 But the will to change is questionable. Dejene 
argues that he is “not sure if the tradition can change. It has been the same under all 
the regimes, the will needs to come from the owner”.179 Staff rarely does 
investigative reporting and most of their work is to compile the newspaper with 
material from the internet, the international wire services, the Ethiopian News 
Association (ENA) and the Walta Information Service, a TPLF party-affiliated 
company.
The situation for the government press deteriorated the most during the 2005 
election period. Bereket has been sharply criticised for not effectively gauging the
to the people and recognises that “we need to develop a platform where we 
engage”.182 It is not clear that there is either the commitment or vision to change the 
government’s communication strategy and the way in which it uses the newspapers to 
communicate. Kefyalew Azeze was exceptionally frank when he noted that “the 
Ethiopian government has no vision - there is no communication strategy. They have 
a development strategy but the media are not mentioned. They talk about the 
information laws but you need the vision.”183
Few Ethiopians have suggestions how the government press or the media in 
general could be improved, but the head of EPA and the editors of Addis Zemen and 
The Ethiopian Herald, as well as the Ethics Officer at the Ethiopian News Agency, 
are all in the process of implementing the Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
strategy developed by Dr. Michael Hammer and is part of a wider government-led 
public service restructuring project. BPR claims to be a ‘radical’ strategy for 
redesigning companies and the way in which they interact with one another. The 
programme advocates significant downsizing and ‘wiping the slate clean’. While 
they all seemed to have a photocopied edition of this book from the 1990s, there was 
little indication that it was either fully understood or ready to be implemented.184
Transforming organisations with the bureaucratic history of the newspapers 
under the EPA is bound to be a challenge, but it was also not clear what the end result 
should or would be. The editor of Addis Zemen spoke of his desire for his paper to be 
read regionally, and compete with the newspapers in Kenya or serve as a point of 
reference for others including the BBC and Reuters. This seems unrealistic given that 
Addis Zemen is published in Amharic and the readership is by default selective and 
virtually limited to Ethiopia and the diaspora. Nevertheless, it seems hard to fault the 
editors when a vision, strategy and delegated authority appear to be lacking.
2.2 The anti-state press
Until November 2005 there was a strong press that was deeply critical of the 
government. The government attempted to de-legitimise it by calling it ‘anti­
182 Interview: Simon.
183 Interview: Kefyalew Azeze.
184 Interviews: Tesemma, Gebrewold Woldesenbet and Aleyou.
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constitutional’. In many respects this press was indeed strongly opposed (and not 
entirely without reason) to fundamental constitutional and political issues the EPRDF 
supported.
The papers that emerged soon after the EPRDF came to power had greater
influence and support than the papers that later tried to operate and develop in a ‘gray
zone’. The first publications that appeared in 1991 were primarily magazines
including Ifoyta, Ruh and Tobiya. These were soon followed by several private
newspapers, including Iyita and two papers published by Tamrat Bekele, Addis
Tribune and Addis Dimts, that became particularly influential. These first papers and
magazines had multiple aims: making money, challenging the government on key
issues, and for some journalists, doing a job that they enjoyed. Shimelis Bonsa notes
that an excerpt taken from the first issue of Iyita one of the first private newspapers
published on Ghinbot 10, 1984 (EC) is illustrative of these intentions
... to make profit, to educate and disseminate information relating to current 
political, economic and social issues for the benefit of the people, to help the 
people improve their reading culture and promote publishing and journalistic 
experience among the wider public.185
For almost all the papers, however, the political objectives tended to be markedly 
more important than implied in Iyita. Most papers took a strong, consistent and clear 
line against the EPRDF and opposed a number of the government’s most important 
policies. The issues that these papers raised in the early 1990s include many that 
either the same or similar papers were raising fourteen years later. This not only 
suggests that there is a strong constituency for the arguments and that they represent 
real grievances among some of the population, but also that the government has 
ignored or been ineffective in addressing the issues.
Many of the journalists that started Tobiya and some of the other papers spent 
substantial time during the Derg at Addis Zemen, The Ethiopian Herald or working 
for the party paper. The founders were mostly seasoned journalists from the Derg, 
including Mulugeta Lule, former editor of the Derg party’s magazine and Goshu 
Mogus, who ran the censorship office for the Derg. Some of those who worked in
185 BONSA, S. (2000) Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for 
Social Studies, p. 24.
186 The Commission to Organise the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE).
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prominent positions during the Derg were imprisoned or accused of involvement in 
the regime’s crimes.
For example, Mairegu Bezabih, another founder of Tobiya, spent a year and a 
half in jail on charges of genocide for having executed 300+ people but the 
government could not prove the case.187 Mulugeta Lule, who left Ethiopia for 
America after being imprisoned several times for his articles in Tobiya, has also had 
substantial accusations leveled against him including having been a Derg spy and 
responsible for the death of Ethiopia’s most famous novelist of the Derg period, Baalu 
Girma. These accusations have been dismissed by some as government propaganda 
to discredit Tobiya.m
The background of many of these journalists is key to understanding the role a 
substantial portion of the press has played in Ethiopia and why the present 
government has expressed so much hostility towards these journalists. Just as the
for example, charges that “Ethiop was political hooliganism in practice. It was 
always supporting the CUD, it didn’t balance and the editor is interested in politics 
not media”.190 In many respects, the government continued to see him as a member of 
the Derg and was wary of what it perceived to be his efforts at de-legitimising the 
EPRDF.
Not all papers that were opposed to the state were run by former Derg 
journalists. According to Bonsa, more than 40% percent of the papers that followed 
in what he calls ‘the second phase’ were run by journalists with little or no experience 
in journalism.191 The papers were less institutionalised than TobiyalLissane Hezeb 
and did not have the same kind of access to informants. The same news from the 
radio, TV, or government newspapers was reinterpreted and represented in a more 
sensational manner in some private papers.192 Many of these journalists also relied on 
news and commentary that were published by the diaspora, particularly in the US, on 
websites such as ethiomedia.com. For example, Menelik, Asqual and Satinow were 
prominent papers that were edited by Iskinder Nega193 and drew heavily on material 
from the diaspora websites. Iskinder was also deeply critical of the government, yet 
was younger than his colleagues who might have been involved with the Derg. He 
clearly argued in his papers that he supported the political party All Amhara Peoples 
Organisation (AAPO) and wanted to restore Amhara political power. More recently, 
however, he has been supportive of federalism, which the AAPO has opposed.
2.2.1 Tobiya
Tobiya is indicative of the ‘anti-state’ press and can be regarded as the trend- 
setting and pioneering paper that most others followed. Soon after the establishment 
of the magazine, Tobiya launched a paper and had an amount of start-up capital that
190 Interview: Aregawi.
191 BONSA, S. (2000) Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for 
Social Studies, p. 31.
192 Ibid. p. 36.
193 Iskinder spent significant time in the US and returned when the EPRDF came to power. The period 
in the US affected his desire to create change in Ethiopia and when he first returned he thought that the 
time was ripe for this. With the fiancial resources and international connections he also had more 
flexibility than some of his colleagues.
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substantially exceeded that of its competitors making it quickly one of the strongest, 
most institutionalised and professional papers.194
Derbew Temesgen, a longtime media lawyer and founder of Tobiya, described 
the start-up:
The first motive to establish the paper was because most journalists - 52 were 
laid off. They [the EPRDF] dismissed those that worked with the previous 
regime.... But they [the journalists] had to eat and work. They had to do 
their profession so some organised a company to start a weekly paper. 
Tobiya is a traditional name for Ethiopia. They named it after the first short 
story (novel) that was called Tobiya}95
These journalists were generally well trained, had experience working for a 
newspaper and were able to produce their publications professionally and quickly. 
The paper had its own office and even staff dedicated to advertising and 
administration. While the journalists tend to talk of the editorial agenda of the paper, 
there was also a business side that contributed to its success. As a project of the Atbia 
Kokeb Publishing and Advertising Company (AKPAC), the paper succeeded in 
attracting advertisements thus helping to make it sustainable.
At the same time, the political agenda was fueling the work and passions of
many of the staff. The editorial policy of the paper was clear. According to Derbew
“in the editorial policy it was against ethnic politics and against the separation of
Eritrea. Ethnic politics is not good for the unity of the country”.196 Indeed, early
editorials and articles emphasise this line. The following two examples of editorials
illustrate the arguments that were common in the early months of publication:
The attempt by the fascist Italians to divide the people and the country was 
not successful, but now it is getting rooted thanks to the current regime. The 
people of the country are being divided along ethnic lines... The 1991 
Charter follows and adheres to the secessionist ideology of a few Eritreans. It 
seems that the Charter was prepared to facilitate the secession of Eritrea from 
Ethiopia....The attempt to view unity as a marriage is very simplistic and 
incorrect. The people of Ethiopia are connected by history, nature, culture 
and psychological make-up.... We also think that no group should be 
allowed to disintegrate the country. In the new Ethiopia, the unique and 
terrifying term is “unity”. The charter is not in favor of unity. It also seems 
that the constitution fears the same term. It rather pronounces and emphasises 
the phrase “self-determination up to secession”.... The regime supports the
194 According to the Mass Media License Registration and Control Department, it was founded with 
90,000 birr but in an interview with Derbew he noted that the paper had 50,000 birr.
195 Interview: Derbew Temesgen.
196 Interview: Temesgen.
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division and disintegration of the country and we think this is the first 
national government to do such a thing in the world.197
The second example, entitled “Against History,” argues:
We understand that we are living in a time when some are deliberately and 
full-heartedly involved in distorting the country’s history; and of course, 
destroying it.... They say Ethiopia has colonised Eritrea and some other 
nationalities... this is treason, history will pass judgment on the doers of
t 198such acts.
The early Tobiya papers and magazines consistently argued against the right to 
succession and often accused the Ethiopian government of allowing Eritreans to 
intervene in, if not overtly control, local affairs.199 The paper would also argue for 
reconciliation or a new spirit of forgiveness200 as well as suggest that the current 
government should be held as accountable for current violations of human rights as it 
was aspiring to do for former leaders of the Red Terror.201
Unity was and remains a key word. As the reader can note, it appears several 
times in the above quotations and continued to be used in papers like Tobiya until 
they closed. It has also been a word of choice for the opposition. The Derg used 
‘unity’ repeatedly as its mantra of why it was fighting. During the guerrilla war it 
used the press to refer to the TPLF war as being “activities of anti-unity elements who 
are engaged in destructive activities in the name of democracy”202 or would argue that 
“anti-unity elements seeking to dismember the country have persisted in carrying out 
acts of destruction resulting to immense loss of life and damage to property”.203 In the 
comer near the mast of every government paper there were two slogans ‘in unity lies 
our strength’ and ‘peace is the basis of progress’. Under the title of the paper was the
197 24 February 1986 (EC), Editorial, “A serious threat faces the country more than ever”, Tobiya, p.2
198 19 January 1986 (EC), Editorial, “Against history”, Tobiya, p.2
199 13 January 1994, Editorial, Tobiya (as quoted on 20 January 1994 in Press Digest, p.4).
200 For example, an article on 21 July 1994 argued “there is a need for a spirit o f forgiveness which is a 
prime requirement for reconciliation and reconstruction. In Ethiopia, the government is actively 
advancing enmity between the peoples of Ethiopia through the media and has also been living in the 
past in the last three-and-a-half years. Such dishonest and politically dangerous ways are pursued in 
order to monopolise power. This country’s future rests not on any one dominant group but on every 
Ethiopian, (as quoted on 25 July 1994 in Seven Days Update, p. 6).
201 A reporter from Tobiya argued “the crimes of the past are to be exposed soon and the criminals to 
be sentenced in public. Yet, there is no proof that the very same crimes are not being repeated today. 
Human rights organizations repeatedly lament of the growing violation of democratic and human rights 
indicating that the country is moving from one era of darkness to another, (as quoted 28 November 
1994 in Seven Days Update, p.6).
20221 February, 1991, Editorial, “For still greater determination”, The Ethiopian Herald, p.2.
203 08 January 1991, Editorial, “Persistent Peace Effort”, The Ethiopian Herald, p.2.
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Derg slogan ‘Ethiopia Tikdem’ meaning ‘Ethiopia First’. While it may seem benign, 
the slogan was and continues to be laden with meaning.
2.2.2 From Tobiya to Lisane Hezeb
In 2003, after twelve years, some of the journalists from Tobiya left to start 
another paper, Lisane Hezeb. Both papers continued publishing until just after the 
2005 elections when they were closed. Lisane Hezeb is the focus of the present 
analysis because most of the key journalists left Tobiya including Mulugeta, Derbew 
and Kifle Mulat. Derbew argued that the intention was “not to make money but to 
have as many forums as possible to strengthen the media”.204 Nevertheless, the 
journalists clearly left over internal disagreements. As one informant argued, “Lisane 
Hezeb was the strong part; it had the editor, publisher, columnists. The other part 
[Tobiya] became infiltrated by the EPRDF”.205
Lisane Hezeb was started under the newly established Addis Alem Press, 
which literally means ‘the new vision press’.206 According to a published 
announcement launching the paper,
n was  Nisi l aui icneu c o i mi me u
E x c e r p t s  f r o m  the f o l l o w i n g  th ree  e d i t o r i a l s  in L isa n e  H c :e h  d u r i n g  
ion  p e r io d  are in d i c a t iv e  o f  the m a in  po l i t i ca l  a n d  ed i t o r i a l  l i ne o f  the
long-standing problem. Today, even a national reconciliation may not solve 
the problem....208
Secondly, deep frustration with the TPLF as a minority party was regularly expressed:
A self-imposed EPRDF and political parties trying to liberate the people are 
fighting a peaceful war that is gradually progressing.... The TPLF has always 
been destroying the country, dividing the people. Since it captured state 
power, it has been ruling the country... with an undefined and inconsistent 
revolutionary democracy.209
Thirdly, issues of land rights and accusations about the activities of ‘ex-Derg
elements’ were discussed. In this particular editorial, the argument relates to what
was raised in a recent televised debate before the elections.
EPRDF says ownership rights should not be given to the peasants while the 
oppositions say they should be entitled to that right. The opposition says 
EPRDF’s claim that the peasants would sell its land... is not grounded 
because the peasant has its own wisdom and traditional knowledge... if we 
see the case neutrally, saying that land can be sold doesn’t mean that it 
should be sold. One of the manifestations of democracy are ownership 
rights. It is when the peasant owns land that his full rights will be 
respected... The EPRDF representative was accusing the CUD of mobilising 
dangerous vagrants and the ex-regime soldiers against the incumbent. What 
makes people vagrants or dangerous remnants is unemployment and such 
people didn’t create the unemployment problem...It is the same with the ex­
regime soldiers. These soldiers are not soldiers of the “Derg” regime but of 
Ethiopia. Do we say the current soldiers are soldiers of EPRDF if the party 
loses power? The ex-regime soldiers have come to the rescue of Ethiopia 
when Eritrea launched its aggression and sacrificed their lives. So, is it right 
to label them anti-people?210
These arguments have all been deeply controversial and are topics on which the 
government would prefer not to engage.
Debating press laws or criticising the way the government hospitals are run 
are within a circle of debate that the government can tolerate because it does not 
challenge the fundamental tenets of the EPRDF. Nebiy Makonnen of Addis Admas 
explains this space: “At Tobiya, they are almost all from the former regime, but it’s 
not to be hated. There is a need to express the view.”211
As will be elaborated in the coming chapter, one of the major political issues 
in Ethiopia, and one that has often preoccupied journalists, is the failure on the part of
208 4 February 2005, Editorial, Lisane Hezeb, p. 2.
209 25 February 2005, Editorial, Lisane Hezeb, p.2.
210 14 April 2005, Editorial, Lisane Hezeb, p.2.
211 Interview: Nebiy Makonen.
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the government to engage and debate these critical topics as part of the process of 
reconciliation and nation-building.
2.3 ‘Gray Zone’papers
There are a number of so-called middle ground papers. The papers that have 
attempted to occupy this space between government and anti-state publications have 
been a mix of English and Amharic papers. This task has been markedly more 
difficult for the Amharic papers.
2.3.1 The English papers
Of the five weekly English papers that occupy this space; namely, The 
Reporter,212 The Daily Monitor, The Sub-Saharan Informer,21'1 Fortune214 and 
Capital,215 the latter two are business papers with a political bent. They have chosen 
to publish in English to make the papers accessible to the diplomatic and international 
business community and they target well-educated readers.
2.3.1.1 Capital and Fortune
executive, was made managing director. Fortune has attempted to angle itself with a 
strong business focus along with political analysis while Capital has emphasised 
social issues with long interview sections and has a strong arts and culture section 
with regular contributions by the scholar Richard Pankhurst.
As with every paper in Ethiopia, the editor is a defining, and perhaps the most 
influential, factor in determining the agenda and characteristics of a publication. 
Tamrat is unique because he is relatively young; he was trained in journalism in the 
US and can be seen as part of a new generation. He is too young to be in the student 
movement and apparently has succeeded in forging relationships with journalists of 
all persuasions as well as politicians.
Tamrat started his career from little and began by contributing to some of the 
magazines during his university days that were blossoming including Heber, Addis 
Dimst and Addis Tribune. With a loan from a publisher, he started a weekly paper, 
Tomar, which was an instant success with its loud headlines. He stayed with this 
paper and wrote several articles that landed him in jail, including one criticising Prime 
Minister Meles for closing roads from the airport to the palace when he passed. In the 
article, ‘Does Meles hate us or is he afraid of us?’ Tamrat argued Meles was scaring 
and alienating people. Ethiopians tend to have a complex relationship with authority 
and this article was seen as provocative. After an investigation and several weeks in 
jail, he received a sentence of 15,000 birr that was later appealed and cut in half.216
Tamrat’s initial journalism experience was working with former military men
that worked for the Derg and had recently started papers. As he notes, “I was one of
the only civilians involved”. Eighteen months later he won a fellowship to work in
the US and returned changed arguing that
I had a complete transformation. The way we were operating wasn’t a 
reflection of society but a reflection of our own heads. We used to read the 
[Ethiopian] Herald, form our own views and then write. We used to not 
question or ask but would just publish the news as it was, we wouldn’t 
crosscheck or follow journalistic perspective.217
216 Interview: Tamrat Giorgis.
217 Interview: Giorgis.
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Tamrat argues that he is now in a position where “I don’t need to have an ideology. I 
don’t need to promote Ethiopia’s unity or diversity. I can tell the truth and criticise 
it” 218 jje ^knowledges that he tries to have his paper fall in the middle by
giving readers timely accurate, neutral, objective stories and to allow 
conflicting views and give them the platform to express their views. The 
form of journalism the government wants is development journalism, but it’s 
propaganda. Most journalists are that kind but from the other side - they talk 
in the same way about Ethiopian glory, etc. They see themselves as 
guardians of this ideal of Ethiopia.219
Tamrat’s paper is the only paper in Ethiopia to have an editorial code. It is the most 
professionally published in the country and with the help of a British copy editor has 
fewer typographical errors than other publications.
Since his return to Ethiopia from his training in America, Tamrat has joined 
the EPRDF’s political elite. His success is very much his own as he did not come 
from a privledged background. For an editor serious about his newspaper this can be 
seen as an essential means of gathering information and ensuring his business 
interests. But critics argue that he has significantly compromised any possibility of 
objectivity. He is friendly with Bereket Simon and has reportedly forged close 
relations with others in the government. United Ethiopian Democratic Forces 
(UEDF) opposition leader Merara Gudina pointedly claims “Bereket owns Fortune. 
Even Amare Aregawi is more independent”.220 Anecdotally, some Ethiopians do see 
Fortune as one of the more neutral papers but it is generally viewed as government- 
leaning. For example, while the paper will report powerfully about government 
violence during the 2005 elections, it does not leave the realm of tolerable criticism to 
challenge the ideological or ethnic basis of the EPRDF. The willingness to be 
somewhat critical while remaining in good favour with the government has given him 
a certain authority and status with the international community and consequently 
greater access to international trainings and conferences as well as the ear of 
diplomats- significant perks that are not to be overlooked.
218 Interview: Giorgis.
219 Interview: Giorgis.
220 Interview: Merara Gudina.
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2.3.1.2 Other English papers
Other English papers, including The Sub-Saharan Informer and The Daily 
Monitor, operate on the periphery yet are still notable particularly because they are 
among the few papers that continue to publish.
The Sub-Saharan Informer has ambitiously tried to be a newspaper for the 
continent using Addis, with the African Union and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), as a focal point for continental policy issues. The 
paper has had many financial difficulties despite a significant sum of personal 
financial capital as start up. Logistically, it has been difficult for The Sub-Saharan 
Informer to coordinate offices from Ghana to Kenya in terms of both distribution and 
the production of content.221 The paper operates largely on the periphery of debates, 
and the government has been tolerant of the fact that the editor and owner is Sudanese 
(the paper is, however, registered in his Ethiopian wife’s name), which is a violation 
of the press law. Published in colour and costing four birr, double the price of other 
papers, it is simpler for the government to tolerate it than to bother closing it.
The Daily Monitor is the only daily English paper as the other four are all 
weeklies. The Daily Monitor primarily publishes newswire reports. It used to take a 
strong editorial line, but due to pressure from the government it began publishing its
editorial in the form of a cartoon and writers only occasionally leave the office to get
222stones.
2.3.2 The Amharic papers
It is significantly more difficult for the Amharic papers to operate within this 
‘gray zone’ space. The government is more concerned with what they say and their 
readership is also often more critical and demanding. In the post-election period to the 
present, Addis Admas223 has been the largest paper in Ethiopia with a circulation of 
30,000, a level that has remained relatively stable for the past several years. During 
the election it peaked at 75,000. Nebiy Makonnen, a founder and the current editor-in- 
chief, calls the area in which he operates ‘the gray zone’ (hence the title for this
221 Interview: Joseph Aboulfaki.
222 Interview: Kidau Abera.
223 Available at: http://www.addisadmass.com.
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section) and explains that Addis Admas was founded because the private press was 
either pro- or anti-government and did not give sufficient attention to education, 
social or cultural issues. In Addis Admas, politics are predominantly on the first page 
and the rest of the paper focuses on cultural and educational issues. For Nebiy, 
culture and arts serve to expand the gray-zone as they can be ‘culturally political’. “In 
transition periods” he notes, “politics is wanted. But if it stabilises, culture and arts is 
wanted more”.224
Addis Admas’ editorials are well-known for skillfully providing guidance and 
critiquing current political issues in a subtle and relatively lenient way. In contrast 
with the editorials of other papers that tend to give direct guidelines, the editorial 
starts with a proverb and then gives a short story or folklore and concludes with a 
paragraph of analysis. The proverb is chosen very carefully and attempts to tell 
exactly what is going on in the country. As Nebiy explains, “if you don’t analyse the 
situation well you can’t find a proverb.”225 Nebiy studied chemistry, but he considers 
himself to be a poet. He was a political prisoner for ten years under the Derg and his 
literary accomplishments, including translating Gone with the Wind while in prison, 
have been documented in Paul Throeaux’s, Black Star.
One other paper that must be acknowledged as part of this category, but which 
is no longer publishing, is Meznania. Abiy Tekle Makonnen began Meznania after 
two years at The Reporter and is significantly younger than many of the other editors. 
His background is in law and he recently earned an MA in Holland. Abiy also sought 
to mediate and work in this so-called middle area and had some success until he chose 
to close his paper after the election violence. Most of his readers were young, 
educated professionals. Negotiating this middle ground was very challenging and he 
was one of the few successful journalists of a new generation to work to carve out 
some new space.227
224 Interview: Makonnen.
225 Interview: Makonnen.
226 THEROUX, P. (2003) Dark Star Safari, New York, Houghton Mifflin.
227 Interview: Abiy Tekle Makonnen.
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2.3.2.1 The Reporter
The Reporter was started several years after the first wave of newspapers 
began. After coming to Addis with the TPLF, Amare was appointed head of 
Ethiopian Television and later head of the Ethiopian News Service. After several 
years in these positions, Amare decided to start The Reporter. He claims that he felt 
he could be of more service to the country by entering the private debate; however, 
his frustrations of working with the government media are also evident. His task of 
altering the vast bureaucracy of the media agencies was complicated by divergent 
visions of the media and clashes of personality and ideologies. The split between 
Amare and Bereket is evident, as the two have sparred publicly. But Amare’s 
continued high-level contacts among those in the ruling party and his access to start­
up capital (approximately 50,000 USD) made The Reporter a prominent paper very 
quickly. At first the public was unsure of what to expect from a former TPLF fighter 
and generally anticipated the paper would be propaganda. However, The Reporter 
soon won a strong following from various segments of society that appreciated its 
criticisms of the government and found it to be relatively balanced and objective. 
From Amare’s perspective:
There were other newspapers [but] The Reporter was... different from 
inception. We set a different norm in media. There were some private papers 
but there was a highly polarised situation between the government media and 
the private media. The government media was saying everything in this 
country is good, there is nothing bad. And some of the private papers said 
everything in this country is bad.... There was nothing for the public to call a 
spade a spade. So one of the reasons for the creation of The Reporter was: 
can’t we have a balanced free and fair media in Ethiopia? Exactly when we 
started we were attacked from both sides.228
While The Reporter does not have a code of ethics, Amare argued that his code is
clear and everyone on the paper is aware of it. He does not mind what political
inclinations writers might have as long as they do not come out in their writings. At
The Reporter, he argues,
We have a development direction [and] we have a concept of democracy we 
believe that’s good for the people. There are human rights values, 
democratic values, election values. The Reporter is not going to discover 
that. The EPRDF is not going to discover that... they’re already discovered.
228 Interview: Aregawi.
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If everybody respects this, we praise them. If they violate them, we criticise 
them.229
Initially, The Reporter focused on criticising government policy. It was 
regularly charged with libel and contempt of court for critical reporting. Fortunately, 
the paper has a former constitutional judge on the staff that spends much of his time 
defending the newspaper from such charges and reducing crippling fines. The 
Reporter and its staff have avoided the harsher penalties many of the other papers 
faced for several important reasons. Despite falling out with some in the government, 
Amare was, and still is, a respected fighter from the struggle and he has maintained 
connections with people in power. The government also knows where his loyalties 
are: he is Tigrayan and has fought for the cause. He is not a former Derg cadre as are 
some of the other journalists.
The elections were very trying but also very revealing for all papers and this
was particularly the case for The Reporter. Until the elections, The Reporter criticised
the government regularly on a variety of issues from not allowing private
broadcasting stations to freedom of information and the right to form legitimate
associations. Several articles immediately before the election period highlight the
general approach to critiquing the government. For example, an editorial argued
The constitution guarantees freedom of association. But when it comes to 
implementation, the government has neither the conviction nor the desire 
regarding the creation of free associations.... The EPRDF always prefers to 
deal with the leadership of “friendly” associations and does not embrace their 
members. It thinks that if it has the leadership in its hands, everybody else 
will “fall in line”.230
It is notable that The Reporter does not go as far as some of the other papers have in 
arguing that the associations are only fronts, or that the government’s approach to 
these associations is merely reflecting the way the EPRDF uses political groups to 
present an appearance of a pluralistic party when it remains ruled by an elite. 
Crucially, The Reporter does not raise issues of the legitimacy of the ruling clique 
within the EPRDF.
229 Interview: Aregawi.
2309 April 1005, Editorial, “Seizing presentable opportunities”, The Reporter, p.2.
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In another example of ‘safe area’ criticism, The Reporter is very vocal about
the press law and has gone so far as to advocate closing down the Ministry of
Information. Most in the government agree that there is a very poor information
strategy and they at least give lip-service to the idea that there should be independent
broadcasters beyond the two licenses recently issued. So while The Reporter has
been critical of what it sees as Prime Minister Meles’ hypocrisy towards issuing
commercial licenses to private radio and television stations, it will criticise the failure
to implement a policy or argue that a proposed law is too harsh rather than attack the
government on fundamental ideological issues. While the editorials may sound
critical, they are engaging within the ‘democratisation or development’ sphere of
debate. For example, The Reporter asked, regarding Meles’ participation on Tony
Blair’s Commission for Africa, “Why is it that the Prime Minister of Addis Ababa is
different from Commissioner Meles Zenawi of the London-based Commission for
Africa?” noting that
In the report that was prepared in London and simultaneously launched in 
Addis Ababa and London, it is explicitly stated that African governments can 
assist media independence by granting commercial licenses for radio 
stations... PM Meles is a signatory of this report. So what prevented his 
government from issuing commercial licenses to private radio and television 
operators despite the enabling legislation being approved almost six years 
ago?... Incidentally such a divergence is not observed only between Addis 
Ababa and London, it also exists between Addis Ababa and Washington. In 
Addis Ababa, the government says privatising the sole state-owned 
telecommunications services provider is unthinkable. But in Washington it 
says that it is willing to do so. Similarly, in Addis Ababa the government 
adamantly declares that it would not restructure the biggest bank in Ethiopia, 
the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, but to the IMF and the World 
Bank in Washington it expressed its commitment to break up the bank into 
four entities.231
Articles such as this led readers to argue initially that The Reporter was opposed to 
the government or at least very critical. But in contrast to newspapers such as Tobiya, 
The Reporter is being critical of the government but primarily on issues that the 
government is already discussing and in some cases has acknowledged the need for 
new policies or reform. This is an issue that will be developed further in the coming 
chapter.
231 26 March 2005, Editorial, “Our policies” Which ones?”, The Reporter, p.2.
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3. Conclusion
For all papers, navigating the support of the government, journalists and 
readers is complex and unpredictable but rarely random. Building on primary data, 
this chapter has key developments of the media landscape in Ethiopia. 
Misperceptions about the historical evolution of the press have been challenged and 
the contemporary press has been elaborated in such a way to focus not on the 
mechanics but the role and the driving focus of these media outlets, which are 
different than what we might expect in the west and also are particularly context 
specific to Ethiopia. Just as is the case in Uganda, the media outlets discussed here 
cannot purport to represent the perspectives or cater to all Ethiopians. Many local 
ideas on the Ethiopian nation-state never make their way into the media as the country 
is both highly un-urbanized and diverse. Nevertheless, the views that are 
represented in the media are powerful and have strongly influenced the development 
of the media system and political system as a whole, which will be further explored in 
the coming two chapters.
Understanding the role of the press in Ethiopian society requires the breaking 
down of particular characteristics of the press system as well as the political dynamics 
that influence and shape these particular media outlets and their journalists. Turning 
quickly to the coming chapter, certain issues introduced in this chapter will be 
expanded and elaborated. Features that provide the most insight to the particularities 
will be addressed thus developing a more nuanced portrait of the Ethiopian press 
system. It will begin by continuing the discussion on the polarisation of the press in 
the pre- and post-election period.
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CHAPTER 4:
The Ethiopian Press System
“To become institutionalised we need a new 
generation with no nostalgia or enmity, 
one that is free of hatred”. 2 ?2—Woldu Yemessel, General Manager, Radio Fana
This chapter will build upon Chapter 3 and probe into the dynamics and 
complexities of Ethiopia’s media system, focusing on the press and following the 
framework introduced in Chapter 2. By examining the press during the recent 2005 
elections this chapter will begin by looking at one of the most evident features of the 
press in Ethiopia - the extent of polarisation. Closely connected to polarisation is the 
way in which journalists think about the work they do and how their publications 
contribute to political processes. In Ethiopia, this is a relatively broad spectrum.
The second half of the chapter will look into the process (or failed process) of 
institutionalisation of media organisations and the factors that have contributed to 
this, both from the state and from the media. The discussion will focus on the one 
hand on the efforts on the part of the Ethiopian state to structure or intervene in the 
press system, most typically through legislation, and on the other hand on the media’s 
reaction to these interventions. Together with the previous chapter these four sections 
will continue to build a portrait of Ethiopia’s press system focusing on the political, 
social and cultural aspects.
1. A Polarised Press
The press in Ethiopia is deeply polarised. These divisions are reflective of a 
number of factors including divergent visions of Ethiopian national identity, 
differences of political ideology and alternative perceptions of the role of the press in 
society. The 2005 election period was one of the most divisive periods for the media 
in Ethiopia’s history. While before the election there were many positive indications
232 Interview: Woldu Yemessel.
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of the role the media were playing in mediating different views, the situation took a 
sharp turn immediately after election day.
Some studies have argued that the media were relatively accessible to
different groups prior to the elections. While a number of embassies did their own
limited analyses, Dr Gebremedhin Simon of the Graduate School of Communication
at Addis Ababa University also conducted a study that concluded,
There were some very positive innovations leading up to, and during the run­
up to the election. It was very evident in the public owned media where great 
improvement was seen. Secondly, there was success in granting the parties 
access to the government media. The quota of airtime given to all parties was 
met. But at times highly political and emotional attacks were launched on 
personalities. Thirdly, relevant authorities were flexible and gave significant 
interview space. The Ethiopian Television was very balanced.233
The media were enjoying the same degree of openness that was granted to the 
political parties for the first time in the history of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, much of 
this temporary success prior to voting day was lost in the aftermath of the election, 
which was characterised by violence and government repression. The following 
sections will briefly describe the role of the press during this period.
1.1 Government press
Before the elections the government press scored some bright points and many
agree that in this period the government media in general were relatively balanced or
at least gave a decent amount of space to the opposition. Dejene Tesemma, editor-in-
chief of The Ethiopian Herald, calls this time ‘exceptional’ as his paper was
So neutral... it was relatively liberal in the entertainment of views of other 
individuals. During the election, [there were] campaigns and debates [and] 
we would pick up the live transmissions, translate and print them in the 
Herald.234
This period did not last long as immediately after the elections the paper turned again 
to self-censorship.
233 The graduate school, of which Dr Gebremedhin Simon is now the Dean, is known to be supportive 
of the EPRDF. Nevertheless, a wide number of informants corroborated his argument that the media 
was relatively open before the elections. (2006) Gebremedhin Simon lecture, Workshop on Press 
Freedom, Hilton Hotel: Addis Ababa.
234Interview: Dejene Tesemma.
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When the success of the opposition party Coalition for Unity and Democracy
(CUD) appeared to threaten the EPRDF’s majority, the government’s willingness to 
provide space for the CUD in the government media drastically diminished. The 
previous openness was replaced by the government’s push for discrediting the CUD 
through propaganda, which made some government journalists feel uneasy. A 
journalist from the highest levels of Ethiopian Radio who asked to remain anonymous 
described his experience, the hard choice he had to make and the change of discourse 
in the government media:
I spent most of my career in radio doing the news and current affairs. 
I stopped working there in June 2005.1 resigned in September after I took a 
three-month vacation. I love broadcasting and didn’t think of leaving the 
radio, it was my lifetime job but the situation was getting beyond what one 
could bear. We had to politicise things. Sometimes people push you to do 
things. Before it wasn’t so recurrent but it started from the eve of the 
election.
Before the election was the nicest time of my life. I received more 
than 300 calls on the day of the election. We followed every activity of 
polling stations with 22 radio reporters. We received news from ENA and 
Walta, everyone was so motivated and it was free.
The next day everything was different. The TV announced that the 
EPRDF has won and then things got bad. The Prime Minister announced a 
one month state of emergency.... A few days after polling we were told we 
were ‘back to editorial’. ‘Back to editorial’ meant we would no more 
accommodate opposition ideas. The ruling party considered it to be out of 
their generosity and charity that the opposition got to use the government 
media. It was a problem of attitude.235
The level of discontent among government journalists is striking, as is the willingness 
to discuss it openly, though anonymously. A colleague from the Ethiopian News 
Agency, who also requested to remain anonymous, described similar challenges at the 
English Desk of the ENA, particularly after the elections. At the ENA,
Any sensitive political stories must be seen by a central manager. If 
it’s a press release from the CUD, we say forget it, it’s better to send a 
reporter to a development workshop. The opposition states their position 
formally and sends it to the state and private media. We don’t cover it if the 
CUD calls for peace or anything positive. They [the government] want them 
to be hostile and violence promoters. I was frustrated but I don’t dare to 
resign. Before if you would resign from the state media you could join the 
private media. It was an easy leap but now you can’t. It was a deliberate 
move that they shut down so many papers so state media journalists can’t go 
anywhere.... There was an immediate shift in The Reporter. There is no
235 Interview: Anonymous.
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difference from ENA and joining The Reporter.... Working for the state 
media you start not to care, you are a typewriter.
At the ENA we have been compiling our reports from the election. 
The reporting is biased and you can visibly see the difference between pre- 
and post-election reporting.... The adjectives for the CUD came after polling 
day. For the city riots there was an established phrase ‘the street violence that 
was instigated by the CUD’- everything started with this phrase. It has not 
yet been investigated yet we accuse them. Sometimes at the English desk we 
would add some words like allegedly. We wanted to get out of the situation 
and distance ourselves but at the Amharic desk [they did] not. If I consulted 
the GM [General Manager] he would have said no. The English desk is a 
particular case... we would also put stories from Reuters, etc., but the GM 
would select phrases from the stories that are against the opposition. He 
would order the Amharic desk to only translate those phrases, they were very 
selective phrases to paint a bad image of the CUD and make the international 
media look like it supports the ENA.236
These testimonies were common from journalists interviewed. Government 
propaganda is primarily aimed at people in the rural areas whom it views as its real 
constituencies. But in the post-election period, the government felt exceptionally 
insecure and it increased the tone of its propaganda, a move that quickly became 
counter-productive particularly among the private press and the opposition supporters 
whose messages it was trying to counter.237 These groups became even more 
frustrated and angry towards the EPRDF as evidenced in both the rhetoric used on the 
streets and the criticisms in the newspapers. Blen Fitsum of Ethiopian Television 
contends that
People hate the EPRDF because of the lies the papers propagate. People 
want to have their views confirmed, but it’s not changing the way people are
236 Interview: Anonymous.
237 An editorial on August 13, 2003 in Lisane Hezeb, p. 2 noted that “the programmes are actually 
reinforcing people’s hatred towards this media”. And a lengthy editorial in Lisane Hezeb on 15 July 
2005, p. 2 was dedicated precisely to this issue. Entitled “It is a Message” the article argued that:
The failure of the EPRDF’s propaganda is one of the most serious problems 
the party faced. Most people lost trust in the government media and boycotted it. 
The media which is a public asset is functioning as the government mouthpiece. 
People prefer the Amharic services of Deutsche Welle and Voice of America radio 
stations to ETV and Ethiopian Radio. The regime and the whole system is imposed 
on the public through the power of the gun. EPRDF has no popular ground. Its 
media is also the reflection of the party and not trusted by the public. It has been 
trying to feed the public with lies and disguising facts in various political, economic 
and social reports.
The government media also acted illegally in declaring that the EPRDF won 
the election even before the counting was over.... EPRDF and its media has been 
working against the national interest and killing the hopes of democracy in the 
nation. We believe that the thin line connecting the EPRDF and the public is broken. 
The people are sick and tired of the government and its officials and is rejecting their 
media...
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thinking. Now there’s so much hatred in the public. People need to be ready 
to agree to disagree. ETV started lying three or four weeks before the 
election. They said that it was just the unemployed, etc., people that 
supported the CUD. It’s so immature. People need to develop that culture of 
tolerance.238
The hatred towards the government media was also extended on a personal level to 
those working for the institutions. While Blen personally did not have much 
difficulty, the editor of Addis Zemen described how he and his family were harassed 
in their neighbourhood: some neighbours chose to ignore him while others would 
shout profanities.239 The culture of tolerance and the space to agree to disagree is in 
even shorter supply now than after the elections.
1.2 Anti-state press
During the elections neither Tobiya nor Lisane Hezeb was particularly 
sensational. According to Derbew Temesgen who was working for Lisane Hezeb at 
the time:
Tobiya and Lisane Hezeb were trying not to be sensational. We wouldn’t 
break with a sensational story. We had providers of information or agents 
within the government. Other papers seem sensational because they get news 
from the opposition but not from the government... we also tried to get 
information from the government but they would decline 240
While some have tried to portray Lisane Hezeb as solely an opposition paper, Derbew 
notes that
It did become a form of the opposition; but it [the paper] didn’t have any 
means of providing information. We were criticising government policies 
and telling the government that the country needs a dialogue.241
238 Interview: Blen Fitsum.
239 Interview: Wondimkun Aleyou.
240 Interview: Derbew Temesgen.
241 Ibid.
Indeed many articles within the private press were calling for dialogue. An editorial on 27 August 
2005, p. 2, in Lisane Hezeb noted, “According to our assessment of the confusing political 
configuration in the country, both the EPRDF and the oppositions do not seem to be strong enough to 
establish a government unilaterally. That is why we have been repeatedly calling for discussions and 
compromises”. And in a lengthier article addressing this issue entitled “The 11th Hour Message” 
published on 20 September 2005, p. 2, the article opens by noting
Today our country is at a crossroad. If we discuss issues and compromise, the future 
will be bright. If we do the opposite, which is what is happening right now, then 
destruction awaits us. As we have repeatedly said, no single force can lead the 
country.... The TPLF/EPRDF has time and again asserted that its ideology would 
continue to be Revolutionary Democracy. It is the parties’ right to choose its 
ideology but it cannot impose it on the people. Oppositions are willing to have
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Their circulation increased during this period about 50% but did not reach the levels 
of Menelik or Ethiop. Neither paper was forced to close by the government, as were 
other papers that were accused by the government for using hate speech, but the 
printers, however, refused to print them contending that they had run out of paper or 
giving other excuses. In such circumstances the owners could not sustain the cost of 
the employees and the house rent, so they had to close.
Some papers were sensational and have been accused of exacerbating ethnic 
tensions and encouraging violence in the post-election period. While it is true that 
many papers referred to the EPRDF as a minority-led regime and expressed 
grievances with its ethnic basis, the government also sought to manipulate the 
ethnicity issue.242 For the EPRDF, the separation of ethnicities has been an important 
part of ruling such a vast and diverse country. As Mamdani reminds us, at the end of 
colonialism, all nationalist governments reproduced the colonial legacy uncritically 
“each sought to reform the bifurcated state that institutionally crystallised a state- 
enforced separation, of the rural from the urban and of one ethnicity from another” 243 
which essentially led to a new form of despotism. While the EPRDF is in fact multi­
discussions. The TPLF/EPRDF, however, is doing the opposite.... Our message at 
the 11th hour is, “Discuss, Let’s Discuss”. Let us all be the winner. Stop persecuting 
members of the opposition. We are at the 11th hour.
242 For a general discussion on ethnic federalism in Ethiopia see
TURTON, D. (Ed.) (2006) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, 
Oxford, James Currey
More specifically, however, Kymlicka has argued that the problem with ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
is that the “process of institutionalisation has not always been the outcome of peaceful democratic 
mobilization, but has rather been imposed from above and/or captured by local elites who do not 
represent the interests of the wider group.” KYMLICKA, W. (2006) Western Models of Multinational 
Federalism: Are They Relevant for Africa? IN TURTON, D. (Ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian 
Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford, James Currey. p. 58.
And Fiseha notes that
In practical terms, however, the EPRDF controls all the regional state governments in 
the Ethiopian federation, either directly through its member parties or indirectly 
through affiliate parties.... This largely centralized party structure appears to 
contradict the division of power that is expected to exist in a federation. The party 
structure in Ethiopia undermines the federal division of power and subordinates the 
regional governments to the federal government.... inter-governmental conflicts are 
rare.... Party discipline, combined with ‘democratic centralism,’ has a great impact 
on decision-making within the party. The central committee of the ruling coalition 
generates specific plans of action, often through the chairman himself, which then 
form the basis of the EPRDF’s five-year plan to be implemented across the country. 
FISEHA, A. (2006) Theory versus Practice in Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism. IN 
TURTON, D. (Ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford, James Currey. p. 156-7.
243 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 8.
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ethnic, the government also sought to manipulate the ethnicity issue during the
elections with the media. As discussed in the previous chapter and as Lisane Hezeb 
noted in the debates “EPRDF’s labeling of CUD as the Interhamwe of Rwanda is 
irresponsible”.244
Much of the blame for facilitating a polarised environment and exacerbating
tensions is placed on the government, or as Amare Aregawi noted, “they have the
responsibilities because they have the gun”245. Similarly, Dejene Tesemma, editor of
The Ethiopian Herald, agreed with Derbew and Amare in this way:
Ethiop was so extreme because they couldn’t verify information because all 
the government doors are closed. They couldn’t verify what was true or not. 
The government should have made them friendly [as M useveni did]. It was 
up to the government to facilitate training centres, open forums and promote 
dialogue. Otherwise they resort to gossip and hearsay. It is up to the 
government to transform. In the absence o f civic institutions, academic
However, the fact that the CUD, which clearly was a political party, was espousing a 
similar message and had members imprisoned for genocide makes Kidane’s assertion 
unlikely. In addition, much of what these journalists were saying, and the position 
from which they were saying it, has characterised the Ethiopian media for a number 
of years. The message was not new; it was rather the timing and the conditions in the 
country that made the EPRDF perceive it as so dangerous.
1.3 ‘Gray zone’press
During this period there were some journalists who sought to operate in the
‘gray zone’ despite its complications and the significant drop in popularity suffered
by their papers.249 In the aftermath of the elections, readers bought newspapers that
confirmed their perceptions. Meznania, for example, which was operating in this
‘gray zone’, did not take the line that the election was rigged. The editor-in-chief,
Abiy Makonnen explains that
Except for testimonies from friends and relatives, we did not have conclusive 
proof... Meznania said that the legitimacy of the elections was psychological. 
If people thought the election was rigged then the election wasn’t good.250
One week when Meznania dared to criticise the opposition, circulation figures 
provided by the Ministry of Information show that its circulation notably dropped 
until several weeks later when it attacked the EPRDF and regained some readers 251 
Nevertheless, Abiy was careful about publishing items that might inflame the delicate
249 The situation was similar for foreign journalists operating in Ethiopia. They too had difficulty 
operating in neutral territory and were harassed not only by the government but also the opposition. 
Mohammed Adow, the BBC correspondent that was based in Addis before, during, and after the 
elections recalled that
I was fortunate I left Ethiopia without being hurt. I was being followed, I had my 
phones tapped and sometimes people from either group were threatening me. I was 
being told I was being biased, that I was pro-government but then the government 
told me I was pro-CUD. It depended on whom I was reporting on the other day. I 
would carry a copy of reports and ask people to tell me what’s wrong. You couldn’t 
carry a middle line but I didn’t take any bribes and I had no reason to be biased. 
Working in Ethiopia is one of the most hostile environments in the world. 
(Interview: Mohammed Adow.)
Navigating both strongly polarised sides of the political spectrum in Ethiopia is very difficult as 
Mohammed suggested. It remains to be seen how and if this will change with the recent release of the 
journalists. While the private journalists that were imprisoned have been told that they are allowed to 
resume their activities, the confidence in the tolerance of the government for them to do so is lacking.
250 Interview: Abiy Tekle Makonnen.
251 Personal communication, Ministry of Information, circulation figures and interview: Makonnen.
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situation. He was concerned, for example, that by “calling it [the EPRDF] a minority 
regime, we may encourage violence. We didn’t write that the government only 
represents a minority as it may bring unforeseen consequences” .
The Reporter also lost many of its readers for, some critics argue, becoming 
overtly pro-government. Many readers in Addis speak of a sudden change in the 
editorials, but in some respects it has been more of a revelation that The Reporter 
would not challenge the status quo in the same way some of the opposition supporters 
would. The paper did not, as others did, condemn the outcome of the elections as a 
total fraud but rather advocated accepting the rule of law and the National Election 
Board’s (NEB) ruling. In an editorial entitled “Opposition should accept election 
results for the sake of democracy, unity and the people,” The Reporter referenced 
what A1 Gore had said about the US Supreme Court’s ruling rm th^ suit initiator!
public’s concern that such a change occurred when he notes that Amare’s change of 
course was the right one.256 Shemelis contends that
The R eporter changed course. Amare must be smart because he shifted gears 
and follow ed another course. Before Amare was calling for the public to 
establish a transitional government which was in flagrant violation o f the 
constitution. He made various utterances that could have put him in the dock 
but he’s rectified his w a y s ....257
Amare maintains that his paper has been misunderstood recently. In response to the 
accusations that he has ‘changed sides’, Amare asserts:
Never, never, never, never at all. W e didn’t shift because o f any 
pressure. But the situation itself was a guide for us. Let me explain what I 
mean. W e don’t want to be pro-government and we don’t want to be against 
the government either. We don’t want to be pro-CUD, and w e don’t want to 
be against CUD either. Why should we be for or against? Our focus is, tell 
the truth. Anybody who enjoys telling the truth, they are with us. If they
j  —  u  — •—  *1 ------------------------------------------------------------   - - -
have listened to them. Because gracefully, they didn’t go to parliament and 
disgracefully they are already in parliament.... Now they are asking ‘give us 
more time, we will go to Addis’.... We said everything has to be done in 
June, now they are doing it in February. We were right. We are proud of our 
position. The people who were saying we have shifted are the people who 
have joined the parliament.
We haven’t shifted; it is them who have shifted.... I believe in that 
one and the greatest mistake they have ever made is not going to parliament. 
My evaluation is, all right this is a party. CUD is a party that never misses an 
opportunity to miss an opportunity!258
The question of whether the CUD should join parliament was a major issue of 
contention. In contrast with other papers, Amare advocated with a relentlessness that 
alienated many people. Fortune, for example, also urged the opposition to join 
parliament but it did not gain as much of a ‘pro-government’ reputation as The 
Reporter.
Amare, along with the government, was clearly shocked and taken aback by
the widespread support that the opposition gained. As he noted in his editorial
immediately after the elections:
A political scenario which no one had thought of or prepared for is today 
unfolding itself in Ethiopia. The forecast for the outcome of the May 15 
elections was that the ruling party would lose a few seats while the 
opposition would gain some. But the results convey a very different picture. 
Although one party contesting the election may have more seats than others, 
a situation has arisen where most of them have assumed the responsibility of 
government, albeit at different levels.259
While Amare was surprised by the results, there are several possible explanations for 
understanding the perceived change within The Reporter.
One explanation of the shift is a realisation on the part of the perception of the 
readership about the extent to which The Reporter actually challenged the status quo 
and was critical of the government. Ethiopian readership is also notoriously particular 
about people and newspapers that try to navigate the middle ground or appear to 
change positions. As Nebiy noted, “the public likes persistence, if you take different 
sides or vacillate, they don’t like it. But if you always go straight, you earn 
respect”.260 Amare agrees that there was a bit of this, particularly in Ethiopia where 
people like to see you on one side or the other:
258 Interview: Amare Aregawi.
259 21 May 2005, Editorial, The Reporter, p.2.
260 Interview: Nebiy Makonnen.
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When the opposition came they enjoyed our criticism of the government. 
When we started criticising them for not going to the parliament they were 
angry. They said ‘why did you criticise us? We thought you were criticising 
the government’. We said yes we’ll criticise the government if they make 
mistakes. Then we are criticising you because you are making mistakes... 
We don’t care whether it’s the government, the ruling party or the opposition. 
If they have got something wrong we tell them and they don’t like us.261
Another possibility, which has not been substantiated by documentation, is an 
argument made by Gerard Prunier of the French Centre for Ethiopian Studies. He 
suggested that Amare could have been threatened by the government and was on a 
government list of potential persons to be shot. This list supposedly fell into the 
hands of some embassies, including the French Embassy. As a Tigrayan that had been 
critical of the government, Prunier alleges that Amare was doubly despised.262
The elections, for some Ethiopians, were an exercise of going back into the 
past, digging into history and bringing up arguments that were begun decades ago. 
The fact that Amare is Tigrayan and did fight with the TPLF also did not escape 
public attention. While many individuals were targeted, some shot and others 
imprisoned, in the aftermath of the elections, it can be argued that Amare had a lot to 
lose if the EPRDF lost power. He has substantial business interests apart from The 
Reporter, including a shop, the Horn of Africa Press Institute, and an import-export 
business. A change in regime, or a very destabilising political situation, could 
threaten these interests and his access to future business opportunities.
2. Ideologies of Ethiopian journalists
There are various explanations about how Ethiopian journalists see the work 
they do, particularly compared to countries such as Kenya or Uganda where the press 
is more institutionalised and journalists are better trained. While there are some that 
are working ‘for the bread’, the journalists that are having the greatest political 
influence are generally those working for the independent press and are primarily 
motivated by a desire to affect the political process.
261 Interview: Aregawi.
262 Interview: Gerard Prunier.
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For the ease of explanation and comparative analysis, there are three groups 
that characterise the prominent players of the press: politically aligned journalists, 
press freedom journalists, and gray zone journalists. There is, however, overlap 
among these groupings and some readers and journalists would certainly have 
different perceptions and dispute whether the below mentioned papers actually fall 
into the category listed.
All of these journalists are affected by the difficulties of having access to 
government information. From the government journalists and EPRDF sympathizers 
to their harshest critics, the lack of information has an impact on what journalists can 
report and what the newspapers are used for. There is not a culture of disseminating 
information but Ethiopians are also not accustomed to demanding it. Partly this is out 
of deference for authority and a respect for hierarchy but it is also out of fear of 
making oneself known to the authorities. It has only been the select few journalists 
with some ties to those in government- such as Amare, Tamrat and Zerihun that have 
been willing and able to get information from those in the ruling party.
2.1 Politically aligned journalists
In line with what has been discussed so far, many of the journalists that were 
deeply opposed or strongly supportive of the government were politically motivated 
to practice journalism the way they did. On both sides of the spectrum, journalists 
said that due to extenuating circumstances, they could not be balanced but were 
forced to argue their position in an effort to discredit what they perceived to be the 
inaccurate information of the opposing side. A brief mention of some of the 
ideological tendencies among different segments of the press follows.
2.1.1 Pro-government
The election was a particularly tense and exceptional period that magnified
existing tendencies. On the side of the government and pro-government supporters,
Kefyalew Azeze, General Manager of the Ethiopian Press Agency, maintained that
Before the elections we were balanced, but after not. The editorial policy says 
in times of crisis look for options that bring solutions. After the election the 
scenario was totally different so we approached from the view of what the 
government thinks is happening. For two weeks we completely closed the
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doors for the opposition. When we opened it up we tried to voice their 
concerns. But private papers were deceiving people so we had to give access 
to government perspectives.263
Those at the highest levels of the government media are political appointees and often 
former fighters of the TPLF. This is the case for the head of ENA, EPA and of course 
Walta and the party radio and newspapers. But their immediate subordinates, such as 
the editor of the Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen are not required to be party 
members and are appointed on merit. Many journalists in the government media are 
there simply for a job. Often they are graduates with few other opportunities, having 
studied subjects such as English or Amharic at university, which excluded them from 
alternative, more lucrative, careers in law or economics.
Independent journalists that are overtly pro-government are less common than 
those highly critical of the government but Zerihun Teshome of Iftin (the husband of 
the radio journalist Mimi Sebatu) is one example and is indicative of the few 
independent journalists that occupy this space. Iftin is a very pro-govemment paper 
that started publishing the day after the June post-election riots in Addis.
Zerihun was one of the forty-one academics dismissed from AAU one year 
after the EPRDF came to power because “the EPRDF didn’t want to be criticised by 
people sitting in a university”.264 He was in the philosophy department and along 
with his colleagues, a number of whom were affiliated or active in the Derg, was 
politically active and concerned with issues of Eritrea and ethnic federalism. He soon 
left for the US where he became involved in opposition politics only, as he claims, to 
become disenchanted with their intolerance for Ethiopians of different ethnicities and
'yf.c
alternative ideas. Zerihun returned to Addis in 2000 and became close to some of 
those in the EPRDF.
Zerihun is clear where his loyalties lie and believes that “we have to take
0f\f\Ethiopian unity into the next century”. With no training in journalism, Zerihun 
started Iftin as a direct response to the elections because he believed that the “the time 
to fight is when we become terrorised” and that “the media are so dominated by
263 Interview: Kefyalew Azeze.
264 Interview: Zerihun Teshome. See also: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2003) Lessons in Repression: 
Violations o f Academic Freedom in Ethiopia. New York, Human Rights Watch.
265 Interview: Teshome.
266 Interview: Teshome.
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opposition ideals... I came out clean and clear; we stand for the country’s 
constitution. We will be committed to peaceful and incremental change, if the EPRDF 
benefits, fine. We don’t want chaos.”267 While Zerihun admits that in the beginning 
he was “90 percent on the side of the government,” he now says he is attempting to
OAR ’7AQmove into the middle ground. Iftin is strongly associated with the EPRDF and it
appears unlikely that his partisan reporting will be forgotten anytime soon.
2.1.2 Anti-state
There were a number of factors that motivated the journalists who were 
strongly opposed to the government. While many of the most influential editors and 
publishers were in prison at the time of this research, their positions were known 
publicly and most were open about their motivations for editing or running a 
newspaper. A number of their colleagues spoke anonymously about what drove these
and impoverished it was hard for him to be neutral.270 Tamrat Giorgis, a close friend
of Iskinder’s, elaborated:
Iskinder never said he was a journalist. He used newspapers to promote his 
political objectives, namely Ethiopian unity and then self-determination for 
the Amhara. While the ruling party sees him as having blind hate, he is 
[actually] driven by idealism and power.271
It would also be a mistake to argue, as some have tried, that these journalists and 
editors did not know how to abide by professional norms of objectivity, a problem 
that is suggested to be correctable with more training. Most know what journalism 
ethics are, but they have defined other roles for themselves and they, just as Zerihun 
at Iftin did, are choosing not to use this approach at this time.
The editors and leading journalists of these papers were predominately from 
the middle and upper class and could be considered part of the intelligensia. In some 
cases, if they were not part of the Derg government, they spent significant time 
abroad and returned to Ethiopia after the EPRDF came to power.
2.2 Press freedom journalists
The press freedom journalists share many similarities with the previous group 
but are generally less prominent. Many of these journalists are no longer in Ethiopia; 
they have fled into exile mostly to Kenya but a number are also in the UK, US, Egypt, 
and Yemen among other places. These journalists worked for papers like Addis Zena 
and also for less popular papers, many of which stopped publishing a number of years 
ago such as Goh, Aemero, and Moresch. Through interviews with six of these 
journalists in Nairobi several common characteristics emerged to characterise this 
group.
There was an overwhelming desire on their part to get to America or the UK. 
Some were journalists for a short period in Ethiopia before they fled to Kenya to 
register for asylum and seek passage out of Africa. While some of these journalists 
certainly suffered government persecution during their time as journalists, it was 
difficult to tell to what extent they were actually targeted. By and large, they had a 
tremendous sense of self-aggrandisement, seeing themselves as the Ethiopian
270 Interview: Anonymous.
271 Interview: Tamrat Giorgis.
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journalists and fighters of freedom. They were, however, mostly young, university 
students who did not have the serious contesting relationship with the government 
that some other journalists such as Mairegu Bezabih, Mulagetu Lule or Goshu Mogus 
had. These journalists also had trouble articulating what exactly they were fighting 
for, although they believed they were in a fight. Usually they fell back on what they 
thought an international researcher would want to hear such as “human rights” or “I 
am writing to express myself’. 272 Another said that when he wrote for Wanchief it 
was “to have an alternative media for the public and to write the truth” and a 
colleague noted that Kibrit newspaper “wasn’t a business, the salary was sometimes 
100 birr. But our aim was to tell people what happened”.273
While this may be true, Charles Onyango-Obbo and Anthony Mitchell, who 
both worked to assist these journalists as refugees whilst in Kenya, noted that they 
were extremely difficult to help because they appeared to lack clear ideas of what 
they were doing and their role as journalists.274 Some arguments were significantly 
off the mark. Kifle Mulat, for example, when interviewed in Uganda tried to argue 
that “because Ethiopia was never colonised, people know what freedom is” in 
comparison to Ugandans.275 Given Ethiopia’s history of slavery and subjugation of 
some ethnicities, this is obviously untrue.
Indeed, it was difficult to interview the journalists as they were very intense, 
passionate, and a bit theatrical. Similarly, there was almost a complete inability for 
self-reflection or even acknowledgement of alternative perspectives. Everything was 
black or white. And as one journalist commented in response to a question about what 
the weaknesses were of his news organisation: “we don’t have any weaknesses as the 
press. We did our best as journalists. The restrictions of the government had us make 
mistakes... the total problem is with the regime”.276
272 Interview: Kassahun Lemma.
273 Interview: Tekle Woldemariam.
274 Interviews: Charles Onyango-Obbo and Anthony Mitchell.
275 Interview: Kifle Mulat. I have some hesitancy about placing Kifle among this group because of his 
background. While Kifle worked in the Ministry of Information during the Derg, most of the 
journalists in this group did not. Nevertheless, after two interviews with Kifle and seeing him give a 
lecture, he never succeeded in expressing arguments about his work as articulately as his colleagues
such as Derbew or Mairegu both from Lisane Hizb.
276 Interview: Anonymous.
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While these journalists have, to some degree, become the face of Ethiopian 
journalists in exile, they have not been a significant force in shaping and defining the 
media. Many, in fact, were merely serving as a ‘tapella’ that refers to a practice that 
started after leading journalists were jailed repeatedly. Editors such as Iskinder Nega 
that have been jailed a number of times began to face harsher charges and as a repeat 
offender could be denied bail. Thus they began to have others register as the editor of 
the paper and many of these individuals are reflected in this category.
2.3 ‘Gray zone’ journalists
More articulate, and clearly liberal, personal perspectives on their role as 
journalists were put forward by Amare Aregawi and Tamrat Giorgis. As previously 
discussed, both of these journalists were, and continue to be, supportive of the 
government and status quo. They also aspire to create papers that can be respected 
internationally and are competitive regionally. Amare describes his position in these 
terms:
How we see it is that we don’t discover a new job for our newspaper or a new 
policy. Newspapers are agenda setters.... Newspapers try to show the way. 
They don’t force - they don’t have the power. We are setting an agenda, 
whether they are accepted or not. Is this a discovery for The Reporter! No. 
The Guardian, The New York Times, Washington Post, Figaro- that’s what 
they do and that’s what we are doing....What are those agendas? The 
agendas are agendas of development and democracy and human rights 
endeavours. Do we discover them? No, they are there on the table. They are 
UN rules and values of human rights, economic development... They’re 
already in the world. Ask the government, do you believe in free market? 
They say yes. Ask the opposition, do you believe in free market? They say 
yes. But when you criticise them from those values, they are angry. We 
don’t care about Hailu Shawel, Berhanu Nega and Meles Zenawi when we 
write. If I have got some nights I don’t sleep properly, it’s when I feel we 
didn’t give the right information to the public person. We shouldn’t have 
done that. We should have waited or investigated it further, now that’s what 
I feel. Otherwise I don’t care about them.277
At the same time, however, Amare has been criticised for placing his political 
alliances and ideologies above this ‘international’ mission that he described. In the 
context of Ethiopia, however, it may be easier to articulate such ‘universal ideals’ 
rather than implement them. In addition, Amare, like a number of other journalists 
that seek international recognition for their work, is undoubtedly influenced by the
277 Interview: Aregawi.
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messages that international diplomats and organisations have made clear they want to 
hear from journalists in the developing world.
Tamrat, in contrast, is of a younger generation and emphasises his desire to 
change the culture of media in Ethiopia. He sees this as one of his primary roles as a 
journalist. For him, the elections were a defining period and he has taken great pride 
in the fact that he preformed what would be expected of a journalist working for an 
international paper. While most papers in Ethiopia are largely commentary and there
is little investigation or effort to go out and get a story (beyond going to press
conferences or development workshops), Tamrat sees Fortune as having different 
ideas and building a new media culture:
Fortune took enormous risks in coming out during the violence.... 
There was an argument about whether to come out, but it’s hospitals and 
media that need to come out. We need to tell the story; it’s the story of the 
decade. People need to tell the story that while you were in your house this is 
what happened. [I told my staff that we need] courage, interest and 
commitment. What we decide today is a life decision. Walking in town was 
dangerous, anyone could kill you anywhere. I took all my staff to their 
houses to pick them up and take them home. I was going in all the
neighbourhoods and there was no one here to protect the office. I compare
this decision with the decision to just let people go home; it would have been 
much easier and safer, but the issue wasn’t regular. It was not about business 
but killings and mass-arrest. So we decided to write our own experiences. We 
violated our own third person rules to write in the first person. I was with my 
reporters in Merkato. We drove there to be there, to go deep into the 
epicentre of the crisis. We have a commitment to readers to do that.... I 
received calls from mothers to send their children home. At Capital the 
journalists said it wasn’t safe to do their job. They wouldn’t take that risk. 
To be there and dedicated to our readers took courage and commitment.
During the crisis in Gambella, no one sent reporters to Gambella. 
Amare can afford it. It’s about how you see yourself as a journalist. It’s your 
perception and role. [In Ethiopia, we do] McDonalds journalism- people just 
take the packaged things and give it to readers.278
Tamrat’s perspective is unique, particularly because most newspapers use news from 
the internet or use it primarily to advocate a particular political perspective. It is 
difficult to see how the older generation could be involved in developing a new media 
culture and although Fortune is seen as being close to the government, Tamrat is 
trying to encourage a less ideological and new generation of journalism. However, its 
influence on the other papers that are more driven by ideology or politics appears 
inconclusive.
278 Interview: Giorgis.
122
2.4 Other motivations for journalists
The small, but significant, number of journalists that see themselves as 
aspiring to or participating in a broader global profession of journalism should not be 
excluded. Some of these journalists, who tend to be younger and work for the private 
press, have ideas about journalism that are similar to those of their colleagues across 
much of the world. Some of them work for the government media because they have 
a particular love of a medium. An example is Blen Fitsum, a news presenter on ETV 
who said she wanted to be a television journalist and since there were no private 
outlets she had no choice but to work for the government media.279 The reality is, 
however, that young people with a university education are not inclined to join the 
private media. They can earn far more in other sectors and with less risk. When 
older journalists such as Amare speak of the need to engage a new generation, in the 
current political situation which is dominated by debates and politics going back 
decades, there is little space for younger people. The vast majority of young people 
joining the media are doing so for ‘the bread’ or they may have served as tapellas. 
Younger journalists motivated by either the ‘watchdog’ ideal or for political reasons 
are the exception.
Culturally, it is also important to note the historical motivations for becoming 
a journalist in Ethiopia- some of the country’s greatest authors have also been 
journalists. A notable characteristic that appeared to stretch across journalists with 
varying ideologies, and relatively unique to Ethiopia in the region, was that journalists 
turned to the press because they wanted to be writers or poets but could not survive 
financially. In the past, these authors wrote for the Ministry of Information and 
published their books on the side, sometimes with severe consequences. Bealu 
Girma, for example, is the most well-known case. Bealu wrote for and served as an 
editor for a variety of papers including Menen, Addis Zemen, Yezareyitu Ityopia, and 
The Ethiopian Herald, but was killed by the Derg over a book entitled “Oromay” 
which means “henceforth.” In this book he denounced the catastrophic situation of 
the war in the north. Berhanu Zerihun and Mamou Wodeney are other examples of 
former editors of Addis Zemen and employees of the Ministry of Information who
279 Interview: Blen Fitsum.
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have been prolific writers. Mamou recently celebrated the publication of his fiftieth 
book.
Journalism as a profession has provided Ethiopia with authors and similarly 
much of the press has also played a role in providing people with something 
equivalent to books. While many cannot afford books, newspapers are more readily 
available and have a far larger circulation. The steady success of papers, such as 
Addis Admas, with the largest circulation (apart from election periods) and with its 
focus on arts, culture and literature (each week it publishes a short story), is indicative 
of the interest and respect for literature among Ethiopians.
Overall there are important differences among journalists’ ideologies as to 
what the role of the press should be in Ethiopia’s political development. Journalists 
and readers alike have notions of what the media ‘should be like’ that are usually in 
line with normative standards of the role of the press in conflict/post-conflict 
situations, although rarely do these seem to be operative in practice. Given that the 
institutionalisation of media companies is weak and few papers have editorial codes, 
there are often differing ideas among journalists about what the intentions of their 
paper are. Seemingly straightforward ideas of the media can also have multiple 
interpretations, such as ‘development journalism’. Like ‘unity’, many of these words 
are loaded with alternative meanings that outsiders unfamiliar with their other usages 
miss. Similarly, the idea of ‘watchdog journalism’ can be interpreted differently. 
Blen Fitsum summed up an observation from many informants when she commented, 
“here there is a misconception of what the media are. The opposition thinks it’s 
always to be against the government. They don’t think the media should be balanced 
or fair.” This, however, is also what the government has argued at times. The 
comment is reflective of the struggle between using the media for pressing political 
aims and trying to understand its intended role in conflict/post-conflict situations as 
argued by western development organisations. However, perceptions of the roles of 
the media and journalists are complex and almost never straightforward during times 
of transition and upheaval.
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3. Institutionalisation of the press
Institutionalisation has been a significant problem for the private and
government press in Ethiopia. Shimelis Kamal, the Federal Prosecutor and a former
journalist describe the challenge in these terms:
There have been calls for institutional change. The media failed to organise 
itself as a vibrant industry. There is a need to develop a vibrant media 
industry on the ideas of the market and the market will take care of itself. 
First is to create a legal framework... many papers were owned by a sole 
proprietor who was the publisher and the editor. This has retarded the 
growth of professionalism. There is a need to encourage periodicals to 
organise themselves as a business.280
The press has struggled to develop into a profitable and independent industry for a 
number of reasons, some of which originate with the government, others from the 
industry itself and still others are inherent constraints from within the society. This 
section will discuss the process of institution building and then briefly focus on those 
constraints emerging from the industry and the government.
In Uganda the government press, The New Vision, had a strong role in 
institutionalising and professionalising the private press, particularly the Monitor. 
This has not been the case in Ethiopia. Since most consumers of the government press 
are interested in the information relating to government programmes such as tenders 
and taxes, the private press does not regard the government press as serious 
competition. In contrast, the government press, particularly Addis Zemen, does
allocated to advertising, copy-editing and distribution. There is, however, regular 
turnover of staff and in many cases journalists work at a paper only for several 
months. Structurally, many news organisations have paid little attention to developing 
business models, proper accounting practices and clear journalistic principles that 
define their product. Only one private paper, Fortune, has an editorial policy that the 
editor could produce.283 Most papers, including the large Reporter, admitted that they
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have not written such a policy. At the same time, all papers had a clear idea of what 
they stood for - whether it be human rights, democracy or challenging the current 
government but in many cases it is unclear whether the staff has an idea of the paper’s 
policies beyond the present opinions of the editors.
It is difficult to generalise about the structure of the papers in the private 
sector. Fortune is the most organised and well structured. The paper still attracts 
some of the best journalists and those that have a background in politics or 
economics. Expectations of journalists and reporting ethics are clear at Fortune. 
There are policies for what journalists may take from NGOs or the hosts of meetings 
or tours (a pen, for example, is acceptable but a t-shirt is not).285 Such standards are 
unusual for Ethiopian papers. In a country with few financial resources, balancing 
what is acceptable and what challenges the integrity of the paper is difficult. Tamrat 
complains that
The NGOs are giving people large per diems. Taking money is not possible 
but not taking transportation isn’t realistic... the international NGOs pose a 
big problem: they take you to Nazret and give you a huge per diem. The 
national secretariat of an NGO wanted to take journalists to Nazret and 
offered them 1000 birr. We didn’t send anyone. But almost all other papers 
sent someone; it’s money that comes from overseas to help journalists. It’s 
outrageous.286
Few papers have as much oversight on their staff as Fortune does. The establishment 
and growth of Fortune has been relatively recent, but the paper is an important entry 
into the market more for the example of how it is managed than for its content.
283 Interview: Giorgis.
284 Interview: Aregawi.
285 For more on the complex relationship between NGOs and journalists in Ethiopia see: STYAN, D. 
(1999) Misrepresenting Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa? Constraints and Dilemmas of Current 
Reporting. IN ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) The Media o f Conflict. London, Zed. p. 292.
286 Interview: Giorgis.
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At other papers, including for example The Reporter, which I worked for in 
2001-2002, there is often less editorial oversight and structure. The English version 
was different from the Amharic, which had a much larger circulation and was more
influential in defining the parent company, Media and Communications Centre
(MCC). While there is significant overlap between the two papers, including a direct 
translation of one of the Amharic editorials into English, the Amharic paper is more 
closely monitored by the owner and editor, Amare Aregawi. The English paper 
generally gave journalists significant space to pursue the topics they chose. While 
recognising that as a foreigner my articles might be regarded as less threatening, 
nevertheless I would, for example, show up at the office with my article and give it to 
the person who was doing the layout for the paper. It was almost never edited and 
simply inserted on a page. While Amare usually checked the final copy before it went 
to press, by that time it was very late to make changes or pull the story without 
leaving a hole. Thus, at least in some cases, there was insufficient editorial oversight.
Given this setup, it is not surprising that papers are often referred to as
‘Amare’s paper’, or ‘Nebiy’s’ paper’. The editorial line is seen as a direct reflection
of the personal views of the owner/editor rather than the paper as a whole. For
example, when there was widespread discussion in Addis about how The Reporter
increasingly criticised the opposition after the elections, it was regularly framed in
terms of the personal attitudes of Amare. Because of the informal way that the paper
was organised and his holding positions of both editor-in-chief and owner, Amare
was able, in fact, to alter immediately the paper’s editorial line.287 It is common in
Ethiopia for the owner to also be the editor and for other staff to serve multiple roles.
As Bonsa describes:
More often than not, a person, usually male, would act as proprietor,
publisher, editor-in-chief, senior reporter, advertisement and circulation
manger. This situation of overlapping duties was also applicable to chief 
editors, deputy editors, managing editors and reporters.288
While Tobiya, The Reporter, and Fortune, among others, had (and have) the luxury of 
having offices in a house, equipment such as computers as well as trained and
287 A number of journalists at the paper were frustrated with the abrupt change and seven left shortly 
after to find employment elsewhere.
288 BONSA, S. (2000) Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia: 1991-1999, Addis Ababa, Forum for 
Social Studies, p. 28.
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experienced journalists that were, and are, committed to the profession, many other 
papers were simply small groups of people getting together to write and try their hand 
at publishing a paper.
Bonsa refers to this group as comprising the second phase of the proliferation 
of papers. The first phase included papers like Tobiya that were largely run by 
experienced journalists from the previous regime. Many of these journalists, 
however, soon fled into exile abroad due to government harassment. In contrast, the 
second group of papers that rose to fill the gaps generally had staff that had no 
journalism training289 and were often in university or had recently graduated from 
high-school and were doing the writing on the side. Often these papers were started 
by someone who would get a major lead and come out with a very sensational story 
for their first copy. It validated their existence and provided instant attention. For 
many of these papers, however, the source or informant quickly dried up after a few 
issues and the paper collapsed because it did not have anything substantial offer. 
These papers seldom had long-term plans. Other papers, whilst they may have had 
long-term plans, often lacked a coherent business or development strategy. For 
example, a journalist who was involved with Ethiop and asked to remain anonymous, 
explained that
We didn’t have money but we’d sell the papers and then we’d give the 
money back to the paper. It wasn’t started as a business; it was the role of 
democracy. In 1992 EC it started being profitable... we had a little bit of 
advertisements but we didn’t want anyone to invest. A businessman would 
have an agenda.290
As previously discussed, the journalists at Ethiop had a political agenda which often 
predominated the paper’s development agenda. In addition, the institutionalisation of 
the press has been affected by a lack of investment as well as issues such as the role 
of women in the press, training opportunities and the development of institutional 
memory.
289 Ibid. p. 31.
290 Interview: Anonymous.
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3.1 Women, university and journalism training, and institutional memory
In contrast with many other countries in Africa, including Uganda, where 
women regularly hold prominent positions and often report on politics, Ethiopian 
women journalists remain marginalised. They are almost always relegated to writing 
about culture or social issues and many male colleagues find it shocking to find a 
woman writing on political issues. I can attest that even being a foreigner at The 
Reporter did not help to dispel discontent amongst some male colleagues that I would 
be writing the weekly feature article on political and economic issues. Marginalising 
such a large proportion of the population, leaves media organisations all the poorer 
and with fewer intellectual and strategic resources.
Another major issue hindering the institutionalisation of the press is that 
journalists, particularly those from the private press, are rarely given serious training 
in journalism or related subjects. Excellent journalists of course come from different 
backgrounds, and often the best backgrounds are those grounded in a particular 
discipline, such as science, which can inform reporting. But many journalists in 
Ethiopia have not completed university and it is common for a newspaper to not have 
one person on its staff that has studied journalism or media management.
The Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute (EMMTI), which was 
established in 1996 under the Ministry of Information, has been the central institution 
for training journalists but has consistently restricted its students to those of the 
government media. Journalists who were interested in working for the private media 
and desired training would generally study subjects such as Amharic or English at 
university and then try to take a class that was related to journalism or media studies. 
In 2000, however, the Norwegian government gave a large grant to start an MA 
programme in Communications at Addis Ababa University. While almost all students 
worked for the government, the programme was not explicitly restrictive.
A final but major issue facing the press is the lack of an institutional memory 
within most news organisations. Journalists rarely stay on beyond a year at many 
papers and there are hundreds of journalists abroad in exile. Some of these journalists 
have legitimate reasons to go into exile as they had been persecuted and imprisoned 
by the government. In other cases, however, people work only briefly as journalists to 
establish a case for an asylum claim. The Ethiopian Free Press Journalists
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Association (EFPJA) has written many letters of support, often for journalists that 
have suffered little persecution, and has even been accused of selling letters to support 
asylum claims.291
While journalists in Uganda or Kenya often live a relatively middle class life 
and enjoy more institutionalised media organisations, many Ethiopian journalists do 
not have a similar perception of job security. Family pressures are usually such that if 
offered the opportunity to go abroad journalists will be letting down the family if they 
return to Ethiopia. Most journalists I encountered who had had the opportunity to go 
abroad for training, had decided to stay and many others I interviewed said that if 
given the chance to travel, they would not return. It is also notable that from the East 
African Journalist Fellowship programme that informed this research, only one out of 
three Ethiopian participants returned while the journalists from the other six countries 
all went back to their jobs. The Ethiopian fellows were not writing articles 
particularly critical of the government as they worked for The Reporter and Capital 
and were recommended by the UK Embassy.
This continuous exodus of journalists weakens the papers and provides little 
momentum to go forward and build upon. Charles Onyango-Obbo was part of a 
Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ) mission to Ethiopia in 2006 to assess the 
situation of the media and the status of the imprisoned journalists. Onyango-Obbo 
criticised the ways in which CPJ urged journalists who were not in prison but could 
face persecution to flee to Kenya. In Uganda, he argued, there was a culture of 
challenging laws and fighting for space for the press as absolute freedoms were not 
something that could simply be given to journalists. Styan similarly argues that 
“Foreign liberals protesting at the arrest of editors overlook the facts that nowhere 
were the trappings of liberal democracy gained without struggle. If they are to be 
durable, civil rights such as freedom of the press have to be fought for, not simply 
acquired as a ready-made accessory from a foreign donor’s presciption list.”292 Thus, 
if most or all of the journalists are out of the country, it is difficult to engage and 
challenge legislation and media policies. As Onyango-Obbo elaborated:
291 Interview: Harmut Hess and Anonymous.
292 s ty A N , D. (1999) Misrepresenting Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa? Constraints and Dilemmas of 
Current Reporting. IN ALLEN, T. & SEATON, J. (Eds.) The Media of Conflict. London, Zed. p. 300.
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Ethiopia had one of the freest medias in the Horn of Africa.. .the challenge 
now is not with the free press because even a half-free press is a victory. 
Even a half-bad newspaper is better than a nonexistent one. Because you 
have to go through the period where journalists come up then they get 
cracked down. If you don’t and they just leave, there is no institutional 
memory. You have nothing to build on. You have to start from scratch all the
293time.
With most of the private papers shut down, and journalists out of the country, much 
of the recent progress the private press made has been lost.
As this section has argued, one of the major factors missing from the 
Ethiopian media landscape are strong papers that can serve as a model or an example, 
encouraging and pushing the other papers to compete with it professionally. The 
government media has not succeeded in setting an example (and has rather done the 
opposite) and in the current political environment, the institutional development of the 
private media looks tenuous in the immediate future.
4. Government intervention
Despite democratic rhetoric on the importance of freedom of association and 
the role civil society, the Ethiopian government’s attitude towards all civil society 
bodies is that they need to be controlled.294 This is reflective of the ‘revolutionary 
democratic’ process of transition that Prime Minister Meles has outlined and that will 
be elaborated in the next chapter.
Despite subscribing to constitutional protections of freedom of thought, 
opinion, expression and the press,295 as well as the ratification of international 
declarations protecting such rights,296 since the EPRDF came to power there has been 
a history of regularly arresting and persecuting journalists. Journalists are often
293 Interview: Charles Onyango-Obbo.
294 ABBINK, J. (2006) Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its 
Aftermath. African Affairs, 105, 173- 199. And for a less critical analysis on civil society groups in 
Ethiopia see RAHMATO, D. (2002) Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia. IN ZEWDE, B. & 
PAUSWANG, S. (Eds.) Ethiopia: The Challenge o f Democracy from Below. Uppsala, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet.
295 Article 29 of the Federal Constitution guarantees these rights under Right of Thought, Opinion and 
Expression.
296In 1993 Ethiopia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 1998 Ethiopia 
ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which guarantees the right to freedom of 
expression in Article 9 and it also adopted the Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in 
Africa in October 2002.
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heavily fined and imprisoned for periods ranging from days to years. Many who
7Q7
work for the private papers have been in jail several times. In recent years Ethiopia 
has earned the dubious distinction of being Africa’s worst jailer of journalists after 
Eritrea.
The period after the elections was particularly difficult for press and 
government relations, as dozens of journalists were jailed at different times. The 
courts brought up old charges, some dating several years back, and also charged some 
journalists with having a role in the post-election violence. A number were directly 
linked with politicians and were charged with treason and attempted genocide under 
the penal code.298 Shimelis, the Federal Prosecutor, explains the logic of the charges 
and the case against the journalists that were not charged under the press law:
It can appear we are charging them for opinions they hold but the 
editorials aren’t opinions but pure incitements. Most editorialised the CUD 
views and openly called for the violence or actions that th<* r i m  lraforciiin
government forms a new constitution they would allege a new uprising or 
popular insurrection. The demands were unconstitutional. They were not 
asking for a coalition government but for the suspension o f the constitution
and a transition;
themselves in this court. They expressed themselves with the CUD. If they 
are mere media owners, then why do they and the CUD side? It’s a clear 
indication that they are working and conspiring together.299
Over the years, the private press has been very concerned with press freedom 
and a substantial amount of column space has been dedicated to debates about this 
issue since it began publishing. Much of this has been about the press law, which 
since 1992 Ethiopia’s journalists have ostensibly been accountable to.
The government has long been discussing the need for media reform and 
legislation was at the core. In 2008 a new press law was passed by parliament. This 
law was drafted numerous times and since 2003, when it was first prepared, it has had 
significant input from international organizations. Organisations such as Article 19 
and International Press Institute, issued critical comments arguing that the penalties 
were too strong and some clauses restricted freedom of expression.300 In 2005 the 
government removed some of the most controversial aspects of the press law and put 
them in the penal code. The law is regularly referred to as ‘draconian’ and not 
surprisingly local journalists are highly critical. It often appears that it is those 
journalists in the ‘grey zone’ that are most enraged over this legislation since they are 
the ones likely to feel the greatest impact.
Amare Aregawi, who over the years has fought publicly with Bereket Simon, 
has been particularly active in engaging and challenging the government over the 
draft press law. But for journalists that are the most critical of the government, they 
will, in many respects, continue to be governed by an alternative legal system- one 
that operates more at the will and whim of the EPRDF and Prime Minister rather than 
an independent legal and judicial system. These journalists are acutely aware of this 
reality and they are often less outspoken on the press legislation than Amare but they
299 Interview: Kamal.
3° °  press jaw an(j the current 1992 law, is often described as ‘draconian’ for requirements
ranging from citizenship to requirements to submit a copy of the publication within 24 hours to the 
Ministry o f Information. The MOI has been quite strict about papers publishing who the editor in chief 
is and the editor or the address of the paper cannot be changed without the approval o f the MOI.
For an analysis of the press law, albeit slightly problematic one because it appears to be largely cut and 
pasted from a template see www.articlel9.org/pdfs/analvsis/ethiopia-note-mav-2004-draft-press- 
law.pdf. See also, http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/publications detail.html?ctxid=CH0057&docid= 
CM S1141814166586
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also refused to have legal counsel during their 2005 trial claiming that it was 
impossible for them to have a fair hearing.
4.1 A need for more legislation?
The government’s strategy of focusing on addressing what it views to be 
problematic reporting primarily with legal tools and intimidation poses many 
challenges. Without engaging journalists, or attempting to shape the media in 
alternative ways, there is little change to the discourse it finds so threatening. The 
approach also exacerbates conflict between what the government views to be 
opposing perspectives. While the government does encourage self-censorship, it does 
little to cultivate appreciation of its own views and make journalists sympathetic.
At the same time, as has been the case with the recent press law, the debates 
on issues surrounding press legislation allow the government to distract attention 
from the real problems. The EPRDF has been notorious for commissioning reports 
and analyses from international governments and donor agencies, then stalling on the 
implementation of their findings and later re-commissioning similar reports just to 
look like they are open to change.
The situation is clear enough that even Kefyalew Azeze, a party member and
head of the Ethiopian Press Agency, argued that it is not legislation that is needed but
a change of commitment and culture:
There is talk of a law on freedom of information but it is not the law that will 
guarantee you the access. It’s not the existence of the law but it’s a change of 
attitude needed within government offices to sell themselves. We are trying 
to write in papers that people in government offices aren’t giving 
information. We have to use the newspaper, we believe the more you use the 
paper, people will respond if we say this man isn’t giving information.301
Other members of the government, including the influential former Minister of 
Information, Bereket Simon, still choose to emphasise the role of legislation in 
shaping the media, while adding that the government was looking to “open access to 
government information, interviews, press conferences. We need to develop a 
platform where we engage so they won’t complain for lack of information”.302 And in
301 Interview: Kefyalew Azeze.
302 Interview: Simon.
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response to the widespread imprisonment and closure of newspapers after the
election, Bereket argued that
Journalists have been the instruments of this colour revolution. They’ve 
transgressed the law of the land. Let the judiciary respond, it’s the only viable 
solution.. ..We hired experts from other countries to decide what to do. They 
looked at the existing laws, there are plus sides, and limitations. They’ll 
propose some areas; we’ll discuss these issues with the opposition and other 
stakeholders.303
Bereket’s view prevails and for the foreseeable future the focus will remain on 
legislation.
As long as the enabling environment, particularly the judiciary, for the press is 
not strengthened and the judicial system continues to operate the way it does with 
such little transparency, journalists will have scant confidence in the system. This is a 
marked difference with Uganda where journalists have the confidence to challenge 
the government in court. But in Ethiopia, where the most serious cases, or those that 
are strongest critics of the government (such as many of the journalists jailed in 2005) 
are penalized under legislation with the possibility of harsher punishment such as the 
penal code and the courts are transparently unfair, the press laws matter less. Thus, 
the debates on the press law in Ethiopia will continue to serve as an illusion to help 
divert international attention from the underlying issues that are more difficult to 
reconcile.
4.2 Difficulties in challenging the government and expanding the circle of operation
Journalists regularly expressed confusion and frustration with the seemingly 
unsystematic way the government chooses to press charges against particular articles. 
For the past fifteen years journalists have been brought before the courts but no 
judicial precedent has been set to empower journalists to make decisions. It simply 
appears that it is EPRDF leadership that says what is tolerable and by whom.
Joseph Aboulfaki, editor-in-chief of the Sub-Saharan Informer (SSI),
describes, for example, a situation that worried him because he was unsure as to
whether the government would come after him:
A reporter was going on Monday to the US and they put in a story that the 
government was running out of money to pay the police. I didn’t read the
303 Interview: Simon.
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story properly but he said his relatives were in the Ministry of Finance. 
Nothing happened but I was scared... maybe it was true but I thought the 
government was going to come but they kept quiet.304
Similarly, Joseph is impressed that he has not yet been targeted for being Sudanese. 
Under the Ethiopian press law foreigners are not allowed to be involved with media 
organisations. Bereket and Meles know Joseph is Sudanese but choose to allow him 
to continue. It is only the heads of some ministries that give him problems and say 
that foreigners support the SSI. Joseph contends that ministers call him in over things 
that appear minor. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, accused him of 
misquoting the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Fraser, 
and once he used a photo of Ethiopians demonstrating in Washington DC which, 
according to the Minister, was inaccurate in making it look like there were hundreds 
of people there rather than a smaller crowd. In general, the justice system has not 
articulated where incitement begins or ends or even what it means. For journalists, it 
often appears as though there is not a legal starting point from which they can begin 
to challenge legislation as charges usually seem to be issued according to the whims 
of the court.
The government picks its battles and many times it is personal. If a minister 
feels particularly aggrieved or offended by a specific article, he or she may choose to 
attack the news outlet for this. This personalisation of government and media 
relations is particularly difficult as many of the ideological clashes and personal 
relationships go back to the student movement in the 1970s. Both sides have found it 
difficult to separate the past from current disagreements. For example, after the 
elections when a number of journalists were in prison and the government seemed to 
be hesitating about arresting more, a meeting was called for the independent press at 
the Ministry of Justice. In what seemed to be a pre-orchestrated background 
agreement, the Minister of Justice and Zerihun Teshome, editor-in-chief of Iftin, 
announced a plan whereby all old charges (many from a number of years ago) would 
be dropped but future mistakes by journalists would be punished strongly. Goshu 
Mogus, formerly head of the censorship bureau under the Derg, told the Minister of 
Justice sarcastically that he does not know how to run a censorship office; he could
304 Interview: Joseph Aboulfaki.
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set one up for him. Shimelis, the Chief Prosecutor, replied by saying that they had 
given him the freedom for him to say that. Soon after the meeting Goshu was 
arrested by the police. There are two stories about how events unfolded.305
According to Shimelis, he was charged with clandestine criminal activity and was
found with explosives and firearms under his bed.306 Derbew Temesgen, a lawyer that 
has regularly defended journalists particularly from Lisane Hezeb for which he was 
working, was providing legal defence for Goshu. His version is significantly 
different:
Armed police came at 6pm and took him [Goshu] away. They returned to his 
home, closed his family in another room and put a knife, grenade and pistol 
in his bedroom. They acted if they were searching the house but they are 
doing this to all opposition members.307
Derbew believes that even if journalists or the opposition are being framed, it is still
Anthony’s experience reporting in Ethiopia is similar to that of many other foreign
journalists and researchers, a number who have also been asked to leave or been
denied entry.310 Anthony describes the pressure to self-censor:
They [the government] would call us up and threaten us journalists. They 
would say that they are watching me. In November they called me in and 
said it was a final warning, they called me a human rights activist... They try 
to scare you so you don’t write the stories. Tsegaye, the Reuters Ethiopian 
guy, wouldn’t report some stories. In January I saw someone being shot. If 
there’s a sensitive story, you call everyone and I called Tsegaye and he said 
don’t run it: the government said that guy was shot in the countryside. 
Tsegaye’s close with Bereket... When we went to cover Hailu Shawel’s 
house arrest, the AP photographer got beat up and Bereket told me we would 
be wise to stay away from these things.311
For Anthony, and most of the other journalists, the most frustrating thing is “that you 
can’t prove anything. If you can’t confirm you can’t write. Maybe we have good 
sources but the government says it’s total rubbish, so how do we confirm anything?” 
Clearly the complicated relations between the journalists and the government are not 
simply limited to local journalists but also indicative of broader systemic problems 
affecting foreign journalists as well.
5. Conclusion
Before turning to issues of the political system, I wish to briefly summarise a 
few features of the press system that will stand in contrast to the case of Uganda. The 
Ethiopian press itself is divided, weak and conflicted over its purpose. The tendency 
among Ethiopian publications has been to focus on the government as the enemy and 
to blame it for the dismal quality of the private papers. While the government has 
undoubtedly done tremendous damage to the press, and essentially silenced all voices 
after 2005, at the same time there has been a surprising inability on the part of many 
private journalists (mostly the anti-state ones) to objectively evaluate their products 
and self-reflect. Most journalists adopted the discourse of international human rights 
NGOs that claim journalists are heroes battling a horrible government. While to some
310 Chris Albin-Lackey, for example, researched atrocities in Gambella and was later refused entry into 
Ethiopia.
311 Interview: Anthony Mitchell.
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degree that is true, Charles Onyango-Obbo made an interesting comment from the
Uganda perspective when he noted:
He [Museveni] sees our [Monitor’s] attitude as hostility. He realises that he 
cannot escape from it so he says to us that it is important to understand the 
nature of the state and the recourses that the state has. The state basically has 
the laws and the power of coercion. So therefore it is natural that the state 
would resort to the laws. You might think it is undemocratic repression but 
that is the law and he says that the state will use those laws to dominate and 
shape the public space and dialogue.... By the same token, the journalists 
must also fight their comer. You must protect your side of this bargain. 
Therefore you shouldn’t expect the state to make your job easier... the state’s 
job is not to make it easier for people that are contesting its power to 
function: no, it’s your job if you are journalist or a civil society activist. 
Don’t expect that your opponent will help you win the game.312
So far, Ethiopian journalists have largely cast themselves as ‘victims’. The press 
system as a whole remains weak, without unity or institutional foundations and lacks 
leadership.
Of course challenging the system and working to ‘expand the circle’ takes a 
certain confidence in institutions. In Uganda, Onyango-Obbo and his colleagues 
could feel confident that they would get a relatively free trial from a reliably 
independent judiciary, which has not been the case in Ethiopia. As the coming chapter 
will discuss, government engagement and ideologies of nation-building are also key 
factors in the development of the press system.
3,2 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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CHAPTER 5:
The Political and Social Structure that has shaped 
Ethiopia’s Media System:
Guerrilla War, Political Experience and Practical Calculations
Is it not simply Amhara and to a certain extent Amhara-Tigre supremacy?
Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian language is?
Ask anybody what Ethiopian music is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian religion is?
Ask anybody what the national dress is? It is either Amhara or Amhara-Tigre!!
To be a “genuine Ethiopian ” one has to speak Amharic, listen to Amharic music, 
to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity, and to wear the 
Amhara-Tigre Shamma in international conferences.
In some cases to be an “Ethiopian ” you will even have to change your name.
In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (to use Fanon’s expression).313
—Walleligne Makonnen 
Struggle, 1969
The above quotation is from a provocative article entitled “On the Question of 
Nationalities” from Struggle, the student publication at Haile Selassie University, in 
which Walleligne Makonnen called for a revolutionary war against the Imperial state. 
Expressing a key argument of the Eritrean independence movement, Walleligne 
argued that every ethnic group should have the right to self-determination and 
succession from Ethiopia. Indicative of the historical complexities between the press, 
student movement and politics, this article is regarded as a turning point in the student 
movement. The government responded by censoring all student publications.
The process of nation-building in Ethiopia has had a strong impact on the 
press, but at the same time the press has taken very active part in this process. 
Literature on the Ethiopian state abounds,314 but the complexities of relations between
313 As quoted in GUDINA, M. (2006) Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian History: the Need for 
a New Consensus. IN TURTON, D. (Ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in 
Comparative Perspective. Oxford, James Currey. p. 123.
314 OTTAWAY, M. (1990) The Political Economy of Ethiopia, New York, Praeger Publishers, 
CLAPHAM, C. (2006) Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation. Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 44, 137- 150, CLAPHAM, C. (1988) Transformation and Continuity in 
Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, SORENSON, J. (1993) Imagining 
Ethiopia, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, PAUSWANG, S., TRONVOLL, K. & AALEN, 
L. (Eds.) (2002) Ethiopia Since the Derg, London, Zed, LEVINE, D. (1974) Greater Ethiopia: The 
Evolution o f a Multiethnic Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ZEWDE, B. & 
PAUSWANG, S. (Eds.) (2002) Ethiopia: The Challenge o f Democracy from Below, Uppsala, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, TURTON, D. (Ed.) (2006) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford, James Currey , GUDINA, M. (2005) Ethiopia: A Transition 
Without Democratization. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University, ABBAY, A. (2004) Diversity and 
Statebuilding in Ethiopia. African Affairs, 103, 593- 614. ZEWDE, B. (1991) A History o f Modem  
Ethiopia, 1855-1974, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press.
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the press and political development gets very little attention. Historical research has 
focused on Ethiopia as an empire, as a coloniser and more recently as the only state 
on the continent to give birth to a new federal arrangement. Ethnic politics in 
Ethiopia has also been of interest to scholars; some regions and groups, such as the 
Amhara, have been extensively studied and researched while others, such as the 
Somali-Ethiopians in the Ogaden, have been largely ignored.315
In order to understand the current press system it is important to examine the 
process of transition from the Derg to the EPRDF and the guerilla war that endured 
for over two decades. This chapter looks at the political and social structure that has 
shaped Ethiopia’s media system including issues such as ethnic dimensions, the 
political strategy of the TPLF, and the ways in which the EPRDF sought to rebuild 
the state and consolidate political power.
The first part of the chapter analyses the TPLF’s ideology, its struggle to 
establish a dominant position in Ethiopia politics and the application of lessons 
learned whilst fighting in the bush. While during the struggle the TPLF exhibited 
some democratic practices, it believed there was a greater need to demonstrate 
progress and policies rather
4j.1t tv^  vugagt/
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these groups. There is also a sense of entitlement evident on the 
leadership, who after having fought for over two decades in the bush
party.317 Since these beliefs and attitudes are rooted in the past, and the EPRDF 
shows no inclination to move beyond them, continuing tension between journalists 
who oppose the regime and the government appears inevitable.
The second section of this chapter considers the consolidation of power, 
specifically the federalist constitution that allows for the secession of states. This has 
been a controversial and recurring theme in the private press and is one that polarises 
Ethiopians. There is a tendency for outsiders to take the government’s democratic 
rhetoric at face value rather than explore some of the Prime Minister’s writings where 
he has elaborated his theory of Revolutionary Democracy. As will be elaborated, this 
ideology does not necessarily have the same principles regarding freedom of 
expression that are often assumed in democratic states. It will be argued that from the 
government’s perspective, a free press is a privilege and a tool to be exploited when 
beneficial for consolidating power.
The third section discusses reconciliation and trust in Ethiopian society. The 
EPRDF has done little to improve trust between the people, the government and the 
press, a failure that has had important consequences on the latter. Also examined is 
how the government handled the transition of the media (particularly the Ministry of 
Information) from the Derg to the EPRDF. It will be argued that by failing to 
incorporate Derg supporters into the new government, the EPRDF isolated them and 
created a stronger opposition that came to dominate the private press. The EPRDF did 
not see reconciliation as either necessary or a priority. Many of the issues that have 
divided elites since the days of the student movement have continued and have 
regularly surfaced in the private press. By essentially ignoring these issues, the 
government hoped that they would go away, but they have gained currency in recent 
years.
Finally, Ethiopian politics is located in a global framework. Ethiopians have a 
fierce sense of independence and are unwilling to be pushed around by more powerful 
countries. Partly because of Ethiopia’s international standing as a close US ally and a 
frontline state on the war on terror, the EPRDF has been able to withstand substantial 
internal discontent and perpetrate extensive human rights abuses that would have
317 CLAPHAM, C. (2006) Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation. Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 44, 137- 150.
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otherwise brought about exceptional condemnation and pressure. Thus, as long as 
Ethiopia continues advancing US policy in the region including, for example, 
maintaining troops in Somalia to prop up the Transitional Federal Government and 
fight the Islamic Courts Union, real external pressures for democratic change seem 
unlikely.
Competing historical narratives
Before moving to the areas of analysis, it is useful to have a brief illustration 
of the competing ideas and visions of Ethiopia, which are held by some Ethiopians318 
and reflected in the press. One of the most interesting ways of understanding 
competing visions and the ideological underpinnings since the EPRDF came to power 
is though the recitation of Ethiopia’s recent history by different stakeholders. During 
the course of this research, which included recording people’s oral histories and 
extensive semi-structured interviews, the historical context was crucial in 
understanding competing visions of contemporary events. Bereket Simon, for 
example, provided a version of Ethiopian history and the changes the EPRDF has 
implemented through the following excerpts:
Ethiopia passed through two types of autocratic governments in 
which the political economy was based on using state power to grab land 
from the farmers. Political power was a source of wealth.... Both regimes 
were based on the domination of many nationalities and they both evicted 
farmers and then turned them into tenants. Seventy-five percent of the 
population was affected by a national oppression, which led to seventeen 
armed rebel movements. There was a national movement. Either you address 
it boldly democratically or it disintegrates.
After the EPRDF overthrew the military [government], Ethiopian 
and the world mentality both thought that we had to move in a particular 
direction and that the democratic avenue should be opened as well as 
pursued.
We had a fundamental restructuring of society. We dismantled a 
command economy. Espionage institutions and the private sector became the 
engine of growth. We introduced national equality, which is the only savior 
of this country. We reorganised the society along new lines and confronted 
the national issue in a bold, progressive manner....
This radical restructuring has been a cause for some people to feel 
aggrieved. They felt that we’ve come to dismember Ethiopia.... They felt it a
318 GUDINA, M. (2006) Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian History: the Need for a New 
Consensus. IN TURTON, D. (Ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford, James Currey.
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threat to the old Ethiopia. The old guards from the old status quo... they 
used it to amass wealth but the old days are gone forever.319
For Bereket, the EPRDF initiatives were drastic and unusual as they introduced “new 
thinking” and had to “restructure the state and society radically” which, in his
opinion, is “different from Uganda where Museveni has not fundamentally
restructured it”.320
In contrast, for Berhanu Abebe, an intellectual who used to be in charge of the
railways for Haile Selassie’s regime, the current EPRDF has misunderstood history
and presented a negative vision for the country. Berhanu argued:
They [the TPLF] are ignorant of history, their vision of the outside world is 
negative and limited. The elimination of Mengistu was a negative exercise. 
Once in power they have continued this negation. It’s a negation of history 
and the past. They don’t have a clear concept of continuity; their mind still 
works in terms of revolution. Philosophically, this is horrible. In South
America, Marxism is just rhetoric, here it is a lack of another intellectual
321resource.
For Berhanu, the EPRDF misunderstands ordinary Ethiopians and what they fought 
for during the Derg period. He argued it has been too easy for the government to 
dismiss the ‘old guard’ as supporters as the Derg, and cast themselves as the 
liberators. Rather, Berhanu argues, the Derg was essentially being destroyed for the 
superpowers in an effort to defeat the USSR and the TPLF was just one of a number 
of insurgency groups that were involved in the struggle to overthrow it. The TPLF has 
failed to
analyse the position of Ethiopians during the Derg. The TPLF intervened 
when the Derg had lost the battle with the people. Ethiopia has never been 
communist... Those that collaborated with Mengistu have cards - there were 
about 250,000 people but the TPLF considered all of Ethiopia pro- 
Mengistu.322
Berhanu suggests that some in the west have also been insensitive and ignorant of this
period, giving the example
In Hard Talk, when the British journalist asked Hailu [Shawel] what he was 
doing for the Derg. There is this thinking that if you supported the Derg, then 
you are opposed to the current government.... But the BBC and the British 
have lost respect of [many Ethiopians] for that comment. [It was an insult to]
319 Interview: Bereket Simon.
320 Interview: Simon.
321 Interview: Berhanu Abebe.
322 Interview: Abebe.
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all Ethiopians who fought Mengistu silently - that lost their children, their 
careers. A Briton comes and during one of the major programmes dismisses 
Ethiopians who fought Mengistu. People suffered for Ethiopia’s survival 
during Mengistu.323
Additionally, he notes that for the US and EU supporting “a military group that 
fought against Ethiopian integrity isn’t the best way to make friends”. For Berhanu, 
the impact of the EPRDF is clear, “we have been sold off ... the damage they caused 
is worse than Mengistu. They have deprived a country its access to the sea.” He 
concludes that the current government is not in a position to criticise ‘the old guard’ 
because “he who fought Ethiopian integrity cannot advocate and accuse”.324
History is extremely important in Ethiopian politics and the press. These 
passionate views, which are elaborated in this chapter, partly explain why the 
Ethiopian state, and the current government, is in such a fragile position and political 
positions are entrenched and not easily reconciled.
1. Ideology of the liberation movement
Guerrilla movements have arisen in many different environments and 
contexts, from Southern Sudan, a region that was long regarded as ‘stateless’, to 
Ethiopia, which has the oldest and most centralised government on the continent. The 
TPLF was one of the longest fighting guerrilla movements and is rooted in the 
historical formation of the state. Its background is important in understanding the 
current fundamental disagreements about the Ethiopian constitution as well ethnic 
divisions within society and the sense of entitlement that the EPRDF projects. These 
issues manifest themselves not only in the debates within the press but also in the way 
in which the government interacts with the press.
In 1974 the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, who claimed Solomonic 
lineage and a direct ordination from God, was overthrown by the military Derg325 
regime after years of student opposition. During this period of upheaval, there was a 
substantial proliferation of regionally based liberation movements that were at odds
323 Interview: Abebe.
324 Interview: Abebe.
325 Derg is Amharic for ‘committee’ and refers to the group within the military that seized power.
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with the Derg’s efforts to nationalise land and ensure the state retained its 
predominantly Amhara character.
The TPLF was one of these movements. It was ethnically, historically and 
geographically rooted in the northern region of Tigray. The Ethiopian state traces its 
origins back to the Kingdom of Axum that flourished in Tigray in the third century 
A.D. and has been regarded as one of the world’s earliest advanced and dynamic 
civilisations with its own script, number system, and calendar. The empire adopted 
Orthodox Christianity in 340 AD, and the current city of Axum claims to be the 
birthplace of the Queen of Sheba as well as hold the Ark of the Covenant.327 By the 
seventh century, the Axum state was losing its central control and consequently 
allowed the emergence over the following centuries of local kingdoms that vied, often 
violently, for supremacy. It was not until the mid-1800s that Kassa Hailu, later 
crowned Emperor Tewodros, from Gondar, established some semblance of a unified 
Ethiopian state. Kahsay Mircha from Tigray, crowned Emperor Yohannes, succeeded 
Tewodros in 1872. Both of these leaders based their state on the legacy of Axum yet 
were unable to bring peace or stability. Local wars raged and international 
interventions were a regular occurrence and because of its strategic location in the 
North, Tigray bore the brunt of these conflicts and at the same time was also affected 
by a number of devastating famines.
Both Menelik II and Haile Selassie, the leaders who succeeded Tewodros and 
Yohannes, cared little about the people in the Tigray region and their suffering, which 
encouraged the rebellion that served as a precursor to the later insurgency led by the 
TPLF. In 1942-43 the Tigrayans revolted.328 The revolt registered some success in 
the beginning and became known as the Woyene, but the subsequent intervention of 
the British army, particularly the aerial bombardment of Mekelle on behalf of Haile 
Selassie, proved too great a challenge and the revolt soon broke down. Thousands of
326 FUKUI, K. & MARKAKIS, J. (1994) Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Oxford, James 
Currey, YOUNG, J. (1997) Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
327 Orthodox Christianity has changed little in Ethiopia over the years and some academics have argued 
that this has had a profound impact on political development. The church in Ethiopia, for example, 
still does not accept the Hippocratic oath but rather believes that Christ was of both man and god.
328 It was largely a peasant movement demanding an end to state interference and seeking relief from 
what they saw as unfair treatment from the central government while dissident nobles who supported it 
were looking instead for a greater share of state power. It was a significant threat to state stability and 
Haile Selassie’s rule when he returned from exile.
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civilians died and the Tigrayans were punished for their disloyalty; land was 
confiscated and passed to those loyal to the central government and the government 
imposed a new heavy tax.
The situation in Tigray continued to decline. Tigrayans dispersed across the 
country in search of better conditions. At the same time resentment towards 
perceived systematic ethnic discrimination grew and the legacy of the Woyene 
became a rallying point for ethno-nationalism. Small rebellions continued by armed 
groups opposing the national government, including in Eritrea, until the famine in 
1972-74 that severely affected half of Tigray’s population. Haile Selassie’s Showan- 
Amhara dominated- government ignored the devastation not only in Tigray but also 
across much of the country.329 When the Derg came to power it continued the policies 
of the previous regime regarding assertive ethnic-nationalities.
During the student movement330 at Addis Ababa University (AAU), a small
group, the Tigray National Organisation (TNO), emerged within the Tigrayan
University Students Assocaition (TUSA). In a small cafe in Piazza, the central
commercial district in Addis, the group produced a declaration that included the
following statements:
The strategy of the movement is the formation of a democratic Ethiopia in 
which the equality of all nationalities is respected; a national armed struggle 
should be waged that would advance from the rural areas of Tigray to the 
urban areas; and the movement should be led by an urban-based organisation 
known as the Tigrayan National Organisation until such time as the armed 
struggle could begin.331
329 It is this same feeling of neglect and mistreatment by the central government that is presently 
fueling a number of ethnically-based insurgency movements across the country from Oromia, to 
Gambela, to the Ogaden. The situation of ethnic disenfranchisement has yet to be solved.
330 As will be explained later in the chapter, it is some the same people arguing about similar issues that 
were on the table forty or so years ago. Passions run deep. There were divisions among the students 
particularly among those that were favoring a revolution based on class struggle. There was, for 
example, a split between those that supported the policies of state ownership of land as later adopted by 
the Derg- this group became know as the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Meison)- and the group 
Democracia, which later became the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) that supported 
individual land ownership. Meison proved instrumental in providing political ideology and direction, 
as well as filling a number of key government posts, for the Derg after they came to power. Excluded 
from the Derg, the EPRP continued to push for its vision of revolution until 1978 when it was targeted 
and severely weakened by the notorious Red Terror. Since the EPRDF assumed power, these groups 
have formed various political alliances- notably in 1991, they established a major opposition party- the 
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF).
331 BERHE, A. (2004) The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. African Affairs, 103, 569- 
592. p. 579.
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The TNO was charged with developing a strategy and preparing the Tigrayans for the 
insurgency. This included cultivating leadership among high school students, 
teachers and other leaders within the community so all would be well versed on the 
ideological underpinnings of the armed struggle including knowlege about other 
guerilla movements such as those in Algeria, Eritrea, Cuba and China. As these 
efforts were complimented by increasing dissent among the peasantry that was fed up 
with the discriminatory and prosecutorial approach of the central government.
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) proved critical in the 
formation of the TPLF in two respects: firstly, they shared important logistical and 
local experience since many of the students had not been in Tigray for a long time; 
and secondly, they trained the students in guerrilla warfare. The EPLF also 
encouraged the widespread recruiting of peasants which gave the newly formed TPLF 
army greater strength.333 Legese Zenawi, who was given the field name Meles, was 
among the first group of recruits, several of whom now have prominent positions in 
the government.
Thus, even before the struggle led by the TPLF, Tigrayans not only had a long 
history of grievances with the central government and Amhara domination but also a 
strong sense of pride and entitlement partially stemming from the history of Axum as 
heart of Ethiopian civilisation. Such perspectives shaped a sense of entitlement to 
rule, hostility towards those that disagree and commitment to a ruling Tigrayan 
clique, that has affected political calculations as how to deal with dissent and the 
press.
1.1 The TPLF in the Bush
The TPLF began operations February 18, 1975 in Dedebit, western Tigray. 
The hierarchy among the leadership of the TPLF was established on academic 
standing at university. There have only been three leaders: two, including Meles and
332 During the preparatory work for initiating the armed struggle, the TNO also sought out links with 
the Eritrean fighters of which there were two main groups, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). At the time there was already an existing liberation front 
operating in Tigray, the Tigrayan Liberation Front (TLF) that was fighting for the independence of 
Tigray and shared some of the more nationalist objectives of the ELF. A relationship was eventually 
forged with the EPLF.
333 Ibid.
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Sebhat Nega were sons of lower nobles whilst Aregowi Berhe was the son of an 
influential judge.334 The TPLF did not replicate the existing hierarchical structures 
prevalent in highland (Amhara/Tigray) culture and early on there was a conscientious 
effort against creating personality cults or an over-dependency on a particular leader. 
In an effort to combat this tendency, which is prevalent in many guerrilla struggles, 
there was a regular peaceful transfer of power between Sebhat and Aregowi.335
The TPLF gained momentum throughout the countryside for its effectiveness 
in articulating widespread grievances. By continuing to persecute the peasantry 
through forced removals to Southern Ethiopia, closing schools under the pretense of 
accusing the teachers of being TPLF supporters and indiscriminant killings, the Derg 
increasingly became the major recruiting force for the TPLF. In addition, with its 
atheist leanings the Derg also sought to undermine the church, a move that did not sit 
well with the devoutly Christian population. In contrast, the TPLF managed to 
successfully incorporate priests into the TPLF framework and filled the gap in 
education by establishing schools in rural areas that would not only educate the 
peasants but also allow a forum for teaching the TPLF’s political ideology.337
The TPLF also sought to differentiate its governance from that of the 
autocratic imperial and subsequent Derg regimes by facilitating a certain degree of 
self-governance for peasants through the organisation of mass associations. These 
were primarily based on interest groups and while their central task was to raise 
consciousness about the struggle rather than to implement policies, they were a
334 YOUNG, J. (1988) The Tigray People's Liberation Front. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerrillas. Oxford, James Currey. p. 38.
335 However, as Meles has led the EPRDF for decades now, this concern has become a reality as Meles 
has created an internal personality cult and those within the party that challenge his leadership are 
expelled. Publicly, however, rarely does Meles ‘sell’ himself as a leader, or even speak directly to the 
people or the press.
36 The Derg initially largely underestimated the effectiveness of the TPLF and saw the other 
insurgency movements including the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), that was receiving support 
of the CIA as well as the Sudanese and Saudi governments, to be the real threat. In contrast with the 
TPLF, the EDU articulated similar grievances but was more conservative and had a feudal orientation. 
The TPLF fought the EDU in the west in the late 1970s and suffered serious defeats which forcing the 
TPLF to develop both militarily and politically though analysis o f their weaknesses, failings and the 
systematic study of military strategy. The TPLF then had to fight the EPRP in the east. With funds 
from students in the diaspora, the EPRP was wealthier than the TPLF but was not successful 
ingratiating themselves with the peasantry partly because of their conduct but also because of their 
position supporting a multi-ethnic Ethiopia rather than the more national approach that the TPLF 
articulated. YOUNG, J. (1988) The Tigray People's Liberation Front. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerrillas. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 39-40.
337 Ibid.
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successful contribution to rural governance. Relatively autonomous from the TPLF, 
Baitos, or councils comprising approximately eleven villages, were established after 
provisional administrative councils had gained enough experience which was usually 
after a couple of years of guidance by the TPLF. An evaluation system, called gim 
gima and inspired by Marxism-Leninism, was similarly established as a tool to assess 
the effectiveness of the TPLF in relation to its commitments to the community, thus 
fostering greater accountability between the TPLF and the peasants.338
As part of the strategy for ensuring peasant support and loyalty, as well as in 
response to the Derg’s attempts to persecute Tigrayans by restricting humanitarian 
and economic assistance, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) was established by the 
TPLF in 1978. The deliverance of clear, tangible and concrete benefits and reforms 
were an essential part of convincing the peasantry that they had more to gain by 
joining the struggle than not. The establishment of REST also facilitated international 
relationships and fimds for the TPLF as many government and international aid 
organisations were willing to engage with a local development organisation but not an 
armed front. REST was highly effective in producing tangible development and 
winning hearts and minds.339
This strategy can continue to be seen today. In the recent elections, for 
example, the EPRDF invested relatively little effort in persuading people to vote for 
the party as it was assumed that because of its success in achieving high rates of 
economic growth, it would win support. This attitude is similarly evident in the 
government’s approach to the private and government press as the EPRDF continues 
to prioritise demonstrating its relevance rather than defending or explaining it.
1.2 Social Ideology
From strategic initiatives such as REST or the gim gima evaluation system, 
the focus of the TPLF was on the peasantry. During the struggle the fighters were 
careful not only to lead an existence similar to that of the people they were fighting
339 YOUNG, J. (1997) Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.
121 and 131-134.
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for but also to treat civilians with the utmost respect. This influence continues today 
and affects the press.
During the war, the TPLF was egalitarian and material possessions were 
shared. There was no personal property and as a demonstration of their work and 
political ethos, the TPLF cadres would live with peasants and share in their hardship. 
Compared with other liberation movements, the TPLF cadres had a relatively 
impoverished existence and they demonstrated a high level of personal behaviour and 
commitment. As Amare Aregawi recalls:
One of the habits of the struggle was that nobody says ‘me’.... One 
guy writes so many things and nobody knows where he’s writing from. We 
don’t talk about our individuals.... There was a group thinking. In a way it 
was good and in a way bad... you don’t know anything about private 
property...there is a jacket here, when you are cold you wear it. And when 
someone brings something we don’t ask where it came from. There is no 
house, nobody’s been using a house, there is no money, nobody says, this is 
my money or that’s my money. Nobody says this is my food, not your food, 
and nobody says this is my writing not your writing. Nobody thinks in terms 
of ‘me’....
There is a concept called the cause that is voluntary. People are 
going there from their house for the cause.... But this is why everybody is 
leaving his village, his children, his office and his house - for our common 
cause. You didn’t go there because you were hungry because you were 
leaving food in your house and going to where you don’t find food. You are 
leaving the house and you are going out into the cold. You have sacrificed 
that much and you would care about it.... Already you’re committed. You 
know that you are going to be killed, you know you are going to be wounded, 
you know they are going to be bombed, you know you are going where a 
snake might bite you and you die of mosquito malaria, you know that.
When you are in the bush if there is a dangerous mission -  [for 
example] we have to transport, this generator or this radio station from this 
place to that place - everybody volunteered to carry it. And [the land is] very 
mined in this area, and unless we could cross that mine [we cannot get there] 
so they calculated the area, the mined area, and they decided if we cross here 
or clear it, it could explode, but I’m volunteering to die now.... It’s very 
common. People fighting, ‘no, me, me, me’, to die. You just cannot 
believe.340
This feeling of unity extended from the bush to when the TPLF first came to power.
The central idea was that everyone had to take whatever post was assigned to him and
try to make it work. At one point, Amare pointedly said that you
can’t underestimate the one-eyed person leading in the land of the blind.... 
When I became the television head, I didn’t feel I am a television head 
because I am good enough to be a television head. It’s just an assignment.
340 Interview: Amare Aregawi.
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I’m not good at being a television head as I’ve never been working in a 
television. I know radio; I know newspapers, magazines, videos. I know 
television itself but I had never even seen a television station... so I could not 
say, I am a television person because tomorrow I could be assigned as head 
of a hospital.341
This social philosophy has been less sustainable in the political world of Addis 
Ababa.342 There is, however, a continued recognition of sacrifice among the former 
fighters. The current government appears to feel entitled to its leadership positions 
and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has even made off-the-cuff remarks to those 
challenging him that they ought to go to the bush for two decades to overthrow this 
government. After believing that its members have given decades of sacrifice, the 
EPRDF sees little need either to negotiate with the press or tolerate the intelligentsia 
that criticise it.
During the struggle the TPLF worked hard to publicise its cause particularly to 
outsiders by inviting foreign journalists to spend time in the bush, a tactic similar to 
that used by the NRM during the war in Uganda. Yimane ‘Jamaica’ Kidane who was 
in charge of Foreign Affairs for the TPLF coordinated these visits, which were often 
highly effective in gaining international support and publicity particularly in 
presenting the struggle as unique and laudable especially in its ideology and treatment 
of the peasants and ordinary civilians.
Alfred Taban from the Khartoum Monitor, a Southern Sudanese paper, was 
one of these journalists who had the opportunity to be invited to Tigray by the TPLF 
to witness the struggle343. He describes an experience when
341 Interview: Aregawi.
342 This is corroborated with the accounts of John Young, among others. See: YOUNG, J. (1997) 
Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, HAMMOND, J. (1999) Fire 
From the Ashes: A Chronicle of the Revolution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991, Lawrenceville, The 
Red Sea Press, Inc.
In describing the problems of shifting this philosophy to the realities of Addis Ababa, Amare noted that 
this caused some difficulty because
now we cannot share one jacket, now there is something called a house, my house, 
my jacket, my property, my car. [Now there can be] corruption, mismanagement, 
greed, That’s why... the people you know, you see them now and you [see] that they 
are different. Conditions have changed, the issue of mine has come, private property 
ownership has come and the character has changed. (Interview: Amare Aregawi)
343 This visit was of strategic interest for the TPLF since the SPLA in Southern Sudan that was an ally 
and provided access through Sudan to all fighters and visitors that were entering Tigray. Jenny 
Hammond was another journalist that was also invited to the TPLF controlled region. She went on to 
write an extensive book chronicling her experience and that of the revolution, see HAMMOND, J.
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Because of the bombings we were traveling at night.... We found a small 
town at 2 pm where they said we should sleep. It was very cold, they threw 
us some blankets, [I said] are you going to sleep here in this cold? [They 
said] yes it is very late so we cannot wake up these people at this time of the 
night. I was shocked because my only knowledge of guerrillas was not like 
that. They were people that would throw away any people at any minute [at] 
will. Take the SPLA; they wanted the best things for themselves at the 
expense of the citizens.344
As Taban illustrates, the TPLF went to great lengths to respect the peasantry and live 
with them as one.
Even today the government continues to regard the peasantry as its core 
constituency.345 In the aftermath of the contested elections in 2005 rather than turning 
to those that were supporting the opposition in the cities, the government launched a 
large-scale campaign for the support of peasants in the countryside. Bereket Simon 
explained, that the push was to enroll farmers in the party. Before the elections only 
600,000 were members, now there are more than two million and the EPRDF is 
expecting another two million to join the party which will bring their total up to four 
million.346
The EPRDF’s emphasis on the peasantry is also evident in their reluctance to 
allow private radio stations and television stations that would reach the masses. Their 
willingness to tolerate the private press with dissent and debate among intellectuals
(1999) Fire From the Ashes: A Chronicle o f the Revolution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991, 
Lawrenceville, The Red Sea Press, Inc.
344 Interview: Alfred Taban.
345 Meles has elaborated this in a draft o f his book African Development: Dead Ends and New 
Beginnings arguing that:
A coalition that covers much of the rural and urban population but is firmly based on 
the rural base, that includes all those that have very little to gain from patronage and 
rent-seeking, a coalition that includes the vast majority of the population and hence 
can guarantee continuity through the democratic process would be a solid base for a 
state that is both democratic and developmental. Such a state would in effect be one 
form of the so-called dominant party or dominant coalition democracy.... 
Technically policy stability and continuity could be achieved even when parties 
regularly replace each other in governing the country. But this can be so only where 
such a solid consensus among politicians and the population on fundamental policy 
has been achieved and where politics is confined to dealing with trivialities and 
personalities. Such a situation is very unlikely to emerge in a developing country. In 
addition politics based on personalities can easily degenerate to patronage politics, 
(p. 14) wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Meles-Extracts2-AfTF2.pdf 
Indeed patronage and rent-seeking has not been as great of an issue in Ethiopia as in other countries, 
including Uganda. Most agree that the government is relatively uncorrupt when it comes to siphoning 
funds for their own self-enrichment- if it is done it is for the party as a whole.
346 Interview: Bereket Simon.
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and those in Addis Ababa stemmed from a belief that these were not their constituents 
in any case, so there was little need to bother repressing them or engaging.
1.3 Political ideology
Political ideology within the TPLF, particularly during the struggle, has
always been heavily debated and taken seriously. The TPLF was solidly Marxist in
the bush and this continues to influence political ideology. The EPRDF is not like the
NRM, or Museveni who, along with many other African leaders of his time, quickly
abandoned socialism when it was no longer fashionable.
On a number of occasions during the struggle the TPLF leadership expressed
admiration and support for Enver Hoxha of Albania. As Patrick Gilkes argued,
Albania was attractive for the TPLF because they stood up and said ‘we’ll do 
it our way’. I don’t think they [the TPLF] cared about how cruel it was. In 
the Marxist/Leninist framework human rights are different - the right to food, 
shelter, work, etc. Everything else is subordinate.347
Given the TPLF’s frustration with the Soviet-backed Derg, it concurred with the 
Albanian arguments that the Soviet Union was “social imperialist” and an enemy of 
the oppressed. As late as early 1990, Meles is reported to have expressed admiration 
for Hoxha although by the time of the formation of the EPRDF and peace 
negotiations, Meles publicly argued that his group had abandoned Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. This was partly a pragmatic response348 to American pressure and also an 
effort to attract greater aid funds for reconstruction. Not surprisingly, western 
governments were pleased with the democratic liberal discourse Meles was 
espousing, giving confidence to many that the vision of Ethiopia he was proposing to 
implement under his leadership was one they could partner with.
Less acknowledged, however, is that some of the current leaders, Meles, 
Seyoum Mesfin, Abay Tsehay and Sibhat Nega, represented an ultra-nationalist 
segment of the TPLF that initially diverged from the broader TPLF’s position on the 
issue of autonomy for Tigray within Ethiopia, in support of possible secession. While 
they backed down on this almost immediately, a similar group, including Meles, was
347 Interview: Patrick Gilkes.
348 The TPLF demonstrated throughout its struggle to be extraordinarily pragmatic- in its earliest days 
it called for the establishment of an ‘independent democratic republic of Tigray’ which it soon 
abandoned in favor of Tigrayan autonomy within Ethiopia.
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behind the 1985 formation within the TPLF of the ultra-left Marxist-Leninist League 
of Tigray (MLLT) in an effort to preserve the ideological integrity of the movement. 
The TPLF recognised that it needed to develop ethnic satellite parties for the EPRDF 
but was afraid that its doctrine would be corrupted. For leaders who so passionately 
believed in doctrine that they would kill each other over slight doctrinal differences in 
the 1960s and 1970s, political ideology was a sensitive issue. Thus, the MLLT 
members saw themselves as orthodox defenders of Marxism-Leninism and the 
‘vanguard party for the TPLF’.349 Gerard Prunier describes it as “the inside of the 
Russian doll and the keeper of the ideology”.350
While the EPRDF claims that the MLLT no longer exists, most politically 
minded Ethiopians suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, this ideology has been 
something that the TPLF never felt it could share with the masses or even the 
intellectuals. It was never explained to the people or debated and discussed. 
According to the TPLF, the media were for developmental issues - not political 
philosophy. This secrecy has also led to the EPRDF being misunderstood or, simply, 
not understood. It is also indicative of a party that is unable to effectively reform. 
With a culture of secrecy so ingrained and committed ideologically, it is hard for the 
TPLF to open up. Trusting journalists with information, providing access to 
information for citizens and offering genuine explanations of the rational behind 
political policies are difficult political changes that are not yet occurring and which 
are affecting the development of the press system.
349 As Medhane Tadesse and John Young argue, “...the MLLT also served as a vehicle for Meles to 
pursue his leadership aspirations. Thus, he pressed for the dominance of the Political Department, 
which was closely linked to the MLLT. The Political Department in turn increasingly gained 
dominance over the foreign mission (of Seyoum Mesfin, currently Ethiopia’s foreign minister), the 
military committee (of Aregawie Berhe, the TPLF’s first leader), and Meles’ major political 
challenger, Gidey Zeratsion (then deputy leader of the TPLF). It was also against this background that 
he began to develop a close cooperative relationship with Tewolde, whose own considerable assets 
served to advance both the party and the more politically ambitious Meles.” TADESSE, M. & 
YOUNG, J. (2003) TPLF: Reform or Decline? Review of African Political Economy, 97, 389- 403. p. 
398.
350 Interview: Prunier.
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2. State construction and the consolidation of power
By 1989 the TPLF was killing or capturing tens of thousands of Derg soldiers. 
The end of the Cold War, the reluctance of the Soviet Union to continue the 
extraordinary military support it was providing to Mengistu, and growing pressures 
from the EPLF and TPLF all contributed to a sharp turn in the fortunes of the Derg. 
Major famines and the manipulation of them by Mengistu to intentionally starve the 
TPLF of peasant support during the mid 1980s also lost him local and international 
support.351 In an effort to stave off this growing dissent, the Derg introduced a multi­
party system. By this time, however, it was too late and the TPLF was in the process 
of establishing a post-Derg government through the formation of the EPRDF, which 
included other opposition and guerrilla movements.352
During the final years in the bush the TPLF began to sketch out policies they
would introduce when they assumed power. Amare describes, for example, the
internal debates that went on in the TPLF regarding a media strategy:
About two or three years before coming to Addis, we started talking, OK, we 
get Addis, what are we going to do with the media? Actually it was a 
discussion in every aspect. We go to Addis, what are we going to do about 
the bureaucracy? Does anybody know about the bureaucracy? We go to 
Addis, what are we going to do with this and that, so this [discussion] was for 
almost one year. I would say even the Derg regime was extended by one 
year because we discovered nobody was ready, so we had this discussion: if 
we go to Addis, who is going to run the radio station? How are we going to 
speak to journalists? We don’t know how to run it, we don’t know how to 
manage it, so we have set up a school of learning how to manage it how 
to...have reporters, in case the journalists don’t want to work with us. So we 
have to learn - we would bring many books from Europe about journalism.353
While the EPRDF’s media policy was relatively ad-hoc it was largely driven by the 
other policy and political objectives for which it fought. Upon coming to power there 
were several priorities for Meles including: to implement constitutional reform in line 
with ethnic and federalist objectives; to consolidate power across the vast and 
populous country through regional representatives; and to consolidate his personal
351Again, it is interesting to see that the EPRDF if using a similar tactic with the fighters of the Ogaden 
Liberation Front at present.
352 In February 1991, the TPLF with the assistance of the EPLF launched a final onslaught against the 
Derg. By May it was clear that the Derg could no longer sustain the campaign and Mengistu fled to 
exile in Zimbabwe.
353 Interview: Aregawi.
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power along with that of the TPLF, a process that has been done through his theory of 
Revolutionary Democracy.
2.1 From Transitional Charter to Constitution
After assuming power in Addis, the EPRDF knew it had to address issues of 
nationalism particularly since it was ethnic nationalism that had spurred the struggle. 
There was a rational basis for seeking to implement a federal arrangement. Since 
Tigrayans are a small minority that fought a centralised government partly in an effort 
to overcome Amhara domination, a state with multiple ethnically based parts would 
allow for control and by default dilute the Amhara character and influence.354 Thus, 
the Transitional Charter, which was adopted in July 1991 at the Peace and Democracy 
Conference, recognised the right to self-determination.355
This was implemented almost immediately as Eritrea was quickly given its 
independence without a national referendum or consultation. The secession of Eritrea 
was almost a foregone conclusion because the EPLF had been instrumental in helping 
the TPLF to power and it is widely acknowledged that there was an agreement that 
should the TPLF reach Addis, it would support the EPLF struggle. Not ceding to the 
EPLF would have dragged the conflict on. After decades of fighting, the TPLF was 
looking for a peaceful settlement. However, the speedy secession and the willingness 
of the EPRDF to facilitate the process with little national debate took many 
Ethiopians by surprise.
The government established a constitutional commission to draft the new 
constitution and arranged broad consultations with the public. Like the Eritrea 
question, the most contested issues of the constitution, including land and the 
federalist system, were essentially foregone conclusions. Even if Ethiopians were 
given enough information to make informed evaluations and decisions on the
354 TURTON, D. (Ed.) (2006) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative 
Perspective, Oxford, James Currey .
355 As the Transitional Charter states, “the rights of nations, nationalities, peoples to self-determination 
is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to: (a) preserve its 
identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language; (b) 
administer its own affairs within its owned defined territory and effectively participate in the central 
government on the basis o f freedom and fair and proper representation; (c) exercise its right to self- 
determination of independence, when the concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the 
above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated”. Transitional Period Charter o f Ethiopia, Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia, 1991, p. 2.
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proposed issues (which they were not), the government was clearly pushing its 
agenda and framing issues in such a way that the participants felt compelled to 
provide the answers the interviewers expected.
The right to secession was entrenched in the Constitution as Article 39 and 
was part of the establishment of a broader federalist system in which the ethnic 
regions would be given greater autonomy and take responsible for their economy, 
education, security, etc. In an immediate way, culturally speaking, this was a great 
relief for many groups that were now able to use their own language. Politically the 
situation was more complicated. Article 39 provided for self-determination up to 
succession but made the actual requirements to do so extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, without the strong support of the central government.356
2.2 Centralising political power: federalism, EPRDF satellites and controlling 
information flows
The groundwork for the federal political arrangement was made during the 
transitional period by expanding the initial coalition that began before the TPLF 
seized power. The TPLF made it clear that it planned to continue to control the 
executive committee and also entrenched its power ethnically within the military as at 
least 50% of the fighters were drawn from Tigray.
The constitution guaranteed these groups ‘equitable representation in state and 
federal government’. In theory, ethnic movements and groups would be freely elected 
and have a strong role in the administration of the country including national 
governance. Not all opposition groups were eager to join the coalition and many 
groups became disenchanted quickly. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), for 
example, was a strong partner that initially joined an alliance with the EPRDF, but it 
soon felt marginalised and frustrated with the EPRDF’s creation of Oromo People’s 
Democratic Organisation (OPODO), an Oromia based party that served as a front for
356 Article 39 states: The right to self-determination, including secession of every Nation, Nationality 
and People shall come into effect: (a) when a demand for secession has been approved by two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned; (b) 
when the Federal Government has organised a referendum which must take place within three years 
from the time it received the concerned council’s decision for secession; (c) when the demand for 
secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum; (d) when the Federal Government will have 
transferred its powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and 
(e) when the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
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the EPRDF. Such organisations were created so the TPLF could avoid real 
competition yet still appear as a multi-ethnic coalition. These groups, however, have 
largely been dismissed as puppet organisations filled by individuals seeking personal 
power and a willingness to provide a fagade of regional support for the central
357government.
In Ethiopia Since the Derg, Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen explained how
during elections legitimate groups have been denied victory in the place of the
preferred partner of the EPRDF’s choosing.358 And when the OLF withdrew from the
1992 elections the EPRDF expelled it from the party and outlawed it for not
renouncing violence.359 Other ethnically based opposition parties, such as the All-
Amhara People’s Organisation (AAPO), have chosen not to participate in the political
process and remain outside the EPRDF.360 Abbay contends that
Those who come to power, at both regional and federal levels, are not the 
real winners of elections; they are the handpicked ‘compradors’. Nor do they 
have any autonomy. Their accountability remains solidly to the central 
government, not to the people whom they are supposedly representing. 
Consequently, in what appears to be a neo-patrimonial system, the prime 
minister maintains power through personal patronage and clientelism.361
357 This de-legitimizing or dismantling of local political organizations has proved to be a common 
approach throughout the government’s approach towards civil society as well. Prominent 
organizations that often had significant support and expressed reasonable criticisms towards the 
government would be dismantled through the arrests of the leadership, threats towards members of the 
staff or financial and/or infrastructural sabotage. Even if the ‘threatening’ group was not dismantled 
entirely, the EPRDF would establish a group with a similar, if not the identical, name in its place. The 
new group would be closely tied to the government but attempt to act as a stand in, a process that often 
initially confused donor and aid organizations as well as the population. Some of the most prominent 
examples that have been targeted are the Ethiopian Free Press Journalist Association, The Ethiopian 
Teachers Association and ERCHO.
One example of this common confusion was on International Teachers Day in 2006, 
UNESCO organised a conference and accidentally invited the government’s Ethiopian Teachers 
Association when they intended to invite the independent Ethiopian Teachers Association. They had 
not yet realised that it had recently been banned for being too critical of the government and a 
government organization with the exact name set up in its place.
358 PAUSWANG, S., TRONVOLL, K. & AALEN, L. (Eds.) (2002) Ethiopia Since the Derg, London, 
Zed.
359 The OLF is currently one of the most dynamic opposition groups in Ethiopia though it is forced to 
operate publicly from the diaspora as it has not denounced the use of violence and still advocates 
armed struggle to liberate the Oromos. It is not recognised as an opposition party but is rather labeled a 
terrorist organization by the EPRDF.
360 The All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) is one of the most vocal and active agitating 
against the right of ‘self-determination’ and was deeply angered with the secession of Eritrea accusing 
the EPRDF of dismantling the country. Despite invitations from the EPRDF, the AAPO declined to 
participate in the Transitional Government, the drafting of the constitution or any elections, arguing 
that the constitutional process was undemocratic and dominated by the TPLF.
361 ABBAY, A. (2004) Diversity and Statebuilding in Ethiopia. African Affairs, 103,593- 614.
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This argument has also been extensively articulated and advocated in the private 
press, which has come to reflect the political divisions of some disenfranchised ethnic 
groups. Tobiya, for example, typically asserts, “Literally all political organisations 
outside of EPRDF are termed as ‘anti-peace and anti-charter’. Disguised and open 
measures are instituted to prevent their free and legal political participation in the 
country’s political life.”362
Just as the government has sought to control political activities representing 
particular regional or ethnic interests as part of its effort to consolidate power, it has 
sought to do the same for information flows.
With the UN and foreign embassies based in Addis it is difficult for the 
government to hide events such as the violent post-election clashes in Addis, so 
coverage of such events is tolerated. It is surprising how seldom, if ever, journalists 
leave Addis to get stories. Journalists in neighbouring Kenya, Uganda and Sudan 
regularly travel around their countries and the region, including to places as sensitive 
as Darfur. Part of why this is less common in Ethiopia has to do with journalistic 
culture, but the practice also reflects the strong reactions from the government to 
those that do seek news beyond Addis Ababa.
From the current military operation in the Ogaden to previous and continuing 
operations in Gambella and Oromia, the EPRDF has been notoriously intolerant of 
rural dissent and criticisms. Similarly the government has extensive methods of 
monitoring citizens, from teachers to the civil service, and is deeply sensitive about 
what information it will allow to emerge and enter these regions. Thus it is not 
surprising that many journalists are wary of traveling outside Addis to cover stories.
362 The article goes on to argue: “Only one political organization, namely EPRDF, controls, directs and 
uses for its own ends the country’s mass media, state institutions, the police force, the country’s 
economy and defence force. Democracy entails the creation of free political parties and their right to 
free political movement. Democracy means to get a viable alternative. But political parties outside of 
EPRDF are prevented by legal obstacles and illegal means to grow and develop into viable alternatives. 
No political organization or party is allowed legal presence and movement in Region 1 (Tigray) outside 
of TPLF/EPRDF. No political party or organization is allowed legal movement and activity in Region 
4 (Oromia) outside of OPDO/EPRDF. The same is true in other regions. In general the situation is not 
conducive to the free movement and existence of independent political parties.” 2 June 1994, Tobiya as 
quoted on 4 June 1994 in Press Digest, pp. 7-8.
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Those who do try are often explicitly told that their security cannot be guaranteed. 
Many papers also argue that they do not have the funds to send reporters in the field; 
while this is certainly the case for some, the papers that do have the funds are those 
that are operating in the ‘gray zone’ and they are less willing to push or upset the 
government.
The private press relies on the Walta, a TPLF-affiliated news agency and ENA 
for news outside the capital or major cities. A prominent journalist who works for the 
ENA and asked to remain anonymous made important arguments including the 
difficulties even the ENA has in reporting events outside of Addis; how politicised 
such reporting is; and the imbalance between the role of the government media in 
Tigray and the other regions. As he argued:
There are thirty-eight branches of ENA across the country. In some 
branches there is one journalist; in a few branches there are two. There are 
twelve branches in Oromia, seven in Amhara, seven in the Southern Region 
and six in Tigray. The rest of the regions have one each. All are accountable 
to the regional desk and they send their news stories through telephone or the 
computer. Thirteen branches are connected with the internet, the others have 
no computer. In Tigray they [the journalists] are only from Tigray. In the 
other regions they are assigned regardless of their ethnicity, in the Somali 
region there’s an Amhara. During the past regime most journalists [were] 
Amhara so there is a scarcity of the human power but now they are starting to 
recruit from the other regions.
The problems have started with the assigned general managers; they 
are all key members of the ruling party and are assigned not because of their 
competency. The ENA General Manager has only a grade twelve education 
but he was a soldier in Tigray. He has no diploma....
It is believed that if you report conflicts such as the police against a 
boy it aggravates the conflict or that reporting on such events makes the 
events transfer to other areas. Individuals may report to the human rights 
organisations but there is no mechanism to report to the country. The 
journalists give us the crude information and we tell it to our bosses but we 
don’t report it....
In Tigray there is local radio but no need for independent media. The 
party radio and paper is working for the Tigrayans. But the party papers in 
the other regions works for the mobilisation of people behind the ruling 
party. It is basically propaganda. In Tigray it mobilises people for 
development, to prevent disease, to keep people in touch and unified. In other 
regions it is simply propaganda.364
363 This was the case when Tsegaye Tadesse (Reuters) and Anthony Mitchell (AP) wanted to go to 
Gambella to cover the violence there. These journalists were both working for international news 
agencies so were in a slightly privileged position. For local journalists, the families are often reliant on 
the salary of the journalists as a critical contribution to the household income. Without insurance their 
families would not be compensated if they were killed or injured.
364 Interview: Anonymous.
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While this comment reflects this informant’s opinion, and was corroborated with 
other journalists interviewed, they also signal the discontent that was commonly 
expressed with the ways information flows were controlled and politicised. This 
journalist claims that his appointment was founded on experience and he had 
qualifications similar to those of the editors of The Ethiopian Herald and Addis 
Zemen. Despite some merit-based promotion, all three of these prominent journalists 
reflected discontent and frustration with the constraints on performing their jobs. As 
an Oromo, for example, one journalist claimed that he was regularly passed over for 
international trainings and workshops. While many of his colleagues have left 
because of this discrimination, he argues that he continues to stay because he believes 
it is important for Oromos to be represented and continue fighting from within.
Almost from the very beginning those outside the EPRDF’s select umbrella 
felt excluded from the constitutional debates and the transitional government’s 
consultations on peace and reconstruction. Girma Beshah posits, “ the very structure 
of the party [the EPRDF] elicits hatred. It’s a party of the Tigrayans. They have 
exacerbated ethnic tensions and generated a degree of hatred as they are seen as a 
conquering ethnic group.”365 The government did little to challenge this idea by 
ignoring competing ideas and continuing to privilege Tigrayans over others.
Issues of regionalism, therefore, have affected the development of the press 
system in two ways. First, information about what is going on outside the capital city 
is not readily available and the government discourages journalists from getting 
access to it. This encourages a divide between the peasantry and intellectuals/urban 
poor. Secondly, the press reflects the issues of ethnicity in a way similar to the 
difficulties faced by ethnic federalist politics. As the press is largely representative of 
elite groups, many feel disempowered, and until recently the press was one of the few 
outlets available to represent their perspectives and through which they could express 
their discontent.
365 Interview: Girma Beshah.
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2.3 Revolutionary Democracy and single party rule
From the beginning there have been discrepancies in what different parties or
groups mean by democracy. Much of the debate has played out in the press. All
actors - international, government, opposition, media, NGOs - have been strong on
rhetoric, but often talk past one another. Just as some journalists adopt the human
rights rhetoric, the opposition and government may profess a questionable belief in
Westem-style democracy.
The TPLF’s approach to economic development is based on market liberalism
but its political ideology has not been as liberal. While the government has claimed
it has abandoned its Marxist roots in favor of democracy, others have argued this is
not the case. As Gerard Prunier commented:
Robert Hudock, of the National Security Organisation in the US said that 
Marxism is dead. But this is a different world. Here they still cling to 
outdated beliefs... Meles will lie through his teeth... the World Bank and EU 
think these are dead ideas but not for these guys.368
Once in power, driven by its ideology, the TPLF began implementing its vision of 
Revolutionary Democracy.
This theory has been articulated in a number of different places including an 
extensive book by Meles titled Revolutionary Democracy and another in progress, 
African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, in which he outlines the 
economic and political arrangements he deems most practical for achieving
'l f .Qdevelopment. His vision of a developmental state is clearly critical of the neo­
liberal paradigm and supportive of the process states such as Korea and Taiwan have 
instituted. It also supports an idea of democracy where there is some scope for 
criticism but essentially within the framework of one party rule. Opposition voices
366 As mentioned, this is most clearly expressed in their approach to the national question of ethnic 
diversity that has followed Stalin’s theory closely regarding ethnically dividing the country and giving 
each region the right to self-determination.
367 As Clapham noted that while Meles has “officially adopted market liberalism as an economic 
ideology, his approach to politics is thoroughly Marxist.” CLAPHAM, C. (2006) Ethiopian 
Development: The Politics of Emulation. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 44, 137- 150. p. 
147.
368 Interview: Gerard Prunier.
369 Sections of this book have been published in The Reporter newspaper and can also be found on the 
web at wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Meles-Extracts2-AfTF2.pdf. Last accessed 20 December 
2007.
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and parties are tolerated so long as they are not a serious distraction from allowing the
ruling party to get on with its central goal of economic development.
Meles has expressed admiration for the ruling coalitions that have remained
dominant in Scandinavian countries and Japan. As he notes,
The ruling coalitions in these countries have had regular, free, open and fair 
elections, and the basic political and human rights have been respected. They 
thus fully qualify as democratic regimes. But they have won elections 
repeatedly and have been in power for long-stretches. In the case of Japan 
the ruling coalition has been in power for almost 50 years. A critical issue 
is therefore can such a stable, democratic and at the same time developmental 
coalition be established in a developing country.370
Consolidating single party rule with the TPLF as the core of the EPRDF is evidently
the EPRDF’s democratic vision. And even though Meles argues that,
There is every reason to suggest that if a developmental state were to also be 
democratic the "hegemonic" nature of its development project would be 
achieved faster and held more deeply because it would emerge from free 
debate and dialogue.371
It is also clear through his arguments on defining ‘fundamental policies’ that debates 
are to centre around issues of development, not the constitution or issues of 
succession, federalism, or land.372 As described in the prior chapter, during 
interviews editors of the government media it was repeatedly emphasised that the 
agenda handed down to them from the government, particularly after the election, was 
to address issues of development rather than politics.
The EPRDF has now been in power for over fifteen years and the vision of the 
party, or the state, is increasingly Meles’ vision. Or as Yemane Kidane, one of the
370 wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Meles-Extracts2-AfTF2.pdf, p. 12. Last accessed 20 December 
2007.
371 Ibid. p. 14.
372 While the system of land tenure has experienced dramatic changes in the past several decades there 
was little change from Derg policies to the EPRDF. The present government still maintains a statist 
system, as the Derg did that is characterised by the following: a) land is held by the government on 
behalf of the people; we have, in other words, state ownership of land; b) each household has only use 
rights over the land in its possession c) land cannot be sold, mortgaged, or transferred to others on a 
long-term basis. At present the household may lease the land to others on a short-term basis; this was 
not allowed during the Derg; d) in order to ensure rights o f use over land the land user has to reside in a 
rural kebele. A household cannot have access to land in more than one kebele. RAHMATO, D. (2000) 
Land Tenure in Ethiopia: From the Imperial Period to the Present. IN OLIKA, T., ARSANO, Y. & 
AADLAN, O. (Eds.) Towards Research Agenda in the Framework o f DPSIR-NIHR Research 
Programme (1998-2003). Graduate School of Addis Ababa University, Department o f Political 
Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University. This policy was entrenched in the 
constitution.
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individuals purged from the government during the 2001 split over Eritrea,373 
complains: “now it’s a one man show. People who used to challenge him are out, so 
within the party he is a personality cult; he’s undisputed. Now the power, feudal and 
Marxist-Leninist elements are influencing the process”.374 Yemane summed up the 
current predicament for the TPLF when he noted that Meles believes “you can have 
democracy as long as you don’t take power from me”.375
Criticism of the EPRDF’s style of democracy, especially by the press, is not 
new, particularly because Revolutionary Democracy, according to the EPRDF, differs 
from liberal democracy by the protections it offers through group rights in addition to
' i n f .
individual rights. This has affected the government’s approach to media policy. 
The tolerance of press freedoms, for example, is part of a utilitarian policy rather than 
a firm belief of the party cadres.
If the opposition voices were in a similar position as the EPRDF, it is unlikely 
they would be more democratic, particularly as some of the leaders were Derg cadres 
and only recently adopted their present democratic discourse. Nevertheless demands
373 There was a split in the TPLF in 2001 over issues relating to the Eritrean war- some wanted to push 
for a conclusive Ethiopian victory in Asmara, while others, including Meles were sensitive to 
international pressure to conclude the conflict as soon as possible. Senior members of the TPLF’s 
leadership were jailed and forced to leave the party, but Meles came out on top and was consequently 
forced to address the underlying causes that promoted the fracture.
At the same time, however, the 2001 split was also a competition over power, and power 
shifted from the broader TPLF central committee to Meles himself. Underlying issues of how 
individuals had changed from the revolutionary days where spartan impoverished living was the norm 
to the luxuries and temptations of Addis Ababa were also issues. Many of the purged cadres were 
charged with corruption but it was also more likely charges of moral corruption the EPRDF would 
have liked to issue if possible. After the initial purge, a number of other party members and the leaders 
of satellite parties were also purged and replaced by individuals that were more agreeable to whatever 
the Prime Minister advocates. (STREMLAU, N., Janes Intelligence Files, Ethiopia, 2007)
374 Interview: Kidane.
375 Interview: Kidane.
376 This frustration has always been present in the press and continued until the papers were closed 
after the 2005 elections. As the newspaper Andinnet, affiliated with the AAPO, argued, the democratic 
theory the EPRDF espouses is undemocratic in and of itself. As
no democratic country has ever embodied the right to secede in its constitution...and 
that the respect of human and democratic rights- rights comprising a set of civil, 
political and economic rights, is what is customarily and practically known in all 
developed western democracies... the respect of individual rights, ipso facto, means 
the respect for any nationality to use its own language, develop its culture and to 
administer its affairs... the concept of group/nationality rights is not given 
precedence under current international law... [thus] when such a right is used in 
place or in opposition to the fundamental individual rights, it becomes a ploy used to 
dismember a country in the name of freedom and ‘national’ liberation” (8 December 
1994, Adinnet, as quoted on 8 December 1994 is Press Digest, p.8).
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for participation, reconciliation and dialogue are understandable and continue today 
with a focus on attacking the process of consolidating power and nation-building.
3. Reconciliation and building trust and confidence
When the EPRDF came to power it allowed freedom of expression but also 
made a very common but crucial mistake and one that many occupying and warring 
forces have made: it disbanded many of those involved with the previous regime, 
from the Ministry of Information to the Armed Forces. Girma Beshah, for example, 
was Mengistu’s former interpreter. He spent several years in jail after the EPRDF 
came to power until he was considered to no longer be a substantial threat. As he 
describes:
When the TPLF first came they didn’t know who was who. They locked us 
all up. A new order was unfolding. It was not a new government but a new 
order, a new era. Everything of the other regime was gotten rid of.... 
Sensitive places were taken over... [they] didn’t want any interference or to 
coexist with anyone. That was the aspiration of communism and Lenin’s 
[theory of] political cleansing - getting rid of the Tsarists. The EPRDF 
wanted to get rid of these people so they couldn’t have any feelings of the 
past, unless they were indispensable people.377
The EPRDF often took action with little knowledge of whom they were acting
against. As a result, journalists that were fired from the Ministry of Information set
up their own independent newspapers. Initially, some of these journalists may not
have been particularly opposed to the EPRDF, but the way in which the EPRDF
handled the situation exacerbated a delicate situation. Girma notes that
All of us that came from that time worked with that government and when it 
was overthrown we didn’t moum the death. We thought better times had 
come. With freedom of the press we were happy and wanted to see it 
develop. But the new government did nothing to capitalise on it. They had
suspicion... the media operators came from that time. Many of them lost
their jobs in the state media. The government sent others to retirement. So
people thought it’s not a new government, but a new ethnic group.378
With its newly found freedom, the private press immediately entered the debate 
criticising the EPRDF and arguing for ‘reconciliation’. An editorial in the 
independent paper Tomar echoes the call of the times:
377 Interview: Girma Beshah.
378 Interview: Beshah.
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There is a considerable confusion over the meaning of democracy, peace, 
justice, prosperity, etc. There is also a consensus that clash may be inevitable 
if people try to translate and apply these concepts in their own way s....Still 
the TG [transitional government] insists there is peace in the country and that 
it sees no ground for a peace conference in a peaceful country. It is, after all, 
drafting a constitution. It is at the thresholds of an elected government, hence 
the reluctance to listen to calls it can afford to term as mere interference. 
And this at a time when some signatories of the Transition period have made 
common cause with non-signatory groups and raised together questions of 
crucial significance. Those in power and their opposition should sit down and 
talk in the interest of the people, for it is the people who must decide in the 
final analysis. The ultimate objective of all the parties concerned should be 
the building of an Ethiopia to be governed by the general will and for the 
general will of the people.379
Even some government journalists were outspoken on this issue. Dejene Tesemma,
editor-in-chief of The Ethiopian Herald, reasoned that
The problem is that the government came to power through violence. There 
needed to be reconciliation and free elections that included every group, even 
Mengistu’s regime. Your defeater cannot be your judge. [It must also be 
understood that] circumstances can compel you to be involved. Not 
everyone should go to jail. [I] wish we had reconciliation.380
The government, however, has only engaged in reconciliation to the extent it deemed
necessary and on its own terms. In a 1991 interview Prime Minister Meles stated his
views in these terms:
We believe in a democratic and peaceful transition. But the WPE [Workers 
Party of Ethiopia] rejected peace until the last minute and suffered a defeat in 
the end. I don’t think there is any reason why we should extend an invitation 
to a party, which, after fighting against peace and democracy and one that 
was defeated and buried, to come out of the grave and make an attempt to 
participate in restoring peace and democracy.381
After the long struggle from Tigray to Addis, the EPRDF felt little need for genuine
reconciliation or negotiation and did not have a strategy for bridging divisions. This
is also clear in how the EPRDF lacked a strategy for using the media to encourage
reconciliation rather than exacerbate tensions. Amare notes that
Even a year before we came to Addis there was an idea of stop the war, stop 
the guns and form a Transitional Government even with the Derg. There was 
a discussion in Rome about this issue, the Americans were mediating to set
379 1 7 December 1993, Editorial, Tomar, as quoted on 22 December 1993 in Press Digest, p. 3.
380 Interview: Dejene Tesemma.
381 7 June 1991, “Ato Meles Zenawi Replies to Questions by Reporters”, The Ethiopian Herald, p. 5.
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up a Transitional Government with every party in the country.... But that 
didn’t work. The Transitional Government was formed with other parties 
minus the Derg. So when the transitional period came the idea was, you 
know, give a chance to all parties. Let the opposition have their say.... How 
exactly do the media play a role in creating peace, in creating democracy? It 
was always trial and error. We didn’t have time to develop an approach to it 
because we ourselves were students of the media. As you know, in Ethiopia 
there wasn’t any tradition of democracy, there is nothing you can learn from 
the bureaucracy - it doesn’t tell you.382
Contrary to what Amare argues, the government did not let the opposition entirely 
have their say and the lack of a strategy, along with the overall suspicion that the 
government had of much of the population, did not help in finding a middle ground, 
compromise or space for negotiation.
In an effort to draw attention to their desire to participate in the political 
discussions, as well as express concern, if not outrage, at the federalist arrangement, 
many groups came together for the Conference on Peace and Reconciliation. The 
government, however, refused to engage saying that these individuals were ‘anti­
peace’ and there was no need for a ‘peace’ conference in a country that was already at 
peace. As the editorial in Waqt noted:
The upcoming Conference for Peace and Reconciliation is just around the 
comer. But the head of the conference’s host country, and the main 
participant at that, is behaving like the head of a household who doesn’t wish 
to be disturbed at mealtimes. And this is at a time when even America has 
become somewhat flexible on the issue of the conference.383
The conference proceeded as planned, with significant participation across the
country and internationally. It reached a number of recommendations and
conclusions and established the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and
Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE), which was the first opposition coalition. In
addition to critiques of the EPRDF “weakening the unity and integrity of the
country”, and calls for a new transitional government with dialogues on the process of
reconciliation and peace-building, the conference ominously argued they were:
convinced that the drama aimed at giving a single political organisation legal 
authority for its undemocratic and dictatorial activities through a great 
document like a constitution should be stopped and that the constitution 
should be drafted by representatives of the people elected by an overall
382 Interview: Aregawi.
383 20 December 1993, Editorial, Waqt, as quoted on 22 December 1993 in Press Digest, p. 1.
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participation of political organisations. Contrary to this, stifling the operation 
of political organisations and endorsing a constitution drafted by a 
commission set up one organisation in the face of popular opposition to it 
will have a similar result of un-acceptability as in the case of past 
constitutions because it didn’t originate from the people. Hence, the Council 
of Alternative Forces will ardently struggle and stand with the people to 
straighten up the process.384
The government was not willing to recognise the conference or the recommendations 
and dismissed it as a demand by a “limited number of intellectuals”.
Outside observes have also been critical although it has mostly been 
academics that closely followed the developments. Christopher Clapham is one of the 
most experienced and insightful scholars on Ethiopia and early on he publicly 
expressed reservations regarding the political process. He noted in one article that 
while the opposition parties may legitimately be criticised for being divided and 
weak, they have
condemned the process of constitution-making in no uncertain terms. And 
there is no sign of a process of dialogue between the government and the 
opposition groups.... The constitution making process to the exclusion of 
these other powerful undercurrents would be as fruitful as worrying about the 
rearrangements of the deck chairs of the Titanic.385
Clapham was writing in 1994 but Ethiopians, and the press, have continued to 
articulate these grievances.
Woldu Yemessel, the General Manager of the TPLF Radio Fana, put the issue
succinctly when he said “ these are long political debates. It has been a thirty years
powers struggle. It is individuals. The Ethiopian media should transform and begin
fresh... the Mol’s [Ministry of Information] are fighting, it’s the current one vs. the
old one”. The argument that there is a need for ‘new blood’ or a younger
generation is something that many Ethiopians expressed, including Amare. He too
sees the current political divisions going back to the days when the political debates
over Marxist-Leninism were first held and explains that
Ethiopia had the strongest student movement in the 1960s. It was leftist and 
looked towards Mao, Lenin and Stalin. Everything now still seems to come 
from the Ethiopian student movement. Now the right to secession can be
384 COUNCIL OF ALTERNATIVE FORCES FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA 
(1994) Press Release. Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
385 As quoted on 22 December 1994 in Press Digest, p.4.
386 Interview: Woldu Yemessel.
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seen from the universities forty years ago. Land ownership as well. The 
ruling party and opposition still have the student movement in mind. There is 
no new generation coming into politics. The ruling party is younger than the 
opposition- they’re in their forties and fifties. The opposition is in their 
sixties and seventies. Ethiopian politics need to be modernised, We need to 
put an end to the leftist student politics.387
For the many private journalists from the intelligentsia and the days of the student 
movement, national identity is a single Ethiopia that was built by the imperial 
regimes. The EPRDF’s deconstruction of this idea has been deeply disturbing and 
something that they continue to address.
3.1 Trust in the society
Reconciliation is further hindered by the lack of trust that pervades many 
different aspects of Ethiopian society, including the press. As elaborated in Chapters 
1 and 2, neither democracy nor a free media are necessarily a ‘natural state’ but rather 
an ideological conquest that requires a certain environment and the space to trust your 
enemies. The roots for cooperation and tolerance must be there and these democratic 
roots are lacking in Ethiopia. Issues of trust and suspicion for other groups pervade 
many political and media issues and interviewees repeatedly came back to the 
underlying causes. Numerous academics and even casual visitors to Ethiopia have 
commented on the evident hierarchy, Ethiopians’ complex relationship with authority, 
and the suspicion that is prevalent in the political and social culture.388
387 Interview: Aregawi.
388 A partial explanation for this distrust of others stems from the Solomonic myth of the nation that 
Ethiopians are descendants from Sheba and Solomon and is thus god’s chosen people. But Ethiopians 
have also historically seen themselves as a pillar of civilised Christianity in a sea of Muslims and 
pagans, this legacy continues to this day and is a major political issue both domestically and 
internationally. And as highland Christians were endowed with lighter skin and finer features many 
continue not to consider themselves to be Africans, an irony given that the African Union is based in 
Addis Ababa.
At the same time, Amhara feudal culture was extremely hierarchical and traditionally most 
Ethiopians have demonstrated a continued deference for leadership and governments. Many Ethiopians 
also hold a strong suspicion of governments which is not surprising given the past of governance in the 
country including: the tradition of feudal lords vying for control over territories; a politically powerful 
highland culture that has been partially closed off from the rest of the world, yet also repeatedly 
invaded; the more recent history of Haile Selassie’s imperial government; Mengistu’s Red Terror rule; 
and perhaps more controversially (most agree that it has been a marked improvement) the 
Revolutionary Democracy of the EPRDF.
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This culture of suspicion pervades virtually all aspects of society, political, 
social, and civil society. The TPLF itself could be seen as suffering from a 
persecution complex and there is a great deal of suspicion within the government as 
well. Within the small TPLF political team, loyalty is prized but even this has been 
tenuous. Meles has excelled with political infighting and coming out on top. Over 
the years of the struggle he has systematically defeated challengers, and while not 
doing so personally has had many of the others that created the TPLF with him killed 
(Aragaye Berhe escaped to Sweden).
During interviews, informants regularly cited the common sentiment “don’t 
trust your enemies”. This has been magnified given the recent political events but has 
been a longstanding characteristic. During a focus group organised by the NGO 
election group Eris in the immediate post-election period, a consensus arose from the 
student participants that Ethiopia does not have a political culture that compromises -  
it’s either ‘a’ or ‘z’. There is nothing in the middle. Compromise, they agreed, makes 
you look weak. Older interviewees regularly mentioned that a problem of the current 
political crisis is that no one wants to be in the middle. If you are in the middle, you 
can be misinterpreted. Rather everyone wants to know exactly where someone stands 
so people typically choose one side or the other.
The distrust also applies to outsiders; for example, the motives of researchers 
are constantly questioned. Sensitive, or even insensitive questions are regularly 
evaded and it is difficult to gain trust. It is problematic to access officials and 
members of the government and a number of times I was sent with minders. The 
situation is even more difficult for Ethiopian journalists. Even if journalists are 
granted access to government officials or organisations, there is a general feeling of 
nervousness about having to interact with the system or appear on anyone’s radar, and 
thus become a target.
Teguest Yilma, the editor of Capital newspaper, noted that it is hard for her to 
get her journalists to corroborate stories with the police because “they simply do not 
want to be in a position to speak with the police. Journalists feel as though they are 
always a suspect and that they could be blamed for something; therefore, they prefer
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to just stay away”.389 It is usually only the editors with the highest connections in the 
government who would feel comfortable pursuing information from government 
sources. This also poses challenges for debates on access to information or freedom 
of information laws. If citizens are unwilling or afraid to approach the government 
for information, it is unlikely that legislation will make much difference.
The present government has done little to change this situation and restore
trust. It did not have a strategy when it came to power and it still does not have one.
As Zerihun Teshome, of the pro-govemment newspaper Iftin, noted
There is discomfort for Ethiopians in the gray area; this is a country of 
slogans. We say we will do it... but it’s difficult to bring stakeholders 
together. This government is scared of being fingerprinted as being a push 
behind something. Good projects get dumped, so they try to look 
uninterested.390
The few small steps towards reconciliation the government has taken, have been on 
its own terms.
But by failing to take seriously comments within the independent press or to 
meet with journalists and respond to their commentary or questions, the government 
has done little to improve this lack of trust. And by attempting to de-legitimise 
opposing arguments by suggesting that they are so peripheral and radical not to 
warrant engagement, they have reinforced the notion of an autocratic party with little 
genuine interest what others think. This attitude, combined with the continued denial 
of access to information, encouraged some segments of the private press to become 
even more opposed to the government, thus further polarising the press system.
Finally, we turn to the international community, a major source of strength for 
the EPRDF, and one that has allowed it the space to deal with the press as recklessly 
as it has, turning away when press outlets are closed and journalists silenced.
389Interview: Tiguest Yilma.
390 Interview: Zerihun Teshome.
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4. International dimensions
Ethiopia’s present international relations are an integral part of understanding 
the nature of the Ethiopian state and how it impacts the press system. With increasing 
conditionality and pressures to respect human rights and democratise, Ethiopia has 
escaped condemnation relatively easily because of its strategic importance and a 
general lack of understanding by outsiders about the country and government. The 
EPRDF, however, faces serious political pressures from the diaspora.
4.1 Strategic priorities
Strategically, Ethiopia has always been an important regional power but its 
influence has been increasing in recent years as it has closely aligned itself with 
America’s war on terror and has become a strategic partner in a volatile region. The 
US’s relations with Eritrea are steadily deteriorating over the failure to force Ethiopia 
to adhere to the border ruling. At the same time, Somalia’s chaos makes for a 
difficult alliance, Djibouti’s small size is unlikely to wield influence and the US’s 
relations with Sudan are also deeply strained; thus Ethiopia is the lynchpin for 
American foreign policy in the region. This was most notably demonstrated when 
Ethiopia invaded Somalia, along with the US, to overthrow the Islamic Courts Union 
and reinstate the Transitional Federal Government in December 2006. This preferred 
status has had an impact on domestic and international politics effecting government 
media policy.
One outcome of this preferential status with the US is that the EPRDF feels 
relatively emboldened to pursue its domestic strategy as it pleases, even if that means 
suppressing most opposition voices and imprisoning tens of thousands of people. 
Much of the international community, led by the US, has demonstrated its willingness 
to prioritise strategic concerns over human rights or other issues. One example that 
Ethiopia has learned from is the unwillingness of the US to pressure Ethiopia to 
implement the UN border ruling giving the town of Badme to Eritrea, despite 
Eritrea’s intense protests.
In addition, the EPRDF managed to deflect the international political fallout 
after the post-election violence of June and November 2006 remarkably well.
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Ethiopia receives over half its budget from international donors and is one of the 
largest recipients of foreign aid in Africa. While governments such as the UK 
announced that they intended to slash aid, particularly direct budget assistance, 
international aid including from the UK has actually increased significantly since the 
violence.
Part of Ethiopia’s success in managing international perceptions of its 
domestic crises is due to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. He makes himself available 
to talk to international journalists, even when he refuses to meet with local ones, and 
willingly interacts with diplomats. He is regarded as extremely smart, and even his 
critics acknowledge that he has an excellent grasp of policy issues. The EPRDF has 
been praised for it’s handling of the economy: there has been a solid rate of growth 
and international financial organisations such as the World Bank have been 
supportive of the present government.391 Meles is known for publicly and privately 
espousing that Ethiopia is solidly on the democratic path, albeit a bumpy, non-linear 
one' “ and those who do not agree, such as the European Union’s head of the election 
observation team, Ana Gomez, are sidelined.
As a whole, the EPRDF has been pragmatic in recognising what policies 
would be internationally acceptable and which ones would not be, as witnessed when 
the TPLF en route to Addis had their shift from Marxist-Leninism to espousing some 
of the principles of liberal democracy. There was, at least in the beginning, a real 
desire on the part of the TPLF to set itself apart from its predecessors and this was 
partially achieved through sending a signal to the rest of the world that the new 
government would tolerate some degree of dissent. As Girma describes: “A lot of the 
writing the government put up with, was something no other government had. The 
government put up with it because they were less consolidated but also they wanted to 
impress the world and make them think they were new. Meles wanted to create an 
image”.393
391 STIGLITZ, J. (2003) Globalization and Its Discontents, London, W.W. Norton and Company.
392 Nevertheless, Meles has also pointedly argued to the western media that “to impose democracy 
from outside is inherently undemocratic”. See January 25 2008, Interview with Simon Tisdall, The 
Guardian. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.Uk/worId/2008/ian/25/l
393 Interview: Beshah.
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The extent to which Meles has worked to create an image that is reflective of 
EPRDF realities is controversial and, as time went on, the need to differentiate from 
the past faded. In fact, the EPRDF has never seemed particularly concerned with 
developing a strategy to project a positive image of itself internationally, despite 
recognition from within the leadership that there is indeed a problem with managing 
its image externally.394 Still, however, there has not yet been talk of establishing a 
centre similar to Uganda’s Media Centre or to the related models in Kenya, Tanzania 
or South Africa.
4.2 Diaspora
The stronghold for the opposition has been the diaspora, which has also been 
an important source of material for media outlets critical of the EPRDF. In a telling 
move, once the CUD leaders were released from prison in 2007 they made a trip to 
America and Europe to garner support, sort out their disagreements over the power 
structure and thank their financiers.395 In many cases the diaspora appears more 
fiercely opposed then Ethiopians within the country, a characteristic that is not unique 
to Ethiopia but is also often the case for other large diaspora populations.
Not surprisingly, this influence has also manifested itself in the media in 
several ways. The internet, particularly blogs, has been an influential source of 
information both within and outside Ethiopia.396 The diaspora runs most of these and 
they focus on commentary and ideological debates over past and current policies. 
Since the election, all blogs have been blocked from within Ethiopia but prior to the 
election since many Ethiopians did not have access to the internet, Iskinder Nega 
would trawl the web and compile the most interesting articles into Menelik, a popular 
and influential newspaper.
This critical side of the diaspora also penetrated the Voice of America at many 
levels and influenced the reporting. Many of the journalists at VOA had fled to the
394 Interview: Simon.
395 The Diaspora has been particularly active in the US, where there is the largest group o f Ethiopians 
outside o f Ethiopia and they have been intensely lobbying congressmen to tie security aid to human 
rights through H.R.2003. This bill has undoubtedly put some pressure on the EPRDF to release the 
political prisoners.
96 The blogs are presently blocked from Ethiopia but some of the most well-known include 
http://www.ethiomedia.com: www.nazret.com: and www.ethiopianreview.com. The CUD website 
www.kiniiit.org is also blocked from Ethiopia.
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US after the EPRDF came to power and were opposed to the government. Along with 
the other journalists that were charged in the post-2005 election period, five VO A 
reporters were charged in absentia for treason and genocide. While the charges were 
later dropped, officials at the VO A acknowledged that there were some problems 
regarding balance and objectivity. More recently the Ethiopian government has been 
accused of blocking VOA’s signal into the country, charges it denies.397
Despite the challenges posed by the discontent of the diaspora, the 
international dimensions of Ethiopia’s nation-building process have helped the 
stability of the EPRDF and allowed it to pursue policies that not only violate 
international standards but also receive strong internal condemnation.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has put forward a complex argument of the political dimensions
has, several lessons emerge suggesting, for example, why the press was closed after 
the elections.
Here, as will be argued in the concluding chapter, the process of reconciliation 
is key. There is a long history of competing ideologies and visions of Ethiopia. Time 
has not proved successful in tempering this animosity and disagreements. The 
divisions and debates on key issues such as federalism, land tenure, ethnic identities, 
and language, remain similar today particularly as Marxism-Leninism continues to be 
an influencing ideology for EPRDF leaders. The press can contribute to the process 
of reconciling these divisions through providing a forum for elite negotiation but there 
also has to be a political will, engagement and initiative that must come from the 
government itself. By failing to engage in debate, respond to the arguments presented 
in the media, and have any real inclusive process of its own, the government 
hampered a much-needed national dialogue. It similarly exacerbated the situation by 
excluding journalists who previously worked for the Ministry of Information under 
the Derg from continuing in the government press, by maintaining that the peasantry - 
not intellectuals and city dwellers -  was its primary constituency, and by holding an 
air of entitlement to power that came after decades of fighting in the bush.
It is important as well to examine the motivations and agendas of all actors. 
Particularly in societies where there is a smaller elite, the relationships tend to be 
more personal and complex, compared to societies, such as the UK, where there are 
thousands of journalists. Chapter 4 focused on this issue stemming from the press 
system, and journalists in particular, while Chapter 5 looked at it from the perspective 
of the political system.
Journalism is often reinterpreted by its practitioners in different contexts. The 
diverse, and sometimes self-interested and political, motivations of Ethiopian 
journalists, have strongly affected the press system. While at the same time, the 
political leadership in Ethiopia remains secretive and paranoid and pressure to make 
information public or to explain policies and motivations are rarely answered and 
appear unlikely to change in the near future. Underlying both these issues is 
historical memory. The debates from the student movement which the current older 
generation that is in power participated in, as well as inter-ethnic relations going back 
hundreds of years, have all impacted the press and remain very much alive today.
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As the press serves as a reflection of political developments, unless the 
Ethiopian state becomes more stable, it is unlikely that the press will become either 
more institutionalised or less polarised. The social and political ideology that made 
the TPLF a successful guerilla movement had to change when it came to power. The 
inability to adapt and be a government for 75 million people has made it less effective 
than it might otherwise be. While the Ethiopian government may espouse Westem- 
style democracy publicly, a further look suggests that Ethiopia is probably not on 
such a linear path of political transition. Despite internal discontent and the strength 
of the diaspora, the political situation is unlikely to change significantly partly 
because of the international environment. The Ethiopian state, however, is 
fundamentally weak and the status quo is unsustainable in the long-term. I now turn 
to Uganda, a case that is also complex and un-democratic, but slightly more 
encouraging both in political developments as well as the dynamics of the press 
system.
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PART II 
The Ugandan Press:
A Fading Forum for Consensus Building and Constructive Criticism
The risk of placing the Ugandan case next to the Ethiopian case is that it can 
suggest Uganda as an example of a success. As the coming three chapters will 
elaborate, this is not entirely the case. The press in Uganda is continuing to evolve 
and its role is changing. No longer is it as politicised, a process that has partly been 
connected the departure of the papers founders, President Museveni’s third term 
project and its present ownership by the Nairobi-based Nation Media Group. Many 
of the dominant actors that were most influential in shaping the press have left and the 
government has had some success in diminishing the role of the press it once sought 
to encourage. While even the so-called ‘opposition’ press never fundamentally 
opposed the single-party Movement system the change in the constitution President 
Museveni imposed to allow him to run for a third term received widespread 
condemnation, including by the Managing Director of state-owned newspaper The 
New Vision, William Pike.
The following three chapters follow a pattern similar to that employed to 
analyse the Ethiopian case, beginning with an historical chapter followed by an 
analysis of the press system variables (polarisation of the press; ideology of 
journalists; institutionalisation of the press; and government intervention) and then of 
the political system variables (ideology of the liberation movement; process of state 
construction and consolidation of power; reconciliation and trust-building; and 
international dimensions). This section largely focuses on the press in the early days 
of the NRM’s nation-building project presenting a complex but coherent portrait of 
the press and politics during this period of transition.
The press in Uganda has played an important and key role in providing a 
forum for debate, participation and dialogue. Just as was the case in Ethiopia, 
however, press systems rarely are what they seem at first glance. Individuals and
< lQ O
personalities have weighed in heavily shaping the press. In Uganda, most of the
398 In an effort to fully develop the ideas and dimensions o f certain individuals I have focused on their 
development and role more than others.
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journalists have long and continued connections and engagement with those in State 
House, which shapes the political and press environment differently than in Ethiopia 
where relations may go back to the student movement but have diverged for decades 
and now are deeply polarised.
Several key events and issues have influenced the portrait that follows. The 
ideology of the NRM’s guerrilla movement is a unique and innovative blend of 
democratic ideals with single party pragmatism that was deeply influenced by the 
experience of organising and bringing peace to parts of the country during the civil 
war. In the beginning, regional experiences, particularly from Tanzania, strongly 
shaped the struggle yet, in contrast with the TPLF, the NRM largely dispensed with 
Marxist ideology when it fell out of favour internationally. A strategy of Resistance 
Councils (RCs) and constructive criticism, which began in the bush, shaped the 
political organisation of the Movement government and deeply impacted the press. 
Similarly the unique development of the government owned The New Vision 
newspaper cannot be underestimated. It had a strong and important role in positively 
shaping the press environment as a whole for which the government deserves much 
credit.
Historically, Ugandans enjoy a proud history of hosting Africa’s strongest 
university at the time of independence as well as influential publications such as the 
magazine, Transition, which emerged from Makerere University during the 1960s. 
Decades of brutal rule by Idi Amin and Milton Obote have not smothered enthusiasm 
for debates and the general interest in politics. Museveni’s populist style is natural 
for Ugandans and contrasts sharply with the more authoritative and detached stance 
Meles prefers.
The portrait that emerges from the next three chapters is of a government and 
a press that during the period of transition managed to have a significant portion of 
the population unified behind the nation-building project. Journalists and the press, 
both government and independent, bought into the system and were a part of it. 
While supportive of the NRM, they nevertheless forged a strong forum for critiquing 
government policies, serving as an important voice of dissent in a one-party state and 
were crucial in keeping it on track as much as possible (or until Museveni decided to 
unilaterally go ahead with his third-term project). The press helped to build
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consensus on key issues, including historical ones, and actively assisted in the process 
of reconciliation. It is a credit to the independent journalists as well as the government 
for without The New Vision, the Monitor would have unlikely been as strong and 
vice-versa.
Recent political developments around the 2006 elections, however, do not 
appear encouraging. While the media in Uganda has been rapidly expanding, there 
are now over 100 private radio stations, and has grown more professionalised 
Museveni’s cling to power has been slowly eroding the influence of the press. The 
press served an important role in a unique one-party Movement system and political 
transition but has been less able to find its role in a more institutionalised, competitive 
yet traditionally autocratic environment.
Just as I acknowledged in the introduction to Part I on Ethiopia, the following 
three chapters exclude aspects of the press and political system. This cannot be a 
comprehensive analysis but the chapters will elaborate a portrait that contrasts 
significantly with that of Ethiopia thus illuminating how the role of the press has 
differed so greatly between the two countries and why.
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CHAPTER 6
A History of the Press in Uganda: 1900-2006
The press during the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), 
has been vibrant but dominated by two powerful media houses: The New Vision and 
the Monitor. They have strongly influenced each other in bringing the debate to the 
centre, encouraging professionalism and institutionalisation. Their role has been key 
in the political and nation-building process. At times, for example, the Monitor has 
functioned as an opposition, while The New Vision has presented the government’s 
positions and policies in a relatively objective way facilitating trust and 
communication between the government and society.
This chapter will explore the press in Uganda from its earliest days through 
the current environment under the NRM, an approach similar to the structure of 
Chapter 3. The first section will focus on the historical development of the press until 
the period when Museveni came to power. While much of the literature dwells on the 
influence of the colonialists, this section will focus on the often neglected but strong 
role of the African press beginning in the 1930’s and 1940’s. This press was 
instrumental in challenging colonial rule and advocating a political agenda of change.
In Uganda, there is a tradition of debate over what the role of the press should 
be in nation-building, particularly in a single-party state. Inspired by the Tanzanian 
experience, Ugandans have long discussed the virtues of freedom of expression at the 
possible ‘expense’ of social cohesion. In contrast with Ethiopia, the debate 
throughout society on media policy issues has been more dynamic and Ugandans 
more willing to use the media to challenge authority. Nevertheless, there are a number 
of similarities in the history of the press in Ethiopia and Uganda. The student press at 
Makerere University in the mid to late 1960’s was active and instrumental in sparking 
debate, just as it was at Haile Selassie University. The student movement in both 
countries also provided much of the intellectual spark for the struggle. The dark days 
that followed under Idi Amin, analogous to that of Mengistu, created a similar group 
of ‘survivors’, though the subsequent government under Obote was slightly more 
tolerant of the press. And while the NRM was fighting in the bush for a shorter period
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than the TPLF, it too developed a media and communications strategy, which 
impacted its later policies of propaganda and constructive criticism.
The second section will focus on the media under the NRM and in particular, 
on two key papers from the government press and the private press, The New Vision 
and the Monitor. Both papers are significantly more professional and institutionalised 
than their Ethiopian counterparts. This, however, has not always been the case. The 
growth and maturation of the Monitor and The New Vision has played an important 
role in the nation-building process in a number of ways including serving as a forum 
for elites to dialogue and forge consensus on issues.
1. The history of the press
1.1 Challenging the colonial system
Missionaries and churches started the first papers in Uganda as they did in 
Ethiopia and across much of the continent. In 1900 Mengo Notes,399 a newsletter by 
the Church Missionary Society, was published and in 1907 another newsletter, Ebifa 
mu Buganda fin 1934 BUganda was changed to Uganda), appeared in Luganda. It 
was later published in English in the late 1950’s as New Day. Munno, which was 
started in 1911 by the Roman Catholic White Fathers, was the longest published 
paper in Uganda and only recently ceased publication in the 1990s.400
The first commercial paper was the Uganda Herald. Published thrice a week 
in English it was aimed at Europeans and planters. The paper tolerated a vigorous 
debate by African correspondents on issues of land, education, labour and wages. 
There were also the beginnings of a debate on the existence and legitimacy of the 
colonial order. Daudi Bussedde, one of the most influential commentators at the time,
399 In 1902 it changed its name to Uganda Notes.
400 GARIYO, Z. (1994a) The Press and Democratic Struggles. IN MAMDANI, M. & OLOKA- 
ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and 
Constitutionalism. Vienna, JEP. p. 410.
Munno remained largely a-political until the 1950s when it started commenting on political 
developments. This commentary continued throughout its publication and had a wide readership 
because Munno was known for being the most effective news source for gathering information from 
around the country. While other papers struggled with sending journalists to remote regions, Munno 
relied on an extensive network of priests to provide news.
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astutely used the paper to launch his radical campaign on behalf of the Bataka, the 
former ruling class in Buganda, over land appropriation.
In the 1920s the political African press came into its own and was driven by a 
few strong intellectuals such as Bussedde who became the first editor of Sekanyola 
(1920), a Lugandan monthly that was the first paper to be owned and edited by 
Ugandans. It was published in Nairobi by a group of Bugandan clerks, teachers and 
printers who were critical of the ruling Bugandan chiefs who had agreed to accept the 
British protectorate government in exchange for land. From the outset Sekanyola 
proposed to be different from the church papers and focus on “African grievances” 
which were neglected in the press. In his first editorial Bussedde argued that the 
newspaper was to stress:
The issues affecting Buganda... and having seen how rulers and chiefs treat 
the poor people who work without pay under laws which seek to drain them 
of blood... I have come to the conclusion that there are some countries which 
are happy to see the suffering of the poor people (bakopi)... my role will be 
to highlight these issues so that we can understand them and learn from those
401experiences.
Reaction to Sekanuyola was hostile, particularly on the part of the Buganda Youth 
Association, which was comprised largely of the sons of the chiefs.
For the most part the press was not seditious and the British government was
uncharacteristically lenient.402 Charges were brought against the editors but Justice
Guthrie Smith argued that he did not want to cripple or discourage “such a laudable
enterprise as a Native newspaper”. He articulated the classic British justification of a
free press in a democratic society arguing that the press:
is entirely legitimate even though it may involve attacks on the policy of the 
government and Public Officials. The law recognises the full liberty of the
401 Ibid. p. 413.
402 There were times papers such as Sekanyola- which later became Gambuze in 1928, Munyonyozi 
(The Explainer, also edited by Bussedde in 1922) or Dobozi Ily Buganda (Voice o f Buganda) among 
others, did exacerbate tensions between groups. The Indian community was a particular target and 
encouraged the Indians to forge an uncomfortable alliance with the Young Buganda that responded to 
the arguments presented in Sekanyola with an article in the Uganda Herald supporting the Indians as 
an integral part of Uganda’s development. Despite urging by the Herald and other communities to 
charge Sekanyola with sedition there was little that could be done as long as Bassude remained in 
Nairobi. At the same time, however, there seemed little inclination to bother pressing charges. The 
first time an East African newspaper was charged with libel was in 1926 when Bassude and his 
colleague Joswa Kate Mugema were found guilty for criticizing the Buganda treasurer for inefficiency 
and urging his replacement with someone that was familiar with economics. SCOTTON, J. F. (1973) 
The First African Press in East Africa: Protest and Nationalism in Uganda in the 1920's. The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 211-228.
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subject to comment on and criticise the conduct and motives of public men, 
and it cannot be doubted that this is an advantage to the community and that, 
although injustice may often be done and though public men may often have 
to smart under the keen sense of wrong inflicted by hostile criticisms, the 
nation profits by public opinion thus freely brought to bear on the discharge 
of public duties.403
This ruling helped to set a precedent for press freedoms as it suggested that, at least 
for the time being, a free press was justifiable in a colonial situation.
Towards the end of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s a more anti-colonial 
and militant African press emerged. By the 1940s several independent organisations 
that were opposed to colonial rule were also involved in publishing newspapers to put 
forward their arguments.404 Growing pressure on the Buganda Government from the 
intelligentsia and increasing tensions between the colonial regime and the Buganda 
government led to a series of grievances and demands made by the Kabaka in 1953 
including the end of the East African federation; the transfer of Buganda’s affairs 
back to the colonial office from the foreign office; a date for the self-government for 
Uganda; and the cessation of Buganda representation at Legco. The colonial 
government responded by forcing Edward Muteesa, the Kabaka, into exile until 1955 
while the newspapers vigorously condemned this ‘arrogant’ action. This move, 
however, also galvanised the intelligentsia into pressuring for Africanisation of the 
civil service and papers such as the Uganda Times, established in 1956, led this 
protest.
During the late 1950s greater divisions within the press appeared as the 
struggle for independence intensified. Nationalist politicians often based their factions 
on religion or nationality and newspapers followed suit mirroring similar divides. 
Communism, the church and the Bugandan struggle for an independent state were all
403 Ibid. p. 219.
404 The Ugandan Growers Co-operative run by Daudi Mukubira published Buganda Nyaffe, a 
newsletter in which he argued that that the colonial regime was re-enslaving Africans. During the 
workers strike and the agrarian agitation in the 1940s, newspapers played an important role in 
articulating the demands of the strikers. There was also an increasing tendency among a growing 
intelligentsia and middle class to confront the colonial government over social and political issues that 
affected them specifically- whether it be having access to European only bars or not being 
discriminated in government posts- rather than a project of emancipation for the Ugandan population 
as a whole. Soon after, the Uganda Post and the Uganda Express, published in English by JW 
Kiwanuku, began to put forward the arguments for self-rule. GARIYO, Z. (1994a) The Press and 
Democratic Struggles. IN MAMDANI, M. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) Uganda: Studies in 
Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna, JEP.
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political forces that not only impacted the development of political parties but the 
press as well.
The Uganda National Congress (UNC) led by Milton Obote, which emerged 
from a split with the United Congress Party (UCP), was particularly adept at using the 
press to advocate its political agenda. Emambya Esaze, edited and published by 
Paulo Muwanga and Damulira Mukiibi, attacked the colonial regime and advocated a 
pan-African agenda. African Pilot, with which Muwango was also involved, 
published similar articles demanding immediate independence. Both papers strongly 
pushed for the resignation of the Buganda representatives and criticised non-Buganda 
members of the Legco ‘foreigners’ dividing people along ethnic lines. In addition, the 
press sustained the 1959 consumer boycott which was directed largely at Asian 
dukawallahs. While some papers and political parties such as the Democratic Party 
(DP) (and thus Munno) opposed the boycott, many of the papers such as Uganda 
Empya and Emambya Esaze were supportive.
Buganda nationalism also fractionalised the press.405 The Catholic Church, 
which supported the DP, used the press as a way to further its interests.406 As 
independence and the first election neared, the Church was able to put its vast 
organisational network behind the party it supported. Through papers like Munno, the 
West Nile Catholic Gazette (which was published in Gulu and circulated in the 
Northern and western Nile provinces), Lobo Mewa and Agetereine, the Church 
attempted to divide the nationalist struggle further along religious lines. Munno, in 
particular was critical of other nationalist group, such as the Uganda People’s
405 Munno, the Uganda Express and the Uganda Argus also became involved criticizing the Buganda 
publishing strong commentary. The Uganda Argus, which was started in the mid-1950s, was part of 
the influential Eastern African newspaper group, including Kenya’s Standard, that was generally 
opposed to the African’s political struggles. There were of course nuances in all of the arguments
these papers were putting forth- it was not simply for or against but each one was supporting the vested
political interest of its supporters over this complex issue. Ibid.
06 The Catholic Church, for example, certainly contributed to the victory of Benedicto Kiwanuka, a 
Catholic member of the DP party, who won the first general election by beating Obote, a protestant, of 
the UPC. Indicative of the discourse within the press at the time, an article in the catholic paper, 
Leadership, noted:
The leader of the beaten party, Mr. A. M. Obote, well known to our readers ascribed 
the overall majority of his opponents to the active participation of a religious 
domination. The explanation lies in the open attacks which Mr. Obote made in
Northern Province (sic!) against the church. No wonder now if Catholics want to
defend their faith and their institutions and they have done it with the ballot.
As quoted in Ibid. p. 447.
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Congress (UPC) arguing that they were leaning towards communism and had contacts 
with countries such as Russia or China. The Catholic papers were primarily 
circulated within Catholic schools and warned voters against the non-Catholic
. .  407parties.
It is difficult to assess the contribution of the press to democracy in the run up 
to the first general election. It was divided and exacerbated factional tensions. The 
intelligentsia and middle class, who were the nationalists, used the media to advocate 
for their immediate goals and desires, which were often different from those of the 
peasant and working classes. The political agenda diverged from the economic one 
and was clouded and distorted in the press as it was often each faction just seeking to 
rid the colonialists to pursue their own privileges. Within this environment the media 
entered independence and the post-colonial period. The trends of the 1940s and 1950s 
when the press was vibrant and dominated by the church, political activists and 
politicians, continued to some degree, but almost all of the papers that had appeared 
during this period faded by the mid-1960’s.
1.2 Debating a new role for the press in the post-colonial period
In 1962 Uganda gained independence and Milton Obote became Prime 
Minister. As this was the first period Obote ruled Uganda, it is usually referred to as 
the Obote I government. Hyden and Okigbo refer to this period as the ‘first wave of 
democracy’,408 as it provided sufficient space for some of the continent’s most 
dynamic magazines like Transition to appear.
During the first few years of the Obote I government there were major debates 
in parliament as to what the role of the media should be. The Uganda Argus followed 
these discussions and would regularly update readers on the different sides. Much of 
the debate sounds familiar to the discussions that occurred when Museveni first came 
to power. On December 11, 1964, for example, Mr. Alex Ojera, Minister of 
Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, was quoted by the Uganda Argus as saying
408 HYDEN, G. & OKIGBO, C. (2002) The Media and the Two Waves of Democracy. IN HYDEN, 
G., LESLIE, M. & OGUNDIMU, F. (Eds.) Media and Democracy in Africa. New Brunswick, 
Transaction.
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Many times the government had allowed the press to criticise what it was 
doing: it did not mind criticism as long as it was true and constructive, but 
when it was aimed at destroying the unity which had been built in the
country, or when it tried to divide people on tribal or religious grounds to
boost a political party it would not be allowed in Uganda.409
It was, however, the government that was to judge what could be considered
‘constructive’. Reflective of the times, the government also argued that the press
should focus on issues of modernising the country and thus development reporting 
should take precedence over politics.410
An article in the Uganda Argus also raised the question of whether a free press
should have a role in a one-party state. Jenkins Kiwanka reported on answers to this
question during a debate that occurred during this period:
The answers ranged from counter questions as to what the questioner 
meant by a ‘Free Press’ to a suggestion that the press in Africa should always 
compromise on ‘national issues’ if it were to continue to exist under a one- 
party system. A member of the panel asked what sort of newspapers the 
African public wanted to read. “Are they interested in such papers as 
published in countries like America and Britain?”
“We cannot afford at this stage of our development to have 
newspapers of the type published in Western Europe,” replied one of the 
participants. “Our governments are engaged in economic reconstruction and 
should not be bothered with undue criticism,” said another. One of the 
Ugandans at the seminar pointed out that he was convinced Africa could 
afford a free press, but that what was required of the press was to be
‘responsible’. When the question of who defines ‘constructive criticism’ was
raised, the answer was, ‘the government’. But politicians the world over with 
their sensitiveness to criticism could hardly be expected to give a fair 
judgment....411
While initially there was some scope and relative freedom of the press under Obote I, 
in 1966 a state of emergency was declared and Uganda became a one-party state with 
Obote as President.
During this period, however, within the government there was also the unique 
emergence of The People newspaper, a commercial paper started by Obote’s UPC 
with a mandate to support the party’s ideology and foster a sense of nationalism.
Because of its connections, the paper had extensive news coverage. The interesting
issue around The People is the extent to which it was editorially independent from the
409 SSEKEBA, D. (2006) The Press in Uganda, 1900-2000. Kampala.
410 TABAIRE, B. (2007) The Press and Political Repression in Uganda: Back to the Future? Journal o f  
Eastern African Studies, 1,193-211.
411 SSEKEBA, D. (2006) The Press in Uganda, 1900-2000. Kampala.
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government and, as will be elaborated later in the chapter, the extent to which it may 
have served as a ‘model’ for The New Vision. Some argued that it was tightly 
controlled but others held that neither the UPC nor Obote intervened in the editorial 
content. Eventually it criticised the UPC government as well as members of 
parliament and senior public officers. The most prominent editor of The People was 
Daniel Nelson, a British journalist who had been working for the Uganda Argus. He 
took up the post after the first appointed editor failed to take up the position and the 
second one, Fred Kakembo, a lawyer, left for a magistrate position. Nelson stayed 
until 1969 and the paper declined after Idi Amin came to power in 1971.
1.3 The university press
At the same time, there was sufficient space during the Obote I period to allow 
for some of the best publications in Africa to evolve and flourish, particularly among 
students. Perhaps the best academic institution on the continent at the time, Makerere 
University was a dynamic environment for visiting scholars as well as young, 
progressive and outspoken students and journalists. In 1961, Rajat Neogy, a Ugandan 
of Indian ancestry, returned from his undergraduate studies at the University of 
London and started Transition. This magazine characterised the enthusiasm and 
optimism of the times. Transition drew on other examples of vibrant African 
publications addressing the process of decolonisation, including Drum in South 
Africa and Black Orpheus in West Africa. The combination of literary commentary 
and political writing was, however, a new approach for a magazine on the continent. 
Neogy emphasised that the present was a time for social integration and the 
acceptance of all races - European, African and Indian. The first few issues focused 
on this topic of race. But soon articles started focusing more on themes such as the 
relevancy of the one-party state to African democracy and the role of liberation 
parties, written by prominent figures such as Julius Nyerere. Within a few issues 
Transition became the most influential magazine on the continent and a platform for 
debate and discussion from contributors of different nationalities. It was a forum for 
communicating between Africa’s intellectual and political leaders. Wole Soyinka, 
Nadine Gordimer, Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa Thoing’o as well as American writers 
such as Martin Luther King Jr., James Baldwin and Langston Hughes all contributed
189
influential pieces. From the beginning, the future President of Tanzania, Benjamin 
Mkapa, was an associate editor and contributor.412
Transition flourished until 1968 after which the Ugandan press declined 
steadily as journalists were imprisoned and tortured and the media was restricted. 
Beyond Obote’s state of emergency from 1966 to 1968 there were ominous signs of 
political repression across the continent, including the coup against Kwame Nkrumah 
and the Biafran war which did not bode well for the future of publications such as 
Transition that were continent-wide forums for debate and dialogue.
In the 32nd edition of Transition there were several articles directed at the 
Ugandan government that pushed Obote too far. Two articles particularly irritated the 
government, the first was by p ’Bitek who noted that “the most striking and 
frightening characteristic of all African governments is this: that without exception, 
all of them are dictatorships, and practice such ruthless discriminations as to make the 
South African apartheid regime look tame”.413 The second, by long-time Uganda 
nationalist Abubukar Mauyanja even received a direct response from the head of 
Obote’s secret police. Mauyanja argued that Obote’s new constitutional proposals 
were “illiberal, authoritarian, and dictatorial.... They provide for the concentration of 
excessive, autocratic, and dangerous powers in the hands of one man.”414
October 18, 1968 was the last issue from Uganda. The government had been 
growing increasingly autocratic for years so the closure of the magazine and arrest of 
Neogy on sedition was no surprise. When Neogy was released from prison he moved 
to Ghana, where KA Busia had recently been elected, in an effort to continue 
publishing. However, when Busia’s government was overthrown in 1972 Neogy 
decided to relinquish control of the magazine to Wole Soyinka rather than risk 
another round of incarceration and persecution. For numerous reasons the magazine 
unfortunately did not survive long.415
412 VAZQUEZ, M. C. (1997) An African Dilemma. Transition, 6-15.
413 As quoted in Ibid. p. 11.
414 Ibid.
415 Henry Lewis Gates Jr. and Kwame Anthony Appiah re-launched Transition in the US in 1991. 
Wole Soyinka serves as chairman o f the editorial board. The magazine draws on the tradition o f  
Transition and publishes on international issues ranging from poetry to politics. As stated on their 
website, there is a strong focus on contributions from people o f colour. See 
http://www.transitionmagazine.com.
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Another major blow to Transition came from abroad. Unbeknownst to 
Neogy, the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom that had been financially 
assisting the magazine was in fact receiving funding from the CIA. While some 
critics of Transition had all along seen the magazine as indicative of the American 
liberal democratic ideology, in contrast to a communist one, this confirmed suspicion 
that the contributors were pushing an agenda. Nevertheless, the legacy of Transition 
was an important one and certainly inspired later generations of African journalists 
and writers. As Wole Soyinka commented, Transition was “Africa’s first forum of 
intellectual and artistic eclecticism”.416 And importantly it engaged governments and 
politicians. Nelson Kasfir, an academic at Makerere who previously had written for 
Transition, noted that “everybody was talking about it and, therefore, it received 
much greater audience than even its circulation would indicate. It generated 
comments in newspapers, politicians responded. It did what a magazine should do: 
excite debate on issues” 417 This engagement between the press and politicians set a 
precedent that later emerged during Museveni’s time when journalists and society 
expect politicians to respond both to and within the press on criticisms and 
government policy.
1.4 Dark Days
After seizing power in a military coup in 1971, Idi Amin ushered in the ‘dark 
days’ for Uganda in almost everyway - including for the media. Hypocritically, a 
reason he gave for seizing power was that Obote did not respect freedom of 
expression and he wanted to re-establish a space for the independent media. While he 
suspended much of the constitution, he did initially retain the portion about freedom 
of expression and the press. Amin even established a School of Journalism. The new 
Attorney General argued that the previous government had fallen because it had 
stifled the expression of opinion such that it “ceased to be in touch with the needs and 
aspirations of the people”, arguing that “Uganda’s journalistic history is at a turning 
point” and that the previous government only tolerated reporting that it wanted to hear
416 As quoted in TABAIRE, B. (2007) The Press and Political Repression in Uganda: Back to the 
Future? Journal o f Eastern African Studies, 1,193-211. p. 196.
417 As quoted in Ibid. p. 199.
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which led to dull reporting.418 These ideas of a free press clearly did not come to 
fruition.
The same year, the Asians were expelled from Uganda and the Uganda Argus 
was nationalised for endeavouring to explain why there was no sugar in the country 
and how the shortage was connected to the factories that were unable to meet 
production targets. The paper was accused of working for imperialist interests and 
being in conflict with the needs of the government; after being nationalised it became 
the Voice of Uganda. Amin soon took over the role of Minister of Information and 
banned all newspapers for ‘a certain period or indefinitely’.419 The journalists at the 
Voice of Uganda became government employees and were ordered to print every 
word of Amin’s speeches. It was common to find Amin’s photo a dozen times in the 
same paper and if he gave the same speech twice in one day, it would appear exactly 
that way - twice. Amin even went so far as to suggest that television editors or news 
readers be dismissed if they presented shortened versions of his speeches.420
1.5 Surviving
By 1973 the few British journalists that remained were quickly ordered to 
leave the country and the last independent papers were closed. The editor of Munno, 
Father Clement Kiggundu, was murdered, and the government shut down the paper 
for being ‘a confusing agent’. The People was also closed for not following the strict 
guidelines of Amin’s propaganda campaign. Journalists that continued to operate 
during this period can be described as ‘the survivors’ similar to the journalists under 
Mengistu. Like their Ethiopian counterparts, many of these journalists were trained 
overseas and highly qualified.
Ben Bella Ilakut was a prominent journalist during this period. In the 
following extensive excerpt from his oral history, of which the length is essential in 
doing justice to understanding the difficulties typical of his generation, he describes 
his experience as editor-in-chief of the government paper, the Voice of Uganda, under 
Idi Amin:
418 SSEKEBA, D. (2006) The Press in Uganda, 1900-2000. Kampala.
419 Interview: Ben Bella Ilakut.
420 Ibid.
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I was the editor-in-chief, but I ran into a lot of problems because... 
what we call the splash, the main story in the newspaper, was all about Idi 
Amin. And if you made any other story the main story in the newspaper, you 
had a lot of problems. My colleagues fled. Some of them were killed. 
Others just disappeared. We didn’t know where they went. So it was very, 
very trying during Idi Amin’s time.
The Uganda Argos became Voice of Uganda. It was 
nationalised...either in December or in...November 72, when the 
announcement was made that we have gotten rid of the imperialists and we 
have taken over and the Uganda Argos’ new name is Voice of Uganda, the 
voice for Ugandan people to speak out here. We didn’t... know at the 
beginning [what it meant] but if you have a rough idea of about Ethiopia, you 
know what it means to be ruled by a military dictatorship. We didn’t. Obote 
had become intolerable so people welcomed him [Idi Amin].
[In 1974] I was now the full editor of Voice of Uganda. There were 
very critical times between Uganda and Tanzania because Obote was living 
in Tanzania, and Idi Amin was always talking against Tanzania and President 
Julius Nyerere.... So one day, the main story had come from the Ministry or 
from the office of the President, they used to send stories direct form the 
office of the President and then we were not supposed to edit anything. You 
had to put it the way it had been. So... the story came and in the morning 
there was a bit of an error saying that Idi Amin yesterday raped Nyerere. We 
liked to use the word rapped -  R-A-P, means to criticise, to attack, but when 
it was in the ...in the past tense, you have to have double P, rapped. If you 
have single P, it means raped. So the story came out that Idi Amin yesterday 
raped Nyerere. My God! Somebody drew Idi Amin’s attention to the 
spelling. They said that you raped Julius Nyerere! So he said, what does that 
mean? They said you slept by force with another man called Julius Nyerere. 
My God! They say...go and get the editor NOW. That was between five 
and six in the morning. So they came to my house not very far from here, 
and I’m not married at that time, so they knocked at the door and when I 
looked I saw some people peeping, and they had caps, the army caps. I had a 
girlfriend who had come the previous day and she said, ‘I think we are in 
trouble’. I said, ‘Can you go and open the door, and if they ask for me, you 
say I’m in the bedroom’, so she went and opened the door, and then they 
said, ‘we want Ben Bella, is he around?’ She said ‘yes, he’s inside, you 
know, he’s still sleeping’. ‘Tell him to get up, the old man wants to see him’, 
meaning Idi Amin. So she came and whispered this to me. So I told her ‘go 
and tell them that I’m going to take bath’. But they said ‘he should not take 
bath he should get dressed right now’. So I dressed in a white suit and a 
white shirt and a white tie, and black platform shoes. At that time the fashion 
was platform shoes, you become taller. I’d just come back from the United 
States remember so I came with a number of pairs of shoes... I was more or 
less a teenager, although I was some thirty years old, and I liked a bit of 
fashion. So I wore these things and there were nine cars that escorted me to 
the office of the President.
So we went. We were using a lift to go to the fourth floor, there were 
only two lifts: one for the President, the other for the regular people. So we 
were in the big lift and we went in. And I was passing by the secretary’s 
office, and I saw somebody who knew me who was my teacher in Secondary 
School. So he asked me in my language, ‘what is the problem?’ Before I
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could answer, Idi Amin was at the door. Idi Amin was dressed in old medals 
and an air force cap.
When I entered the office of the President there were only two 
people. Idi Amin and another man- the hatchet man. The one who’d shoot at 
you without... producing a word, without shutting his eyes. So when I 
looked and ...a thought ran through my mind that I think I’m in trouble. So 
when I arrived he said, ‘you are the editor?’ I said yes, ‘I’m the editor of 
Voice of Uganda\  ‘Thank for you for the appointment’, I said quickly. He 
said ‘you are in trouble’. I said, ‘what trouble?’ because I have not read the 
paper. It was too early, we used to send copies later for me to look through. 
He said, ‘now you’re saying that I raped Nyerere’. I said ‘no, not raped, it 
should be rapped. It is a mistake if it is rape’. He said...Took at what you 
say’, they had underlined the word ‘raped’. So what they did was they got a 
low stool, and they put the newspaper there, ...I think they had organised it 
as they were coming for me, but just put the newspaper on a low stool and 
then as I was looking started shouting at me at the top of his voice. ‘How can 
you say that I raped Nyerere? You think I have got four wives and so many 
others all the Ugandan women are my wives, and you say that I raped 
Nyerere?’
So he is now here. So he is Idi Amin, the most feared man in the 
whole world, talking to me, Ben Bella, alone, while the other guy at the other 
comer is the hatchet man, the man who shoots at anybody. He killed the 
Archbishop at that particular time of Uganda. Who else have they killed in 
the office of the President? So I remained there, I could not get up, because 
Idi Amin was there. How can you get up with a killer hovering over you? 
So I remained like this for roughly one hour. But I was there and.. .then it 
clicked that this means you ... might not leave this place alive. Then the old 
stories of people being killed in the office of the President were in my mind. I 
thought I heard Idi Amin laughing over me because, remember I’ve got two 
Masters degrees from abroad, very high qualifications those days in Uganda. 
He was a guy who went to only one year at school. He went to... primary 
school, a year, never went anywhere beyond one year. The other guy is 
toying with the gun, I thought I’m dead. So... there is a connection between 
stress and your bowels, then I had diarrhoea. My stomach turned. I tried to 
squeeze myself so that I did not... release myself into the white 
suit.. .Remember I’m wearing a white suit! ... Then after some time it passed 
open, there was nothing I could do now, it was diarrhoea. And it came into 
these platform shoes over the white trousers, and when you have diarrhoea, 
you must also pee, it was a combination of these things. So I was like that for 
one hour. So he now told me that you can go, but I did not hear it, because 
my brain... during the torture so I could not hear anything. They have told 
me, you can now go, but I did not hear. Then he touched me, and I fell, the 
glasses flew, because I thought the bullet had hit me...I thought I saw Idi 
Amin laughing at me like a wizard. I think it was a part of the torture. Yes. I 
will never forget that.
.. ..So my girlfriend heard them saying that we are going to the office 
of the President, and then she came and waited for me outside at the tree, so 
when ... later they helped me to get on my feet, he told me that you can now 
go, and I did not have my glasses, but I started walking.... I did not know 
what to do because the brain was not there any more. So I stood there. Now 
there were some military people sitting by the lift... bodyguards of Idi Amin. 
The stories were that if you missed to be killed in the office of the President,
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you’d be killed in the lift, you’d be strangled in the lift, in the big lift by the 
soldiers, then they’d put you into a sack starting with the head. So ....I 
thought now this is the time when I’m going to be killed. So I remained there 
[in the elevator] with the door open nobody can kill you with the doors open. 
So when the other people pointed at me ...I thought that they were going to 
shoot at me. Remember, I’ve just come from torture, my brains had been hit, 
so I’m like a child. So they said, press the button for the doors to close.
That was the longest journey for me when I was alone in the lift. But 
then I happened to arrive on the ground floor. And I started to walk 
and...there was nobody. Now my girlfriend was calling me, here Ben, Ben, 
Ben. I thought I recognised that voice but I was a zombie, I was my own 
world. I’d gone through a lot of humiliation. Totally humiliated. The stains 
of the waste, the mucus.... Total humiliation. Remember, I’m [educated] so 
for me I knew I was learned. Most of the people were not. Idi Amin had not 
gone to school, so there is that.
...But I had that girlfriend of mine say, go to Kenya, go to Kenya, 
follow the railway line. So I started walking towards the railway station. 
Then I followed the railroad towards the Kenyan border, and I spent seven, 
eight, nine days, I don’t even remember walking on the railway line. But I 
had to get away from the main road because there were times when Idi Amin 
used to release people, then they would follow you.. .grab you and you would 
disappear. So I have to follow this because you cannot go on a railway line 
with a car, because of the rail. So I followed that... in my suit. But when I 
got some way after two or three days my mind was restored. Then I got to 
remove the underpants and throw them away, at least because of the smell 
and stench, the poo-poo. After some time, on the other side of Kenya, on the 
Kenyan side I have my fellow tribes-people, so I told them of my story, they 
say OK we need to go to Nairobi and maybe that is where you are going to 
get a job or something to learn how to survive, because they had all heard 
about Idi Amin, So there was a girl, a friend of a friend from Makerere who 
booked a job for me at another Lonrho company in Kenya, the one they call 
now the Standard, and that’s where I spent the next six years as a senior 
editor.421
Ben Bella has since returned to Uganda and is currently a trainer at The New Vision 
and teaches in the journalism department at Makerere sharing with his students his 
impressions of what it was like to work under Amin and Obote. His story resembles 
that of Negash who told of attempting to survive as a journalist under Haile Selassie 
and Mengistu. This survivor mentality, or at least the suffering that many journalists 
had to endure has undoubtedly affected the older and middle generation of journalists. 
At the same time, Ben Bella also acknowledges the benefits of hindsight in assessing 
the media during this period. He does not blame Idi Amin for what he was doing 
arguing:
421 Interview: Ben Bella Ilakut.
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Idi Amin was fighting for his own survival. But I don’t blame him for that. 
Especially when his tormentor.. .Nyerere of Tanzania had been mentioned in 
this story. And how do you explain to people who do not know about 
journalism that the errors are not intentional. So I don’t hold him for 
anything, I mean those are the hazards of being a journalist. And so that’s 
what I went through.422
And just as Mairegu Bezabih discussed the difficulties in understanding the nature of
the Mengistu regime, Ben Bella argues that
Even when I was in London, Idi Amin had overthrown the government. You 
know, we didn’t know what it meant at the time, especially in London, but 
then...when you are in a place like this, you really do not know, like how 
people here do not know what is happening in northern Uganda. You hear 
that there are so many peoples’ houses being burned, children dying, I mean, 
children die every day, people commit suicide and that sort of thing. It is 
when you come to face this issue that you say.. .that is the truth. So it did not 
dawn on me, before this encounter with Idi Amin. When you are editing the 
story, you don’t know what is real. For example, they used to say that people 
used to eat slippers, they were being fed slippers if they found you wearing 
slippers in the city centre, they would just get hold of that then they would 
make you eat the slipper. The reporters would get the stories. You talk about 
it, but it did not.. .it didn’t click 423
That it took time for the violence and destructiveness of a regime to become clear is 
not unique to Ben Bella’s case. Working in oppressive conditions shaped a 
generation of journalists. However, in the case of Uganda, compared to Ethiopia, a 
significant number of journalists were able to go to Kenya to practice their trade and 
continue growing in an environment less oppressive. They later returned with 
important skills gained in this more open media system.
1.6 Some light and ambiguity
It was not until 1979 that the independent press re-emerged. The period 
immediately after Amin’s government was chaotic with a number of coups until the 
elections of December 1980 that Museveni claimed Obote stole and was one reason 
for going back to the bush. Just three days after Amin was thrown out of office, the 
Uganda Times, a continuation of the Voice of Uganda, was published. Many of the 
civil servants from the Voice of Uganda remained in their positions but members of 
the new government replaced much of the editorial staff.
422 Interview: Ilakut.
423 Interview: Ilakut.
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According to most informants and the observable improvement of press 
freedoms, the second Obote period was not as bad as Idi Amin’s days (though Drake 
Ssekeba and other journalists have said it was almost the same). A number of 
political papers began publishing in support of different factions. The Economy and 
its sister, the Luganda weekly, Mulengera, for example, emerged to support the post- 
Amin administration but were soon banned. Similarly The Citizen, an official 
publication of the Democratic Party, was started to support the party’s political 
campaign. While The Citizen was banned after the elections, Munnansi, which 
included both English and Lugandan articles, re-emerged and survived. Ngabo was 
one of the most well-known papers that started right after Amin was overthrown and 
managed to persevere through the Obote government. Ngabo was started solely by 
journalists and was the leading paper for a number of years. In 1984 Ssekeba, a 
journalist who returned from self-imposed exile in the UK to become one of the most 
prominent journalists during this period, started the Star in English. Both the Star and 
Ngabo were strongly associated with the Kabakaship.424 It was, however, during this 
period that a number of the journalists that were to become most active under the 
NRM first started working in the media or became re-engaged (as was the case for 
Ssekeba).
While Obote’s government was relatively more tolerant of the independent
media than Amin’s, the arrest, torture and murder of suspected rebels or NRM
sympathisers was regular and had a chilling effect on the press. Charles Onyango-
Obbo, for example, was a young aspiring journalist at the time who worked for the
Weekly Topic from 1980 until Obote banned it in 1982 and later went on to found the
Monitor and become one of the most prominent journalists of the NRM period.
Onyango-Obbo described how he was rounded up in 1983:
[In] the beginning of 1983 soldiers raided the house where we were living 
and they shot up the place and beat us up and they took us ... in a bus to this 
playground. At this time the war was going on, Museveni’s war, so what 
they would do was they would line you up because they were trying to find 
either rebels or supporters among the population. So they line you up and 
then get these rebels or suspects from prison. So you would all file past the 
rebels and you would look them in the eye and shake their hands and then if a 
rebel decided that Charles was a sympathiser, he holds your hand and says 
‘he is one of us’. You are in this field of 500 or 600 people. And the most
424 Interview: Ssekeba.
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frightening thing about this was that... if it was to be the end without a 
suspect pointing someone out they would take him back to prison and torture 
him, so these guys were really in a terrible state. That was a very bad 
experience, I really got disillusioned at that point and I just knew I had to 
leave.425
The situation was clearly difficult for journalists but some continued to struggle
despite the publishing environment. It was challenging for commercial papers to sell
news that solely praised the government, yet at the same time clearly supporting the
NRM was not possible. As Drake Ssekeba describes:
We were not that opposed... our aim was not to oppose the government. Our 
aim was to build the country and deliver the message of the masses, of the 
people, of the society. But whenever there was something good from the 
government, we’d highlight it. Now there came a time when actually it was 
difficult because... Museveni goes to the bush to start fighting the 
government.... Now there is a trend here, a funny trend: when you publish a 
newspaper and you only support the government, people will not even listen 
to you, even if you are a radio station, they won’t bother. They will not read 
you... they will not buy. So we had a problem. First of all, of course, we 
didn’t want to be a mouthpiece of the government, but at the same time we 
didn’t want to be a mouthpiece of the people that were fighting against the 
government but we would balance 426
At the same time, just as Amin and the Obote governments gathered supporters by 
criticising the existing government’s tolerance of dissenting voices and freedom of 
expression, when the NRM was fighting in the bush it regularly chastised Obote for 
his treatment of the press including both foreign correspondents and local journalists.
1.7 The National Resistance Movement (NRM) media in the bush
Apart from the government media and the few independent papers in 
Kampala, the NRM started its own publication, The Uganda Resistance News.427 
Eriya Kategaya, currently the Minister for East African Affairs, was coordinating the 
External Wing of the National Resistance Army (NRA) during the war. This branch 
was working on publicising the message of the struggle regionally and abroad. Part 
of the NRM strategy was to bring western journalists to the region, but it was also to
425 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
426 Interview: Ssekeba.
427 Selected excerpts from the Resistance News are available in the publication Mission to Freedom. 
NRM SECRETARIAT (1990) Mission To Freedom, Kampala, The New Vision.
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publish the positions and agenda of the NRM and offer an alternative system of
governance by criticising the Obote government’s policies. Kategaya explains:
In the beginning, when the NRM was underground we didn’t have a clear 
media strategy or public publicity. The first bulletin issued was in June 1981 
just to announce that there is a war. In 1982 a group of NRM leaders went to 
London where they met Allison Miller from the Times of London and gave 
her an interview about what they were doing, what areas were controlled by 
the NRM. She was the one to coin the term the ‘Luwero triangle’ and was 
the first journalist to give the NRM exposure. Soon after, the Resistance 
News was established and published in Nairobi, and smuggled into Uganda. 
This publication carried a number of articles explaining why they were 
fighting and the rationale behind their armed struggle.428
While Kategaya was operating in the liberated zone, The Uganda Resistance News 
was not solely his responsibility. His colleague Matthew Rukikaire was based in 
Nairobi, where The Uganda Resistance News was published, and was on the fourth 
sub-committee of publicity and propaganda which was responsible for publicising the 
struggle and getting international support.
Concern for the liberation struggle’s image and for the ways to employ the 
media to shape it, is not new; many guerrilla groups felt the same including the TPLF. 
However what distinguishes the NRM was the particular influence exercised on its 
leaders by ideologies of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa they were exposed 
to during the period they spent in Tanzania. The emphasis in The Uganda Resistance 
News included two important issues for the press system: the reproduction and 
referencing of articles specifically on the NRM struggle that were published 
(particularly in the West) during this period and the persecution of journalists under 
the Obote regime.
The journalists who visited the NRM in the bush were seen as a crucial 
conduit for disseminating information about the NRM struggle. William Pike, who 
later became editor of The New Vision, was one of a number of foreign journalists 
who not only was sympathetic to the struggle but also became an important ally for 
the NRM. Eriya Kategaya elaborates, “We contacted some people to come and be 
there physically... if you were in the bush you can give your stories and it is best to 
get someone independent to sing your song- its more credible.”429 Accuracy or
428 Interview: Kategaya.
429 Interview: Kategaya.
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understanding was not necessarily the strong suit of these journalists and it is 
interesting that despite the NRA’s criticisms of inaccurate reporting recently, these 
articles were embraced. Some publicity was considered better than no publicity as 
illustrated by an article from 1983 that was given prominence in The Uganda 
Resistance News despite serious criticism of the journalist having misinterpreted the 
struggle:
Sometime in the first quarter of this year, a foreign Correspondent visited the 
Liberated Zones of the National Resistance Army, the second foreign 
Correspondent to do so. His impressions were given wide coverage in 
numerous subsequent Articles in German Newspapers, including the 
following Article which appeared in ‘Die Veld’ (The World), one of Federal 
Germany’s biggest newspapers on April 22, 1983, at the very time that the 
Obote Regime was busy claiming to have “finished” the guerrillas. We 
reproduce here below, lock, stock and barrel, the Article of Hans Jorgen 
Germani.. ,430
Despite the German correspondent’s misinterpretation, his visit was still regarded as
an important development. The Uganda Resistance News notes:
Given Hans Germani’s background, it is understandable that he should see 
the Uganda situation almost exclusively in terms of ethnic rivalry between 
natives. However, this traditional mould, so beloved of “anthropologists” 
decades ago, does not fit the Uganda situation. Therefore, while reproducing 
the Article in full, we have to state clearly that the struggle in Uganda is not 
between Bantus and Nilotics. It is a struggle against: fascist oppression, 
wanton murder, rape and other abuses of the democratic and human rights of 
Ugandans.431
At the time, the NRM was forgiving of what it views as the misinterpretations of 
international journalists, a stark contrast to more recent government expressions of 
hostility towards the supposedly false representations of the Ugandan political 
environment by foreign journalists.
International journalists within Uganda covering the Obote government were 
also seen as important in galvanising international support against him. Throughout 
The Uganda Resistance News, international articles where the correspondents may 
not have visited the movement in the bush are cited, critiqued and embraced as their 
own. In a Uganda Resistance News article in 1983 it is noted that “International 
News media are reporting daily occurrences backed by eyewitness’ reports of
430 NRM SECRETARIAT (1990) Mission To Freedom, Kampala, The New Vision, p. 156.
431 Ibid. p. 157.
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atrocities by the Obote regime.” They proceed to “quote some of the latest reports 
appearing in the Foreign Media, which are some of the proven cases of Obote’s 
brutality”. To take one example, Uganda Resistance News cites a Times of London 
article on 21 August 1983 reporting ‘A huge influx of refugees is continuing to flow 
across the borders from Uganda, into southern Sudan’s Province of Equatoria- in flat 
contradiction of the Kampala Government’s claim to have “pacified its strife-torn 
Northern Region”.432 Regional newspapers, particularly The Nation, as well as 
African focused magazines such as Africa Now and African Business were also often 
cited for their important articles but priority was usually given to articles from the 
European press which were often reproduced in their entirety. It is evident that the 
NRM was clearly gathering strength from the idea that the international community 
was somehow aware of the ‘human rights abuses’ of the Obote government.
Tactically, Amin, Obote and Museveni found it useful to base part of their
platform on condemnation of the previous leader’s restriction of freedom of
expression despite that they have then been guilty of similar actions themselves. That
they would do so is significant and follows Francois de la Rochefoucauld’s
expression- ‘hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue’. One example is
particularly pertinent given the recent parallels with Canadian journalist Blake
Lambert who was denied a re-entry visa for his reporting on the 2006 Ugandan
elections and the NRM’s current criticisms of the foreign media’s reporting. The
following extract from The Uganda Resistance News, under the title ‘Obote Gags the
Press’, highlights the NRM’s criticism towards the way Obote sought to silence
international correspondents
On Sunday, 13 of September, 1981, a Kampala-based Canadian journalist, 
Cameron Morton was put under house arrest in the suburb of Nakulabye... 
the official reason given by the Obote government is that Morton was a 
persona non grata according to a 1976 deportation order signed by Amin’s 
government! Since Morton has been living in the country for the last 2 Vi 
years, nobody has been deceived by this smokescreen as to the real reasons 
behind his deportation. It is now common knowledge that the journalist had 
recently been aggressively and successfully investigating mass murders and 
atrocities committed by the Obote regime, particularly at Wakiso and
Namanve in which scores of innocent civilians were brutally murdered....
Thus his deportation is clearly a cmde attempt to gag the press and prevent 
information on Obote’s atrocities from reaching the outside world. ... Morton
432 Ibid. p. 186.
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is not the first foreign journalist to be sent packing out of the country by the 
Obote clique. Vice President Paulo Muwanga, while head of the Military 
Commission government, kicked out several correspondents including Nick 
Warall, Christabel King, June Dector and Robert Dietz, all of whom had been 
boldly reporting on UPC’s gross manipulation of the stages leading to 
elections... Then when he [Obote] has shut up everybody, he will find and 
pay hirelings in foreign media to white-wash his murders; and he is already at 
work on this.433
The article goes on to give examples of the Obote government paying foreign 
journalists to misrepresent military activities.
In a later article, also in The Uganda Resistance News entitled “Obote’s
Contempt for the Press”, Obote is accused of being “an absurd contradiction” full of
“inconsistencies” as “he attacks and is critical of the foreign press but [he] is equally
hostile of the local press”. The article cites several newspaper articles from the Daily
Nation in Kenya, concluding that
Ugandan President Milton Obote said that two American reporters who were 
beaten at an army base last week had failed to heed a warning.. .of course the 
Uganda People’s Congress Government does not like foreign journalists 434
The following day’s paper notes that at a political rally in Bushenyi, Obote said of the 
Western mass media “Western journalists coming to Uganda have biased views and 
in their writing distort the real state of affairs in Uganda”. In The Uganda Resistance 
News, these incidents of persecution of foreign journalists and hostility towards their 
presence by the Obote regime are clearly condemned. The same editorial opens by 
arguing:
The story on the relationship between Obote’s regime and the Press is a long 
and disconcerting one. It is a story of constant conflict- conflict generated as 
usual by the unpopularity of his regime and non-partisan World Press.... 
there is a tendency for the said government to refer to everything that appears 
in the Press about Uganda as ‘Foreign Imperialist Propaganda’ or as out-right 
‘Anti-African’ 435 (emphasis added)
Today, the NRM is sensitive to the reporting of foreign journalists usually arguing it 
is anything but ‘non-partisan’ and has established the Ugandan Media Centre in an 
effort to exert some control over the reporters.
433 Ibid. p. 36.
434 Ibid. p. 102.
435 Ibid. p. 102.
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The Uganda Resistance News also highlighted the plight of local journalists 
criticising the Obote government for shutting down and censoring six newspapers. 
While there is an element of propaganda in The Uganda Resistance News, at the same 
time the NRM saw it as a sign of weakness that Obote’s government was treating 
journalists so harshly. This would be a way, when they took power, to differentiate 
themselves from the UPC.
The NRM was soon to have this chance. On 27 July 1985 Bazilio Olara- 
Okello led a surprise coup that toppled Obote and installed Tito Okello as the leader 
of the new government. While Okello asked Museveni and the NRA to join a 
government of national unity and despite ongoing peace talks in Nairobi between the 
NRM and the government Museveni sought a military solution and continued his 
offensive towards Kampala. On 25 January 1986 the NRA overthrew Okello and the 
Museveni years began.
2. Press under the NRM
When the NRM came to power, one of the first things they did was suspend 
political parties and peaceful assembly.436 The NRM, however, tolerated an 
independent press for several reasons: to provide some space for feedback and 
criticism as a check on public opinion; to allow opposition groups to feel a part of the 
process rather than going to the bush to fight; and, as a symbolic gesture, to suggest 
both domestically and internationally that the NRM was not as autocratic as its 
predecessors but represented a fundamental change. A final, important reason was 
the NRM’s belief in the development of a civil society and open media as part of the 
Movement’s style of democratic change.
The remainder of this chapter will elaborate the recent history of the press by 
focusing on its more influential segments such as the private Monitor and the 
government New Vision. Particularly in the early days of the papers, commentaries 
were the most important part of the newspaper where elites would increase their 
influence or status and even be appointed to key policy jobs. Newspapers have served
436 Legal Notice No. 1, Uganda Gazette, 1986.
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as interpreters of political developments and the forum for elites to dialogue and, if 
not reach a consensus, at least have their perspectives heard.
2.1 The Government Press
2.1.1 The New Vision
As a government paper that has been relatively independent, The New Vision 
is an exception in Africa where dry press releases from Ministries of Information are 
the norm. Despite the important role it has had in shaping the Ugandan media and 
political environment, recent changes in leadership of the paper have threatened its 
status and are indicative of a worrying trend of government harassment towards 
critical voices.437 Nevertheless, the influence of The New Vision has been, and 
continues to be, important.
The New Vision Corporation emerged from a cabinet meeting in early 1986. It 
was a manifestation of the NRM ’s belief that it was bringing a fundamental change or 
a ‘new vision’ not only to Uganda, but also to the entire African continent. The 
editorial policy was established by a legal statue that specifically stated that the paper 
should be national and publish criticism of the government without being an 
institutional opponent of the government. It is also clearly stated on the paper’s 
website that “The New Vision is under no directive to publish praise of 
government.”438 The New Vision was intended to be like the BBC, that is a public 
institution rather than a government mouthpiece. As William Pike, the former 
Managing Director of The New Vision for twenty years, noted “I think it was part of 
the whole concept of fundamental change, that you could have an [independent] 
media, including a government newspaper, because after all the BBC’s independent 
so why shouldn’t an African newspaper be independent”.439
437 William Pike, along with his colleague David Sseppuuya, have recently been forced out by the 
government for not aligning the paper closely enough with the government. These changes do not 
bode well for the future of the paper and will be elaborated later in this section. The role o f The New  
Vision under Pike’s leadership has been an essential dimension in shaping the media system under the 
NRM.
438 Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ugW/
Editors and Managing Directors have sometimes been asked by the government to guarantee this in 
writing, as was the case for William Pike in his appointment as CEO. More recently Els De 
Temmerman made a similar request for her appointment as editor.
439 Interview: William Pike.
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Pike arrived from the UK at the request of the Ugandan government and 
became the Managing Director in July 1986. This was several months after James 
Tumusiime and his colleagues, including the controversial Teddy Sseezi-Cheeye, 
launched the paper.440 Pike was not the government’s first choice as an editor. 
Bakulumpagi Wamala, an elderly cadre who served as the National Secretary for 
Information and Public Relations of the NRM was first offered the position which he 
declined to accept the post of Ambassador to the UN instead. He was ill, however, 
and passed away by the paper’s eighth issue. The second person approached was 
Wafula Oguttu but he refused saying that a government paper could never be 
independent. Oguttu later went on to start the Monitor newspaper. Pike was the 
government’s third choice. He had met Museveni and the other NRM leaders in the 
bush while he was reporting for a magazine based in London and had worked hard to 
be a friend of the Movement by providing exposure and coverage to British and 
European audiences. Pike embraced the request to return to Kampala. He found 
intellectual solidarity between the agenda of the NRA/M and the magazine he was 
working for in the UK that was attempting to be a ‘third world Economist’ with a 
liberal developmental agenda.
The beginnings of The New Vision were humble: a few desks, some Russian 
computers, one telephone line and no money to pursue stories. The journalists had to 
walk everywhere. The first copy of The New Vision was eight pages and came out 
under intense political pressure as parliament had decided that there was to be an 
independent government paper and the Ministry of Information subsequently 
demanded it to be produced very quickly.
2.1.1.1 The Agenda of The New Vision
Only one copy of the first New Vision is known to exist which is held in the 
Corporation’s library. The first editorial of Volume 1 set the agenda of the paper, 
which did not change much in the months after Pike took over. It is entitled “We will 
contribute to this change” and declared that
440 Sseezi-Cheeye soon started one of the most notorious muckraking sheets, The Uganda Confidential, 
and has also been associated with various controversies both in and out of government. Sseezi-Cheeye 
was also part of the group that founded the Monitor.
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“New Vision” has been chosen as the name of the paper at this point in time 
because our motherland has undergone a fundamental change following over 
two decades of bmtal regimes, economic stagnation and social and political 
upheavals as well as conuption, inefficiency and neglect in the highest 
reaches of administration.... At this time when we enter the threshold of 
renewed hope, “The New Vision” will count on the goodwill of all Ugandans 
in its contribution towards national unity, reconciliation and patriotism. 
Since the main problems which beset us in the past were man-made, it should 
not take us too long to solve them if we adhere to the NRM political 
programme. Indeed this may well be the last chance in a lifetime for every 
mature Ugandan to contribute to our nation’s stability, development and
441prosperity.
The editorial also emphasises ideas of human rights and freedoms by arguing that that 
while it is important for an “individual to exercise his human rights in a free and 
peaceful atmosphere” it must be done “without losing sight of his obligations to 
ensure that freedom is not lost again.”442
The first New Vision edition attempted to explain the NRM to the public. The 
headline was “Government to Curb Inflation” and there was a front page article 
explaining the ban on political party activities, including the issuance of press and 
public statements, wearing colours of political parties and displaying party flags, and 
other symbols. It claimed that actions were necessary to create a grace period in 
which the government could develop a government of national unity.
Subsequent early editions tended to focus on government propaganda while 
promoting unity and consensus. The second edition, for example, had a lengthy 
article prominently placed on page three arguing how the Ten-point programme was 
“A simple cure for a deadly disease”.443 The third paper’s editorial led with a “Hats 
off for the NRA”444 congratulating and saluting the Movement for its successful 
liberation in a propagandist tone. There was also a front-page advert from the editors 
and staff of the paper congratulating the NRM/A for “liberating the whole country 
from the fangs of allied fascist armies” and telling them that “The blood you shed for 
this noble mission should remain a bond to unite all Ugandans against any dictators 
and advocates of disunity”.445
441 19 March 1986, Editorial, “We will contribute to this change”, The New Vision, p. 4.
442 Ibid.
443 2 March 1986, James Tumusiime, ‘Ten-point programme: A simple cure for a deadly disease”, The 
New Vision, p. 4.
444 2 April 1986, Editorial, “Hats off for the NRA”, The New Vision, p. 4.
445 2 April 1986, Advertisement, The New Vision, p. 1.
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Despite the pro-NRM propaganda, The New Vision represented a new start.
The editors did not have to struggle with reforming a large bureaucracy such as Radio
Uganda or Uganda television. As a self-accounting and profit-oriented company
there was a strong incentive to increase revenue through reaching new readers. It was
also a completely local, self-sustaining initiative. As Pike notes “the beauty of The
New Vision was that it started from scratch, started with nothing, literally nothing.
We had a Russian printing press that we inherited and that really was our only asset
but we managed to get going”.446 But crucially, as Pike points out
the newspaper was created from nothing so [the government] didn’t have any 
vested interest in how it was run whereas going back to 86... or 85 when 
there was the coup... What do you do in a coup? You rush to take control of 
the radio station. You announce that there has been a coup... you wouldn’t 
have given up control of radio but a newspaper wasn’t such a big deal.447
Thus, it was relatively easier for The New Vision to fulfil its stated goal of being “a 
forum for public debate and dialogue on the affairs of the country”448 rather than a 
large bureaucracy run by civil servants.
2.1.1.2 Independence
Throughout its history The New Vision has demonstrated an ability and 
freedom to criticise the government within certain bounds. The degree to which The 
New Vision is independent from government influences is debatable and is contested 
by many, including journalists that work there, and had long been an issue before Pike 
was forced to leave. The paper has often been accused of being a government 
mouthpiece, not least by the political opposition and other business competitors such 
as the Monitor. There have also been concerns expressed by international media 
rights groups about the freedom of the paper and diplomats regularly approach Pike to 
ask whether or not “the press in Uganda is free” and his paper in particular. Pike’s 
usual response is
What story do you think should have been in the paper, not just The New 
Vision, but all the newspapers, the totality, that has not been in the paper? 
What stories do you think we should have covered? And sometimes they say, 
well we think you should publish more criticism of Museveni, and I said—
446 Interview: William Pike.
447 Interview: Pike.
448 19 March 1986, Editorial, “We will contribute to this change”, The New Vision, p. 4.
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but you see, that’s opinion. What factual stories? And then they struggle to 
come up with things... so most things come out now... ,449
David Mukholi, editor of The Sunday Vision says that “total independence would be 
far fetched”450 and most people agree that there are a few areas that are deeply 
sensitive with the government, particularly Museveni’s personal life (especially his 
wife) and military activities including the war in the north and the Ugandan army’s 
involvement in the DRC. According to The New Vision editor-in-chief David 
Sseppuuya, the government and different ministers do call up to suggest handling a 
story more sensitively or to deny allegations, but he claims that the only time a story 
did not run was a 1992 report about a CIA listening post in the west of Uganda when 
the Mobutu regime was collapsing. The Americans had phoned and asked for the 
story not to be published and the paper complied.451
For many years The New Vision enjoyed unusual independence for a
government paper and some journalists, such as Maurice Ssekawungu, associate
editor of The New Vision, have argued it is freer than most private papers in other
countries. It has been suggested this is because William Pike, as an expatriate, has
been able to function above the fray and deflect government intervention. James
Tumusiime, editor of the Weekly Observer argued that “if it had been in the hands of
a local it would have been different”. And Wafula Oguttu, has noted: “The only
reason The New Vision is independent is because William is a foreigner. William
convinced Museveni that if he wants propaganda, it has to be believable”. In terms of
political coverage, Pike argues, this is not necessarily the case.
What I’ve noticed about the Monitor is that a lot of the problems they have 
are due to recklessness... they were at one point closed down and it was 
essentially over a story of a helicopter that they claimed had crashed, yet it 
had not crashed. Now, after you know it is very clear that no helicopter had 
crashed, why don’t they just apologise? But they didn’t want to apologise, 
they wanted to kind of rough it out, so to me, you see, their problem was not 
that the editor Wafula, at that stage the Managing Director, was a Ugandan. 
The problem was that they didn’t apologise... there were certain kinds of 
mistakes, basic mistakes. If you have made a mistake, apologise. The faster 
you do it, the better.452
449 Ibid.
450 Interview: David Mukholi.
451 Interview: David Sseppuuya.
452 Interview: Sseppuuya.
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But in terms of editorial political bias, being an expatriate has had some impact,
mostly for the better. As Pike elaborates:
In terms of corruption, Ministers or politicians feel embarrassed to try to 
pressure you to give them kickbacks... because we run this place. We don’t 
get government subsidies, and it’s a very profitable company. We don’t get 
squeezed financially by Ministers.... A couple of times Ministers did try but 
they’ve always backed off and haven’t pushed us very far and I think that is 
an area where a Ugandan might have had problems.453
Similarly, being an expatriate has provided some protection against regular 
accusations of tribalism or malicious intent although he has been occasionally 
accused of both:
People can sometimes misread your motives if you’re Ugandan. Like if you 
dismiss someone they say it’s tribalism. I’ve been accused of tribalism but 
obviously I’m not tribalistic, but if you are a Bugandan and dismiss an 
Acholi journalist or printer or someone who’s been stealing, then the Acholi 
can say ‘ah, these Buganda’... that kind of thing is really a chronic problem. 
And similarly, if you run a story about a certain Minister having stolen 
money... if you do an investigation story, if the editor was Ugandan they 
might attribute it to malicious activity 454
At the same time, however, journalists have noted that Pike was in a very privileged 
position. He basically operated at the level of government which allowed him 
substantial access as well as protection. Undoubtedly the fact that Pike was a 
foreigner affected how the paper was viewed but the idea behind The New Vision, and 
the media in general, as having a unique role in the single-party system had 
ideological depth beyond Pike himself, as the following chapters will show.
2.1.13 The future of The New Vision
Since this research was conducted in mid-2006 there have been substantial 
changes at The New Vision that do not bode well for its future. William Pike, who had 
been with the paper for the past twenty years, was recently forced to resign and his 
departure was joined by his very experienced editor-in-chief, David Sseppuuya. 
Robert Kabushenga, formerly of the Uganda Media Centre, has replaced Pike and Els 
De Temmerman, a Belgian journalist previously working with abducted children in 
northern Uganda, has replaced Sseppuuya.
453 Interview: Sseppuuya.
454 Interview: Sseppuuya.
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For many years Museveni was critical of The New Vision’s coverage of certain 
issues and believed it was not favourable enough to the NRM. The February 1999 
headline in the Sunday Monitor “Vision chief Pike’s job on the line” is indicative. In 
this article, Andrew Mwenda argued that “Pike whose two year contract has been 
regularly renewed since 1989 is facing a lot of hostility from certain Movement 
bigwigs over the paper’s perceived liberal policy towards reporting on the 
government”.455 The article goes on to suggest that Pike had fallen out with Eriya 
Kategaya (at the time Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and 
Pike had been asking for a pay rise. At the time of this interview, Pike acknowledged 
that his position was in jeopardy and he has caused some controversy. He explained 
that
T here’s a m ixture o f  pride and then som e peop le fee l that, you know , it [The
N ew  Vision1 should be reined in and it’s our asset and w]
control.
Fi na l ly ,  in a 2 0 0 6  I n d e p e n d e n c e  D a y  s p e e c h  M u s e v e n i  p u b l i c l y  sa id  "I a m  
sor t  ou t  The N e w  Visum. The N e w  Vision  h as  b e e n  v e r y  u s e l e s s  for  a v e r y  Ion
journalist Blake Lambert.458 During his tenure at the Uganda Media Centre, which is 
discussed in the coming chapter, Kabushenga was charged with improving the image 
of the NRM government - essentially a propaganda position. De Temmerman has a 
similarly sympathetic background with the NRM as she has been outspoken on the 
war in the north solidly supporting the NRM’s military strategy there. Together these 
two appointments can be seen as steps in turning around The New Vision to fulfil 
Museveni’s two major criticisms with the paper: the lack of positive coverage of the 
government and, what he regarded to be, the inappropriate coverage of LRA and 
government military activities in the north.
It is too early for a definitive verdict on the direction of the paper but there are 
other ominous signs. Kabushenga is a polarising figure. Gossip within the newspapers 
and on the radio have theorised on how he apparently came to crave power with 
suggestions ranging from neglect of his father to the unfaithfulness of his wife and 
consequent self-esteem problems 459 Kabushenga had previously been stopped from 
writing political columns in The New Vision along with several other journalists over 
commentary critical of the government during the election in 2000.460 After this 
period he made every effort to become closer to Museveni, a task that was not 
difficult because he is reportedly very close with Museveni’s sons.461
What is clear, however, is that Kabushenga has escalated The New Vision’s 
attacks on anyone who criticises the government. There is substantial risk that what 
was one of the most professional government papers on the continent will lose 
credibility. One example of the sort o f debate and discourse Kabushenga is leading is 
an article he authored in The New Vision on May 10, 2007 entitled “Mayombo: There 
is More to the Mwenda, Kalyegira Bashing” . Aside from referring to Andrew 
Mwenda and Timothy Kalyegira as “two leading opposition writers” he goes on to 
say “ ... this desecration dance is the usual lies and extremism of certain elements that 
pass for opposition politicians and commentators. All this, of course, in the Daily
458 LAMBERT, B. (2006) Kabushenga Appointment Bodes 111 for Free Press in Troubled Uganda. 
World Politics Review.
459 9 March 2006 “Robert Kabushenga— the NRM ’s barking dog”, Radio Katwe
Available at: http://www.radiokatwe.com/manenovakabushenga031106.htm and interview: Illukut.
460 MUCUNGUZI, J. (2000) New Vision Staff columnists banned. The Monitor. Kampala. P. 1-2
46lInterview: Teddy Sseezi-Cheeye.
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Monitor, a mouthpiece of the Forum for Democratic Change.” Even more
unprofessionally, Kabushenga goes on to say:
There have been some questions, both in public and private about the 
sanity o f these two. I suggest that we stop insulting people with mental health 
problems. People with mental health problems have no control over their 
actions. If and when they recover, they regret the social consequences o f their 
unintended actions. These two are in full control o f their faculties and have 
made a conscious if malicious choice to be bad and negative. Diabolic is 
perhaps a better description o f who they are.
Yet those who pay them have found it very useful to grant them 
sufficient space to do damage. Ordinarily, people with mental health 
problems are removed from society and confined or given medication to 
restrain them from causing problems. In this case, our two friends have carte 
blanche in the pages o f the pro-FDC the D aily M onitor. It can only be 
because the decision makers in Kenya agree entirely with what they do and 
say. Nothing else explains why they are unrestrained in their extremism and 
lies. You will never see or hear from anyone else on such matters.
I have therefore reached the conclusion that the people who 
com mission this kind o f expression actually have a different agenda, far from 
a journalistic one. Their real purpose is to sow discord in the politics of  
Uganda.462
Articles like this set an unprofessional, aggressive and polarising tone and are new 
ground for The New Vision by the Managing Director. There is dissent, however, 
from within the paper. On May 15, 2007 reporter Jasper Mpiriirwe responded in The 
New Vision arguing:
Kabushenga states that the D aily M onitor is FDC mouthpiece. If 
Mwenda and Kalyegira are wrong in their columns (which I read), so is 
Kabushenga because he seems to attack and reduce a rival newspaper to a 
party pawn. I don’t think that The New Vision is a government mouthpiece. 
Such judgments should be left to readers.
One wouldn’t expect a Chief Executive Officer o f  a leading 
newspaper, regardless o f the degree o f anger, to stoop so low and use the 
same method he seems to denigrate.463
While Pike is gone, his legacy is at least slowing down some of Kabushenga’s 
attempts to convert the paper to more overt propaganda.
462 10 May 2007, Robert Kabushenga, “Mayombo: There is more to the Mwenda, Kalyegira bashing”, 
The New Vision
Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/D78/459/564519/Kabushenga.
46315 May 2007, Jasper Mpiriirwe, “Kabushenga, Mwenda, Kalyegira are the same”, The New Vision 
Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/459/565234.
2.2 The Private Press
A number of private papers have emerged only to disappear since the NRM 
came to power. The Daily Topic closed in November of 1994, along with others 
during this period including Munno, The Star, New Mirror, Express Post, The Citizen 
and Financial Times. The spate of paper closures largely had to do with financial 
difficulties, rising costs of newsprint and mismanagement.
As the most influential private paper, the Monitor has provided an important 
space for elite negotiation and engagement and set a precedent for other papers. After 
addressing the Monitor, and related papers,464 this section will briefly mention a few 
of the more controversial papers that are part of the mix of the independent papers.
2.2.1 The Monitor
The Monitor was a paper that set the tone for the private papers of the NRM 
period in the same way that Tobiya served as a model for the private papers of its 
generation in Ethiopia. The development of the Monitor begins with the Weekly 
Topic, the paper from which the seven founders left to embark on the Monitor. The 
Weekly Topic was started after the fall of Idi Amin in August 1979 but was soon 
banned under Obote’s UPC government primarily for refusing to formally welcome 
Obote back from exile and congratulate him on his electoral victory. The Weekly 
Topic was a leftist paper that focused on global and social issues.
A number of the Monitor's key journalists such as Charles Onyango-Obbo 
first started their journalistic careers with the paper during this period. For Onyango- 
Obbo, this was during his university days, but not for long because, like many at the 
time, he was rounded up by the Obote government and consequently realised that it 
was necessary to leave Uganda. In 1985 Onyango-Obbo was visiting Uganda from 
Cairo where he moved when the coup by Tito Okello against Obote occurred. The 
owners of the Weekly Topic decided to start publishing again and invited Wafula 
Oguttu and Onyango-Obbo to come back in the positions of editor-in-chief and 
deputy editor. The two were the only former contributors in the country at the time.
464 Due to space constraints greater mention of politically influential religious papers, such as the 
Weekly Message, is excluded though they too have played important, and sometimes controversial, 
roles under the NRM government.
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Circulation quickly rose to its 1979 level of 25,000 and the paper maintained its 
critical perspective.465
The three owners of the Weekly Topic, Bindandi Ssali, Kintu Musoke and Ali 
Kirunda Kivejinja, were involved with the NRM and not surprisingly the paper faced 
difficulties with Okello’s government as they were accused of supporting the NRM’s 
war. But this is also what made the paper influential as the owners were all part of the 
student organisation that was associated with the Movement. As Onyango-Obbo 
noted
A lot of guys that owned this newspaper used to be radicals, independent 
activists and young people so the newspaper succeeded... and became so 
influential... you couldn’t do anything and you couldn’t function in Uganda 
without courting, without having them on your side.466
Not surprisingly the NRM worked very hard to court them and when the NRM seized
power, the owners were all given prominent positions in the government: Ssali
became Minister of Local Government, Musoke was appointed Prime Minister and
Kirunda was Minister of Works, Transport and Communications. With these political
appointments, the journalists at the Weekly Topic found it difficult to be critical of the
government or maintain editorial independence. As Onyango-Obbo describes
So the irony at that point The New Vision... had more freedom to cover the 
news than the Weekly Topic which was an independent paper. If The New 
Vision ran a story their motives were not in question but if the Weekly Topic 
ran a critical story the President would ask these guys in the cabinet how can 
you run a critical story about the government which you are a part of. They 
would never believe that these guys had nothing to do with the newspaper.467
Nevertheless, the editorial team fought to maintain their independence and 
continued to publish a number of stories that were critical of ministers or friends of 
the owners, despite pressures to avoid such topics. It was in this context that Oguttu 
was fired. He says that he “saw it coming” but perhaps the defining event was an 
editorial that he wrote criticising the president for merely lamenting corrupt members
A fL Q
of the government when it was in his power to fire them. A number of his 
colleagues decided to leave as well. As Oguttu describes:
465 Interviews: Oguttu and Onyango-Obbo.
466 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
467 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
468 23 July 1993, Onapito-Ekomoloit and Kyazze-Simwogerere, “One year later I feel satisfied-Wafula
Oguttu”, The Monitor, p. 8.
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When I announced that I was leaving they asked me what I was going to do. 
I told them that Charles Onyango-Obbo (then on a course at Harvard in the 
USA) and I had been discussing the possibility of starting a newspaper but 
nothing concrete was on the ground. Then I learnt that three of them, 
Richard Olal Tebere, James Serugo and John Kevin Ogen Aliro had, since 
the Serugo crisis in March, also had been thinking of starting a newspaper 
and that they had actually written some sort of editorial policy for it. So I said 
fine and we just fitted in.469
The Monitor was bom in the following weeks and, according to the journalists, it was
not necessarily designed as a political opposition paper as it is often portrayed but as
new space for independent debate. In Onyango-Obbo’s words,
...it was basically, in fact a long-term struggle for independence because at 
that point it was clear that ... it was really necessary to have a newspaper 
which was not holding political interests... some of the divisions in Uganda 
were really beginning to emerge... the division was getting deeper, 
corruption was on the rise and ... at that point the democratisation process 
was going a little bit too slowly and this non-movement thing, I mean the 
movement was actually... taking root as a conventional one party 
dictatorship... so we needed democratic ideas and in fact that’s probably the 
best way to describe it.470
The six journalists from The Weekly Topic, along with Teddy Sseezi-Cheeye of 
Uganda Confidential, became the owners and sole shareholders. This was a relatively 
novel idea of ownership in Uganda and rumours circulated as to who the ‘real’ owner 
could be when the paper first started up. UPC tried to argue that it was owned by the 
Internal Security Organisation, while others claimed it was funded by the NRM 
Secretariat, but at the same time there were also rumours that it was close to the UPC.
The founding journalists claim they went out of their way to maintain editorial 
independence by not accepting any financial contributions, no matter how generous, 
from outsiders unless they were in the form of purchased advertising space. As 
Oguttu explains:
When we started, Sudhir [of the de-licensed Crane Forex] wanted to come in 
with us and we almost let him or anyone else who wanted. Then we realised 
I would again cause us problems of accountability and political or economic 
pressure as at the Weekly Topic. It would be just going back to square one... 
yes many people wanted to come in and help us start up. But we didn’t wish 
to be exploited again at some future date 471
470 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
471 23 July 1993, Onapito-Ekomoloit and Kyazze-Simwogerere, “One year later I feel satisfied-Wafula 
Oguttu”, The Monitor, p. 8.
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So rather than starting with substantial capital, the owners agreed to go without pay
for several months and recruited a group of students at Makerere to do internships 
with them to build the workforce. Through friends they managed to find a small 
room in a basement with a couple of desks and chairs from which to start working. In 
addition, as this group of journalists was the most prominent in the country they also 
successfully managed to recruit advertisers with payment in advance for the coming 
three months before the paper published.
The mission of the Monitor was partly political but it must also be seen in the 
context of the experience this group of editors had had at the Weekly Topic. Thus, in 
the first paper published on 31 July 1992 Oguttu summarised and introduced the 
mission statement of the new paper in his “A word from the publisher” on page one:
The guiding virtues in our work shall be democratic practice, 
observance of human rights, unity of Ugandans in diversity, a clean 
environment, social welfare of all groups of people in Uganda, protection of 
the rights of minorities and the underprivileged like women, children, the 
disabled etc. and the promotion of all activities that contribute to the process 
of national development. We shall all the time stick to getting truth from the 
facts and we shall play the game fairly according to the rules and ethics of 
responsible journalism.
We shall steer the Monitor free from any business and political 
manipulations aimed at serving narrow or selfish interests.
We shall be independent of government and of all social, political, religious 
or economic groups or any individual.
While the Monitor may hold its own position on any issue, it will 
allow all schools of thought and views to contend in debates as part of a 
national growth towards tolerance, respect for other people’s opinions and 
greater democracy. We believe there must be room for every body to co­
exist peacefully with others, irrespective of one’s faith or ideological 
beliefs.472
This desire for independence was unanimous among all of the founding journalists 
but navigating the complex political relationship with the NRM was difficult 
especially as the Monitor soon came to be seen as ‘the only opposition’ in a one party 
state.
This was further complicated because in the beginning the Monitor was 
accused of ethnic bias. A number of papers were affiliated with political parties, 
which are often aligned with ethnic groups, and the Monitor was accused of being an 
‘O’ affair. Names beginning with O are typically associated with the Nilotic people
472 31 July 1992, “A word from the publisher”, The Monitor, p. 1.
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and when the journalists, including Wafula Oguttu, Charles Onyango-Obbo, Richard
Olal Teberer and Kevni Ogen Aliro among others, broke away from the Weekly
Topic, some perceived that this was because this group of people were no longer
supportive of the NRM. These accusations recurred so often that Oguttu felt the need
to address them in an interview in his paper. He argued,
Some of us don’t even think about ‘Os’. These are very brilliant people. A 
fine crop of journalists.... Even when I was recruiting them in the Topic, I 
never considered the “O”.... If you take me, for example, I have very few 
“O” friends, even from my nationality. My great political friends are not 
even Sarnia. So these things are said but there is nothing you can do about 
them.473
He went on to note that both William Pike who provided the first print runs on credit 
and Kassam Mumtaz who helped to find the premises for the Monitor were not ‘Os’. 
The current ownership of the paper by the Aga Khan, and the fact that most of the 
founders have left the paper, dispels many of these accusations of the early days. 
While there may have been some tendency to have a number of ‘Os’ involved in the 
paper, it was actually owned by Easterners, Northerners and Baganda. The group did 
not include any Westerners (the region where Museveni is from and the group that is 
accused of having privileges to public contracts and jobs). Oguttu claims that this 
diverse ownership helped it to avoid having to directly support a particular party.
2.2.2 The Monitor, The Nation Media Group and a New Generation
Soon after the Nation Media Group, which is owned by the Aga Khan, 
purchased the Monitor in 2000 the owners and founding journalists of the Monitor 
left for new challenges. Their reasons for leaving varied. For some it was partly that 
did not have much else to prove since they had developed such a successful product 
in a short period of time. But it was also the personal sacrifice and external pressure 
that encouraged journalists like Charles Onyango-Obbo to move on. As he describes:
Too many people had paid too high a price, my mother had fallen 
sick because of the problem... you know it’s hard to have your child 
denounced in the media everyday... when you went to court, you know... too 
many people weren’t free to come and stand bail, so you had to call on very 
close friends and family. For me it helped me, it brought me fame and all 
these things- my career. But to everyone else it was a liability...and then
473 23 July 1993, Onapito-Ekomoloit and Kyazze-Simwogerere, “One year later I feel satisfied-Wafula 
Oguttu”, The Monitor, p. 8.
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people get the sense that you’re probably using it to be a celebrity. Because 
they are not in your shoes, you know they don’t understand what’s going on.
But what actually did it for me was, because o f what I’d becom e in 
the M onitor actually it had become a disservice, in the sense that the M onitor 
had really lost the ability to fight other fights. I fought the w ar... If I didn’t 
take a stand, the M onitor didn’t take a stand. If I didn’t stick my neck out 
they didn’t stick their neck out. So my success in the sense that I’m an editor 
became a failure... because then you start to look around you and you say, 
how many people would fight this fight if I’m not there?474
It was also made clear to the Nation Media Group that if the Monitor got rid of 
Onyango-Obbo, the Monitor ‘problem’ would be solved. By 2005, all of the founders 
were gone.
On reflection the Monitor has changed from when it initially started, but the 
change happened not because Nation Media Group bought the paper but after all of 
the founders left (although the two are related). The Monitor has grown into a 
business and transformed itself into a profitable company rather than the passionate 
instrument for change that its founders idealised. As Joachim Buwembo, the current 
editor-in-chief, notes “ the original Monitor had very fired up people. They weren’t 
as concerned about running the paper in a strict commercial sense with hierarchies.... 
original Monitor would have a
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owners, however, have worked on developing tf 
printing and packaging as well as giving it a r
growth in politics can only take you so far. Museveni is here for the next five years, 
we can only devote so many pages to why Museveni is wrong”.477
Under the ownership of the Nation Media Group the leadership of the paper 
also became more regional. Joachim Buwembo, for example, was the founding editor 
of The Citizen, also owned by the Nation, in Tanzania and the head of Features, Ms. 
Wayua Muli, came from The Standard in Kenya.
2.2.3 Monitor spin-offs
The influence of the Monitor on other private papers is most evident in two
offshoots of the paper, The Crusader and The Weekly Observer. Former Monitor
journalists, often after leaving with some controversy, founded the papers using a
similar style and model as the Monitor.
In 1995, for example, a group of ten scribes left the Monitor over demands for
a 100% pay increase and frustration with the top management’s responsiveness to
their concerns. The journalists were largely mid-level and were known as the
Ultimatum Group in the media. At the time, Wafula Oguttu was out of the country so
the journalists focused their attack on Charles Onyango-Obbo arguing that in the past
year the Monitor denigrated into a business where “a bag of cement for the new
building was more important than a top-notch journalist’s work”.478 Their concern
was not unfounded as the government’s advertising ban forced the Monitor to focus
on constructing a new building and buying a printing press, both at great expense.
Nevertheless, the departure of the journalists was a great shock and ushered in a
difficult period for the Monitor, just as it was trying to grow and transform itself into
more of a business rather than a group of passionate social commentators. Onyango-
Obbo describes one reason why he thinks the Crusader journalists split off:
One of the lessons I learned at that point is that when a newspaper is full of 
too many talented people you have too many prima donnas, it’s impossible to 
run. You know, everyone thinks that they are too important to go and do the 
court story, the accident story, they’ll only interview the President and so you
is primarily regarded as a service the company is obligated to provide. The Monitor Business Directory 
is also seen as an important aspect of the company and does generate revenue. At present it is the only 
directory in the country and has been successful in garnering advertisers.
477 Interview: Buwembo.
478 7-10 December 1996, Kyazze Simwogerere, “The story of the Crusader”, The Crusader, p. 10-11.
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had the most talented group o f journalists in the newsgroup... everyone 
wanted to do the big story.479
While the Crusader was not successful in the long term, some of the journalists 
continued to have an active career in the media. Peter Mwesige, for example, at the 
time was a reporter and part of the Ultimatum Group. He later returned to the 
Monitor as editor-in-chief and is currently head of the journalism department at 
Makerere University.
The Weekly Observer,480 started in March 2004 as an outgrowth of the 
Monitor and continues to publish today with a relatively low circulation of 16,000. It 
too is owned by ten journalists, most of whom quit the Monitor after internal 
disagreements, and are motivated by the conviction they can do a better job than the 
Monitor. According to managing editor James Tumusiime, they still see their job as 
one of public service and holding officials to account. They also believe that their 
analytic approach is better than the M onitor's but they are primarily regarded by 
customers as an elite paper. Tumusiime recognises that the paper is very political 
which means a narrow market but part of the rational behind the Weekly Observer is a 
perceived need to diversify debate and include broader perspectives, such as opinion 
pieces by former presidential spokespersons or army colonels to contribute to the 
nation-building process.481
2.2.4 Courting controversy
Perhaps the two most controversial papers in Uganda have been the Uganda 
Confidential, which is no longer publishing, and the Red Pepper, which has become a 
bit more moderated than when it first came out in June 2001.
Uganda Confidential, with its colourful founder and editor Teddy Sseezi- 
Cheeye, is the most politically controversial publication to have emerged under the 
NRM. Sseezi-Cheeye, who was part of the NRM in the bush, helped to found the 
Monitor and later went on to start Uganda Confidential leading with articles on
479 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
480 Available at: http://www.ugandaobserver.com.
481 Interview: James Tumusiime.
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corruption and murder in the Museveni family.482 Sseezi-Cheeye himself has been 
accused of numerous shady dealings and corruption. He is now back with the NRM 
and has been appointed Director of Economic Affairs and Monitoring in the Office of 
the President. While Uganda Confidential was the first and most famous scandal 
sheet, the Red Pepper has also attracted similar controversy, yet over less political 
subject matter, and has been extraordinarily successful.
Following the model of journalists as owners set by the Monitor, the Red 
Pepper483 was started by a group of five young men who wanted jobs for themselves 
after they graduated from university. Richard Tusiime, editor-in-chief, did a degree in 
Journalism and his entire team had experience in journalism at either The New Vision 
or the Monitor.
The paper began as a weekly with the intent of being research based. The 
founders claim to have set out to answer the ‘why’s’ or the ‘story behind the story’ 
but they soon discovered a new niche, supposedly unintentionally. According to 
Tusiime, “we found a problem with youth and immorality among school children. 
They were having group sex on the beach so we extended the campaign to bars and 
adults. We became the moral police, the feared ones”484. Over a short period of time, 
the Red Pepper gained a large number of readers and now boasts a fancy new 
building outside Kampala that houses over 200 staff. Whilst they may have thought 
that they were ‘fighting the vice of immorality,’ a scandal sheet of gossip and 
shocking pictures became the norm and, according to Tusiime, people bought it to 
read about their friends: “W e’d capture people having bush sex, at weddings etc., but 
now we don’t target anyone. In the beginning we wanted to target elite but they’re 
not a big part of society. Elite find copies in their office... here you need a broad
admitted that when the team was thinking of a name for the paper they wanted 
“something new but also eye-catching - hot social and political sleaze”. The Red 
Pepper no longer sees itself as the ‘moral police’ as they claim that “people have 
reformed, there is no kissing in the street. When the crusade ended, we needed 
another form of identity” so they are now attempting to position themselves as 
conveying insider government information. To do this, they pay people working in 
the ministries a regular salary of 600,000 to 1 million USH486 a month to provide 
information 487
The church and the international community488 have reacted strongly to the 
Red Pepper and the Christian community largely shunned the paper. Despite that the 
Red Pepper is rumoured to be owned by Salim Saleh,489 Museveni’s half-brother 
(these allegations began from the opening ceremony which he attended) the paper has 
regularly had cases in the courts, particularly over charges of pornography. Despite 
these run-ins, the Red Pepper journalists generally feel as though the laws are not 
restrictive, the media environment is open and they have been able to operate a media 
house the way they want to.
3. Conclusion
Tracing the developing of the press from its earliest days through the period of 
colonisation, post-colonial repression and the current Movement system, this chapter 
has provided valuable context for the coming chapters. Several key issues were 
raised here, including the importance of focusing not simply on the press of the 
colonisers but the initial African press that began to emerge during the colonial period 
while at the same time recognising that this period was influential in offering 
Uganda’s first legal classic justification for a free press. The African press, through 
vibrant publications such as Transition set a high standard of debate and dialogue
486 Approximately 290 GBP.
487 Interview: Tusiime.
488 International press and observers have been critical o f their naming and shaming of gays and 
lesbians saying that it is homophobic. See, for example, 13 September 2006, Peter Tatchell, “Uganda is 
the new Zimbabwe”, The Guardian. Available at:
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/peter tatchell/2006/09/uganda gays are the problem no.html.
489 Ibid.
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from the media. Historical debates over the role of the media in single-party rule was 
also highlighted as were discussions over the rationale of constructive criticism, both 
of which will be addressed in Chapter 8 on the influence of the political dynamics of 
the NRM on the press. The underlying different mentalities and approaches to the 
press, including by the most experienced journalists who could be considered 
‘survivors’ such as Ben Bella has laid a foundation for later discussions.
This chapter has also importantly sketched out the development and role of the 
two major media houses- The New Vision and the Monitor. These media houses have 
defined the NRM media environment and have been important in the political and 
nation-building project. While the changes at The New Vision appear ominous, the 
Corporation continues to expand and remains the paper of choice for many Ugandans. 
Similarly, the present developments within the Monitor are also complex. While it is 
growing at an impressive rate, including recently establishing a TV station, ownership 
by the Aga Khan makes its future role in the democratic developments of Uganda 
unclear. As we turn quickly to the next two chapters, these papers will continue to be 
the focus of analysis as certain aspects are probed more deeply.
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CHAPTER 7
The Ugandan Press System
This chapter will build upon Chapter 6 and further analyse the complexities of 
the press system and the major factors that characterise its role in Uganda. Using the 
framework of media variables elaborated in Chapter 2, and employed in the analysis 
of Ethiopia, this chapter will begin by looking at the degree to which the Monitor is 
really an ‘opposition’ force, the ways it might play this role and how it has been 
shaped by The New Vision. The changing ideologies of Ugandan journalists across 
the generations will then be probed to further understand how and why the press is 
evolving. The second half of the chapter begins by examining the extent to which 
media organisations have become institutionalised and why and what has driven this 
process. In the final section the role of government engagement with the press, both 
formally and informally, and the response of journalists to these interventions, will be 
considered.
1. Politically aligned media and media as ‘opposition’
The Monitor and The New Vision are largely fighting for the same space and 
readership, but while surveys conducted by the New Vision Corporation indicate that 
Ugandans tend to trust The New Vision for government affairs such as budget issues, 
these surveys demonstrate that Monitor is more trusted for politics, particularly by the 
opposition.490 Neither paper is at the end of the spectrum, either vehemently anti- or 
pro-government, and both have been brought to a centre position. Who influenced 
whom to come to the middle is a matter of debate and certainly both have played a 
constructive role. Despite usual assumptions, from the beginning the Monitor was not
490 This can vary somewhat between districts. The New Vision, however, does regular high-quality 
national readership surveys and overall the findings indicate the above-mentioned preferences for the 
two papers. See for example: “National Readership Survey”, The New Vision, 12-15 April 2001 and 
“Results o f the New Vision Readership National Survey”, The New Vision, 19 November- 15 
December 2004.
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uniformly opposed491 to the government just as The New Vision was not purely 
propagandist.
In the recent elections there appeared to be few policy issues of great 
substance or divergence between Museveni and his challenger Kizza Besigye of the 
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), at least compared with differences between the 
party platforms of the CUD and EPRDF in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, there were major 
issues including Museveni extending his term as President and the government’s 
treatment of Besigye, who was imprisoned just before voting day.492
An analysis of media coverage during the election period conducted by the 
Democracy Monitoring Group suggests that the press was generally more balanced in 
its coverage of the candidates than the electronic media (TV and radio). Both The 
New Vision and the Monitor were considered to have provided relatively fair 
coverage. Within The New Vision Corporation, The New Vision was more balanced 
than its sister papers Bukedde and Etop.493 During the elections the circulation of the 
Monitor continued to grow. Readers appear to trust The New Vision for providing 
updates and insights into government policy but, as acknowledged by David Mukholi 
in the previous chapter, there are additional pressures on The New Vision during the 
election period that affect the balance of its coverage. The M onitor, on the other 
hand, is seen as providing insight into the opposition and a more accurate assessment 
of the political process and debates.494
An additional factor affecting the Monitor during the recent elections was the 
position of Wafula Oguttu, the founding editor, as the spokesperson for Kizza
491 There are a number o f groups that want to overthrow the Movement, but they have tended to 
operate more on the periphery and did not mobilise the intelligentsia or gain widespread support for 
their newspapers. The LRA in the North proposes a different state, not just a change in government but 
a change in the constitution built around the Ten Commandments and they have been unsuccessful in 
selling their view to the majority of Ugandans. While many Ugandans initially supported Museveni 
and believed he should be given a chance to bring peace, those that want change now are primarily 
advocating for new leadership (as opposed to Ethiopia where many are arguing for a new government 
and even constitution).
492 See for example 9 January 2006, Gerald Rulekere, “Uganda Elections 2006: Besigye Strong 
Contender for the Uganda Presidency”. Available at: 
http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/dailv/homepage.asp‘?ID=264.
or 22 February 2006, Will Ross, “Bitter Rift dominates Uganda poll”, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/474018Q.stm.
493 (2006) Uganda Media Coverage of The 2006 Elections. Democracy Monitoring Group.
494 “Results o f the New Vision Readership National Survey”, The New Vision, 19 November- 15 
December 2004.
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Besigye. The government enjoyed claiming that the Monitor was biased towards the
FDC, as Minister Buturo argued:
The Monitor did a good job for the FDC. The NRM is strong in the
countryside so we haven’t been affected by the Monitor's limited influence.
We don’t harass them and have no desire for retribution. We have no time 
for the Monitor but it keeps us focused. Ugandans are learning to manage 
differences and argue. It is a new situation. The media has helped us realise
there is another side to our side- that there are other views. It helps us to
keep it in mind that there is opposition so we weren’t surprised by the
• • 495opposition.
The previous chapter analysed the relationship of The New Vision with the
government and the degree of independence it enjoys. As it is usually the Monitor
that is charged with being the ‘opposition’ press and the more polarising of the
papers, this section will focus on the Monitor as such an actor and examine the
interaction of the two papers.
1.1 Differing perspectives- how much o f an ‘opposition press'?
Charles Onyango-Obbo has complained that he has been described as “editor
of the opposition Monitor newspaper” not only by the Uganda government but by
international observers as well. He argues that this is unfair because “an American or
British newspaper almost never referred to a newspaper as an “opposition”
publication simply because it was critical of the Clinton or Blair governments.” 496
But the founding journalists claim that the Monitor did not set out to become a paper
of ‘opposition’ despite that they are widely perceived as the government ‘opposition’.
Maurice Ssekawungu argues there was a turning point in this perception:
Before the first elections there were efforts for a new constitution. This is 
where divergent views started to emerge. The Monitor chose the other side, 
they highlighted angles critical of the government...that is where the Monitor 
became opposition and when they started having problems.497
Onyango-Obbo responded to a question about the Monitor serving as the opposition 
in a non-party system affirmatively, acknowledging, “the Monitor was very, very 
strong in our critique of the system”. As Oguttu noted,
495 Interview: Nsaba Buturo.
496 ONYANGO-OBBO, C. (2004) Seeking Balance in a Continent Portrayed By Its Extremes. Nieman 
Reports, 58,6-8. p. 9.
497 Interview: Maurice Ssekawungu.
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The Monitor did not want to be seen as opposition but the Monitor filled the 
gap. It was seen as opposition because it gave a forum for those that criticised 
the government.498
However, the founding journalists argue that they have rather always been driven by a 
fierce desire for independence, which partially led to the perception of it as 
opposition.
The birth of the Monitor out of the Weekly Topic provides some insight into 
this argument. When the NRM came to power, the owners of the Weekly Topic were 
appointed as ministers in the new government. In an argument that was corroborated 
by other informants, Oguttu suggests that
Museveni did it to control the paper. I was editor and Charles was deputy 
editor. We were very critical but the president didn’t want us ... to talk about 
corruption... I wrote an article saying the president should stop denying 
corruption. The owners were coming at night and changing the stories...
[we] didn’t start the Monitor with the idea of being an opposition force but
wanted a forum for discussion and we didn’t want to be controlled 499
Thus the commitment to independence, to choose and defend positions on national 
policy, has been a recurring theme for the Monitor and something that clearly all the 
founding members agreed upon while also disagreeing on particular issues.
Beyond this commitment to independence and debate, there is certainly no 
uniform ‘Monitor perspective’. Onyango-Obbo, for example, has spent his entire 
career in journalism and speaks of how he was motivated as a child to become a 
journalist by listening to the BBC with his father. Despite having to leave the 
Monitor, and Uganda, he has not considered another occupation and now works for 
the Nation Media Group in Nairobi. Oguttu, on the other hand, has always been the
most politically motivated of the Monitor founders. “The others don’t vote. I’m the
only one who votes,” he said. But he does draw a distinction between politics and 
journalism noting, “I first left journalism and then went into politics”.500 
Nevertheless, in the beginning of the NRM government, he was transparent about his 
support of the NRM. He even admitted that he had been offered several jobs in the
498 Interview: Oguttu.
499 Interview: Oguttu.
500 Interview: Oguttu.
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administration including an ambassadorship. Similarly he was open about his dislike
of the opposition in parties, commenting in a 1993 article:
Our view is that government should allow freedom of association. I as an 
individual, I definitely support multi-party politics. But I don’t like DP and 
UPC. That one I have never hidden. I have a problem with DP and UPC 
because they have refused to tolerate each other and co-exist peacefully.... I 
say why don’t we give NRM another five years so that at the end of that, we 
shall say time has come.501
While Oguttu was also clear in his support for the NRM, nevertheless, the
Monitor had long been accused of supporting opposition parties before the FDC.
When accusations were running high in 1993, he responded directly to the arguments
in a Monitor editorial:
One of the most common complaints about the Monitor has been bias against
the political parties. On reflection, we did not always report the activities of
the political parties as fairly as we could have. This criticism concerned us
because the Monitor set out to be an obsessively independent publication,
and on the question of whether Uganda should be a multiparty or no-party
502(Movement) state, we do not have a side.
Oguttu goes on to argue that “on this, we can say we think the NRM is a great 
improvement over all the regimes Uganda has had in the last 25 or so years. We feel 
for example that there is sufficient freedom of press for us to make all the legitimate 
comments we have wanted to make”.503
How can the fact that the Monitor is often described as the ‘opposition’ paper 
be reconciled with the reality that the founding editor regularly expressed support for 
the NRM? Oguttu was involved with the NRM from the early days in Tanzania and 
thus his situation is probably not that different than the one shared by his colleague 
Kizza Besigye. Until he formed the FDC opposition party prior to the 2001 elections, 
Besigye was a high-ranking minister for the NRM, served as a senior military advisor 
to the minister of defence, and married Museveni’s former girlfriend, Winnie 
Byanyima. In the case of the Monitor, however, it was in the paper’s interest to be 
seen as a critical independent voice. It burnished its anti-establishment credentials 
using government banning of advertisements and various charges as testaments to its
501 23 July 1993, Onapito-Ekomoloit and Kyazze-Simwogerere, “One year later I feel satisfied-Wafula 
Oguttu”, The Monitor, p. 8.
502 23-27 July 1993, Editorial, “Forgive us our Sins”, The Monitor, p. 3.
503 Ibid.
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independence or as symbolic awards of excellence for probing, critical journalism. 
Similarly, it was also in the government’s interest to be able to claim that there was an 
independent and vocal press and thus bolstering its argument that it was genuinely 
bringing about a new change and democracy to a unique one-party system.
An article by Wilson Ogolla in the Monitor illustrates the complexities of this
debate and the divided interpretations of Ugandans. Ogolla questioned the idea that
the Monitor was really anti-NRM or anti-Museveni. Ogolla argued that the Monitor
has a complex role in Museveni’s politics:
The Monitor is a creature of NRM politics, and it is an essential strategy in 
the overall scheme of Museveni clinging to power and sanitising the fact that 
he is a militarist who grabbed State House by force of arms. This is
important, because the Monitor never questioned the legitimacy of how
Museveni came to power, to them his five-year guerrilla war was a revolution 
which was made through the ‘sacrifice’ of peasants’ blood.504
The war in the North against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has been cited as an 
example of how the Monitor took sides. The paper regularly chose the centre path 
calling for peace talks or diplomatic engagement with the Sudanese rather than calling 
on the NRM to curb its actions and alleged atrocities. Ogolla argues that the
relationship between Museveni and the former editor Wafula Oguttu was a rivalry
where
They might clash on the field during the match, and have acrimonious 
rivalries off the field, but at the end of the day they are both interested in the 
survival of the football league. That’s why the one-party Movement allows 
the Monitor, which always pretends to play in the centre, which actually 
means eating from both the Movement and the Multi-partyists, to exist.505
Not surprisingly, some in the Monitor respond harshly to such accusations. Henry 
Muwanga-Bayego, for example replied that Ogolla’s assertions were ‘insulting’ and 
just because ‘bringing down the NRM government has never been its grand agenda’ it 
does not necessarily imply that it is pro-NRM.506
Andrew Mwenda, an outspoken Monitor journalist, however, agreed that the 
Monitor is pro-NRM leaning but also impartial because there is no deliberate editorial
504 6 September 1996, Wilson Ogolla, “Monitor, Museveni are enemies by day and lovers by night”, 
The Monitor, p. 3.
505 Ibid.
506 20-23 September 1996, Henry Muwanga-Bayego, “Monitor, a product of NRM intolerance, never 
been lovers”, The Monitor, p.3.
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policy at the Monitor to support or oppose the government. Nevertheless, it is
perceived as being pro-Museveni by omitting to extend as much fair coverage to the
critics of the NRM as it does to the government. Mwenda also argued,
Who cannot see that at the editorial level, the paper never questions 
Museveni’s capture of state power by the gun? Why are we so blind to the 
fact that criticisms in the paper do not, by any stretch of imagination, 
question Museveni’s competence as a leader but do say Ssemogerere is not 
fit to rule?... The Monitor never supported federalism at all. On the question 
of multi-partyism, it NEVER supported an immediate and unconditional 
return to political pluralism which the opponents of the regime were calling 
for.507
Thus, perspectives on the extent to which the Monitor was an ‘opposition’ paper 
diverge yet most agree that within certain limits the Monitor was at least a self­
restrained critic of the government and has served as an important critical voice in a 
single party state.
1.2 Bringing the debate to the centre
The Monitor and The New Vision have also influenced each other in fostering
public debate and defining a centre space in which debates could occur. Pike was
pleased when the Monitor appealed to him for support in printing the paper. His
newspaper owned a printing press and agreed to print the Monitor on credit for two
weeks. In some respects it seems counter-intuitive that the CEO of the country’s
largest paper would assist the development of what could possibly be a major
competitor. While Pike may have underestimated the potential strength of the
Monitor, just as the Monitor journalists themselves were surprised by their own
success, there is also another factor. Onyango-Obbo suggested that Pike
Wanted a strong independent political newspaper because that determined his 
face. So long as there was a newspaper that was more critical of the 
government than The New Vision then he could write without pressure, but as 
soon as there was no other newspaper then he would become [pressured]. He 
needed... a newspaper that was critical of the government in order that he 
could place himself in the centre position.508
A number of informants concurred with Onyango-Obbo and while there was little 
indication that the Monitor was going to become an “opposition paper” many of the
507 20-23 September 1996, Andrew Mwenda, “Monitor serves as NRM pray”, The Monitor, p.4.
508 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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Monitor journalists had been critical of some of the NRM’s policies. Thus for Pike 
the Monitor could help his publication by serving as a strong government critic to 
balance out the debates. This position would allow The New Vision to take the middle 
ground and participate and cover certain issues and debates raised by the Monitor that 
The New Vision might not otherwise address due to government pressure.
From the Monitor's perspective, The New Vision was also something it could 
position itself against. While The New Vision tried to cater to a broader portion of 
Ugandan society, the Monitor was able to frame itself as the independent voice and 
largely sought readers who were politically inclined. At the same time, The New 
Vision had a strong role in bringing the Monitor to the centre politically. To remain 
competitive the Monitor had to address some of the large issues The New Vision was 
covering and engage with the debates and agenda it was setting. As the Monitor 
wanted to compete with The New Vision for readership, and with a large proportion of 
the population generally willing to give the NRM a chance, to have been too radical 
would simply have meant that readers would choose The New Vision over the 
Monitor.
The Monitor has continued the trend of moving towards the centre, with much 
movement occurring recently partly in response to multipartyism. As Oguttu 
explained,
When parties were formed 1.5 years ago, the Monitor wanted to be more 
objective. The government put a lot of pressure.... When multipartyism was 
restored the paper changed.... It was no longer as necessary for the paper to 
be the constant dependable critic of the single party system.509
But the Monitor has also been moving to the centre because of a number of other 
factors including a younger, less political, generation of journalists and growing 
business interests. In addition, closely related to the negotiation of political space 
between papers such as the Monitor and The New Vision has been the process of 
institutionalisation.
509 Interview: Oguttu.
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2. Institutionalisation of the Press
As has been made clear so far, the press in Uganda is significantly more 
institutionalised and advanced than its counterpart in Ethiopia. While historical 
factors account for some of this difference, contemporary developments have been the 
most influential, including strong competition, an emphasis on training a new 
generation of journalists and the overall business interests of investors in the media 
companies. Paradoxically, it can be argued that state intervention, including the 
withdrawal of government advertising to a paper such as the Monitor, also 
encouraged the greater institutionalisation in Uganda.
2.1 Media management
Journalists and editors regularly talk about mismanaged media enterprises - 
owners and editors who misappropriate funds, fail to invest to improve or stabilise the 
press and engage in corrupt dealings for self-enrichment. Star and Ngabo, for 
example, are one case in which the journalists aspired to ‘build an empire’. Despite 
having some of the best journalists in the country, the English and Luganda papers 
only lasted from 1980 to 1996. Ngabo started as a weekly and was the first paper 
published after Idi Amin was deposed. The paper was extremely popular but the 
owner, without the consent of the editors, registered the company in his own name so 
that they became his employees. The paper was making money but the journalists 
were not given regular salaries while the owner, according to Maurice Ssekawungu, 
the founding editor, was squandering profits on women. Ssekawungu attributed this 
failure, in contrast to the success of The New Vision's corporate structure, to “an 
African management system”. In 1993 Ssekawungu left the Star and Ngabo to start a 
competing paper in Lugandan at The New Vision. Although it is a government paper, 
he prefers his current position because he claims it is easy to know the rules and 
expectations.510
The New Vision has strong institutional and organisational structures for which 
the leadership of the former Managing Director, William Pike, has been key. David 
Mukholi, editor of the Sunday Vision, suggests a contrast with the Monitor, “at The
510 Interview: Maurice Ssekawungu.
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New Vision we aren’t built around individuals. If William Pike goes on holiday, no 
one notices.”511 In the previous chapter, it was discussed how, for Charles Onyango- 
Obbo, part of the need for him to move to Kenya was because the Monitor had 
become too personalised. He was the one fighting all the fights, a situation that had 
become a liability for the paper. With the first generation of the Monitor journalists 
gone, the company has become more institutionalised.
For Ssekawungu The New Vision helped to bring ‘great sanity in general’ to 
the press as a whole. Others, from the Monitor as well, agree. Peter Mwesige, a 
former editor-in-chief of the Monitor and now head of the School of Journalism at 
Makerere, described how the partisan media was not viable and not fulfilling the need 
to attract sustainable audiences. Prior to the 1990s it was not possible to talk about 
the institutionalisation of the press until The New Vision came into its own and 
changed the environment.
It wasn’t just a party hawk, it didn’t just push the party line but it was very 
important that the paper was okay economically. The New Vision drew other 
papers to professionalise. If The New Vision was run the way other 
government papers were run, the Monitor would not have had the pressure to 
professionalise. Journalists at the Monitor were more into making a political 
case and were pushing certain ideas and issues but now this has changed.512
Similarly, David Ouma Balikowa, one of the founders of the Monitor and now 
Managing Director of Timeline Communication, argued that “we were journalistically 
driven. Soon after we realised we had a big business, we [were surprised]. We
r  I  <2
weren’t concerned about the finance, we wanted our stories to make an impact.”
The case of The New Vision is also unique, particularly for a government 
paper, as it has been very profitable and is among the top income generating 
businesses for the government - 80% of the stocks are owned by the government and 
the remaining 20% by private individuals (5% are New Vision employees). Pike 
mentioned that he would like to see another 20% listed on the stock exchange 
although since his dismissal this seems unlikely. The New Vision has been profitable 
and successful largely because it was a Corporation and therefore had a different
511 Interview: David Mukholi.
512 Interview: Peter Mwesige.
513Interview: David Ouma Balikowa.
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accountability structure than Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, for example. As Pike 
explains:
We are self accounting, and we made a small loss in our first year of 
operation, which was three or four months but since then we’ve been in 
profit. I was with the Prime Minister the other day and he was saying ‘what’s 
your salary?’, and he asked what is our editor’s salary and he was shocked 
because ... the Prime Minister’s salary would put him at about the level of a 
middle editor here... So we’re self accounting, so we don’t need money from 
the government, whereas Uganda Broadcasting was actually a department, 
part of the Ministry of Information, or part of the Office of the President, and 
as such, they got a subvention from the Treasury. A lot of the money was in 
fact embezzled, but they didn’t have proper accounting processes. There was 
no incentive to increase your revenue, increase your listenership, and increase 
your market penetration. It didn’t make any difference, you know, you still 
got the same subvention from the government. Actually therefore the 
government was your customer rather than the listener....
We have to put headlines on the front page that the public wants to 
buy. If we don’t produce the product that the public wants to buy we’ll 
collapse. We’ll go out of business, whereas Uganda Television or Radio 
Uganda, well if they get money from the state and the money they collect 
doesn’t go to them, it returns to the state, they have no incentive.514
This govemment-business model is an important indicator suggesting that reform may 
be more difficult than developing an independent institution from scratch. With a 
close eye on the competition, and the flow of journalists between media organisations, 
the productive and profit-oriented culture of The New Vision clearly set the tone for 
the industry as a whole. In an effort to expand their market they have also sought out 
the masses and the readers beyond the political class and consequently forced the 
Monitor to do the same.
The Monitor, however, has also influenced The New Vision as well. A number
of people would dispute Peter Mwesige’s comment noted earlier about The New
Vision having the larger impact on the Monitor. For example, in terms of innovation
James Tumusiime of the Weekly Observer and former Monitor journalist argued
It is the other way around. The M onitor  forced The N ew  Vision to become
more professional. The N ew  Vision  had to keep up. In the late 1990’s the
Sunday M onitor  was leading The N ew  Vision. Look at The N ew  Vision in the 
early 90s and now, it’s an entirely different product. Competition forces 
people to get on their feet.515
Similarly, Balikowa argued,
514 Interview: Pike.
515 Interview: James Tumusiime.
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The New Vision simply reported the news. It was us who shaped The New 
Vision. Pike always came to talk to us at the Monitor, The New Vision had 
already established itself. It was a newspaper that reported the events, it 
couldn’t venture into the analysis. It couldn’t do investigations and actively 
report on corruption.516
It was also noted by the Monitor journalists that The New Vision still had typewriters 
when the Monitor began with computers. And similarly, the Monitor was the first to 
go to colour in 1996. Thus while The New Vision led the competition in corporate 
development, the Monitor contributed by innovating, risk-taking and embracing 
technology. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the Monitor's more hard-hitting 
reporting has allowed The New Vision to take a more critical and centre position than 
is usually possible for a government paper.
2.2 The Aga Khan and an unpredictable business environment
Two other factors, in addition to the way The New Vision set the standard for
media management, have strongly influenced the institutional development of the
Monitor. The first, and less obvious one, is the banning of government advertising
and the second is the buy-in of the Aga Khan.
The banning of government advertising encouraged the development of a solid
business strategy. About a year after the Monitor’s founding, the government banned
all departments and parastatels from advertising causing the paper a twenty-five
percent drop in advertising revenues. The Monitor thus shifted towards attracting ads
from small companies and generally began increasing its support for liberal politics
and free market economics. These companies proved to be more profitable even
though they often took out smaller adverts. They paid for their advertisements up
front with cash, however, while the government often took more than six months to
pay. According to Onyango-Obbo, the ban proved to be a blessing in disguise as it
forced the Monitor to rethink its business strategy as a whole, beyond finding viable
advertisers. As he explains:
In 1993, I think it was around August, we had for two weeks been running 
stories which were based on leaks from the cabinet. Something about which 
the government got very upset and they placed an advertising ban on the 
Monitor so that no semi-state institution was allowed to advertise in the 
paper. At that point before the age of privatisation, there was no private
516 Interview: David Ouma Balikowa.
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sector, so the effect of that is that we lost immediately about 80% of our 
revenues. But it was a very important thing in the sense that it was the best 
thing that happened to the Monitor. If that hadn’t happened then the Monitor 
would have collapsed and we wouldn’t be here by now because we had never 
really understood the vulnerability of the business because at that point we 
were renting the office from a businessman who was dealing with the 
government. He had government tenders to think of. Only then we realised 
that we have this office... and we were using a commercial printer... We 
realised we need to have two things: we need to have our own building and 
we need to own our printing press.... It was at this point we made the 
decision that we are going to begin saving ...and do all the things that we 
need to do to get money to build our own office and build our own printing
517press.
More recently, the style and management of the Monitor was deeply affected
by the buy-in of the Aga Khan and its incorporation into The Nation Media Group.
From William Pike’s perspective,
We took the centrist position... and the Monitor emotionally was happiest to 
be out on a limb as the opposition paper. So when the Aga Khan bought the
Monitor ... gradually he’s been pushing it to the centre and when they got rid
of Wafula and the old guard three years ago they made a much more active 
effort to come to the centre and then they started publishing corrections and 
apologies and trying to... publish stories from the government.... Some 
stories that the Monitor wrote were really crazy and unsubstantiated... there 
were all sorts of stories, without going into details about them, but so they’ve 
actually moved much more to the centrist position.518
The Aga Khan, like other large investors, wants to protect his investments, which
helps to keep the paper in the political centre. As Oguttu notes, however, this is not
always entirely transparent:
In 2002 when the Nation came in they cared more about money. The Aga 
Khan has large interests in Uganda. He has a hotel and a dam. Museveni 
gives it [to him] as leverage over the Monitor.519
Similarly, Andrew Mwenda, along with other journalists, argues that the threat to 
media freedoms is not the government but rather businesses that are often sensitive to 
maintaining government favour.520
Media ownership is a contentious issue and has not been fully addressed in 
Uganda’s National Information and Communication Policy. Big companies are
517 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
518 Interview: Pike.
519 Interview: Oguttu.
520 Interview: Mwenda.
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prominent and demanding advertisers and have growing influence over the media 
particularly as The New Vision and the Monitor increasingly dominate the landscape. 
At the same time these companies have provided the papers with secure revenue and 
thus brought greater stability to a precarious media environment. The challenge, 
however, is for the papers to find a way to remain true to their initial objectives and 
their dynamic founders.
2.3 Talent and capacity building
A major characteristic of institutionalisation is the development, recruitment
and retention of talent. In this realm, the Monitor and The New Vision have both been
successful, although in different ways. With idealistic motives, but also in pursuit of
their own self-interest, the leading editors of the Monitor, who were initially with the
Weekly Topic, started a journalism programme at the University of Makerere. As
Onyango-Obbo describes: “when we started the Weekly Topic a second time, there
was absolutely no talent in the country, no journalists.” When the Weekly Topic
started there were two things that they initially sought to do: make money and train
new journalists. A colleague of Onyango-Obbo’s that was already working at
Makerere agreed to market the idea of a journalism course if the team at the Weekly
Topic put together a curriculum for the degree. Surprisingly, the University Senate
passed the proposal.
Onyango-Obbo and his colleagues taught on the programme for five years,
four of which were unpaid. This benefited the Monitor because the paper was able to
recruit the best graduates and the quality of the students was consistently improving.
For Onyango-Obbo
... some of the best people started to emerge, I mean these were young 
people coming up in the media and we had to show that we cared about what 
we are doing so a lot of the best people then came to work for the Monitor 
which had all the best young students, because I was teaching there daily.521
At the same time, however, The New Vision has set the pace for training through its 
in-house programme which is run mainly by Ben Bella who works with the younger 
journalists several days a week. The New Vision also makes an effort to send at least 
one staff member to the UK a year for extensive training through the Thompson
521 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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Foundation or a related programme. As the media houses have grown and their 
resources have expanded, this commitment to staff training has been a key part of 
institutional development.
There is significant exchange of journalists and ideas between The New Vision 
and the Monitor but there are still discrepancies in how the two news organisations 
are run. Both recruit each other’s journalists and both pay top price for the best. But 
there is greater order to the way The New Vision operates, expectations are clear and 
the possible path to promotion is evident. In contrast, many journalists tell of how 
they were recruited by the Monitor for a prominent position, and offered a significant 
pay increase, but when they moved to the Monitor they languished in the newsroom 
with little to do and no direction for assuming their new position. This has 
discouraged journalists, such as David Mukholi, editor of the Sunday Vision, to 
switch to the Monitor despite repeated offers with promises of a substantial salary
522raise.
In sum, the process of institutionalisation was affected by multiple 
developments. In the near future, media businesses will continue to be profitable and 
are likely to become increasingly influential. Challenges posed by business and 
advertiser interests, and the leverage the government has over these companies, will 
continue and grow thus threatening editorial independence. Much of the future 
influence of these factors, however, will depend on how successfully journalists 
challenge them as is also the case in the coming section on the role of government 
intervention.
3. Ideology of journalists
Journalists in Uganda have differing motivations for working in the newspaper 
industry and divergent understandings as to what their role should be in the nation- 
building process. Sometimes they choose to define an identity for themselves, but in 
other cases it has been externally imposed. So far, for example, it has been discussed 
how journalists at the Monitor were seen as critics of the government, while their
522 Interview: David Mukholi. Yet in my visits to the Monitor newsroom I observed curious and helpful 
journalists. The newsroom appeared more spontaneous and energizing than that of The New Vision.
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colleagues at the Red Pepper were regarded as part of the ‘moral police’ (despite 
however immoral they may have been in some cases such as in their targeting of 
homosexuals). In Uganda, however, the media are increasingly less defined by 
personalities or political allegiances but rather divergent ideologies can be seen across 
generations. This is different than in Ethiopia and was not so much the case in the 
early days of the NRM as it has evolved slowly. On the one hand it can be viewed as 
part of the process of institutionalisation and strong cohort of young rising journalists 
but it can, and must, also be seen as part of the NRM’s process of consolidation 
power. As Museveni pushed forward with his third term projects, the factions within 
the media that were most critical of it were pressured to leave gradually. No longer is 
the press, to the same extent, serving the role it did when the NRM first came to 
power as a space for elites and political factions to dialogue.
At present there is a tendency to reflect and say that the ‘golden days’ are 
over. Many of the older journalists are complaining that the current generation is 
apathetic and does not have the same passion for the profession that the previous 
generation had. At the same time, for many the ‘struggle’ has changed. So for 
journalists like Charles Onyango-Obbo who spent much of his time in Uganda 
fighting to have the space for journalists expanded and enlarged, the nature of the 
fight may have changed for some younger scribes—despite the ominous political 
developments such as the 2006 electoral process.
3.1 The older generation
There is an older generation that is still active in the media and includes well- 
known and respected journalists such as Ben Bella flakut, Maurice Ssekawungu and 
Drake Ssekeba. As described in the previous chapter, many of those from this group 
struggled to survive as journalists during Idi Amin and Obote’s time. Their work as 
journalists was often about continuing to pursue a craft they were genuinely 
passionate about, but it was also a struggle during a time when so many were 
suffering and being killed.
Today, few of these journalists are involved in overt political activities. Drake 
Ssekeba is working as a television presenter while Ben Bella, renowned for his sense 
of humour, spends as much time telling stories of Idi Amin or his current raw
239
vegetable diet as he does training journalists at The New Vision. While interviewing, 
Ssekawungu comes across as a distanced and reflective journalist with perspective. 
This is also a reflection of age. Similarly, during interviews with veteran journalist 
Philip Ochieng in Kenya, who was one of the most outspoken and controversial 
journalists in East Africa for several decades, he too took a more tempered approach 
and colleagues said that his mellowed and patient approach to life has been a recent 
development.
Drake Ssekeba presents a perspective that is indicative of those from his
generation. For Ssekeba, objectivity and the idea of ‘guiding those in power’ are the
most important roles for journalists. It is a less confrontational strategy than what
Onyango-Obbo would regard as his role and is also different from what many of the
younger journalists believe their role to be. As Ssekeba describes,
We journalists, and I’ve told my friends in politics... for us journalists, we 
come to serve people. We don’t serve ourselves. When politicians come to 
government, they are actually pretending that they are serving you but 
actually they are serving their own interests. You see, when I come to write a 
story, I don’t expect a reward from the public, no, I just expect word from my 
employer who gives me a salary at the end of the month or the week.... You 
see we are like judges. You are there to report what is good for the society, 
yes, that is why we don’t lose face. Because we know why people are 
suffering in area A and B and we see what can be done. A politician knows 
what’s happening but he wants to use his political gain to do other things.... 
We journalists are there... to guide the nation.523
While less politicised than the journalists who started the Monitor, for example, this 
generation has set a tone of objectivity and professionalism. They remain involved 
and influential in the press by conveying their experience and lessons through 
continuing to practice their trade and train the current younger generation.
3.2 The Monitor Legacy
Journalists such as Wafula Oguttu, Teddy Sseezi-Cheeye, Charles Onyango- 
Obbo and William Pike are from a period of the struggle where the press played a role 
in consolidating the power of the NRM. Some of the journalists during the early 
days of the NRM or the late Obote I period saw themselves operating as ‘opposition’
523 Interview: Drake Ssekeba.
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in single-party rule and most regarded themselves as an important part of the 
Movement’s political and nation-building process.
The emphasis, particularly for the private journalists, was less on building a 
strong business or holding to professional standards as Oguttu recognised in a 
Monitor editorial,
Journalism is not a popularity contest. It is part of our job to annoy people 
who don’t want to be criticised; to humble the arrogant; to expose the 
plunderers of public wealth; and to uncover political charlatans. Someone 
has to do this job. Since it is our business, we shall do it. Forgive us our 
recklessness, overzealousness, and even sloppiness...524
Despite efforts to suggest otherwise, from the government’s perspective the Monitor
journalists were highly political. William Pike remembers “Charles [Onyango-Obbo]
once telling me that the mission statement, he didn’t use that word, mission statement,
but the mission of the Monitor was to be a thom in the side of the government”. And
Minister Buturo clearly sees Onyango-Obbo as a political actor:
The editors [of the Monitor] are political. [Charles Onyango-] Obbo is really 
a politician who is a journalist. When you report politically you’ve taken a 
position. [The Monitor] has had editors who are politicians and it’s made 
them extremist.... During the Movement there were many politicians that 
didn’t agree with it. The Movement didn’t take away the opposition.525
William Pike, as editor, similarly expressed a certain conviction of pursuing particular
goals, given the nation-building project, including a commitment to objectivity and
factual reporting that could be trusted by a variety of constituents, thus helping to
create consensus on the past and the present. As Pike argues:
My mission was always to provide factual news, a variety of opinion and a 
factual and comprehensive news of all key issues... and with a variety of 
opinion to act and allow people to contribute letters and debate in the paper 
as a consensus building exercise to create consensus in society.... [The New 
Vision] is playing its role providing facts, being a newspaper of record... 
that’s where we’ve helped and wanted to do because it helps to build 
consensus by getting agreement on what actually happened. Because that is 
the starting point for consensus.526
Forging consensus and journalists seeking a middleground has been key in nation- 
building. As elaborated in the previous chapter, articles from The New Vision
524 23-27 July 1997, “Forgive our sins”, The Monitor, p. 3.
525 Interview: Buturo.
526 Interview: William Pike.
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explaining the NRM, its policies and ideology have been important in familiarizing 
and including Ugandans in the political process. Oguttu, Onyango-Obbo and Pike 
were among the most influential editors during the early period of the NRM 
government and are representative of a generation that is largely no longer active in 
the media. While many of their objectives have been replaced with the priorities of a 
younger generation, the influence, particularly of the Monitor founders, continues 
among some.
Ben Bella, who can look at the current situation with a bit of detachment, has
argued that Andrew Mwenda is one of the few remaining journalists who still has the
critical spirit that Oguttu or Onyango-Obbo had. Younger than either of them by ten
or fifteen years, Mwenda has worked closely with Onyango-Obbo and currently is
host of the most popular call-in radio show, Andrew Mwenda Live on KFM. Mwenda
sums up his journalistic drive: “I just want to express myself. I do what I believe is
right and I don’t want to be enslaved but I just want to be free.”527
While Mwenda may have a passion reminiscent of the Monitor founders, there
are also some younger journalists striving to model themselves after the ‘original’
Monitor group. James Tumusiime, a former Monitor journalist felt, for example, that
the Monitor had become too soft and Kampala was in need of a more hard-hitting and
political paper. Tumusiime started the Weekly Observer in March 2004 with a group
of journalists that quit the Monitor for a variety of reasons including low pay and the
conviction they could do a better job -  a story reminiscent of the beginnings of the
Monitor. At the time, however, Tumusiime’s explanation of his goal as a journalist
emphasises objectivity,
We see our job as a public service and holding the government to account. 
The emphasis is on balance and accuracy. We don’t consider the Observer to 
be opposition. We want to be middle of the road and do not want to be 
associated with one side or the other. We decided that we don’t need to be 
allied, partly because the readership is small -  16,000 weekly.... [Weekly 
Observer] is really seen as an elite paper.528
It is difficult to know if the Weekly Observer will succeed in penetrating the market in 
the same way the Monitor did but it appears unlikely. They do not have the political 
clout or constituency to have the same role in politics and negotiating with the NRM
527 Interview: Mwenda.
528 Interview: James Tumusiime
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that their colleagues had at the Monitor. With papers seeking to attract more readers, 
advertisers having increasing influence and a new generation of journalists that has 
been brought up under a system emphasising ‘professionalisation’, it seems as though 
the environment has changed along with the journalists.
3.3 A new generation
Today the newsrooms are filled with a younger generation of recent graduates
that do not have the connections with those in power that Oguttu and Onyango-Obbo
had nor the same idea of a mission. This generation was not in the bush with the
NRM nor part of the early days of the Movement. They have been trained to be
journalists, spend time on the internet, and see themselves as part of a global
profession rather than freedom fighters. Many have also adopted the discourse of the
international media development agenda: they talk about ‘being watch dogs’,
‘checking the state’ and ‘informing people’.
Some older journalists see this younger generation as having a lack of
professionalism or passion. As Drake Ssekeba argues:
There is a problem with journalists today. They don’t have the professional 
ethics we used to have... it is rotten today, a lot of corruption. People come 
into journalism because they don’t have jobs.... People come from 
everywhere because they have nothing to do.... Even in journalism, people 
used to go into professions because they loved the professions.... Today it is 
not like that.... So professional ethics has been diluted.529
In response to a question on the impact of professional journalism training, Ssekeba 
commented that a major problem was that journalists still do not know the questions 
to ask: it isn’t so much the process of actually writing the story but understanding the 
issues.
Most of the people today are young in age and they don’t have adequate 
training, they don’t have experience.... You see if I were to ask a question, 
I’d ask a real question... because I would know what I am asking about. 
Before I come to ask you I have my own answers. I have made research, 
however little it may be, but I’ve done research. But today people don’t 
know that, people who are in journalism today, a few of them know, but a lot 
of them don’t. That’s why they can’t raise the issues.... There are some 
people here who are called very good journalists, they are good journalists 
but actually when they come to argue, I hear them, you know on the radio,
529 Interview: Ssekeba.
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they are without we call it, ink, without documentary evidence. They just
530argue...
While this is true to some degree, conversely, it can also appear this way to older 
journalists who are used to a paper focusing on major advocacy issues (e.g., 
supporting the Kabaka, pushing for a particular political party or furthering the 
nationalist agenda) because when papers turn more generalist, as is the current trend, 
reporters are expected to cover a variety of issues on which they might not have 
expertise.
Charles Onyango-Obbo argues that the current generation is the most ‘trained’
group of journalists the country has seen. While many of his generation received
training abroad, this group has passed through Makerere University’s Department of
Journalism. Contrary to popular perception and the days when, as Onyango-Obbo
said, “no half respecting man would allow you to marry his daughter if you were a
journalist”, the journalists now are often some of the best students. But Onyango-
Obbo also expressed disappointment about how journalists have changed:
The point was that journalism had a social purpose and the social purpose 
was to better society. And we had a kind of class prejudice that to be a 
journalist you needed to have a radical or working class background and that 
if you were too bourgeois... you would not be able to empathise with the 
downtrodden and the poor.... In the third year of the programme there was 
hardly anyone from the working class. By the fourth year, to enter the 
journalism programme required the highest marks of any subject in the
531university.
Nevertheless, following a theme that has been elaborated in previous analysis in this
thesis, Wafulu Oguttu, laments that the current generation of journalists are not
setting the agenda the way he and his colleagues had done at the Weekly Topic or in
the early days of the Monitor.
In the current elections, the media didn’t set the agenda. Politically the 
media was stronger before. Charles and I had a larger name in the eyes of the 
politicians. The leaders were of my generation and they cared what we said. 
The leadership is older than the journalists and they don’t take young people 
as seriously. It’s also culture. In the 1970s and 80s we were disregarded, the 
politicians didn’t care about us and now it is coming back slowly. 
Professionally, journalists aren’t unified. Their integrity isn’t as high as
530 Interview: Ssekeba.
531 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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when we were there. Before you were there for the profession. Now 
journalists are bought.532
Professionalisation has also been an issue for the government (albeit in a slightly 
different way). Uganda has tight definitions of professionalism and what it means to 
be a journalist. For example, when the journalists from the Stanhope-LSE East 
African Journalist Fellowship wanted to set up a journalists’ association, it was the 
Ugandan members who pushed to have the word ‘professional’ in the title of the 
association. The members debated what it meant to be professional and for the 
Ugandans in particular it was a sense that what they are doing is a trade, something 
not just anyone can do, but a job for which you must acquire skills similar to 
becoming a doctor or teacher.
This stance stems from the Press and Journalist Act of 1995 that attempted to 
professionalise journalism through establishing a professional body by law, the 
National Union of Journalists, and through prescribing an academic qualification for 
practicing journalism in Uganda. From the perspective of the Fellows, this was not 
problematic and many of their colleagues agreed that it was also a way of justifying 
what they do and separating themselves from pontificators. The Fellows chose 
similar standards for who could join the new association.
Ugandan journalists are not the first address such regulations regarding 
professionalism, but the extent to which they have embraced the rules as their own is 
interesting.533 It is difficult to identify why Ugandan journalists to subscribe to or at 
the very least remain complacent about this legislation.
Professor Frederick Juuko from the Law Department at Makerere University 
has suggested that this urge to professionalise, even on the part of journalists, has to 
be seen in the context of the Movement which all Ugandans were compelled to join. 
Because of this pressure, it is natural for journalists to feel compelled to join a 
professional body.534 While all journalists certainly do not feel this way, a viewpoint
532 Interview: Oguttu.
533 In 1996, this type of law was tried in Zambia but the journalists there organised against it and the 
high court ruled it as unconstitutional. In Costa Rica there was a similar attempt to pass this type of 
law but the journalists there went to an Inter-American Human Rights Court and the law was thrown 
out because it contravened Article 13 of the Inter-American which assert the rights of freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. Journalists, it was argued, are exercising a fundamental right 
and requiring them to be licensed violates that right. (Interview: Frederick Juuko).
534 Interview: Juuko.
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captured by Andrew Mwenda’s comment earlier about journalists ‘just wanting to be 
free’, they have not effectively organised themselves into a union or association that 
would unite in opposition against such legislation.
This younger generation may yet, however, become as politically active as 
their predecessors. As Museveni extends his rule indefinitely, discontent among 
many journalists is palpable and could lead to a renewed energy and the same sense 
of mission that shaped the early days of the Monitor.
4. Government Intervention
The state has sought to influence the development of the media in a number of 
ways including enacting media legislation, establishing government-sponsored media 
outlets or information sources, imposing censorship or encouraging self-censorship, 
and facilitating politician and government engagement with journalists. The ways in 
which laws are implemented and journalists respond to such pressures are also 
important determinants of the effects government intervention has in shaping the 
press system.
4.1 Legislation
Despite being signatory to international and national covenants, the 
Uganda government employs legislation and other tools to limit freedom of 
expression. This is not unique as even the most restrictive governments may ratify 
international agreements.
The 1995 Press and Journalist Statute, the 1996 Electronic Media Statute, the 
2005 Uganda Broadcasting Corporation Act and the 2005 Access to Information Act 
are reflective of the current legal tools used by the government to regulate the media. 
The 1995 Press and Journalist Statute replaced the Newspapers and Publications Act 
that was repealed in 1995 and had numerous restrictions, many of which were added
535 In 1995, Uganda ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Uganda is also a 
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights In addition, in 1986 Uganda ratified the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and is also a member of the African Union which 
requires it to uphold the October 2002 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa.
536 In 1995 the Ugandan parliament passed a new constitution that provided for the guarantee of both 
freedom of speech and the press.
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in Idi Amin’s time. The new law professionalises the practice of journalism through 
the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda (NUU) and establishes a Media 
Council. The NUU has the objective of training and maintaining professional 
standards of journalists as well as setting educational standards including qualifying 
examinations. Journalists have generally accepted the NUU, but it is the Media 
Council537 that has been more controversial.
The Media Council has been ineffective and has been rendered so by the 
government itself. It is under government control and despite independent 
appointments of respected and prominent journalists and academics, the Chair is from 
the government. When the Council has intervened it has rarely ruled positively for 
the media. Paul Mukasa, Head of the Council, notes that part of the problem is “the 
government doesn’t usually refer cases to the Council. People prefer to use courts of 
law”.538 He argues that one reason why people do not use the Media Council is a lack 
of knowledge: “they aren’t aware the laws exist and the perception among journalists
r - l Q
in the region is that journalists should regulate themselves”. Nevertheless, the 
Media Council has been involved in a number of cases on its own, including 
censoring a controversial play, the Vagina Monologues, and working with the Uganda 
Media Centre in accrediting foreign journalists and accepting referred complaints.
Since the NRM came to power, dozens of journalists have been arrested540 and 
charged with crimes ranging from libel to sedition often under the penal code and 
criminal code. The government is also known for directly intervening and shutting 
media outlets down. In the recent elections, for example, its closing of KFM radio 
station (part of the Monitor group) was very controversial and there have also been 
smaller, less publicised cases particularly outside of the capital. While the 
government now shuts down the press less often than radio stations, it has been the
537 The Media Council, which has “the Director of Information or a Senior Officer from the Ministry 
responsible for information, who shall be the Secretary to the Council”, is given a number of functions 
as outlined in statute (10) including: to regulate the conduct and promote good ethical standards and 
discipline of journalists and to arbitrate disputes. The Media Council is also responsible for registering 
journalists and publications. The Media Council and Broadcasting Council are responsible for issuing 
licenses.
538 Interview: Paul Mukasa.
539 Interview: Paul Mukasa.
540 These cases are well documented on websites such as Reporters Without Borders www.rsf.org. 
Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org and Committee to Protect Journalists www.cpi.org.
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print journalists that have been the most influential in challenging legislation and 
forcing reforms.
4.2 Expanding the Circle
For years Andrew Mwenda and Charles Onyango-Obbo dominated headlines 
and international alerts from press freedom agencies because they sought to challenge 
directly the courts and rulings. The government has often charged editors and 
journalists at the Monitor for the publication of false news. Every time, however, the 
journalists have been fully acquitted. Some at the Monitor have almost embraced 
government persecution, regarding it as a natural political development and part of 
the process of building the country. As Onyango-Obbo recalled:
I remember one time I wrote something and he [Museveni] was 
sufficiently moved by it that he sent me this email explaining why he thought 
the article was important... He sees our [the Monitor's] attitude as hostility. 
He realises that he cannot escape from that so he says it is important to 
understand the nature of the state and the recourses that the state has. The 
state basically has the laws and the power of coercion. So therefore it is 
natural that the state would resort to the laws. You might think it is 
undemocratic repression but that is the law and he says that the state will use 
those laws to dominate and shape the public space and dialogue. The state 
has other resources. By the same token the journalists must also fight their 
comer. You must protect your side of this bargain. Therefore you shouldn’t 
expect the state to make your job easier. It is the job of the journalist to fight 
for their comer.
Don’t expect that your opponent will help you win the game. From 
pure intellectual honesty I could not disagree with him because he was 
correct. That is the thing about Museveni, he will respect you if he sees you 
believe in something and he will argue with you profoundly.541
Onyango-Obbo demonstrated his willingness to ‘fight his comer’ a number of 
times. For example, an article in the Monitor in 1999 featured a picture of a woman 
whose head and pubic hair was forcibly shaved by a soldier in Northern Uganda.542 
Onyango-Obbo was at first reluctant to run it as he knew there would be 
consequences, but he faced the opposition of his staff. He explained the dilemma in 
running it:
541 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
542 11 May 1999, photo, The Monitor and story 17-23 May 1999, Charles Onyango-Obbo, “The Naked 
Woman And The Cover-Up” The East African
Available at: http://www.charlesobbo.com.
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A recent hire at the Monitor happened to be the girlfriend of a military officer 
and she witnessed a fight in the military barracks in Northern Uganda and 
managed to capture it on camera. A fellow military officer had a girlfriend, 
and he also had a wife. So the wife came and found this woman there... they 
had a fight. When the man came back he sided with his wife and then he 
started beating the [girlfriend] and he called his friends to help him subdue 
her. So then they grab her and drag her to a field and they shaved her head 
and pubic hair... so this photograph comes to the Monitor. By that time I 
was not in the country, I was in Ethiopia. So the guys [at the Monitor] take a 
look at this, they want to run the story but then they say no, let us wait for 
Charles to get back, this is too hot. So I return and they showed me the 
photos of the story. I told them, you know this one is too hot, we can’t run it. 
So they said no. They said Charles, you know, if the Monitor can’t run this, 
then we have lost the reason why we founded this paper. We founded this 
paper because stories like this never used to get published.. . 543
The story was run and had a huge effect.544 It divided public opinion. The 
government arranged truckloads of people to demonstrate outside the Monitor's office 
and bum effigies of Monitor staff. Onyango-Obbo was well aware of the impact and
knew he would be arrested, but he still was willing to publish the story. As he
describes:
The government had met and had decided that it was my handiwork... and 
they said we should take him and torture him to tell us where he got the story 
and to give us the details. So my friend told me, and another Minister told 
me, Charles this time they are going to set out to kill you. You should 
escape... I said I am not going to escape, I just sat around and waited and I 
was arrested.... People believed that I was the one who had done it. They 
arrested me, our MD [Managing Director] and the editor of the paper... the 
police... they fingerprint you... and then they start recording your statement. 
But then I noticed they kind of kept me away. They recorded the statement 
of our MD and editor and they kept me behind. I think their calculation was 
that both the MD and the editor would say I took the decision and they would 
release them and keep me. So the story that they wanted to keep me and 
probably torture me or something, you know was actually correct.. But
then... both of them [the MD and editor] said they had the still photo and
they said Charles was not in the country, we just used this photo. So they 
[the police] were very... disappointed when they recorded my statement and 
they were asking me all these questions. I said I don’t know, I don’t know 
because I wasn’t there. But the only thing I could not say was that I had 
opposed the publication of the photo. So again, we were taken to court.545
This was just one of many court battles but until October 2002 the Monitor had never 
been shut down. Under these circumstances, Onyango-Obbo demonstrated a similar
543 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
544 See for example, 14 May 1999, Anne Mugisa, “Monitor Cheifs Charged over Nude Picture”, The 
New Vision’s p. 1.
545 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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willingness to engage and challenge the system in an effort to ‘expand the circle’. As 
he describes:
In October 2002 we had run this story about a helicopter crash...a 
government helicopter had crashed in the north and implicit in the story was 
that it might have been brought down by rebels. The story didn’t say so 
explicitly but I can understand that someone could get that meaning out of it. 
So the government said that it was demoralising the troops because it showed 
that the rebels were very strong and had the capacity to bring down a 
helicopter so it was going to be encouraging the enemy. We knew that there 
was going to be trouble over that story but we didn’t know what kind of 
trouble.
We didn’t imagine at that point that they would close down the 
Monitor ... but we misunderstood the extent of the crisis in the military over 
their inability to control the conflict.... Around 6:00 my cell phone rings and 
the guy says the security people have surrounded the office and they are not 
letting anyone in and they are not letting anyone out. They... have started 
confiscating our communication. So I said, okay let me come. Museveni’s 
minister, he’s been aware that the government can get nasty, so he panics and 
said Charles you cannot go back to the office, you have friends who can 
arrange for you to get out of this country tonight, in 4,5,6 hours you are in 
Kenya, Rwanda or Tanzania. I said no. He said by the time you get to the 
office it will be dark, if they sent armed guys and they have surrounded the 
office what do you think you are going to do? At least wait and go in the 
morning. I told him our MD is in West Africa, it is my responsibility. I have 
always stepped up to the plate in these situations; I am not going to stop now. 
So I left, I called the guy that called me and I asked him to pass by my house. 
I thought that they would have security people at my gate but they didn’t. So 
I said bye to my family I told them that I am going and I don’t know how this 
will end, what will happen. And I drove to the office. You could see these 
guys in military coats with these guns and they had blocked the roads so 
nobody was passing through. So I said it was me, so they let me through. 
The government people had come, there were over 20 cars lined up. You had 
60-100 heavily armed people surrounding the building. You could see the 
gleam from the guns. It was very interesting when I walked in, the reaction of 
everybody. First the staff was very relieved seeing it. But the security people 
just couldn’t comprehend that I knew what happened and I had run back into 
it. They were puzzled. But immediately it kind of gives you an edge and you 
win their respect. It is not that I didn’t have an opportunity [to get out of it or 
leave], given our old networks that we could still activate, but I didn’t.546
Onyango-Obbo was charged and later left, under much pressure from the government,
for a new position at the Nation in Nairobi.547 Nevertheless he continued coming
back to Uganda for the trial:
At that point I used to go back to Uganda every three weeks or so to go to the 
trial for the helicopter story. When I would come, people would say why do 
you come back, you are a free man? Why do you come back? I said because
546 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
547 1 3 December 2002, Feliz Osike, “Monitor’s Obbo moves to Kenya”, The New Vision, p. 1.
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if  I stop the guy wins, if  I lose the case I’ll just stay in a Uganda jail, I’ll 
serve my term and then go back to Kenya. I made that trip for about a year to 
attend the court.548
Onyango-Obbo’s court battles were also the focus of much news coverage in both the 
Monitor and The New Vision which made them all the more effective.
Andrew Mwenda similarly engaged the law in an effort to create more space 
for journalists. During a much-publicised arrest in August of 2005, Mwenda was 
jailed for several days for criticising the Ugandan government for sending Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader John Garang home on an unsafe 
helicopter. Museveni responded personally in a public speech to Mwenda’s 
accusations so it was not a surprise when he was later arrested. Through M wenda’s 
jail diaries that are made public on the Monitor website, one can clearly see that not 
only did he use the opportunity to take advantage of covering a new side of Uganda - 
his fellow inmates - but he also resisted efforts by his friends to release him early. As 
he notes
The last visitors that evening were Capt. Francis Babu, then Minister o f  State 
for Housing, and later Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire. Both wanted to discuss 
with the President the possibility o f  my release. I told them I wanted the law 
to follow its course.549
Mwenda could easily have lobbied to be released but instead he chose to set the legal 
system in motion and use it as a new pulpit for advocating greater media freedoms.
The importance and logic in facing the justice system was part of expanding 
the circle, testing the limits and forcing formal recognition and definition of the space 
in which journalists could operate. With new governing structures, these spaces are 
less defined and tested. The efforts of these journalists have been successful. For 
example, in 2004, the Monitor successfully pushed for the Supreme Court to rule that 
section 50 of the criminal code that allows for two years imprisonment for “false 
news” conflicts with article 29 of the 1995 constitution guaranteeing freedom of 
expression. Onyango-Obbo and Mwenda were charged under this section in 1997 for 
their article entitled “Kabila paid Uganda in Gold”.550 The Monitor has effectively
548 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
549 http://www.themonitor.co.ug/specialincludes/mwenda/index.php. Last accessed 16 December 2007.
550 In 1997 Obbo and Mwenda were charged for the publication o f false news in relation to a story 
alleging that Laurent Kabila, who at the time was struggling to oust DRC dictator Mobutu Sese Seko
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worked to have this code removed and currently has a number of other cases in court
challenging existing codes that it argues penalise the press unduly.
Partly this willingness to challenge the system comes from a belief that
journalists will get a fair hearing and that they do not have to run away but rather can
face the laws and prosecutors fairly, with well-trained lawyers. It also stems from a
belief that greater freedom is possible and that some freedom already exists. As
Onyango-Obbo noted:
You have to have the freedom before you abuse it. The test of whether you 
have a free press is how much you can annoy the powers that be, or abuse the 
freedom and have only public criticism, a legal suit or an advertising ban 
slapped on you as opposed to a total ban of the paper or possibly being 
shot.551
Particularly at the Monitor, there was the notion of ‘keeping things in 
perspective”.
Whatever one says, there is a fundamental difference between the NRM 
government’s attitudes toward the press and that of other governments. It is 
true they get angry and punish newspapers like they did with the advertising 
ban and have arrested journalists. Journalism is not a bed of roses, you have 
to get these pricks, but the NRM government’s first instinct is not to close 
down newspapers.552
At times Onyango-Obbo has also argued
It sounds perversely ironical for someone like me who is often critical of 
government to say this. The NRM government is corrupt and has distasteful 
discriminatory practices towards Ugandans from some parts of the country, 
but on the press they score 7 out of 10.553
Simlar arguments were reiterated in interviews with many journalists from Onyango- 
Obbo’s generation. Without downplaying the courage of journalists such as 
Onyango-Obbo, many of the most prominent journalists that have been willing to 
challenge media restrictions have enjoyed ties with State House from either the days 
of the struggle, family or friends. Museveni has also been willing to engage with 
these journalists informally, it is commonplace for the President to call journalists and
from power, paid both the Ugandan and Rwandan army gold for their assistance. Several years later 
the journalists were acquitted but in 1999 Wafula Oguttu, Charles Onyango-Obbo and Deputy Editor, 
David Ouma Balikowa were charged with criminal libel and the publication of false news again.
551 22 July 1994, Kalenzi, “A two year old Monitor counts the beans”, The Monitor, p. 1.
552 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
553 22 July 1994, Kalenzi, “A two year old Monitor counts the beans”, The Monitor, p. 1.
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to respond to their articles in their paper, which has been important in building
confidence between the government and the press.
Andrew Mwenda is one example of a journalist that seems to have a 
particularly complex relationship with the government as he comes from M useveni’s 
region. It would be naive to think that the personal side does not also play out in the 
has elaborated this complex relationship with Museveni’s family in his
My relationship with the M useveni family and government has 
always been a confusing one. I am always critical o f the president and his 
government. Yet M useveni personally has always given me audience to talk 
to him - on phone or going to see him at state house. Even in our meetings, 
which are always o f an intellectual nature, we disagree a lot but sometimes 
find areas o f agreement.
Museveni's young brother Salim Saleh is a close friend. Indeed, my 
love for Saleh is my worst disease as a journalist. I always pray that 
something doesn't happen to him, yet Saleh has an incredible propensity to 
stir up trouble for himself. Possibly it is because we share this com m on trait 
that we are close friends.555
And when Mwenda was imprisoned and Museveni’s son came to visit him in prison:
We hugged with Muhoozi and laughed at each other. W e were 
supposed to have dinner that weekend. Now we couldn't! He said although he 
totally disagreed with what I said on radio, and thought I had run mad, he still 
felt as a friend he should come and sympathise with me.
He called Saleh on phone and I talked to him. I had thought Saleh 
would say, "Be strong." Instead, he acted in a way uncharacteristic o f  him 
and expressed profound anger with me. This is the second time Saleh 
expressed his anger to me in spite o f  my many provocations; the first time 
being when Museveni delayed to meet me at State House on a scheduled 
appointment and I stubbornly walked away in protest - only to find my phone 
in the car ringing. And who was on the line? Maj. Gen. Joseph Kony!55
Personal relationships are often complicated to decipher but matter greatly in looking 
at the way in which the government has intervened in the media system. Museveni 
has been skilful at co-opting critics but criticism by the older journalists with whom
554 This is especially the case if it involves the President's daughter who Mwenda is rumoured to have 
dated (Mwenda insists she was the one to ask him out). Interview: Mwenda.
555 http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/mwenda/mwe08181 .php. Last accessed 16 December 
2007.
556 Ibid. Joseph Kony is the leader of the LRA. He is extremely elusive and rarely gives interviews to 
journalists.
media. He 
jail diaries:
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he shares a more personal relationship with is often nuanced. Kampala, however, is 
not Uganda and while most journalists are based there the situation is different in 
other areas of the country.
4.3 Beyond Kampala
Journalists in Northern Uganda, in particular, are regularly targeted by media
legislation which the government selectively applies. The NRM is particularly
sensitive to reporting on the army and is often used as the rationale, particularly
during debates in parliament on the role of the press in nation-building, for restricting
the press. In the late 1980s this issue was debated extensively in relation to the Penal
Code Act amendment bill in 1988. Arguing in support of a section amendment James
Tumwesigye illustrates the common perspective of the government:
There is no unlimited freedom... all these freedoms have got some 
limitations. But somehow, some people do not understand this. They think 
that freedom is unlimited and they have the right to say anything irrespective 
of the harm that this may do to other people and the society as a whole. In 
this respect I would like to note some examples where our newspapers have 
been guilty of excesses.558
Among a number of examples, Tumwesigye cites:
There have been reports in the local newspaper discouraging the peace talks 
that have been going on between the government and UPDA [Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army]. Now, what interest does such a newspaper 
serve? We have insecurity, we have conflicts and when two parties sit 
together to create harmony, the newspaper comes out and says, this is no 
good, the talks will fail; this and that and that.. . .559
The amendment was passed by parliament criminalising the publication of anything 
about the army unless explicitly approved as not jeopardising national security.
557 It is also important to note that Museveni is deeply sensitive about reporting on his family. As 
Oguttu notes
There have been issues of corruption relating to Janet, the first lady as well as the 
wealth of Museveni’s children. If you publish about it, they’ll arrest you. You can’t 
write that Janet was involved in two murders....Museveni is giving away state land 
to mistresses - you can’t write that (Interview: Oguttu).
Sseezi-Cheeye notoriously opened his first edition of Uganda Confidential with the news that 
Museveni’s wife was involved in a murder; not surprisingly he was arrested for this. But nevertheless 
he remains close to those in power and is currently a Presidential advisor.
558 HASERT, 13 July 1988. Bills, second reading the penal code act amendment bill, 1988, p. 83
559 Ibid.
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Activities included under this would be about the movement or supplies of the army 
or the enemy as well as specific operations.
Not all journalists are willing to face charges or readily provoke the 
government, particularly in territory that is notoriously controversial such as national 
security. Many journalists avoid security issues and those that are assigned to report 
on the war in the North or other related military activities, such as Uganda’s 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tread with great caution and 
often self-censor. Most journalists agree that there is one set of rules for reporting in 
Kampala and another set of rules that journalists must abide by in the countryside or 
particularly in the North.560 As James Oketch Bitek, the Monitor Bureau chief in Gulu 
explains:
Reporting in a war zone isn’t easy. If you report government losses with the 
rebels they aren’t happy. For self-survival you need to analyse things on your 
own.... When we report on government forces we are summoned. When the 
war was quite serious it was more problematic though.... There have been a 
lot of changes. We [the Monitor] may not be as vigorous as in the past. Our 
reporting style has changed. Most of the managers now agree with the 
government, they have their own style. We at the grassroots level may have 
to change; if you write a very hard-hitting story it can be altered so you learn 
to write that way. For now we can go ahead with the new style.561
Bitek also highlighted what he believed to be the differences between The New Vision 
reporting and the Monitor reporting:
The New Vision does some propaganda for the military officers: if there has 
been no serious fighting they might write and say that a lot of people were 
killed. For the Monitor, we demand to be taken to the scene. We want to 
witness the result of the battle, unless it’s in Sudan but even we’ve been 
going there. Before you write the story you look at the impact, then you see 
if you can put it right. If not, you leave it. For example, the President 
[Museveni] made a statement that was sort of nasty. The New Vision went 
with it but the BBC and we abandoned it. The New Vision had to write 
retracting the whole story because it would endanger the relations between 
Sudan and Uganda and the local people. You have to abandon it for the good 
of society.562
560 The government’s sensitivity to reporting outside of the capital is also illustrated by the ban 
imposed by the Media Centre on foreign journalists in the run-up to the election stating that they must 
stay within 200 km of the capital.
561 Interview: James Oketch Bitek.
562 Interview: Bitek
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Particularly in the North, an opposition stronghold, navigating the election period 
highlighted the difficulties in reporting there.563
Younger journalists who lack the network of connections with those in power, 
as well as the journalists operating outside Kampala, have to tread more sensitively 
than their more prominent and politically connected colleagues. As the older 
generation has gradually been less influential, and thus the strategy of informal media 
engagement Museveni cultivated has been less possible, the government has adapted 
by formalising the government-press interaction.
4.4 Formalising state- media interaction: The Uganda Media Centre564
A notable development in the shift to more formal methods of dispensing 
information and engaging with the media is the establishment of the Uganda Media 
Centre. It was established prior to the 2006 elections and until late 2006 Robert 
Kabushenga served as director. The Media Centre is located in a small house in 
Kampala and has the look of a well-funded NGO rather than a government ministry. 
This is indicative of a lesson from The New Vision: it is easier to start from scratch 
than to reform an existing complex bureaucratic ministry.
563 Choice FM, for example, was shut down during the recent elections allegedly for failing to follow  
the codes outlined by the Media Council including recording and maintaining records of broadcasts as 
well as for not renewing its license. Journalists Sam Lawino, the editor, and Obol Nelson, the 
Manager, argued that the Broadcasting Council came, took away all their documents and then they just 
disappeared leaving them with no way to prove that they had the proper license and documents.
In Northern Uganda, Mega FM and Choice FM are the two largest stations (there are others, 
including King Radio and Radio 4, but they are smaller with less reach). Mega FM, for all o f its virtues 
and important contributions in promoting peace in the region, is pro-government. Choice FM was the 
station of choice for the opposition during the elections and there were some very heated debates with 
opposition leaders including Besigye. While the government certainly didn’t like what Choice was 
broadcasting, as with much in Uganda, there is another dimension that Lawino and Nelson mentioned. 
Much of politics and the media is personal and on air during a debate between the incumbent and 
challenger for municipal elections, Gulu Resident District Commissioner Walter Ochora became 
furious and used vulgar, obscene language abusing Norbert Mao (the challenger). Without being asked 
directly, however, during an interview Ochora denied having any contact with Choice FM saying “I 
never listened to Choice before it was closed. Mega was preferred because of the wide coverage.” He 
also said that “They [Choice] would get opposition candidates to air their view- why they should be 
voted and then they went beyond- they started insulting and provoking the other side.” (Interview: 
Walter Ochora). Since decisions to close or restrict particular media outlets are often made locally 
legislation is often employed in an ad-hoc and inconsistent way.
These journalists seldom have the connections with those in power in Kampala that the 
influential print journalists have. The role o f informal engagement on the part of the government 
cannot be underestimated and certainly has limited the ability and opportunities for journalists working 
outside of Kampala to effectively challenge legislation or ensure it is applied consistently.
564Available at: http://www.mediacentre.go.ug
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The mandate of the Uganda Media Centre is similar to that of a Ministry of 
Information. According to Kabushenga, the changing media scene with its multitudes 
of media outlets necessitates a shift away from just ownership to engagement. No 
longer is it simply enough that the government owns both The New Vision and Radio 
Uganda: it needs to have a public diplomacy strategy of managing information in a 
systematic way. Thus Kabushenga saw his mandate as not merely a presidential 
spokesperson but as the director of the government’s communication strategy that 
must reach all the people in Uganda, manage Uganda’s reputation abroad and 
harmonise the voices of the government.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Uganda Media Centre is that it has 
been directly modelled on South Africa’s Government Communication Information 
Service (GCIS).565 Kabushenga and his colleagues simply went to the GCIS website
While Museveni has been accessible to journalists, the blossoming of over 
one-hundred radio stations has made it difficult for one person, no matter how 
charming and accommodating, to engage with all journalists and make his arguments 
public. Thus, in an effort to insert the government’s perspective into this more 
decentralised public debate a government representative is provided to go on the 
radio. The Uganda Media Centre helps by giving pro-government or sympathetic 
members of parliament key information to be used in the debate. This is also part of 
an effort to harmonise ministries as it is common for individual ministries to have 
their own communications strategies to benefit the minister, serving as “a platform for 
prominence and to show that they are more hardworking then everyone else”.567 The 
Uganda Media Centre has tried to put forward a unified line through regular press 
briefings and restricting the public remarks of individual ministers.
Managing the country’s reputation abroad has also been given new emphasis. 
The South African GCIS focus on coordinating the message of their embassies has 
proved particularly instructive. As the international community has focused on the re­
writing of the constitution and the continuing war in the North, Museveni’s 
government has been under increasing pressure to control this information and 
counter it.
In sum, the Uganda Media Centre is essentially seeking to disseminate
propaganda and control information both within the country and internationally. And
just as the Media Centre was strategically established before the 2006 elections,
current efforts of government propaganda are in anticipation of the 2011 elections.
As Kabushenga explained,
In the last elections we were totally missing a communication strategy. I want 
to have the firefight now and have a consistent argument using the media. It 
is easier to do that than be repressive, it is cheaper.568
From experience prior to, and during, the 2006 election, many journalists are sceptical 
and wary about the Uganda Media Centre as they consider it to have been intolerant 
and restrictive towards both local and international journalists. Thus, if the Centre
weeks, and we called in those people to come and study our scheme here... 
(Interview: Benjamin Mkapa).
567 Interview: Kabushenga.
e r o
Interview: Kabushenga.
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wishes to gain the sort of acceptable reputation that the GCIS enjoys, there is a good 
amount of work to be done building bridges and repairing the damage by 
Kabushenga.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has put forward some new ways of beginning to understand the 
press system in Uganda. It has challenged prevailing notions about the Monitor as 
‘opposition’ press and has thrown into question what exactly it means to be 
‘opposition’ in such a complex and politicised environment. As will be elaborated in 
the coming chapter, the Monitor, as both a product and critic of the NRM has played 
an important role in nation-building and providing a forum for debate and 
reconciliation. Similarly, the unique role of The New Vision as a government paper in 
encouraging consensus on the national project and encouraging institutionalisation of 
the stands in contrast to that of its counterpart in Ethiopia, The Ethiopian 
Herald!Addis Zemen.
In addition, the importance of journalists in challenging and engaging with the 
government, and vice versa has been discussed. During the nation-building process, 
the boundaries were not always evident and thus it has rested on both sides to engage 
in defining them through legal precedents and the process of ‘expanding the circle’. 
However, actors that could engage in this are slowly becoming less influential and 
active and are rather being replaced by a group of more ‘professionalised’ and even 
‘objective’ journalists. As the founders of not only the Monitor, but also The New 
Vision are being replaced, so too are the papers’ objectives and the space for factions 
to meet, debate and dialogue is also evolving. It is on this note that we turn to the final 
chapter of this part to examine the political and social structure that has shaped the 
press environment and contributed to its development and the current trend.
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CHAPTER 8 
The Political and Social Structure That Has Shaped 
Uganda’s Media System:
Guerrilla War, Political Experience and Practical Calculations
No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard; 
it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country.
In Africa, we have seen so many changes that change, 
as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil 
We have had one group getting rid of another one, 
only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced....
Past regimes have used sectarianism to divide people along religious and tribal lines.
But why should religion become a political matter?
Religious matters are between you and your god: 
politics is about the provision of roads, water, drugs in hospitals, 
and schools for children.
Don’t you see that people who divide you are only using 
you for their own selfish interests?
Our Movement is strong because it has solved the 
problem of tribal and religious division.
-President Museveni 
1986 Inauguration
The recent history of the press in Uganda must be understood within the 
context of the NRM’s claims to bring unity, reconciliation and peace to the nation and 
the extent to which it has been successful. The NRM has been Uganda’s most 
democratic and effective government. Even Museveni’s harshest critics concede that 
the country has experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth and 
widespread peace and security, particularly in the south. In most parts of Uganda 
poverty has been reduced, though this has been affected by HIV/AIDS rates and 
population growth. Nevertheless, the government has recently embarked on 
ambitious social programmes such as free universal primary education.
Uganda appears strong, stable and relatively progressive compared to Ethiopia 
but it is not a complete success story of advancing peace and justice. The ongoing 
rebellion in the North with the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has impoverished and 
marginalised a significant portion of Ugandans, as has the war in the West against the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Uganda is also currently involved in the war in the
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and there is systematic discrimination 
towards other groups within the state including the Karamojong.569
There is substantial literature on political development from the colonial 
period to the contemporary. Academics have been particularly interested in the impact 
of colonialism,570 land policy,571 the Lords Resistance Army,572 democratic 
movements and the structure of governance, including the Resistance Councils 
(RCs)574 established by the NRM. The process of nation-building has had a strong 
impact on the press and the press has also contributed to political developments.
Following the framework of analysis for the political variables, the first 
section of this chapter will begin with the NRM’s nation-building process focusing on 
the NRM’s ideology and the liberation war. Several factors relating to the 
development of the press system will be elaborated including: a) the early focus of the 
NRM on regional liberation struggles which has endowed the current government 
with a regional focus and mediated some initially strong Leninist leanings; b) 
Museveni’s leadership and personality as it sets the tone of the present government 
and plays a key role in government-press relations; and c) the emphasis the NRM 
placed on persuading people in the bush which was carried over into the government 
and impacted not only their own press, but the way in which they engaged journalists.
The second section considers the consolidation of power specifically 
addressing the role of participation, the Resistance Councils, and the unique one-party
569 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1999b) Hostile to Democracy: The Movement Systme and Political 
Repression in Uganda. IN WATCH, H. R. (Ed.) New York, Human Rights Watch, MUGAJU, J. & 
OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) (2000) No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities, 
Kampala, Fountain Press, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1999a) Hostile to Democracy: The Movement 
System and Political Repression in Uganda. New York.
570 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
571 BAZAARA, N. (1994) Land Policy and the Evolving Forms of Land Tenure in Masindi District. IN 
MAMDANI, M. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular 
Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna, JEP.
572 ALLEN, T. (2006) Trial Justice, London, Zed, BEHREND, H. (1998) War in Northern Uganda. IN 
CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African Guerrillas. Oxford, James Currey.
573 OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (1994) Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda: A Historical 
Perspective. IN MAMDANI, M. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) Uganda: Studies in Living
Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna, JEP.
574 DDUNGU, E. (1994) Popular Forms and the Question of Democracy: The Case of Resistance 
Councils in Uganda. IN MAMDANI, M. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) Uganda: Studies in Living 
Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna, JEP, BRETT, E. A. (1994) Rebuilding 
Organization Capacity in Uganda Under the National Resistance Movement. The Journal o f Modem  
African Studies, 32,53-80.
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Movement system. The press has been an important tool for creating consensus, 
explaining the NRM to the public and fostering a forum for elites and factions to 
debate. Museveni has also sought to consolidate his power through less democratic 
means, including patronage and war. This early process of nation-building, 
particularly the first ten to fifteen years, has been definitive in govemment-press 
relations.
A third section on reconciliation and trust and confidence building extends the 
analysis to include the process of incorporating former opposition elements and civil 
servants, including those from the former Ministry of Information, as a means of 
developing and presenting a new vision of Uganda. The government also facilitated 
and allowed a national debate, within certain bounds, for which the press served as an 
important forum for discussion on what the country’s new agenda should be. With a 
new style of ‘populism’, Museveni’s role in building trust between the population and 
the government, engaging critics and conveying the impression of listening to the 
concerns of his people, has been important in the development and role of both the 
independent and government press.
The fourth section addresses the international dimensions of the political 
process and argues that while the NRM appears particularly sensitive to donor and 
international concerns on governance, it is also willing to take risks when it comes to 
silencing critics. A key feature of the NRM, particularly in comparison with Ethiopia, 
is its regional and outward focus. Not only does Uganda aspire to be a leader within 
the East Africa Community but the NRM also compares itself to regional standards, 
including of the press, in neighbouring Kenya and Tanzania, both of which are more 
democratic.
Together these four sections will argue how the unique ideology of the 
liberation movement, along with the substantial and generally successful process of 
reconciliation, consensus building and consolidation of a national agenda has been 
instrumental in shaping the press system as it is today. At the same time, the press 
has been important in providing a forum for elites and factions to meet, debate and 
discuss the national project. Unfortunately, however, this progress seems to be very 
much in jeopardy at present as the NRM increasingly appears to be proving right
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those critics who argue the Movement is nothing more than a cover for a single party 
autocracy.575
1. Ideology of the guerrilla movement
1.1 Lessons from Southern African insurgencies and nation-building projects
The NRA/M was the first African guerrilla insurgency to defeat an incumbent 
African regime and establish a successful and enduring post-insurgency 
government. As an exceptionally effective and stable movement, the revolutionary 
ideology and methods of insurgency warfare that Museveni elaborated impacted post­
insurgency governments and movements across the region including Ethiopia and 
Eritrea as well as Rwanda, Zaire, Sudan and Somalia. The commitment of the NRA to 
achieving non-coercive and non-sectarian civilian support for the guerrilla struggle 
was unusual577 and impacted government strategy towards the press.
In 1967 Museveni went into exile and joined Dar-es-Salaam University where 
he was active in radical student politics. President Julius Nyerere’s progressive 
leadership was a major draw and influence for Museveni and other liberation fighters, 
as it served as not only an ideological beacon of liberation but he was actively 
supporting movements across the continent. Museveni made contact with Nyerere 
who was assisting Obote against Idi Amin, and obtained the Tanzanian President’s 
support with the condition that all the opposition groups would gather under Obote’s 
leadership. While there was some attempt on Museveni’s part to do this, there was 
fundamental disagreement as Obote insisted that all the resistance be under his 
leadership as president.578
575 MUGISHA, A. (2004) Museveni's Machinations. Journal o f Democracy, 15, 140-144, OLOKA- 
ONYANGO, J. (2000a) New Wine or New Bottles. IN MUGAJU, J. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. 
(Eds.) No-party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities. Kampala, Fountain Publishers, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (1999b) Hostile to Democracy: The Movement Systme and Political Repression in 
Uganda. IN WATCH, H. R. (Ed.) New York, Human Rights Watch, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(1999a) Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda. New York.
576 CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) (1998) African Guerillas, Oxford, James Currey.
577 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
578 NGOGA, P. (1998) Uganda: The National Resistance Army. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerillas. Oxford, James Currey.
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In response to being unable to find common ground, the Front for National 
Salvation (Fronasa) was formed in August 1971 and became a precursor to the 
NRM/A. Underlying the choice in pursuing a liberation struggle was a belief, 
following the Frente de Libertacao’s (Frelimo) experience, that it could give birth to a 
new society founded on equality and non-ascriptive politics.579 Frelimo, at the time, 
was fighting an insurgent war against the Portuguese colonialists in Northern 
Mozambique that emphasised support of the people as an imperative for winning a 
war. As a student, Museveni had organised a trip for a student group to visit Frelimo 
in the liberated zones and after Fronasa was established cadres were sent to 
Mozambique to be trained with Frelimo.
The attempts to overthrow Amin in 1972 were unsuccessful and resulted in 
hundreds of casualties. Fronasa worked to establish resistance cells within Uganda, 
but these soon failed as the plot was uncovered and the members were publicly 
executed. In 1978-1979, the Tanzanian army led a successful invasion, with the 
assistance of a number of exile groups including Fronasa, to overthrow Amin and 
install Professor Lule as President. Museveni served as a minister in this government 
and competed during the 1980 democratic elections under the Uganda Patriotic 
Movement (UPM).
While in Tanzania Museveni and his colleagues learned much from the 
Tanzanian example of the media’s role in nation building and liberation struggles. As 
former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa explained, Tanzania’s strategy during 
this period was:
First we gave voice to the movements. We gave voice. Oh yes, we gave 
pages to them. We would interview them, we would reproduce their 
manifestos, we would publish their press releases which would give them a 
great deal of confidence. [This was done] to educate our own people so that 
they didn’t lower their support for the liberation. And particularly with 
regard to the radio.. .they were given special time which was beamed to all 
Southern Africa, so that helped them to carry the message.. ,580
In response to a question about The Uganda Resistance News in particular, and the 
importance of an international media strategy as well as Tanzania’s interest in this, 
Mkapa explained:
580 Interview: Benjamin Mkapa.
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The liberation movements tried to have a press wing, a press officer, whose 
job was really to scan through the newspapers, at the time we had no internet 
of course, but to focus on them, to direct comments.... It was very important 
particularly for the outside world.... Reuters would pick up whatever it 
was... and put it on the international news. But in our country it was really 
in making sure that there was no flagging in the support for the liberation 
movement... among the population. Although we did not suffer as much as 
Zambia, for instance... nevertheless we made lots of sacrifices. You see, we 
would have rallies and these people would volunteer... clothes for the 
refugees and stuff like that... so you had to uphold that support and it helped 
to tell the people how effective the liberation movement was.581
As will be elaborated in the coming sections, Tanzanian support and the example set 
by their government was important for the NRM in providing both lessons in 
liberation strategy and the potential role of the media during a guerrilla war.
1.2 The political and social ideology of the NRM in the bush
The 1980 elections marked the birth of the NRM.582 In that year, with the 
support of Nyerere, Obote claimed to have won the elections though they were 
probably rigged, particularly in Southern Uganda since Obote’s supporters were 
mostly in the North. Because of the presence of the Tanzanian army, Museveni and 
his allies realised that removing Obote by a coup d’etat would have been impossible. 
The environment was conducive instead for a guerrilla struggle, an action that 
complemented the NRM’s political ideology.583
According to its doctrine the NRM needed time to educate and organise 
people as well as to establish the structures that could replace the weak state that 
currently existed. From the start, political education was central throughout the 
struggle and succeeded in helping the NRM to develop a strong political base. The 
NRM was influenced by Mao Tse Tung’s argument that political mobilisation is the 
crucial starting point for any insurgency and it also drew on Che Guevara’s foco
581 Interview: Mkapa.
582 In 1981 when the war began, the NRM was initially known as the Popular Resistance Army (PRA). 
It did not adopt the name NRM/A until merging with Professor Lule’s exiled Uganda Freedom Fighters 
(UFF). The UFF contributed little more than Lule’s name to the struggle as he became the nominal 
head of the organization though he passed away during the struggle formalizing Museveni as the head 
of the NRM/A.
583 NGOGA, P. (1998) Uganda: The National Resistance Army. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerillas. Oxford, James Currey.
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theory that the government’s repressive reactions to insurgencies would mobilise 
support among the population.584
This theory, also shared in Ethiopia by the TPLF, had momentum early on in 
the NRA’s struggle as the United National Liberation Army (UNLA) was loathed in 
many parts of the country, particularly in Buganda where Obote was despised for his 
treatment of the Kabaka in 1966 and in West Nile where the population was being 
attacked for supposedly continuing to support Amin. Young people turned to the 
NRM as an alternative after experiencing torture at the hands of the Obote regime or 
being persecuted as a possible NRM sympathiser. Tutsi refugees from Rwanda in 
exile in Uganda were also a major target for persecution because many had previously 
supported the DP against the UPC. Obote also tried to portray Museveni as a 
Rwandan interfering in Uganda’s internal affairs. This accusation, combined with the 
attacks on the Rwandan community, provoked support and by January 1986 a quarter 
of the NRA was of Rwandan origin.585
The repression of the Obote regime increased as the NRA became 
increasingly successful. Thus just as Mengistu was the best recruiting tool for the 
TPLF, Obote did the same for the NRA; and both guerrilla movements were careful 
about maintaining good relations with civilians by avoiding unnecessary pressures or 
harassment.
In the early days of the struggle, the NRA paused for several months to 
consolidate lessons learned from their initial hit-and-run operations and also to go 
underground for a period to recruit further members and strengthen connections with 
the local population. The NRA was operating solely in Buganda in the area northwest 
of Kampala, an area known as the Luwero Triangle, situated between the roads that 
went North from Kampala to Gulu and northwest from Kampala to Hoima and the 
Kafu River. The NRA was unique in that there was virtually no outside assistance 
given; the single contribution came from Libya although it amounted to no more than 
a small cache and they relied mainly on capturing weapons from government 
forces.586
584 Ibid.
585 Ibid.
586 Ibid.
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During this period Museveni also went abroad for several months to gamer 
international support. At this time it became evident just how dependent the NRM 
was on his personal leadership - very little could happen when he was away. After 
wide-ranging discussions within the Movement it was concluded that they could not 
be so reliant on the leadership of a single individual so the organisation structure was 
reformed. Despite this, the NRM today continues to a degree of dependence on 
Museveni as his unique form of democratic populism has continued to characterise 
governance in Uganda.587
During the struggle, the NRM developed a political system in pyramid form 
that was a precursor to the Resistance Councils, which later became institutionalised 
when it came to power. Influenced by Lenin’s principles of democratic centralism, 
the National Resistance Council was the head of this structure and sought to develop a 
commitment to the central organisation and give peasant communities self- 
government without constraining the central leadership. The novelty of the system 
was also its emphasis on community rather than individual rights.588 Museveni was 
head of the National Resistance Army Council (NRAC) and High Command, which 
were responsible for setting military policy and leading the insurgency. In an effort to 
reduce reliance on Museveni the NRAC included commanders of all battalions and 
heads of administrative departments. Policy and Administrative Committees were 
established to advise the commanding officers.
A Political Commissar was also established to ensure that all Movement 
supporters and fighters were fully indoctrinated in the rational of the struggle. 
Soldiers were encouraged to engage in constructive criticism as they were permitted 
to criticise commanding officers as long as it was done in good faith and openly. This 
was regarded as an important part of the process and later had an impact on the NRMs 
approach to the press and tolerance of debate.
The fighters had a strict code of conduct for which some offences were 
considered to be ‘Category A’ which could lead to the death penalty and included 
crimes such as murdering a civilian and treason. ‘Category B’ crimes were less
587 CARBONE, G. (2004) 'Populism' visits Africa: the case of Yoweri Museveni and no-party 
democracy in Uganda. Crisis States Research Centre's Annual Workshop. Delhi.
588 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 201.
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serious and included theft, encouraging tribalism and claiming group victories as your 
own; punishment was less severe and could include suspension, demotion or
C Q Q
imprisonment. The Movement took great care to ensure that tribalism did not 
become a problem and promotion was based on achievement rather than education 
and induction training was uniform regardless of background.
The National Resistance Council (NRC), as the main political organ, was 
broken down into several committees including the External Subcommittee which 
was tasked with mobilising support internationally primarily from Ugandans in exile. 
It was based in Nairobi and headed by Matthew Rukikaire whose remit also included 
publishing the Uganda Resistance News which, as discussed in Chapter 6, was a key 
component of the public information strategy. The Political and Diplomatic Sub­
committee590 was headed by Museveni’s deputy in the NRA High Command, Eriya 
Kategaya, and was responsible for informing the international community and 
organising the Resistance Councils in the liberated zone
Political education of the fighters and the population was key as the people 
were seen as an ally in the struggle and campaigns. As Kategaya describes:
I would encourage fighters to read the history of Uganda. We also looked to 
Mozambique, Vietnam for their armed politicians and South Africa, Cuba so 
officers could appreciate other armed struggles. We saw ourselves as part of 
this broader community.591
In addition, he notes that
The NRA invested heavily in persuading people. They had a political and 
military wing, they’d go and educate people in the village to be mobilised, 
they’d talk and explain the cause. It was modelled after the Maoist, Chinese 
movement. Maoist movements invest in persuasion, political debate. 
Guerrilla movements that were supported by Soviets cared more about the 
military. Regarding freedom of expression, you can’t mobilise support 
without feedback.592
This emphasis on persuasion is a key characteristic of the NRM that has influenced 
the way it sees the role of the press and as discussed earlier, specifically influenced 
The New Vision.
589 NGOGA, P. (1998) Uganda: The National Resistance Army. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerillas. Oxford, James Currey.
590 There was also the Finance and Supplies Committee which, as its name implies, coordinated 
supplies for struggle and managed the organization’s finances and was headed by Zak Kaheru.
591 Interview: Eriya Kategaya.
592 Interview: Kategaya.
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Whilst in the bush, the NRM also developed a clear political agenda to
mobilise the people in support of the values and objectives for which it fought. This
plan, known as the Ten-Point Programme was implemented as the political agenda
when the NRM came to power. The introduction to the programme states that:
The Ten Point Programme or areas which the Movement pledges to cover in 
the programme are democracy, security, unity, independence, economy, 
social services, misuse of public office, displaced persons, regional co­
operation and strategy of the mixed economy by the Movement and acts as a 
guide in the people’s struggle against the neo-colonial regimes.593
The Ten-Point Programme is a fundamental part of the ideology of the NRM and the 
process of political transformation it has attempted to implement. The programme 
describes why Uganda is ‘stagnant’ economically and how the points could form “a 
basis for a national coalition of democratic, political and social forces, that could at 
last, bring some motion”.594 The first point of the programme emphasised the 
“establishment of popular democracy” that included three elements- parliamentary 
democracy, popular democracy (the resistance councils) and a decent level of living 
for every Ugandan. The second point addressed the “restoration of security” allowing 
for the disappearance of state inspired violence and the protection of private property. 
The ‘consolidation of National Unity’ was the third point, noting that one of the 
principal causes of strife in the country has been sectarian violence and that this has 
hindered groups working together for national development causes.595 The Ten-Point 
Programme was later replaced by the Fifteen-Point Programme and also set the 
precedent for the Eight-Point Programme that the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
implemented when it came to power in Rwanda.
593 NRM (undated) Ten-Point Programme of NRM Kampala, NRM Publications.
594 Ibid.
595 The fourth point looks at ‘Defending National Independence’ which points critically at the 
interventions of international actors in Amin and Obote’s time- particularly of Westerners and argues 
that Ugandan interests must come first and absolute independence from all external actors is key. Point 
five extensively outlines “Building a National Economy” and notes that this is “probably the most 
important point of the whole programme” and advocates a mixed and integrated economy that is not 
dependent on external actors but is self-sufficient. The sixth point advocates for the Restoration and 
rehabilitation of Social Services including health, education, and access to clean water. Elimination of 
corruption and misuse of power is the following point followed by the resettlement of the displaced 
people is point eight. Point 9 looks at regional cooperation and human rights that primarily advocate 
for regional collaborations. The final point is on following a strategy of mixed economy- a rejection of 
the laissez faire of pure capitalism but a system in which the state takes over particular sectors to guide 
the economy while the majority of economic activities will be carried out by private entrepreneurs. 
(Ibid.).
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The NRM’s particular style of democratic populism, with a strong investment 
in persuasion initiated during the struggle, not only influenced the way in which the 
NRM consolidated power after taking over the state but it has also affected the way in 
which the government and press relate. In contrast with the EPRDF’s emphasis on 
convincing the population of its cause through demonstrating progress, the NRM’s 
persuasive strategy requires the leadership to debate and argue its case, while 
accepting criticism, thus making government and press relations important.
2. The process of state construction and the consolidation of power
The Obote regime was eventually overthrown by an internal coup d’etat in 
July 1985 and replaced by the weak government of Tito Okello. In December 1983, 
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) commander Oyite Ojok died in a 
helicopter crash and the UNLA proved unable to function without his leadership. 
Disputes over his succession also arose between the Acholi and Langi groups further 
weakening an already delicate situation. The NRA used this period to consolidate 
gains and attract large numbers of troops that defected from the UNLA. It succeeded 
in gaining control of the entire southwest of the country. While President Moi of 
Kenya brought together Okello’s government and the NRA for peace talks in Nairobi, 
the NRA merely used them to buy time, as it did not need to negotiate with a military 
victory within reach.
NRA troops seized Kampala on 26 January 1986. While there are many 
factors this success can be attributed to, some have argued that none have been more 
influential than Museveni himself. When Museveni emerged from the bush in the 
1980s few Ugandans knew who he was but were pleasantly surprised with the 
charismatic intellectual that led the war.596 As Patrick Ngoga notes:
596 There is a small body of literature that addresses the personality of Museveni and his role in shaping 
Uganda, including works by the author himself. See for example, OTTAWAY, M. (1999) Africa's 
New Leaders, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment, AMAZA, O. O. (1998) Museveni's Long March 
from Guerilla to Statesman, Kampala, Fountain, MUSEVENI, Y. K. (1992) What is Africa's Problem?, 
Kampala, NRM , CARBONE, G. (2004) 'Populism' visits Africa: the case of Yoweri Museveni and no­
party democracy in Uganda. Crisis States Research Centre's Annual Workshop. Delhi, KASSIMIR, R. 
(1999) Review: Reading Museveni: Structure, Agency and Pedagogy in Ugandan Politics. Canadian 
Journal o f African Studies/  Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, 33, No. 2/3, 649-673, 
MUSEVENI, Y. (1997) Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle fo r  Freedom and Democracy in
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But one critical variable in assessing not only the success of the NRA during 
the insurgent war, but also the achievements of the post-insurgent 
government, was the strong and visionary leadership of Yoweri Museveni, 
which is readily obscured by an emphasis on more general variables such as 
‘popular support’. Although any effective insurgency requires a combination 
of leadership and support of the people, there may be considerable variation 
in the significance of each.... Museveni remained its [the NRA’s] military 
and political pillar. This in no way implies that his leadership was the sole 
determining factor in the NRA’s success, but it does suggest that it was the 
single most important factor.597
Today, twenty years later many question whether the Movement can survive without 
him. Nevertheless, the process of state construction and the consolidation of power 
were advanced by resistance councils, constitutional revisions and more contentious 
means such as patronage.
2.1 A single-party system: participation and persuasion
When the NRM came to power, party politics were banned, partly because the 
leadership feared the largely unknown NRM might not win. The NRM also believed 
that it was party politics that had been dividing and destroying the country and the 
pluralist democratic model was inappropriate for the current stage of Uganda’s 
development. Underlying the argument for single-party rule was the concern that in 
the West political parties represent the class interests of industrialised societies while 
in Uganda, because it is pre-industrialised, parties may only represent ethnic or 
religious groups thereby accentuating divisions.
The NRM argued that the Movement system differed from regular one-party 
systems because everyone could participate and elect representatives. The Resistance 
Councils (RCs), which were started during the war, have been the most unique and 
illustrative manifestation and have been a central part of the NRM’s strategy to 
consolidate its power and bring peace to the country. RCs were initially established 
up as rebel support structures during the struggle as a means of directing food and 
supplies to NRA fighters. After coming to power, RCs were established in every
Uganda, London, MacMillan, MUSEVENI, Y. (1990) The State of the Nation. IN MUSEVENI, Y. 
(Ed.) Consolidating the Revolution. Kampala, NRM Publications.
597 NGOGA, P. (1998) Uganda: The National Resistance Army. IN CLAPHAM, C. (Ed.) African 
Guerillas. Oxford, James Currey.
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district and since the 1996 elections have been referred to as Local Councils.598 There 
has been fascination with the RCs by political scientists and African scholars, many 
of whom initially praised the RCs as an innovative model.599 In 1988 Eriya Kategaya, 
at the time First Deputy Prime Minister, argued the important role of the RCs in 
creating unity:
Because for the first time people are meeting in RCs regardless of their 
political belief in one organisation which has never been there before. 
Before, our people were fighting through parties. Even brothers who are in 
different parties would not meet to discuss their problems but now through 
RCs, all members of the community at the village level meet and discuss
their problems  People can sit down and talk together, discuss their
problems in the village, look for solutions to those problems regardless of 
their political beliefs, even religion. ... During the stmggle... the lesson we 
learnt is that when people are having a common objective, they will really 
unite regardless of tribe and religion.600
In line with creating this unity, the RCs were also regarded as a liberating force for 
women by giving them a voice as there was a requirement for each committee to have 
a woman representative.
The RCs were also seen as a way for people to practice democracy. Some
might argue they were a way to keep people sufficiently amused with the pretence of
democracy whilst the leadership indulged in patronage and authoritarian tendencies,
but consistent with the view of Museveni as ‘the teacher’, RCs were regarded as a
“big school” for teaching appropriate democratic habits. According to the NRM,
these habits were not natural but have to be practiced. As Kategaya elaborates:
I hope that through the RCs we shall teach our people to accept and handle 
different points of view and even when there are differences to regard each 
other as Ugandans first and foremost. The holding of different views does 
not make you less of a citizen than the other and this has been a problem in 
this country where you find that somebody loses a job because he is reported
598 There are five levels of the local councils (LCs). LC1 is responsible for the village, LC2 is the 
muluka, LC3 is the gombolola, LC4 is the saza, while LC 5 is responsible for the entire district. 
Problems are to be presented at the lowest level and make their way through the levels until the 
problem is sufficiently addressed or resolved. Similarly, directives are channeled down through the 
levels until implemented at the appropriate local level. All LCs are elected directly by the people and 
the national government represents itself through Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) at the 
district level. The relationship between the LC5 Chairman and the RDC can sometimes be complex 
and it is difficult to decipher who is more powerful but it can also vary between districts.
599 REGAN, A. (1998) Decentralization Policy: Reshaping State and Society. IN HANSEN, H. B. & 
TWADDLE, M. (Eds.) Developing Uganda. Oxford, James Currey, BRETT, E. A. (1994) Rebuilding 
Organization Capacity in Uganda Under the National Resistance Movement. The Journal o f Modem  
African Studies, 32,53-80.
HASERT, 7 June 1988, National Resistance Council, p. 160.
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to you as having voted a wrong party. Now what does engineering got to do 
with voting?601
The democracy the NRM believed it facilitated was also more direct and 
active than parliamentary democracy where voters might vote once every several 
years. Part of the rational behind the RCs was that Ugandans would have to be 
concerned and participate on a daily basis and this involvement was a way to 
strengthen internal security. By attempting to provide a framework through which 
conflicts could be resolved and justice executed, it was the NRM’s hope that fewer 
people would resort to violence; much in the same way that the press can serve as a 
forum for elite negotiation.
The development of the press must also been seen in the context of the 
Resistance Councils and the policies of constructive criticism. When the NRM first 
came to power, they did not have a coherent strategy for approaching the media. The 
extent to which The New Vision was strategically planned by the NRM to alter the
f.ryy
discourse in society or to shape the media environment is debatable. It did not 
necessarily anticipate how it would evolve and The New Vision has been more 
dynamic and professional than most expected. When William Pike was asked 
whether the paper was a clearly articulated part of the new government’s strategy he 
replied:
No, they didn’t choose to, it was an accident. I think they just set up the 
newspaper, got us to do it, and we did it and you know, built up our own 
track record.... I don’t think it was a policy.... You know there were so many 
problems then and everyone was chipping in and everyone was trying to do 
what they could and so we were trying to do what we could and other people 
were trying to do what they could and it was like re-building a country... I 
don’t think that they were consciously thinking that the radio was different or 
the TV was different to the newspaper.603
Even if the beginnings of The New Vision were characterised more by the initiatives 
of single individuals, it was the RCs and the policies of constructive criticism which
601 Ibid. p. 162.
602 Justus Asiimwe, an engineer involved in setting up the Russian printing press for The New Vision, 
said that the original plan for the paper was actually created during the Obote II regime and was to 
develop a far-reaching paper called the National Mirror. The printing presses were to be distributed in 
Kampala, Mbarara and Soroti but were sitting in Kampala and not yet functioning because the project 
was being stalled with each change of the government. And similarly, there was the example 
mentioned earlier of The People newspaper under Obote I.
603 Interview: Pike.
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set the pace for these initiatives to emerge and to build a dialogue with the public. For 
Kategaya:
The New Vision was a new thing, the idea that you could have a government paper 
free enough to have opposition views. In 1986 we tried to bring together new and 
different forces. We created a broad administration so we needed a new press.604
While the paper initially was used for explaining the NRM, its tolerance for debate 
also stemmed from a belief that it was an important part of the process as well as 
confidence that the NRM was secure in its leadership position and The New Vision 
would only bolster its case for the Movement. As Minister Buturo argued: “The New 
Vision has come from growing confidence; we can easily connect with the population. 
We have regular elections and enjoy support throughout the country. The New Vision 
can write like any paper.”605 And in founding editor James Tumusiime’s words: 
“People embraced The New Vision. It was new thinking with a new government. It 
was something you didn’t have before. A government paper that reports a drunk 
minister—people gained faith and that Minister was sacked.”606 Thus, as the 
government was seeking to consolidate its power it represented a shift from the status 
quo and facilitated a debate between different factions.
2.2 Constitution building
The emphasis on participation was also important and exceptional in the 
crafting of a new constitution. Few other countries in the world have embarked on 
such an ambitious process of consultation which was, by most accounts, widely
fiOninclusive, thorough and relatively transparent. This also stands in significant 
contrast to the case of Ethiopia.
In 1989 Museveni established a special Constitutional Commission under the 
leadership of Supreme Court judge Justice Ben Odoki that was tasked with consulting 
the people and preparing a draft for approval by a constituent assembly; fresh 
presidential and parliamentary elections were then to be held under this constitution 
which was approved in 1995. The primary issues for the constitutional commission 
had to do with federalism versus centralism, the reinstatement of monarchies, and
604 Interview: Kategaya.
605 Interview: Buturo.
606 Interview: James Tumusiime.
607 BUSSEY, E. (2005) Constitutional Dialogue in Uganda. Journal of African Law, 4 9 ,1 - 23.
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whether the Movement system should continue or multipartyism should be 
reintroduced. A unitary system was chosen while it was decided that the Movement 
system should continue indefinitely. There were widespread community consultations 
and while most citizens lacked the information, skills and education, to assess and 
evaluate the constitution, there was nevertheless, a general acceptance of the 
document. At the same time, however, the government has also used other means to 
consolidate power.
2.3 Consolidating power through less democratic means
The greatest challenge for the constitution and the Movement system came 
from Museveni himself and his advocacy to repeal Article 105(2), which limits the 
terms a President can serve to two, in a 2005 constitutional referendum thereby 
allowing him his current term. The controversial referendum was extremely divisive 
and many have regarded it as a sign that the Movement has lost its way, though some
ZAQ
also argue that democratic talk has never been more than a facade.
Ministers who opposed Museveni’s third term project were initially forced to 
resign and even after the election this remains a sensitive issue. For example, it has 
been suggested that William Pike was forced to resign as CEO of The New Vision 
because he was fundamentally opposed. Kategaya, is one person, however, who has 
survived in Museveni’s government as a Minister despite his public criticism and a 
period with the opposition. He suggests that “changing the constitution creates a 
credibility gap. But it would be okay, if there was a need for changing the 
constitution.” However, his time with the opposition left him unconvinced of the 
alternative. He felt that the opposition needed to “sit down, build the party first- 
attacking Museveni isn’t a programme.”609 So Kategaya returned to the NRM and 
currently serves as minister of the East Africa Community.
608 MUGAJU, J. (2000) A Historical Background to Uganda's No-Party Democracy. IN MUGAJU, J. 
& OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) No-Party Democracy in Uganda. Kampala, Fountain, OLOKA- 
ONYANGO, J. (2000b) New Wine or New Bottles? Movement Politics and One-partyism in Uganda. 
IN MUGAJU, J. & OLOKA-ONYANGO, J. (Eds.) No-Party Democracy in Uganda. Kampala, 
Fountain.
609 Interview: Kategaya.
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Museveni has sought to consolidate power in other ways beyond changing the 
constitution. There have long been accusations that the NRM violates human rights 
and intimidates opposition supporters. And there is widespread acknowledgement that 
corruption has also been part of Museveni’s strategy for consolidating power and 
fulfilling desires of public gain. Museveni has been tolerant and even facilitated 
access to resources for leading elites as part of an effort to keep them within the ruling 
party and loyal. A complex system of patronage has become entrenched within the 
system that the newspapers appear to have had little effect in curbing.
For example, the issue of ghost soldiers fighting the LRA has been a very 
publicised scandal as it has been estimated that 25 million USD was being lost every 
year to pay soldiers who did not exist.610 While some in the UPDF have been 
sacrificed as an attempt to demonstrate that the problem was being tackled, arguments 
have regularly been put forth about the extent to which the NRM uses the war in the 
North as a means for continuing to inflate the defence budget and gather resources to 
maintain the system of patronage. Given that donors are deeply involved in 
overseeing and managing parts of the budget in other areas (such as health and 
education), the defence budget is the most accessible for manipulation. Foreign aid
also has had a role in allowing the current system of patronage to grow and has
facilitated Museveni’s consolidation of power. As Mwenda and Tangri have strongly 
argued,
Large amounts of aid have enabled the government to ensure law and order 
and address basic needs including education, health care and infrastructure. 
Foreign aid has also enhanced the popular legitimacy of the Movement 
regime. But it has also sustained the patronage of that regime. Large aid
flows, which have been channelled through the state, have expanded the
public resources available to the government.611
Given such systemic examples, it does not appear that corruption is likely to decline 
in the near future but is instead becoming increasingly entrenched, particularly in the 
media as Museveni continues to buy-off critics. As Andrew Mwenda argues 
“Museveni can be very intolerant but he respects debate.... But if you live off him
610 TANGRI, R. & MWENDA, A. (2006) Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption 
Institutions in Uganda. Journal of Modem African Studies, 44, 1,101-124.
611 MWENDA, A. M. & TANGRI, R. (2005) Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime 
Consolidation in Uganda. African Affairs, 104/416,449-467. p. 453.
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financially, if he pays or bribes you, he makes you silent.” While dissent and 
debate have been important tools in demonstrating the uniqueness of the single party 
Movement system, patronage has had a role in keeping the debate within certain 
bounds.
Despite the clear shortcomings of its strategy to consolidate power, the NRM 
has been effective in creating the strongest state in Uganda’s history. The RCs have 
been a way to involve the masses in the Movement and essentially consent to the 
process. The emphasis on participation has also shaped the press and political 
environment in several important ways. A vibrant civil society has emerged which 
debates and discussions are conducted on critical issues from human rights to 
development. Non-governmental actors have been encouraged by the government, 
engaged and have had a stake in political and social processes.613 While not everyone 
agrees,614 many Ugandan seem to have largely put the past behind them and are 
focused on future goals and developm ent615
3. Reconciliation
The process of reconciliation has not only been key in consolidating power 
within the nation-building process but also in encouraging the press system to develop 
the way it has. The government has had to work hard to gain the trust and confidence 
of all sectors of society, including the media, which has been an important forum for 
creating consensus. This section probes into issues and the process in greater depth.
612 Interview: Mwenda.
613 Though it has been noted that NGO’s in themselves have not necessarily increased political 
participation DICKLICH, S. (1998) Indigenous NGOs and Political Participation. IN HANSEN, H. B. 
& TWADDLE, M. (Eds.) Developing Uganda. Oxford, James Currey.
614 MUTUA, M. (2007) Beyond Juba: Does Uganda Need a National Truth and Reconciliation 
Process? Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 13,401-414.
615 Charles Onyango-Obbo, for example, argues that it is precisely because Uganda has had such an 
unstable history that there is more peace now, particularly in contrast to the recent events post-election 
violence in Kenya. Uganda, with nine leaders since independence, has given the chance for different 
leadership from various regions or tribes to have control o f the central government thus, over time, 
fewer communities have been excluded from power. In addition, the violent and chaotic past, has 
allowed fro more national issues to be dealt with (as has also been the case in Rwanda). This has not 
been the case in either Kenya or Tanzania. 2 January 2008, Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Election mess, is 
Uganda now better than Kenya?”, Daily Monitor, p. 3 Available at: 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/Charles Onyango Obbo/Election mess is Uganda now be 
tter than Kenva.shtml.
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3.1 Incorporating civil servants and opposition
When the NRM came to power, there were a number of different groups
fighting the central government including the Former Uganda National Army
(FUNA), Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), Uganda National
Liberation Army (UNLA) and the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM). The NRM
attempted to reconcile and integrate those that it defeated both militarily and
politically.616 Militarily, as Museveni argued,
...we use principled reconciliation, not cover up. By the 24th of January 
1986, for instance, we had 12 brigades of our resistance army, which we used 
to defeat the last faction of the neo-colonial dictatorships. However, by the 
end of 1986, we had added another 10 brigades, mainly, from the forces we 
had defeated. By effecting national reconciliation, we were able, within one 
year, to cope with Sudanese aggression on our own. Eventually, we gained 
the upper hand over both Sudan and their proteges in their destabilisation of
m ust be d e lv ed  into and add ressed . O th erw ise , you  are p ostp on in g
617prob lem s.
lad to bring these different factions together. The state was weak and if 
hting continued, peace would be impossible.
NRM justified the insurgency as necessary to overturn the fraudulent 
1980, but when it came to power it did not call for immediate elections, 
irst had to create a broad based, but not a coalition, government which 
existing parties (the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), Democratic Party 
ervative Party (CP) and Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM)). The 
was framed in such a way as to give people a sense of belonging, 
that not every part will be equal, nor will it necessarily be democratic, but 
ryone will be represented. The press also played a role in allowing an 
eating consensus. James Tumusiime, the first editor of The New Vision, 
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this environment, The New Vision saw its role, at least initially, to “emphasise facts 
and be a newspaper of record. We didn’t have any problems until 1987 when the war
/ r i o
in the North intensified and I was threatened to be sacked for reporting on this.”
The NRM was also careful not to exacerbate these different factions by 
dismissing civil servants who were serving under previous governments including 
those working for Radio Uganda or UTV. Kategaya recollects that in the immediate 
aftermath of the NRM coming to power,
In the political history of Uganda, one group comes and sweeps everyone out. We 
said we must have a stop to this. If he worked for Radio Uganda maybe he didn’t 
believe it but he survived. Our main concern was to let everyone settle down, not feel 
harassed. We had 500,000 refugees in Sudan, we told them to walk back. We wanted 
to make sure everyone was comfortable in the country and show that you are new 
group, you have different thinking.619
The retention of civil servants contributed to the general feeling that Museveni was
indeed bringing the peace and security he promised. Former Minister of Information
Nsaba Buturo notes that in the Ministry of Information,
This government didn’t go about dismissing those they thought were 
unfriendly. Those that wanted to continue working could. If you are to get 
stability you don’t interfere.... Stability can only be when you carry-on with 
everyone so there have not really been arrests either. [Uganda] has a
turbulent past so achieving stability only happens when you involve
620everyone.
Jack Turyamwijuka, Head of Radio Uganda during the transition from Obote to
Museveni, corroborated this when he noted that:
No one was fired when the Movement came to power.... People were civil 
servants but now they are independently recruited. For our editorial policy, 
having the other independent radio stations makes little point in restricting 
government radio because if you don’t say it, others will. Radio Uganda now 
has a board of directors. Most are former civil servants but there are business 
people as well. ... No one was sacked during the transition. Civil servants 
were not affected by change of power.621
In contrast with Ethiopia, this inclusive process helped to build confidence in the 
NRM and win over sceptics. A point reiterated in many interviews was that this 
strategy also kept potential critics of the government close and part of the system.
618 Interview: James Tumusiime.
619 Interview: Kategaya.
620 Interview: Nsaba Buturo.
621 Interview: Jack Turyamwijuka.
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These organisations with large bureaucracies are difficult to reform but
working with the existing journalists, even in the context of starting an entirely new
media enterprise could reap valuable results. Crucially, The New Vision, which
importantly was a new start in many respects, hired some of the journalists from the
recently collapsed Uganda Times. Incorporating the Uganda Times' journalists was
difficult because as James Tumusiime pointed out,
Most of the journalists were used to propaganda and advancing a particular 
cause. They couldn’t imagine they could write openly... the nucleus team 
going to run the paper was far from cohesive. A climate of suspicion hung 
over the paper as old political beliefs simmered below the surface. Many of 
the recruits who came in from outside thought that those they found there 
were moles of the old regime. This kept the latter on the defensive.622
But at the same time it provided a valuable opportunity for beginning to create
consensus. These journalists necessarily had a different perspective of the recent
changes in Uganda and one had to create consensus or mutually accepted facts before
it would be possible to report on the new directions Uganda was heading. Pike
describes one of his first initiatives when he arrived twenty years ago and people
could rarely agree on basic issues.
The journalists in The New Vision were essentially, at that stage, the 
journalists from the old government newspaper. They completely denied that 
people had been killed in Luwero so one of the first things I did after a 
couple of months was hire some buses and go out to Luwero and start 
kicking bones around in banana plantations. And then they were very 
shocked but there was a complete mismatch [on issues], I think there are 
some issues now, you could see this argument about Kony now, and should 
Kony get amnesty? Most Northerners... are accepting that Kony committed 
atrocities. I mean it’s not disputed.... The government also committed 
atrocities but actually the key facts are mostly agreed on. The motives of the 
government might be disputed, but key facts are accepted whereas in ’86 
even key facts weren’t accepted. So I think the media as a whole, not just The 
New Vision, by providing comprehensive information has really helped to 
build that kind of consensus.623
Gradually a new team was built, journalists were trained and the paper was able to 
carve out its own independent direction.
This process has been an important component of nation-building. In contrast 
with Ethiopia, where the former Ministry of Information officials under the Derg 
were forced to resign and consequently channelled their bitterness and opposition to
622 Interview: James Tumusiime.
623 Interview: Pike.
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the government into private papers,624 keeping the former Amin and Obote journalists 
as part of the system and engaged reduced the necessity for them to seek employment 
as opposition. They were also less likely to be as deeply opposed to the changes as 
they had vested interests in the new system.
3.2 Engaging with opposition ideas and forging a national agenda
The NRM allowed political space for dissenting voices thereby inhibiting the 
development of insurgencies. Dr. Ssemwogerere, Second Deputy Prime Minister, 
argued this rationale in parliament during a debate on the Penal Code Amendment 
Bill in 1988:
Mr. Chairman, we talk of human rights. The fight- verbal on paper or in the 
bush or wherever, against Obote One, against Idi Amin, against Obote Two, 
etc.; fundamental arrests on the fight for the preservation of human rights in 
this country.... you must accept that Uganda is mature enough to contribute 
to this culture of human rights in Africa. And that is why we must dismiss 
from our minds- and I pray earnestly- once and for all any temptation to 
make the same mistakes, which have been made by many people all over the 
world over generations with the same results....
And the question is: ‘what is the ultimate cause?’ And we know that many of 
them are fighting because there is no political space for organised defence. 
They go underground.625
Tolerating some political space and engaging with opposing voices can keep
enemies close and operating within a particular national agenda. Compared to the
radio, The New Vision had a relatively limited reach, which allowed the government
to test out its ideas of extending constructive criticism to the public while being
careful of its potential impact. Pike notes that The New Vision developed from what
the NRM was practicing in the bush where
They used to have rallies or parades where the soldiers were allowed to 
criticise the officers, as long as it’s done openly in good faith.... And the rule 
was that you would never get in trouble as a soldier for practicing the 
principle of constructive criticism. So really the newspaper was an extension 
of that.... They came out, they were a guerrilla army but as a guerrilla army
624 It also parallels the way in which the NRM and TPLF handled the government armed forces when 
they came to power. The broader lessons of reconciliation and incorporation within these institutions 
are evident and have most recently been demonstrated in Iraq where the US occupying forces made the 
grave error of dismantling the Iraqi army- only to have them re-emerge unemployed as various 
insurgencies.
625 HANSARD, 12 July 1988, The penal code amendment bill, pp. 68-69.
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they’d supported free speech, constructive criticism and that kind of thing so 
they wanted that to continue in the newspaper.626
This argument is corroborated with Haserts reporting discussions in parliament, such
as by Dr. Ssemwogerere, during the early days of the NRM government. The
background is also further outlined in an article in the fourth The New Vision paper
quoting Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Mr. Abu Mayanja. The Minister
is reported as saying that
The newspaper should not censor any honest opinion but that instead it 
should encourage debate on matters like security, economy, politicisation and 
other issues which affect all Ugandans...Ugandans who have strong cases to 
argue... use the newspaper for that purpose... no single individual or group 
has all the answers to our problems... let us encourage positive criticism 
because we as a government are not enemies of the people.627
While criticisms of some policies were tolerated, attacks on the NRM were
not always welcomed by the public as a whole. The anti-state press, for example,
gained little traction in Uganda. When the NRM came to power Munnansi and The
Citizen were published by the Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress
published The People. But these papers offered few alternatives to NRM policy,
frequently were inaccurate and failed to appropriately gauge the mood of the country.
They would, for example, repeatedly refer to the NRM as a ‘dictatorship’. Charles
Onyango-Obbo describes one such incident:
When Shariat, [in about 1995], called President Museveni an adulterer, 
murderer and a mad man, it thought it would sell highly in Gulu where the 
government is unpopular. However, it got the shock of its life when it sold 
only five copies in this town where the government is most hated. The
government paper, The New Vision, in contrast sold 300 copies on that
628issue.
Much of the population was looking first and foremost for peace and security,
which also suggests why The New Vision was so popular with its debates happening
within a certain framework of tolerated dissent. As Onyango-Obbo argues,
Museveni’s war resonated a lot...it was not going to be just a change of 
government but... it was going to be a remake of the whole character of 
Uganda as it had been from the time of 1900 or the First World War. So to 
the extent that intellectual space in Uganda had for a long time been 
dominated by the South and Western elites, when Museveni came to power
626 Interview: Pike.
627 9 April 1986, “Vision role spelt out”, The New Vision, pp. 1 and 8.
628 24 July 1999, Onyango-Obbo, ‘T o cry or not cry for the independent press”, The Monitor, p. 3.
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there was no dissent from the very beginning.... The strength of Museveni 
was massive.629
Nevertheless, Onyango-Obbo was one of the first people to write a column in the
Weekly Topic, and later the Monitor, criticising him. While the publishers and the
editors of both papers thought the Movement was ‘a good thing’, Onyango-Obbo
expressed his concern that
Africa doesn’t have a good experience where you get democracy through a 
dictatorship [and] Uganda should get very used to a culture of dissent early 
otherwise we are just going to create a big man and someone that is 
uncontrollable.630
Onyango-Obbo also argued that he
Didn’t support the economic policies of the day, they tended to be statist... 
and once you monopolise the economic space... it means you have controlled 
all space for any other possible social action. So all that happens is that a 
government grows but a society atrophies.631
But as Onyango-Obbo admits at the time “no one else really shared those views”.
Criticising the Movement system also immediately pigeonholed someone to
be seen as opposition. While today Onyango-Obbo might feel somewhat vindicated
by how the political process has unfolded, he argues that at the time, perhaps his
criticism of the Movement was
A mistake, in the sense that people were not ready for that. In a way it was 
based on simple persuasion rather than the evidence because people were 
saying okay, where is the evidence that he [Museveni] is going to become a 
dictator and all these terrible things are going to happen. All you could point 
to at the time was historical precedents. So in many ways I think that we had 
a disconnect and because I did these things very early... when most of the 
country was still really in a euphoric moment you get straight jacketed.... 
You grow in the popular imagination of people of just someone who is 
dogmatically opposed.632
While the population may not have been initially particularly enthusiastic, the 
arguments did gain traction over time.
As discussed in the previous chapter, critiques such as Onyango-Obbo’s were 
tolerated and even tacitly endorsed by the government as dissent and criticism was 
seen as a central part of the Movement system; thus the government not only came to
629 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
631 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
632 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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rely on the perception of the Monitor as opposition but even encouraged it (a trend
that has been seen from the beginning through the 2006 election). The freedom to
engage in debate separated the Movement from other single-party systems and
Museveni needed papers like the Monitor to prove that the Movement system was
indeed different. The paper might not have been perceived as an opposition actor to
the same extent if it had been operating in a multi-party system but the fact that
Uganda was “a virtual one party system was almost a fascination to some people”,
Onyango-Obbo said. He also argued,
In Uganda, I think because of the one party thing it had this predicament. 
Museveni needed an alibi to show that there is this unique thing called the 
Movement system and it has all the attributes of a leader of a political 
system, except that you cannot run on a party platform, but you can run on 
leader merit. So they had to allow the press to try it. What they didn't 
foresee is that because the political state was fairly restrictive, that the 
independent media... any newspaper or radio, which had the courage, would 
eventually... come to capture the emotion of a lot of people as a platform by 
people who are trying to force the system. The Museveni government then 
came to rely [on the Monitor]... They used the existence of it- they would 
say, look at the paper like the Monitor. There are very few markers of a 
democracy and they would point to Tanzania and Kenya, which have 
newspapers which are critical, so then they say look you cannot therefore 
deny the fact that we have something special and unique happening here. So 
in many ways we also became a pawn of the regime.633
Thus for the government, having public debates and the Monitor as a critic or 
opposition was an essential part of validating the Movement system as a whole.
At the same time, however, the Monitor acting as an opposition force has been
credited with contributing to the overall political maturation of the society as well as
the national project. Maurice Ssekawungu, associate editor of The New Vision,
strongly believes that papers, such as the Monitor, were helping to create checks and
balances that restrain the government and foster public debate. Ssekawungu argued
that US President GW Bush would be “a despot if he were running a third world
country” which highlights the need for a strong system and that in Uganda,
the opposition papers are helping to build up a system. The role needs to be 
taken on not only by the opposition papers but others. The opposition can 
support building the system because they have the freedom....634
633 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
634 Interview: Ssekawungu.
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The question for Ugandan journalists and the press according to Ssekawungu is “how 
can we support systems to grow, how can we be willing co-partners? How do we 
make the politicians be co-partners and identify common objectives?” There has been 
a strong desire by many journalists to set or shape an agenda and in the one party 
system the media has been the most viable outlet. Crucially, however, the Monitor did 
not disagree with the fundamentals of the national project. Initially, at least, it was 
only critical of the execution of particular parts of it.
The government’s engagement with opposition and critical ideals during the 
early period as the NRM was consolidating power was important not only in 
preventing the development of insurgencies, as Dr. Ssemwogerere, Second Deputy 
Prime Minister argued during the parliamentary debate on the penal code, but also 
in making people feel empowered to contribute to what could be considered a 
national debate. This has been possible because of the willingness of the government, 
particularly the executive, to not only recognise such criticism to be valid but to 
directly respond to it.636 In addition, this opportunity to use the press to vent 
frustration and anger at the government did, however, make retreating to an armed 
struggle less of a possibility for different factions. With space to continue their fight 
or struggle verbally, pursuing violence seemed a less appealing or necessary option. 
At the same time, the government was able to dismiss their arguments of ruling as a 
dictatorship by allowing the most press freedom ever enjoyed in Uganda since 
independence.
Finally, in the process of reconciliation personalities matter. As was 
elaborated in the previous chapter, Museveni’s style of guerrilla fighter and 
intellectual has been very popular and has even been gaining traction in other 
countries in the region.637 His mix of paternalism and populism, as both a teacher and 
a man of the people, proved powerful and particularly successful in the initial years of 
the NRM government. Since coming to power, Museveni regularly held court, often
635 As mentioned in his extensive quote several pages earlier.
636 See for example, Museveni’s notorious lengthy reply to Sseeyzi-Cheeye in the Uganda 
Confidential. 15 March 1992, Museveni, “President Museveni Replies to ‘Uganda Confidential’, 
Uganda Confidential, p.. 1. In the same paper, Eriya Kategaya, then First Deputy Prime Minister, also 
responded to accusations against him. 15 March 1992, Kategaya, “Kategaya hits back”, Uganda 
Confidential, p. 7.
637 Guerilla leaders in Rwanda and the DRC have adopted elements of his style.
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inviting journalists to his Rwakitura ranch where he claims to know all the names of 
his hundreds of cows.
However, while the government has tolerated opposition views and built 
confidence among critics, reconciliation has not been straightforward nor is it a 
complete process. Museveni has been criticised for increasing ethnic and tribal 
tensions. Critics maintain that he regularly favours people from his group and the war 
in the North is seen as an example of his willingness to persecute Ugandans for his 
own political ends. Nevertheless, Museveni’s unique style of democratic populism 
has arguably facilitated trust and reconciliation among many Ugandans and 
encouraged the growth of a press that has been relatively sympathetic to his initial 
vision of a national project.
4. International dimensions
The international dimensions of Uganda’s nation-building project must also be 
considered as they have had a strong influence in the political calculations of the 
NRM. It is, however, different than in Ethiopia which is of greater strategic 
importance to countries like the US and enjoys more power in ignoring international 
pressures.
With fifty percent of the Ugandan government’s annual budget coming from
multilateral and bilateral assistance, the government is sensitive to donor demands for
democracy and tolerance of an independent media. Museveni reportedly stated:
The people who have opened their markets to us are the ones who want to 
open political space to multiparty politics.... We should not take decisions 
that will scare away investors because, if there is disinvestment, it will take 
years and years before we can convince them to return. So we need to make 
a tactical compromise in order to realise our strategic objectives.... China can 
afford to say “no” to them and get away with it. But we are a small and poor 
country. Here we are with both internal political agitation for multiparty 
politics and external pressure. So let us open up as a matter of strategy since 
we cannot face them like China, in order to let our economic transition 
continue undisturbed.638
638 22 February 2003, Mwenda, “Museveni was firm as Movement diehards opposed opening up”, The 
Monitor, p.3.
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Donor contribution to Uganda significantly increased between 1989 and 1994.639 
During the Cold War there was less interest on the part of the donors in promoting 
democracy across the continent and Museveni’s pronouncements of establishing a 
mixed economy were too leftist for many western governments.
Uganda has become an economic success story for donors and is praised for 
achieving high growth rates and being friendly towards businesses. During the early 
1990’s Uganda’s GDP was growing steadily and rapidly and donors were reluctant to 
push political reform for fear of upsetting this strong performance. Western 
governments have also relied on Uganda as a partner to achieve their foreign policy 
goals and has proven itself to be strongly pro-US in its relationship with Sudan and 
has even provided the troops for the African Union mission in Somalia in 2007 - a 
mission that no other African country has released troops for, despite various pledges.
Not surprisingly, the Ugandan government is sensitive to the local and 
international media that influences the opinions of donor countries. As Minister 
Buturo argued, “the Monitor is a major source of news for the international 
community... we don’t think they are balanced as they are a major source of negative 
perception.”640 It isn’t only negative political publicity that the government is worried 
about but the more general image of Uganda is also a concern. Partly this seems to be 
an issue of pride- government officials expressed concern that papers run articles 
suggesting that the city is dirty or falling apart which discourages visitors.641
This government has also been willing to engage outsiders more than its 
predecessors did and it has been more open to providing access to information than 
many other governments on the continent. Access to Ministers, government officials 
and documentation is relatively easy and foreigners are treated with less suspicion 
than in countries like Ethiopia. This is, however, not to suggest that international 
criticism is welcome. While there are no cases that I have found where foreign 
academics have not been allowed into the country for a paper they have written (as a
639 For more on donor involvement see, HAUSER, E. (1999) Ugandan relations with Western donors in 
the 1990s: what impact on democratisation? The Journal o f M odem African Studies, 37, 4, p. 621- 641.
640 Interview: Buturo.
641 The impact of the media (both local and international) on tourism has long been an issue for the 
NRM. 9 November 1999, Wa Mucoori, “Bad News! Tourists are staying away, minister blames the 
press...”, The Monitor, p. 25.
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number have been refused visas in Ethiopia), journalists have occasionally had more 
problems.
The most controversial, and relatively exceptional, case recently involved the 
Canadian journalist Blake Lambert who was working for the Economist and Christian 
Science Monitor. Lambert was denied re-entry to Uganda on 8 March 2006 after a 
short visit to South Africa. He had written a number of reports critical of the war in 
the North and the coming elections. The renewal of his press accreditation was an 
area of previous contestation; it had expired in January and Father John Mary 
Wiliggo, head of the Media Council, argued that it would be hard to deny 
accreditation to Lambert because the Council had “members who belong to various 
political affiliations and ideas” and “it is never easy to push them into one 
direction”.642 Thus, under pressure of the Ministry of Information and the Media 
Centre, Lambert was censored using the Immigration Code. Lambert was not alone 
in coming under pressure from the Media Centre; Will Ross from the BBC was also 
reportedly warned by Kabushenga that an extension of his accreditation was 
dependent on his reporting. Consequently, after he wrote a report on the death of 
seven civilians in a refugee camp, his accreditation was cut from one year to four 
months.643 Restrictions such as an order forbidding international correspondents to 
travel more than 100 km from Kampala without the permission of the Media Centre 
prior to the 2006 elections were also imposed.
From the perspective of Kabushenga, the problem with Lambert’s reporting 
was that it was tarnishing the image of stability that the government had worked so 
hard to build. In 1986, he noted, there were 60,000 visitors while today there are 
600,000, and it has taken a long time to build up this confidence. The suggestion that 
Uganda is sliding back to Idi Amin’s days, he argued, could encourage embassies to 
send out messages for their citizens to avoid the region. Kabushenga is not alone in 
believing that the region suffers from constant negative publicity; but for him this
642 1 April 2006, Robert Menard, “How to kick a foreign journalist out o f Uganda”, Daily Monitor. 
Available at:
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/opinions/How to kick a foreign journalist out of Uganda 
.shtml.
643 25 January 2006, Reporters Sans Frontiers report, “Government puts foreign press under close 
watch four weeks before election”. Available at: www.rsf.org/article.php37id article^ 16267.
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negative reporting in the name of democracy is apparently a cost not worth bearing.644
International pressure by NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, Committee to 
Protect Journalists and Amnesty International, appears to have been a consideration 
for government employees such as Kabushenga but has not been a defining factor. 
The quality of the research by these groups has generally been dismissed by the 
government. In response to the internal debate about whether Lambert should be 
denied entry, Kabushenga noted “We knew CPJ etc. [would respond], we weighed it, 
and it was better to suffer that”.645
It is not only western demands that are putting pressure on Uganda for 
political reform. The progress towards multi-partyism in Kenya and Tanzania, 
Uganda’s neighbours and strongest allies, is increasing momentum for change. The 
three countries share strong political, social and economic ties and are working 
towards establishing an East African Economic Community (EAEC). Eriya Kategaya 
is currently the Minister in charge of this portfolio but there have been rumours that if 
Museveni ever stepped down as President, becoming head of the EAEC is a job he 
covets. One-party rule in Tanzania began in 1961 and recently ended in 1992 when 
the country adopted a multiparty system and held competitive elections in 1995 and 
2000 with a change in presidency. Kenya too made the shift in 1991 and held 
elections in 1992. In 2002, it became the first East African country in which a leader 
of an opposition party peacefully replaced the ruling party. Uganda not only feels the 
pressure from Western governments but also from its own neighbourhood- a factor 
that may well be even more important.
644 He also notes the irony that it is the same international newspapers that come to him in an effort to 
sell tourism or investment supplements to advertise Uganda’s opportunities internationally.
645 Overtime, the government came to see journalists as affiliated with the West. In a press conference 
Museveni gave for journalists in 1996, he noted this at least three times stating “I think we shall have 
to examine the rights of the newspapers. Of course now you say, that you are children of the Western 
countries- that if we touch you, the Western countries will cut off aid, this is how you can even insult 
people”. He later referred to the Fredrick [Ebert] Foundation as “those sponsors of yours” and argued 
that “Although you think you have got an alliance with these Western countries which give us money- 
because that is how you can insult people, if  it was not for tat you can be sure you would never insult 
some people here”. 14-17 June 1996, Owachi, “Papers, police, northern rebels fighting me- Museveni”, 
The Monitor, p. 9.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter has elaborated the complex political dimensions of the press 
system tracing the development of the NRM’s approach towards the press and 
broader processes of debate and engagement from the bush through the 2006 election 
period. While the NRM developed a media organisation during the guerrilla war, it 
was really their experience in convincing and engaging people to participate in the 
struggle that set a tone for later policies. A tolerance of dissent, debate and criticism 
continued into the NRM government helping to contribute to the uniqueness of the 
single party nation-building project. At the same time, Museveni and his colleagues 
proved adept in not only incorporating different factions into the government (at the 
same time he chose to engage some militarily as demonstrated by the war with the 
LRA in the North) but they also used the press as a tool for reconciliation. His 
personal style of populist leadership and a willingness to personally engage with 
journalists shaped a space for trust-building. In addition the role of The New Vision, a 
particularly exceptional enterprise as a government-owned paper, was important in 
engaging with the Monitor and creating a strong forum for debate and dialogue for 
competing factions.
Together with chapters 6 and 7 a nuanced portrait of the development and role 
of the press in Uganda has been developed. Chapter 6 focused on the press system 
while chapter 7 the political system. As these three chapters have elaborated, the 
press in Uganda has played an important role in the nation-building project and was 
largely driven by a generation of journalists that were very much a part of the NRM’s 
struggles but succeeded in creating a unique and constructive press environment. As 
noted by William Pike’s agenda for The New Vision there was an important role for 
the press to play in reconciling historical myths and creating consensus on the past, 
particularly among elites, so the country could move forward. At the same time, the 
Monitor effectively showed the government that there was another side that they must 
consider. The press in Uganda, however, adopted the role of an ‘opposition’ to some 
degree because it was clear that in the single-party government the outlets for dissent 
were relatively demarcated and clear. This is unlike Ethiopia where the government 
purported to be democratic and practice multi-partyism when it was evidently not the
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case. This caused deep frustrations among factions that wished to compete with the 
EPRDF’s political ideas but were unable to engage in dialogue with the government.
The elite press has been changing as the political system has moved away
from its ideals when the NRM first came to power. Discontent with the nation-
building process has increased significantly in recent years and some are suggesting
the only way Museveni will leave power is through a coup.646 Onyango-Obbo
expressed concern about the present lack of a national agenda and has argued that it is
not just a problem endemic to Uganda but is reflective of a broader political crisis that
has affected the continent:
If you look at the whole of Africa today you don’t have what you call a 
national party.... Tanzania and Botswana are the last nationalist parties. 
What has happened since is there are regional parties or you have tribal 
parties... or as in Kenya, tribal coalitions, so the big national parties have 
actually died. The only national institution that has political influence in 
Africa today is the media. Whereas previously you could see the competition 
between the national media and the ruling party as giving two views of the 
nation. Today you have a contest between the media and the government, a 
contest between the national position and the regional tribal position.647
The fact that the media served as providing some semblance of a national agenda and 
debate in Uganda is an important differentiating factor from Ethiopia where the press 
has never been able to take on that role but has largely represented particular interests.
However, the important argument that Onyango-Obbo is making, and others 
have also suggested recently, is that the national agenda is being lost to Museveni’s 
personal quest for holding on to power and thus the national dialogue is becoming 
increasingly localised. Slowly the influence and role of the media as a political actor 
in Uganda is also being eroded. Thus, while progress has been made in expanding, 
professionalising and institutionalising the media environment, its role as a nation- 
builder and mediator is declining. Turning now to the conclusion, Uganda will be 
compared with Ethiopia further highlighting the differences between the 
developments and role of the press and political system in the transitions nations after 
civil wars; thus distilling the unique role the press may play in such situations.
646 Interview: Esther Nakkazi.
647 Interview: Onyango-Obbo.
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CHAPTER 9
The Press, Politics, Nation-building and Elite Negotiation
The comparative study of Ethiopia and Uganda has illuminated when and how 
the press has a role in the complex nation-building processes of conflict and post­
conflict states. By focusing on the ideas and strategies for political transition and 
transformation that began before Museveni and Meles came to power, and continuing 
the analysis well into their tenure, the origin and evolution of certain ideologies that 
still influence the present have been identified.
Why the Ethiopian government silenced the press while the press remains 
vibrant in Uganda is a key question raised in this thesis and points to the difficulties 
of reconciling the rhetoric and reality of leaders and regimes trying to win 
international support. As with democracy in general, press freedom is an ideological 
conquest against great odds; it took Europeans and North Americans centuries to 
develop the press systems that exist today, which are still seldom perfect or uniform. 
It requires acquiring skills and trust both of which come slowly, particularly for 
countries emerging from or engaged in violent conflict. And there are always 
divergent perspectives on what the role of the press should be at particular times in 
different societies.
Both Meles and Museveni faced internal and external pressures to democratise 
and liberalise the press. There were two main domestic calculations that they shared: 
first, because the TPLF and NRM used much of their propaganda to repudiate the 
government’s of Obote and Mengistu for human rights abuses there was some 
obligation to differentiate themselves from these leaders with clear policy differences. 
Secondly, the NRM and EPRDF both believed that some space for dissent would help 
them to more effectively consolidate power by gaining the trust of critics and 
projecting a face of tolerance. In terms of extremal pressures, when these leaders 
came to power, the USSR was no longer offering a viable alternative for ideological 
or strategic alliances and the new governments were eager to demonstrate to the 
international community that they were part of the free world. Since tolerating press 
freedoms was simpler and more immediate than fundamentally transforming their 
countries into democracies, allowing newspapers seemed a reasonable choice for
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both. Their political ideologies did, however, differ significantly which has helped to 
account for the contrasting role the press has played in nationbuilding.
This concluding chapter will begin by discussing the ways in which the press 
has reflected the political processes of transition from the guerrilla struggle to creation 
of a national government. Secondly, it will argue that the major role for the press in 
Ethiopia and Uganda has been to serve as a forum for elite negotiation of political 
power, reconciliation, building historical consensus and envisioning the future of the 
country. And thirdly, the broader implications and future lessons this research 
suggests not only for further research but also for policymakers and practitioners 
working in this field will be explored.
1. From guerrilla struggle to government
Neither Ethiopia nor Uganda has succeeded, to use Mamdani’s term, in 
creating a nation of ‘citizens’648 and the way in which they have attempted to 
consolidate their power and rule diverse populations is significantly different and has 
impacted the development of the press. Both Meles and Museveni claimed to bring 
‘fundamental change’ and both did to some degree. Interestingly enough, each of the 
presidents’ closest aides claimed that the other country did not change as 
fundamentally. As Eriya Kategaya, Uganda’s Minister for East Africa, argued:
Ethiopia hasn’t gotten out of its monarchy/hierarchy. It is still a regimented, 
authoritarian state. Zenawi has taken it over but not broken it. Here we 
wanted to deliberately break it. Now people are asking if the state is weak 
because we can’t order people about.649
While Bereket Simon, Head of the Political Department for the EPRDF, argued:
In Uganda, Museveni has not fundamentally restructured the state. Here 
we’ve restructured it radically. Sections of the elite are aggrieved and people 
are not ready to come to terms with the new reality.650
In fact, both Bereket and Kategaya are correct in many respects. But Ethiopia and 
Uganda have struggled, and continue to struggle, with significant armed insurgency
648 MAMDANI, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
649 Interview: Eriya Kategaya.
650 Interview: Bereket Simon.
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movements within their borders. These countries are certainly engaged in unique 
nation-building processes but are not necessarily on a direct path of transitioning to 
Westem-style democracy.
The Ugandan state is more stable than Ethiopia, which can be attributed to a 
number of factors including, importantly, the NRM’s consolidation of power. In 
Uganda, Museveni is increasingly appearing as a ‘traditional’ dictator reluctant to 
give up power. There is talk of a fourth term, and with the predominance of the NRM, 
there has been a conspicuous lack of effort to groom a successor. This however, has 
not always appeared to be the case. Many of Museveni’s critics, including some at 
the Monitor, were once his strongest supporters believing that the Movement was the 
best chance for bringing peace and democratic change to Uganda.
During a crucial window of opportunity when they came to power, the NRM 
established an unprecedented level of trust and reconciliation. Through including 
defeated political and military parties in a genuinely broad-based government the 
NRM was able to reduce the influence of its harshest critics and lessen the likelihood 
of them taking up an armed struggle. The NRM has continued to be shrewd about co­
opting or buying off critics. Similarly, a mix of innovative participatory governance 
structures, such as the Resistance Councils, and political persuasion worked to build 
trust in the new government and a broader sense of peace despite continuing violence 
in the North.
Ethiopia, in contrast, appears precarious. Fundamental and divisive issues of 
political ideology among elites, many of which go back to the student movement, 
have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Similarly, competing visions and demands for 
the Ethiopian state, including Amhara-elite yearning for a return to the imperial era, 
Oromo-elite demands for independence and Tigrayan-elite desire to remain the 
dominant power, are becoming increasingly contentious. While at this stage there 
seems to be no viable alternative to the federalist system, the ways in which 
devolution has been implemented have done little to encourage reconciliation or 
genuine participation. In addition, widespread dissatisfaction towards the secession of 
Eritrea and the continued overtly TPLF-dominated EPRDF make it unlikely that this 
party will be able to transform itself into what could be recognised as a broad-based 
coalition and thus move the Ethiopian state out of the present quagmire.
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When the EPRDF first came to power, they squandered an important period of 
good will. Liberation fronts such as the Oromo Liberation Front initially participated 
in the EPRDF until they came to believe they were not being treated as a legitimate 
full partner, so they, along with others such as the presently more powerful Ogaden 
Liberation Front have continued their struggle violently. Similarly, as the new 
government failed to adequately respond or participate to additional reconciliation 
conferences many elites and intellectuals felt powerless and marginalised. The lack of 
dialogue and inclusiveness of former Derg civil servants and affiliates failed to 
reconcile visions of Ethiopia and promote a single nation-building project.
The EPRDF is not willing to relinquish power and there is little international 
pressure for them to do so. While these deep fractures are not easily resolvable, the 
current trend of internal and regional violence suggests that the present political 
situation is untenable in the long-run and, unless modified, can result in either 
widespread violent conflict or an overthrow of the ERPDF. In contrast with the 
NRM’s critics that are arguing for a change in the presidency, the EPRDF’s critics are 
arguing for a change in the constitution.
The media in Ethiopia and Uganda have come to reflect the different degrees 
of reconciliation that have occurred. Where the elites have been deeply polarised, as 
is the case in Ethiopia, the press reflects broad ideological gaps. In both countries, the 
majority of the responsibility for encouraging reconciliation and restoring trust 
between the government, people and the press has been with the government.
2. The role of the press in creating space for elite negotiation, reconciliation, building 
historical consensus and envisioning the future of the country
As has been explored inthis thesis, the press can play an important role in 
building peace and facilitating dialogue in the aftermath of civil wars in certain 
circumstances. It primarily does so through providing a space for different elite 
factions to negotiate power, reconcile divergent versions of history and discuss
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possible future visions for the country.651 Why it has been more successful in playing 
this role in Uganda but not in Ethiopia is a central question that has been addressed.
In both Ethiopia and Uganda we saw how the liberalisation of the press soon 
after the guerrilla movements came to power allowed groups (some of which were 
running parallel guerrilla or liberation wars to the NRM and TPLF) that opposed the 
new governments to argue their political agendas, vie for power within the new 
government and seek allies. Initially, this reduced the incentives for these groups to 
either return to the bush to continue their wars or initiate a new guerrilla struggle. Of 
course not all groups chose to engage the new governments in this forum: the LRA, 
for example, almost immediately began an armed struggle against the NRA. But the 
NRM succeeded in incorporating many other opposition forces into its government 
and tolerated their criticism within the press.
Building consensus about the nature of the revolution continues to be an 
important role for the press in both countries, particularly as newspapers are the 
medium of record. In Uganda, support for the NRM was widespread and the EPRDF 
also had solid constituencies across much of Ethiopia. But the ways in which the 
newspapers in Ethiopia compared with Uganda approached the recent past was
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In Uganda, both the Monitor and especially The New Vision worked to build 
consensus about the NRM and the civil war. Their perspectives did not diverge 
significantly but as pointed out by William Pike in Chapter 8, and reiterated in many 
interviews was, “...in ’86 even key facts weren’t accepted, so I think the media as a 
whole, not just The New Vision has really helped to build that kind of consensus”.652 
This has also been important in providing a basis upon which to envision the future of 
the country. Again while both the Monitor and The New Vision, until Museveni’s 
third term project, shared a similar vision for Uganda, newspapers provided a forum 
for defining, elaborating and debating this vision. Engagement with both the 
government and critics was important and provided useful feedback for the 
government to not only test out the popularity of ideas but to gain a litmus test as to 
the mood and intentions of competing political elements.
In Ethiopia, divergent perspectives on Ethiopian history and unity are 
immediately clear when reading, for example, The Ethiopian Herald or the Reporter 
compared with Tobiya. These were important outlets for presenting these 
perspectives but the lack of dialogue or attempt to reach consensus has been the major 
failure of the press to serve as a forum for peacebuilding.
Much of this role for the press is dependent on the level of trust between the 
government, including the judiciary, and the press. It can be seen from several 
perspectives and as this thesis argues, it has developed differently in Ethiopia 
compared with Uganda. In any nation-building project there are bound to be 
disagreements on the extent of freedoms that should be tolerated. Each actor 
primarily advocates what is in his self-interest, which for the press is to have as much 
freedom as possible while for the government it is to limit criticism and threats to its 
power. The press, in both countries, has enjoyed sustained periods of relative 
freedom. But this space and the role of the press has also been very different. In 
Uganda, journalists have been less polarized and more engaged on holding politicians 
to account on the daily running of government. Ethiopian journalists were more 
divided- those of the government press enjoyed little freedom to criticize or 
participate in public debates (other than as a propaganda organ) while jounrlaists of 
the private press were more concerned with debates over political ideology. This was
652 Interview: William Pike.
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partly a response to access of information, or the amount of information governments 
were willing to provide but it also reflected very different priorities. Ethiopian 
journalists reflected those that held an alternative vision of the Ethiopian state and the 
press was the most significant forum for this.
What is also different in the case of Uganda compared with Ethiopia is the 
confidence that the Ugandan actors had to engage in this struggle. In Uganda, Charles 
Onyango-Obbo and other informants spoke of ‘expanding the circle’ and of 
challenging the government to reform media legislation and provide more space to 
journalists. Museveni knew most of his critics in the press were challenging his 
policies, not the fundamentals of his Movement system project. And Ugandan 
journalists believed that the judiciary was sufficiently independent to hear their case 
and give them a fair trial. Unusually, some journalists even went so far as to embrace 
government legal action as a chance to change broader policies and set norms for the 
judiciary. But both sides saw the process as necessary and instrumental during a 
critical period of nation-building.
The New Vision also had an important role in setting the tone for govemment- 
press and press- press interaction. The paper helped to bring the debate to the centre, 
create consensus, promote the institutionalisation of media companies, and explain 
government policies and positions in a way more balanced than pure propaganda. In 
the process, it set a tone for dialogue that won the confidence of the majority of 
newspaper readers. Museveni also had an influential role in directly answering 
criticisms leveled at him within the press and providing access and regular 
information to all journalists- including some of his strongest critics at the Monitor, 
which thus contributed to reducing tensions and polarisation within the press.
In contrast, there is little trust between the government and the press in 
Ethiopia. The press in Ethiopia has been polarised since its earliest days; this situation 
was exacerbated by the 2005 elections and has contributed to the current protracted 
crisis, as there has been no space for dialogue and the mediation of competing 
ideologies. This is not for lack of a free press but rather because of failed 
engagement. With an aversion to criticism, a sense of entitlement and no effective 
means of communicating their positions, through a paper such as The New Vision or 
regular media briefings, much of the blame lies with the government.
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By failing to engage with the arguments and the private press, the government 
has done little to create a political mainstream. As the EPRDF did not consider it 
necessary to explain their actions or policies domestically, Meles would seldom speak 
with or even acknowledge private journalists. Not only were they unable to write 
balanced reports but the exclusion also contributed to a deep level of frustration. The 
government press and propaganda has similarly increased tensions and polarisation 
and failed to encourage trust or reconciliation. Particularly after the 2005 elections, 
the government newspapers, reflective of the broader government media, took a 
staunchly pro-government position and set a tone of aggression that the private press 
responded to even more vigorously.
In addition, the process of testing the limits with the intention of ‘expanding 
the circle’ is not present in Ethiopia. Journalists have little confidence in the justice 
system and in a number of cases preferred to go into exile rather than continuing to 
face trials in their country. Journalists have typically expected unfettered freedom of 
expression seeing it in ‘legal-absolutist’ terms while the government has tended to 
portray such freedoms as a privilege or gift rather than part of the political process.
For both cases, however, a major issue that is often overlooked as driving 
press-govemment relations is personal relationships. Particularly in situations where 
the press is less institutionalised (as was the case when Museveni and Meles came to 
power) joumalist-govemment relations are frequently characterised by past 
connections and events during the struggle in the bush or the student movements 
loom large. Even for journalists that provide the most liberal perspectives on why 
they are journalists - such as Andrew Mwenda or Amare Aregawi - this thesis has 
illustrated such argements are often are often more complex and nuanced.
3. Lessons and implications of this research
3.1 Re-examining the role of the press in countries in the ‘bottom billion ’
In the review of the literature on the role of the media in conflict/post-conflict 
situations and transitions in Chapter 2, it was argued that the mainstream arguments 
connecting press freedom to processes of democratisation focus too much on the 
media’s role in holding governments accountable. Were this the case, there would be
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fewer examples of extremely corrupt governments that tolerate some of the freest 
media in Africa. And why, despite Amartya Sen’s claims, do famines still exist in 
countries with a free press?
The previous section argued that the role for the press in Ethiopia and Uganda, 
and possibly other countries in similar economic situations, is as a forum for elite 
negotiation. This should not be surprising for media scholars. While recognising the 
risk of appearing to theorize about a ‘historical development pattern’ for the press, 
which is not the intention here, Hallin and Mancini noted in Comparing Media 
Systems that:
From the beginning of the print era, particularly from the time of the 
Reformation, political advocacy was also a central function of the print 
media, and by the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century, when the 
newspaper began to emerge as a force in political life, this became its
principle function.... The political journalist was a publicist who saw it as
his or her role to influence public opinion in the name of a political faction or 
cause, and in many cases newspapers were established on the initiative of 
political parties or other political actors, or supported by them.653
They go on to argue the current model emerged in the late nineteenth century where
the journalist was seen as a neutral arbiter or political communication, 
standing apart from particular interests and causes, providing information and 
analysis “uncoloured” by partisanship. This was often connected with the 
development of a commercial press, whose purpose was to make money 
rather than to serve a political cause, and that was financed by advertising 
rather than by subsidies from political actors. It was also often connected 
with the development of journalistic professionalism...654
The purpose of bringing up the issue of the historical development of the press is to 
stress a point that is often made by political economists but seldom found in the
media and development literature which typically implies that developing countries
do not have to pass through the same stages that Western countries have gone through 
when building their nations.655 But too often expectations about what the media ought 
to be doing are divorced from political realities.
653 HALLIN, D. & MANCINI, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models o f Media and 
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 26.
654 Ibid. p. 26.
655 The economist Ha-Joon Chang elaborates this in much of his work when he argues that the 
pressures on developing countries by developed countries to adopt ‘good policies’ and ‘good 
institutions’, which include features such as a ‘watchdog press’, are often based on the assumptions 
that such policies were part of the development trajectory of the countries recommending them. See
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The press can play an important role in nation-building and peace-building 
whether it manifests itself in the model that developed in late nineteenth century 
Europe or is more similar to that of the Reformation. Future research, policy and 
NGO activities should be based more on the reality of what the media are actually 
doing rather than on what outsiders mythologise them as doing.
3.2 Further research
A free press, or private press, requires trust in journalists on the part of 
readers, which is not easy to come by in countries emerging or involved in violent 
conflict. More research is needed on how the public in Ethiopia and Uganda (as well 
as much of Africa) receives messages and how opinions are shaped. In Ethiopia it is 
rare to find newspaper sellers on the streets of Addis with Addis Zemen or The 
Ethiopian Herald as they only sell private papers, while across Uganda almost every 
newspaper seller has both the Monitor and The New Vision prominently displayed.
Uganda has been more successful in rebuilding public trust than Ethiopia. 
Many newspaper readers have a preference for a particular publication, but there is 
sufficient regard for the institution itself that most papers are seen as acceptable to 
readers no matter their political allegiance. This differs from Ethiopia where there 
was almost no shared readership between government and the private publications 
such as Ethiop or Tobiya. Readers in Uganda and Ethiopia, however, often differ on 
what they expect the newspaper to provide for them. For Ugandans, it is typically a 
more balanced debate and they value objectivity more. Ethiopians tend to prefer 
publications that already confirm their political beliefs. The government press also 
has a role in setting an example as to what the role of the papers should be and 
shaping the expectations of readers. The New Vision, for example, has been more 
effective in creating a tolerant readership than Addis Zemen.
As argued here, the press can play an important role in mediating difficult 
political processes in conflict situations but it takes the cooperation of all parties, 
particularly journalists and the government, to restore the public’s trust in the media 
as an institution. Government engagement with the press helps to legitimise the media
CHANG, H.-J. (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder, London, Anthem Press. CHANG, H.-J. (2007) Bad 
Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History o f Capitalism, London, Bloomsbury Press.
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and make the voices it represents feel included in the debate. It is when the press is 
entirely ignored by the government that the greatest damage can occur. Journalists 
who are left to struggle with unsubstantiated stories do little to restore readers’ belief 
in the role of the press in the nation-building process.
This thesis finds that the press provides an important forum for intra-elite 
negotiation. By the nature of the medium, direct reception is largely confined to the 
literate. Undoubtedly, language has also been a factor in why the elite press operates 
in a some-what different space in Uganda compared with Ethiopia. In both countries, 
publications in local languages are popular but Ugandan journalists and readership 
have greater access to English language media outlets, thus increasing competition 
between local and international media organizations. And in Uganda the debates can 
have a significant impact across the country as radio stations pick up stories and 
translate them into local languages. In Ethiopia, the local private press remains 
limited to Amharic and English speakers in Addis Ababa- a select group with limited 
constituencies but a strong voice in the nation-building process.
While this thesis has largely been interested in the transitional period from war 
to peace, the media environments in both countries, but particularly Uganda, have 
been changing significantly since this research began. Newspapers are becoming 
popular on the web connecting diasporas in new ways and perhaps for the first time 
international news organizations, such as Reuters, pick up stories in the local media. 
Despite these changes, the influence of the press remains for the reasons extensively 
outlined and argued throughout this thesis and the print medium is likely to continue 
to be a dominant source of news media for the foreseeable future.
In understanding the shaping of opinions in Africa, it is also important to 
extend research beyond the mediums of the press or radio. These other outlets, which 
often pick up or use the traditional media, have their own voices and momentum. 
Public debates within the Resistance Councils in Uganda, or the role of the Orthodox 
Church or local mosques in Ethiopia all have an influence in shaping opinions. In 
neighbouring Somaliland, for example, research I have conducted there suggests that 
it was the role of poetry that galvanised support and spread messages about the
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struggle of the Somali National Movement’s liberation war.656 This area is under­
researched but has many connections with the elite press. A promising area for future 
research on the media in Ethiopia and Uganda is on these more informal mediums of 
communication and their connections with elite power and audience reception.
3.3 The role of the state
As was argued in the case studies of Ethiopia and Uganda, government voice, 
such as through The New Vision, and interaction with the private press is a major 
defining factor of the role and development of the press. Recognising the state as an 
important agent of change, rather than something to always be restrained, is part of 
this. Mushtaq Khan argues the need to create a political consensus or a national 
agenda/constituency on development. While international development organisations 
and many Western governments stress decentralisation or anti-corruption measures, 
he argues that there is a more pressing need for a strong state. Because many of the 
currently prescribed good governance reforms cannot be implemented in most 
developing countries, it is important to create an agenda for development. While 
China may be as corrupt as Uganda, the strength of the Chinese Communist Party 
allows for a consensus on development and thus the rents are being used more 
productively.658 Consequently, a question for the media in Ethiopia and Uganda 
should not be how to weaken control of the state but rather how to contribute to the 
national project - in essence central questions that were asked by the African 
nationalists of the 1960s and that were effective in nation-building in Tanzania.
International human rights groups, in particular, often fail to acknowledge the 
potentially positive role of the state. An approach of legal absolutism tends to prevail 
and liberalisation is the consensus. While important, some of the work these groups 
do unfortunately shows little understanding of the real issues at play within particular 
contexts. Reports with factual errors and with parts cut and pasted from previous
656 Some of these war veterans have now become journalists and this has been corroborated in 
extensive oral histories with journalist and veteran, Yusuf Gabobe and the poet Garriyya.
657 See for example KHAN, M. (2002) State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of 
Institutional Reform. IN BANK, W. (Ed.) ABCDE Conference. Oslo. FUKUYAMA, F. (2004) State 
Building, London, Profile.
658 Mushtaq Khan lecture, The Stanhope Centre for Communication Policy Research, London, UK 
February 2004.
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reports are common, illustrating a ‘template’ rationale where an argument is the same 
and universally applicable.
Despite claims to the contrary, international human rights and media advocacy 
organisations are also political. Arguments for freedom of expression are always seen 
through a prism where the state is the oppressor and the journalist is the champion of 
freedom. Their advocacy and interest is appreciated and valued for the international 
attention and support, which is often very helpful.
Yet these organisations can complicate situations when they endorse a 
particular individual beyond campaigning for his or her release from prison. The case 
of Kifle Mulat, head of the Ethiopian Free Press Journalist Association (EFPJA) is 
one example. In 2004 Kifle was awarded the Amnesty International ‘Special Award 
for Human Rights Journalism under Threat’. Local journalists have complained that 
the EFPJA failed to have regular elections for the chairmanship, was not properly 
audited and generally did not function in a transparent way. Such criticisms at least 
raise the possiblity that Kifle Mulat's international support was more a function of his 
outspoken opposition to the Meles regime than for his commitment to good 
governance and transparency.
This legal absolutism or strong anti-government perspective on the part of 
international NGOs is having an impact within the media in developing countries and 
is possibly leading to greater polarisation. Democracy has begun to mean being 
opposed to the government and thus the independent press is expected to give that 
perspective. In this context, if a middle-ground newspaper has one article that 
mentions something positive about the government, its circulation can be negatively 
affected the next week. The journalists that present the strongest opposition pieces in 
the media are often held up by these international organisations as the bearers of 
democracy and many local journalists have become adept at manipulating the 
organisations and gaining undeserving support
In the discussion of ‘professionalisation of journalists’ and the ways in which 
journalists in Ethiopia and Uganda think about the work that they do, what motivates 
them was a central issue. The discourse of human rights advocacy groups has been 
adopted and reinterpreted by many journalists, yet in practice some often have 
different motivations and values. What is needed is more nuanced understanding of
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the complex roles journalists have in the nation-building process rather than what is 
normatively defined for them.
3.4 Analytic tool
Tawana Kupe argues in An agenda for researching African media and
communication contexts that “a dialogue with our colleagues in the social sciences
who theorize and research development paradigms would enrich us”.659 In an effort
to move beyond assumptions of journalists as ‘good’ ‘watchdogs’ challenging a ‘bad’
autocratic persecutory government, a strong analysis of the publications and those that
work for them can provide a more nuanced insight into the complex nation-building
process. This requires a comprehensive political and historical analysis and is
probably one of the greatest weaknesses within much of the existing literature and
discourse. Prime Minister Meles, for example, has been exceptionally talented in
manipulating the impressions of the international community and portraying himself
as a peaceful democrat. But, as Gerard Prunier suggests, much could be understood
about his approach to internal dissent from a look at his past.
In 1978 Meles had the others killed, he doesn’t kill himself. Most of the 
others that created the TPLF have been killed. He is very good with political 
infighting but most foreigners are totally ignorant of his past.... In the past 
twenty years there has been a total collapse of the degree of information 
about Africa.... People can’t analyse politics.660
Understanding the politics, as has been argued in this thesis, is central to 
understanding the media environment.
The analysis in this thesis has focused on the process of transition from the 
civil wars. While researchers have asserted that the present media systems often 
reflect their past regimes, I have argued that it is the process of reconciliation, 
consolidation of power and nation-building that is central; thus prioritising the 
political ideology and approach towards the media of Meles and Museveni whilst in 
the bush more than the media environment of Idi Amin, Obote or Mengistu.
659 KUPE, T. (2004) An agenda for researching African media and communication contexts. Ecquid 
Novi, 25,353-356. P. 354-5.
660 For more on discipline within the TPLF, executions of errant members and competition among the 
leadership, see YOUNG, J. (1997) Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 140-41.
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Similarly, while the colonial legacy is important, greater effort should be put into 
understanding more recent events, particularly those that have been less in the public 
eye during the guerrilla movements.
At a minimum, the framework of analysis presented suggests questions that 
should be asked when researching the press in other poor countries or those post- or 
engaged in violent conflict. Rather than focusing on the immediate closures of radio 
stations and newspapers, or the legal framework, asking questions such as: how does 
the President (or Prime Minister) interact with journalists? What did the journalists 
believe and what were they doing before this government came to power? Who are 
the key players, why and what are their real objectives or intentions? What sorts of 
personal relationships do those in the government and press have and how far back 
do they go? can provide greater insight. These questions are often more difficult to 
answer and take more intensive research than taking events at face value and looking 
at them through a normative lens. However, probing these underlying issues can reap 
rich rewards into the bigger picture of what is happening in complex environments.
These questions and the process of comparison also have broader lessons. 
Early modernisation theory in the 1950s proffered the notion that Western policy 
makers with the right plan and plenty of cash could rid developing countries of their 
problems. The planning has evolved but the underlying presumption too often still 
dominates. It is not unusual to encounter Western instigated and funded media 
projects reminiscent of those launched fifty years ago. In the Institute for Ethiopian 
Studies in Addis Ababa, for example, one can go through the archives and find 
decades of policy papers relating to how the radio will bring literacy or other 
development projects. Mengistu had a number of big pushes to use the radio as a 
panacea for everything from literacy to health. While NGOs no longer plan 
information campaigns on the scale that the Derg regime undertook, similar work 
continues by multiple organisations at present.
The occasional ‘big pushes’, which are so characteristic of international aid, 
regularly fail despite trillions of dollars partly because the wrong questions are being 
asked. William Easterly, for example, suggests that there are two approaches, the 
planners and the searchers. The planner “already knows the answers; he thinks of 
poverty as a technical engineering problem that his answers will solve”. Many media
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developers follow this line: if a free media does not exist, one can be developed and 
this will lead to a democratic ‘modem’ country. A searcher, Easterly argues, in 
contrast
hopes to find answers to individual problems only by trail and error 
experimentation. A planner believes outsiders know enough to impose 
solutions. A searcher believes only insiders have enough knowledge to find 
solutions, and that most solutions must be homegrown.661
It is my hope that the analysis offered here will provide searchers with more tools to 
understand the complexities of media environments and use these tools to shed light 
not only on the media itself but also on the political processes.
This analytic framework is most likely applicable for dictatorships and other 
non-democratic transitions especially where insurgencies have come to power. While 
Uganda’s and Ethiopia’s neighbours - Rwanda, Eritrea and Somaliland - would be the 
most natural extension because of their shared history of guerrilla warfare, other 
countries further a-field might also find insights with adapted analysis. It is clear for 
all countries, however, that the press can play a strong and constructive role in 
reducing violent conflict by not only serving as a forum for reconciliation and the 
peaceful negotiation of power, but it can also be an important indicator for 
understanding the political developments of a country.
Any analyst interested in warning signs for tensions that could possibly erupt 
in violence should take the debates and the extent of engagement between the 
government and the press seriously. However, it should also be remembered that 
while important, the press is a reflection of only part of the political process in 
countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda. By largely serving elites, there are substantial 
portions of the population that are not sufficiently represented or excluded, such as 
the Ugandans in the North and the Ethiopians in the Ogaden. By recognising the 
limitations, it is also easier to find the potential strengths of the press in peace and 
nation-building.
661 EASTERLY, W. (2006) The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done So Much III and So Little Good London, Penguin Press, pp. 5-6.
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INTERVIEWS
Note the location of the interview is in parentheses
ETHIOPIA:
Abebe, Berhanu
Former Press Attache for Emperor Haile Selassie (Addis Ababa)
Aboulfaki, Joseph
Editor-in-Chief, Sub-Saharan Informer (Addis Ababa)
Adow, Mohammed
BBC correspondent based in Addis Ababa (Nairobi)
Addis, Kassahun
Reporter, Sub-Saharan Informer (Addis Ababa)
Aleyou, Wondimkun
Editor-in-Chief, Addis Zemen (Addis Ababa)
Aregawi, Amare
General Manager, Media and Communications Centre (MCC) 
and Editor of The Reporter (Addis Ababa)
Ashine, Argaw
Radio journalist, Panos Ethiopia (Addis Ababa)
Assefa, Befekadu
Editor-in-Chief, The Ethiopian Review of Books (Addis Ababa)
Assefa, Emrakeb
Editor-in-Chief, OASIS magazine and School of Journalism, AAU (Addis Ababa) 
Asress, Fantahun
Press and audiovisual department, Ministry of Information (Addis Ababa)
Ayale Anebesse, Genet
Journalist from Moresch and Goh (Nairobi, Kenya)
Ayale, Teredi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Addis Ababa)
Azeze, Kefyalew
General Manager, Ethiopian Press Agency (Addis Ababa)
Bazezew, Abebe
Journalist from Kieyte, Chocolate and Kibrit (Nairobi, Kenya)
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Bezabih, Mairegu
Lecturer, Department of Journalism, Unity College 
Senior Advisor and journalist, Addis Alem
Former journalist and founder of Tobiya and Lisane Hezeb (Addis Ababa)
Bekele, Tessema
Founder and Executive Director Emmanuel Development Association (Addis Ababa) 
Berhane, Guebray
Senior Communication and Public Information Officer,
International Labour Organisation (Addis Ababa)
Berhane, Namrud
Senior Editor, The Reporter (Addis Ababa)
Beshah, Girma
Editor-in-Chief, Press Digest published by Pheonix Universal 
Former interpreter for Mengistu Haile Mariam (Addis Ababa)
Chesterton, Ben
Project Director, BBC Trust (Addis Ababa)
Dagne, Kumlachew
Inter Africa Group (Addis Ababa)
Fitsum, Blen
English News Desk, Ethiopian Television (Addis Ababa)
Ford, Abiy
Head of the Graduate School of Journalism, Addis Ababa University (Addis Ababa) 
Gebre-Hiwot, Muluwork
General Manager, Berhanena Selam Printing Enterprise (Addis Ababa) 
Gebre-Mariam, Negash
Former Editor-in-Chief of Addis Zemen and The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa) 
Gebre-Yohannes, Kassa
Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Addis Ababa)
Geda, Tamiru,
Former journalist at Capital (Addis Ababa)
Gilkes, Patrick
Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Addis Ababa)
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Giorgis, Tamrat
Managing Editor, Independent News and Media Pic.: Publisher of Fortune 
(Addis Ababa)
Gudina, Merara
Lecturer Department of Political Science, Addis Ababa University and 
UEDF party leader (Addis Ababa)
Hailemariam, Mahalet
Coordinator of the community radio project, Oxfam Canada (Addis Ababa)
Hassen, Ahmed
Member of Parliament, Media and Culture Committee (Addis Ababa)
Heruy, Tegest
Dean, School of Journalism and Communication, Unity University College 
(Addis Ababa)
Hess, Harmut,
Resident Representative, Friedrich-Eibert-Stiftung (Addis Ababa)
Kamal, Shimelis
Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice (Addis Ababa)
Kasgew, Hadish
Head of regional desk, ENA (Addis Ababa)
Kidane, Yemane
Director, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (Addis Ababa)
Kidau, Abera
Editor-in-Chief, Daily Monitor (Addis Ababa)
Lemma, Kassahun
Former editor of Zagabi and Guzuinish and journalist for Demeste (Nairobi, Kenya)
Makonnen, Abiy Tekle
Editor-in-Chief, Meznania (Addis Ababa)
Makonen, Nebiy
Editor-in-Chief, Addis Admas (Addis Ababa)
Malone, Tina
Public Diplomacy Information Office, US Embassy (Addis Ababa)
Mamo, Girmay
ERCHO (Addis Ababa)
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Mamo, Selamawit
Aids Resource Centre (Addis Ababa)
Mburu, Chris
UNMEE (Addis Ababa)
McGeary, Kate
Political-Economic Officer, US Embassy (Addis Ababa)
Merhatsion, Girmachew
Reporter, The Reporter (Addis Ababa)
Mitchell, Anthony
AP correspondent (Addis Ababa and Nairobi)
Mohommed, Zekeriya
ENA (Addis Ababa)
Mulat, Kifle
President, Ethiopian Free Press Journalist Association (Addis Ababa)
Pankhurst, Richard
Founder of the Institute for Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa)
Prunier, Gerard
Director, French Centre for Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa)
Reja, Yusuf
Owner of now defunct Time Out (Addis Ababa)
Sebhatu, Mimi
Executive Director, Zami Multi Media (Addis Ababa)
Simon, Bereket
Head of the Political Department, EPRDF, and former Minister of Information (Addis 
Ababa)
Tadesse, Hailu
General Manager, Bole Printing Enterprise (Addis Ababa)
Tadesse, Tsegaye
Reuter’s correspondent (Addis Ababa)
Taye, Zenamarkos
Cartoonist, Daily Monitor (Addis Ababa)
311
Teffera, Neguse
Director, Population Media Centre (Addis Ababa)
Temesgen, Derbew
Lawyer and General Manger, Addis Alem Press: Publisher of Lisane Hizb 
(Addis Ababa)
Tesemma, Dejene
Editor-in-Chief, The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa)
Tesfaw, Desta
Director General, Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (Addis Ababa)
Teshome, Tilahun
Member, Board of Directors, Bank of Abyssinia and
Lecturer, Department of Law, Addis Ababa University (Addis Ababa)
Teshome, Zerihun
Editor-in-Chief, Iftin (Addis Ababa)
Woldesenbet, Gebrewold
Ethics officer, ENA (Addis Ababa)
Wolde, Abebech
Director, Ethiopian Media Women’s Association (Addis Ababa) 
Woldemariam, Tekle
Journalist from Wanchief, Salim, Goh and Morsch (Nairobi, Kenya)
Wolfson, Teffere
Editor, Seven Days Update (Addis Ababa)
Yassin, Zekeriya
Editor of the Foreign Languages Desk, Ethiopian News Agency (Addis Ababa) 
Yemessel, Woldu
General Manager, Radio Fana (Addis Ababa)
Yilma, Teguest
Managing Director, Capital (Addis Ababa)
Yosef, Helen
Journalist, Ethiopian Television (Addis Ababa)
Zinaye, Tadessa
Director, Ethiopian Mass Media Institute (Addis Ababa)
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UGANDA:
Balikowa, David Ouma
Managing Director, Time Line Communication (Kampala)
Banoba, Paul
Health Programmes, Panos East Africa (Kampala)
Biryetega, Salim R.
Editor-in-Chief, The Weekly Message and
General Secretary, Media for Peace and Religious Tolerance Organization (Kampala)
Bitek, James Oketch
Gulu Bureau Chief, Daily Monitor (Gulu)
Buturo, Nsaba
Minister of State, Ethics and Integrity and Former Minister of Information, Office of 
the President (Kampala)
Buwembo, Joachim
Managing Editor, Daily Monitor (Kampala)
Galooba-Mutebi, Frederick
Columnist, The Monitor and researcher for LSE Crisis States Centre (Kigali, Rwanda) 
Gamurorwa, Anne
Executive Director, Communication for Development Foundation (Kampala)
Ilakut, Ben Bella
Trainer and journalist, The New Vision
Former Editor-in-Chief of Uganda Argus (Kampala)
Jawino, Orisa Raphael
Sales Executive, Mega FM (Gulu)
Kabushenga, Robert
Director, Uganda Media Centre, Office of the President (Kampala)
Kaliisa, Karim
Business Director, The Weekly Message (Kampala)
Kivumbi, Kagole
Director of Information, Office of the President (Kampala)
Kwame, Latigo Micheal
Senior Sales Executive, Mega FM (Gulu)
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Matovu, Mohammud
Programme Assistant, Panos Eastern Africa (Kampala)
Mwebe, Michael Kawooya
General Manager, CBS FM (Kampala)
Mwenda, Andrew
Host Andrew Mwenda Live, KFM (Kampala)
Mukasa, Henry
Reporter, The New Vision (Kampala)
Mukasa, Paul S.
Secretary to Media Council, Media Council (Kampala)
Mukholi, David
Sunday Vision Editor, Sunday Vision: Part of the New Vision Company (Kampala) 
Mwesige, Peter G.
Head of Department, Department of Mass Communication, Makerere University 
(Kampala)
Nabaasa, Samuel Gummah
Country Director, Uganda Radio Network (Kampala)
Nakkazi, Esther
Special Correspondent, The East African (Kampala)
Oguttu, Wafula
Spokesperson, FDC and founder of the Monitor (Kampala)
Onyango-Obbo, Charles
Director of Media Convergence, The Nation Media Group and founder of the Monitor 
(Nairobi, Kenya)
Pike, William
Managing Director, The New Vision Company (Kampala)
Sseezi-Cheeye, Teddy
Director, Economic Affairs and Monitoring, Office of the President (Kampala)
Ssekawungu, Maurice
Associate Editor, The New Vision (Kampala)
Ssekeba, Drake
Former Editor-in-Chief, The Star and Ngabo (Kampala)
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Sseppuuya, David
Editor-in-Chief, The New Vision (Kampala)
Tumusiime, James
Managing Director, Fountain Publishers and first editor of The New Vision (Kampala) 
Tumusiime, James
Managing Editor, The Weekly Observer (Kampala)
Turyamwijuka, Jack
Commissioner, Uganda Communications Commission (Kampala)
Tusabe, Basil
Communication for Development Foundation Uganda (Kampala)
Tusiime, Richard
Editor-in-Chief, Red Pepper newspaper (Kampala)
Wabwire, Paul Gamusi
Deputy Clerk Legislative Services, Parliament of Uganda (Kampala)
Wassawa, Tom
Circulation Manger, The New Vision (Kampala)
Other interviews 
El Baaz, Adil
Editor of Al Sahafa (Khartoum, Sudan)
Gabobe, Yusuf
Editor of Haatuf (Hargeisa, Somaliland)
Mkapa, Benjamin
Former President of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) 
Ocheing, Philip
Journalist, The Nation (Nairobi, Kenya)
Taban, Alfred
Editor of Khartoum Monitor (Khartoum, Sudan)
Anonymous
There were several individuals interviewed in Ethiopia that spoke candidly about the 
media and government and thus wished not to be named in this thesis.
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